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ABSTRACT:
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the theory of 
organizational learning and the Learning Organization, focusing on the 
characteristics, outcomes and sources of the Learning Organization.
A critical review of existing literature has led to the identification of 
the ten characteristics of the Learning Organisation. Two main hypothesis 
were then developed and tested. The first hypothesis, referring to intra- 
organizational learning, is that the existence of the characteristics of the 
Learning Organization within a company enhance organizational learning. 
The second hypothesis, concerning inter-organizational learning, is that 
these characteristics are mainly acquired through relationships with 
Japanese car producing and/or component supplying companies.
This thesis examines direct car component suppliers in Britain, using a 
combination of three empirical methods: exploratory interviews, the 
analysis of seventy questionnaires and in-depth interviews.
The conclusions and contributions of this research are as follows:
Firstly, an improved working definition of organizational learning is 
developed. This new definition comprises the most important elements of 
former definitions, but considerably extends them.
Secondly, a new model of the comprehensive organizational learning 
cycle is elaborated, consisting of two phases. Furthermore, the cycle is 
analysed with regard to possible interruptions.
Thirdly, a coherent model of the Learning Organization with its 
characteristics is synthesised and refined from the piecemeal models of the 
existing literature, as well as operationalized for empirical research.
Fourthly, this thesis concludes that the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics have a positive impact on organizational learning outcomes, 
though predominantly in an indirect way via organizational learning 
systems (first null hypothesis rejected).
Fifthly, this thesis concludes that the relationship of component 
suppliers in Britain to Japanese companies in the car industry is 
advantageous when acquiring tacit knowledge about the characteristics of 
the Learning Organization (second null hypothesis rejected). Nevertheless, 
the commitment of top management plays a pivotal role in this process.
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1. In t r o d u c t io n
1. Introduction
As a prologue of this thesis, this chapter first presents the area and the 
goals of this research, then it introduces the two main hypotheses and the 
major findings. Finally, it outlines the structure of this thesis.
1.1. Area and Objectives of Research of this Thesis
The interest in the area of research of this thesis started with Argyris & 
Schon’s work about organizational learningi in 1978. Later, with the 
publication of Senge’s book (1990) “The Fifth Discipline - The Art & 
Practice of the Learning Organization”, this area attracted new attention. 
However, Huber (1991: 88 or 1991a: 124), for example, suggests that 
“there is a lack of both cumulative work and syntheses with which to create 
a more mature literature”. This still appears to be the case, and this thesis 
aims to rectify this situation.
Additionally, the literature about organizational learning and the 
L earning O rg a n iz a t io n ^  is dominated by prescriptive, normative 
management literature and anecdotal evidence of some case studies (cf., 
e.g., Stata 1989, Senge 1990, Leonard-Barton 1992, Garvin 1993 and 
Thurbin 1994, etc.). Despite some empirical work with a larger sample 
(Shrivastava 1983, Ulrich et al. 1993, Inkpen 1992 and Dierkes & Raske 
1994 and 1994a), there still appears to be a lack of adequate 
conceptualization, operationalization (i.e. transforming a theory so that it 
can be used to research reality) and comprehensive empirical testing of the 
model of the Learning Organization, particularly as regards its outcomes 
and origins. The reasons for this scarcity to date might be found in the 
relative novelty of the empirical interest in this subject of the ideal model 
of the Learning Organization, combined with the complexity of the
 ^ Organizational learning is achieved through individual learning of the members of the organization. 
However, organizational and individual learning are not identical.
2 The “Learning Organization” is spelled with a capital “L” and “O” in this thesis and the expression 
refers to the concept of an organization which excels in organizational learning and its outcomes (cf. 
Chapter 3). This does not deny the fact that every organization can leam by chance, which is the reason why 
some authors claim that all organizations are “learning organizations”.
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operationalization of the theory as well as the need for considerable 
resources in order to conduct extensive empirical research.
This thesis reports in particular on a theory-led empirical analysis. This 
involves the identification of the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization and the analysis of the outcomes of organizational learning in 
practice, which in turn leads to a refinement of the theory of organizational 
learning and the Learning Organization. The research was conducted on a 
broad sample of seventy component supplier companies in the automotive 
industry in Great Britain, the choice of which is explained below.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a lot has been written about the 
various reasons for the international economic success of the Japanese 
firm3, especially in the automobile industry, e.g., lean production 
(Womack et al. 1990), trust based customer-supplier relations (Sako 1992), 
innovation (Shimokawa 1994), etc. There are certain easily measurable 
formal methods and systems, such as, e.g., just-in-time (JIT) production or 
total quality management (TQM). This thesis suggests that there are 
essential supporting informal methods, which are hard to identify and 
measure, because they are mostly qualitative. Oliver & Wilkinson (1992: 
ISf, 32If), for example, claim that the main reason for a failure to 
introduce formal methods, like JIT or TQM, is the lack of supporting 
informal methods in the first place, such as certain work practices, 
personnel and industrial relation systems.
This thesis focuses on the theory of the Learning Organization and its 
characteristics, as a possible way of identifying these supporting informal 
methods. This includes a distinction between the process of their 
acquisition, as well as how conducive the characteristics are to the 
implementation of formal systems and to the organizational learning 
outcomes. The theory about organizational learning and the Learning 
Organization offers a coherent theoretical framework, which is refined 
here, in order to look at the car industry from a different angle than 
previous models. A further reason is that the literature on the Learning 
Organization and organizational learning states that some Japanese car
 ^There is no doubt about the fact that Japanese economy in a state o f recession in mid 1998. However, 
this is rather due to a deep rooted crisis in the finance sector as well as the political sector than to a decline 
of the Japanese manufacturing industry (cf. also Tominaga (WirtschaftsWoche) 25-6-1998).
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companies are Learning Organizations (Senge 1990, Adler & Cole 1993 
and Garvin 1993).
It is argued here that the perception of organizations as learning entities 
helps to understand and identify the amplifiers for, and the impediments 
against, organizational learning. Enhancing these amplifiers, and removing 
these impediments, is conducive to organizational learning outcomes and, 
thereby, to organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The framework of 
the Learning Organization appears to be a useful tool for analysing, and 
even improving, existing organizations.
As 50 to 70 per cent of the cost of producing a car can be related to its 
delivered parts (FT (1) 28-6-1993), this work focuses on car component 
suppliers. Due to the vast direct investment by Japanese car producers and 
some of their suppliers in Western Europe, especially in Britain, the 
situation of British car component supplier has changed dramatically over 
the recent years. On the one hand, there has been an opportunity to gain 
new customers and orders (FT (5) 28-6-1993 & FT (9) 28-6-1993). On the 
other hand, it appears to have been very demanding for British suppliers to 
fulfil quality standards required by the Japanese car producers and to 
survive against the new Japanese competition (FT 14-7-1992).
Because of this strong exposure to Japanese companies of direct car 
component suppliers in Britain, this thesis researches those companies who 
directly supply to car manufacturers without any intermediary. This thesis 
investigates the framework of the Learning Organization in the automotive 
components supplying industry in Britain with the help of exploratory 
interviews, questionnaires and in-depth interviews.
Andersen Consulting (1994: 5) suggest in their report that the “UK has 
benefited from foreign investment and the plants supplying Japanese 
customers appear to be learning from these customers.” However, they, as 
well as Krafcik (1986: 28) in North America, fail to research this learning 
process in more detail. This thesis fills this gap in current research.
To summarize, this thesis focuses on the theoretical development, 
operationalization and empirical testing of a model of the Learning 
Organization, in order to investigate what Learning Organizations look like 
in reality (characteristics), what benefits they have (outcomes), as well 
as where the Learning Organization’s characteristics have originated 
L (sources).
A
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This thesis concentrates mainly on the evaluation of, and contribution 
to, the body of literature on organizational learning and the Learning 
Organization. There are some overlapping areas such as lean production in 
particular, but also operations management, just-in-time (JIT) management, 
total quality management (TQM) or innovation theory, which will be 
covered shortly. Some of the limitations in their explanatory power can 
stUTBe offset in this thesis by the theory of organizational learning and the 
Learning Organization, which provides a kind of meta-theory. This is 
especially the case for the dynamics in the automotive industry, as the 
discussion at the end of Chapter 4 demonstrates.
1.2. Hypotheses and Contributions
This thesis is based on two main hypothesis (depicted in Figure 1.1), 
which have been developed through a critical review of existing literature.
Figure 1.1: The Two Hypotheses (HI and H2) of this Thesis
Sources of the 
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Jap an ese  car 
producers 
a s  custom ers
Japanese 
component 
suppliers as 
owners
Japanese 
component 
suppliers as 
co-operators
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Team  work and 
team learning 
Free vertical and 
horizontal flow of 
information 
Education and training of 
the whole workforce 
Systemic thinking and 
mental models 
Leaming reward system  
for em ployees 
Continuous improve­
ment of work 
Leaming laboratories and 
constant experimentation 
Decentralized hierarchies 
and participative 
managerrient 
Flexibility of company 
strategy and employees 
Supportive corporate 
leaming culture
Organizational
Learning
Systems
Team
Improvement
System
Employee
Suggestion
System
Organizational
Learning
Outcomes
Team
improvements
irriplemented
Employee
suggestions
implemented
Ratio of new vs. 
old products 
introduced
New products intro­
duced compared to 
competitors
Improvement of 
internal quality per 
units produced
Improvement of 
external quality per 
units produced
The first Hypothesis (HI) relates to intra-organizational learning, it 
suggests the positive impact of the Leaming Organization’s characteristics
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of car component suppliers in Britain on their organizational leaming 
outcomes.
The second Hypothesis (H2) is on inter-organizational leaming. It 
proposes that the above mentioned characteristics of the Leaming 
Organization are predom inantly acquired through some form of 
relationship with Japanese car producing or component supplying 
companies.
This thesis takes the philosophical standpoint of the phenomenological I 
paradigm (for detailed discussion see Chapter 6), i.e. the world is socially 
constructed and subjective, the observer is part of what is observed and that  ^
science is driven by human interests. This thesis uses Popper’s “critical 
rationalism” (1959) for empirical null-hypotheses testing, which is about 
rejecting hypotheses in order to investigate the viability of the theory 
developed, i.e. the interaction between the Learning Organization’s | 
characteristics, its outcomes and sources.
The major contributions of this thesis are set out below.
Firstly, an improved working definition of organizational leaming is 
developed. This new definition comprises the most important elements of 
former definitions, but considerably extends them.
Secondly, a new model of the comprehensive organizational leaming 
cycle is elaborated. Furthermore, the cycle is analysed with regard to 
possible intermptions, which block the process of organizational leaming.
It is also shown that the successfully completed cycle consists of two phases.
In the primary comprehensive organizational leaming cycle, started by top 
management, the organization is focused and structured to accomplish 
certain goals. In the secondary organizational leaming cycle, the rest of the 
organization strives for these goals set by top management.
Thirdly, a coherent model of the Learning Organization with its 
characteristics is synthesised and refined from the piecemeal models of the 
existing literature, as well as operationalized for empirical research.
Fourthly, the first main null-hypothesis can be rejected, however, only 
partially. It is shown that the Leaming Organization’s characteristics have a 
positive impact on organizational leaming outcomes, though predominantly 
in an indirect way via organizational leaming systems.
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Fifthly, the second main null-hypothesis can be rejected, as well. It is 
demonstrated that the relationship of component suppliers in Britain to 
Japanese companies in the car industry is advantageous when acquiring tacit 
knowledge about the characteristics of the Learning Organization. 
Nevertheless, the commitment of top management plays a pivotal role in 
this process, which has been confirmed by the in-depth interviews.
1.3. Proceeding Structure
The structure of the succeeding chapters of this thesis is set out below.
There is a focus on theoretical work in the second to fourth chapter of 
this thesis, which in detail look as follows.
The second chapter introduces and discusses different leaming theories 
and elaborates a definition o f organizational leaming for this thesis. This is 
followed by a distinction between internal and external organizational 
learning. Then, the three levels of organizational learning are presented 
and the factors that initiate, enforce and obstruct organizational learning 
are introduced. Next, a discussion of organizational memory follows. 
Finally, after an introduction to different organizational leaming cycles, a 
model o f the comprehensive organizational leaming cycle is constructed at 
the end of the chapter.
The third chapter develops an improved ideal model of the Learning 
Organization, combining ten major characteristics, which are identified in 
about thirty different pieces of literature. The chapter continues with the 
explanation of interdependencies among the ten characteristics of the 
Leaming Organization and discussing their ranking in order of importance
The fourth chapter illustrates the history o f Japan from  the learning 
perspective, as it is seen to be conducive to the development of Leaming 
Organizations in Japan. The focus is then put on the Japanese car industry, 
from its beginning in 1936, with special emphasis on the post-war period. 
Then, there is a discussion of flow of Japanese knowledge and know-how to 
Europe and North America. Finally, theories which overlap with the 
organizational learning theory are discussed, showing the advantages of the 
latter.
After the theoretical focus of Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis, there is a 
focus on empirical work in Chapters 5 to 9, which in detail look as follows.
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The fifth chapter gives an overview o f  the situation o f  direct 
component suppliers to the car industry in Britain, as the empirical 
research focuses on this area. The unique British situation, compared to the 
rest of Western Europe, is marked by attracting the lion’s share of Japanese 
automotive direct investments in Western Europe and, therefore, a strong 
presence of Japanese car assemblers and car component suppliers.
The sixth chapter discusses previous empirical studies on organizational 
leaming and the Leaming Organization, and explains the modelling o f the 
conceptual framework used fo r  the empirical work. It also explains the 
reasons for the selection of the research philosophy and empirical research 
methods. A combination of three different methods is elaborated in order 
to obtain a solid balance of research procedures, which are exploratory 
interviews, a questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews.
The seventh chapter presents the result o f  the exploratory interviews 
with six car component suppliers in Britain, in order to examine the 
general framework of this thesis. The exploratory interviews focus on the 
m easurement of characteristics of the Leam ing Organization, their 
outcomes and sources, in order to refine the approach of this research 
project, including the hypotheses.
The eighth chapter deals with the result o f  the questionnaire survey, 
which was mailed to direct car component suppliers in Great Britain (part 
one of the Appendix contains a copy of the questionnaire for the suppliers). 
With the help of seventy completed questionnaires of direct car component 
suppliers with production facilities in Great Britain, the two main 
hypotheses were examined by correlation and regression analysis, and 
various conclusions were discussed and drawn from these outcomes.
The ninth chapter explores four selected companies with the help of in- 
depth interviews, in order to support the findings and corroborate the 
interpretations from the questionnaire survey. Furthermore, additional 
insights are sought into the organizational double-loop leaming process of 
acquiring the characteristics of the Leaming Organization.
The tenth and last chapter draws a conclusion about the implications 
and contributions of this thesis, which can be gained from looking at the 
construction of a theoretical framework (as mainly presented in the 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and its examination by empirical research (as 
presented in the Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). The key findings and insights
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are presented and discussed here: on the literature side of as well as on the 
management side.
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2. O rganizational Learning
The Chapters 2, 3 and 4 focus on the theoretical part of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 discusses and defines organizational learning^ (i.e. the process); 
Chapter 3 deals with the Learning Organization^ (i.e. the subject) as an 
ideal. Chapter 4 looks at the learning history of Japan, specifically its car 
industry, as a source for the model of the Learning Organization.
This chapter deals with the different elements of organizational 
learning. It starts with the three main types of learning theories, which are 
individual, team and organizational learning. The chapter continues with 
different definitions of organizational learning and also develops a new 
one.
Furtherm ore, different levels of organizational learning are 
introduced, which are single-loop learning (i.e. adjustment learning), 
double-loop learning (i.e. change learning) and deutero-learning (i.e. 
learning learning). Then, the initiating, enforcing and obstructing factors 
of organizational learning are discussed. The subsequent section introduces 
organizational memory. Finally, organizational learning cycles from 
various authors are introduced, and a new model of the comprehensive 
organizational learning cycle is developed.
2.1. Different Types of Learning Theories
The Oxford Dictionary (1974: 480) defines the verb “to leam” as “to 
gain knowledge of or skill in, by practice, study or being taught”.
Although learning of the individual is not identical with learning of 
organizations, individual learning is the conditio sine qua non for 
organizational learning (cf. Argyris & Schon 1978: 9ff, Hedberg 1981: 6, 
Klimecki et a l 1991: 127 and Kim 1993: 37ff).
Therefore, individual learning, group learning and organizational 
learning theories are explained in the following sections.
For the definition of “organizational learning” see end of Chapter 2.1.
 ^For the definition of the “Learning Organization” see end of Chapter 3.2.
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2.1.1, Individual Learning Theory
The existent definition of learning theories normally apply only to 
individual learning. According to Pautzke (1989: 90), the best known and 
most frequently-quoted definition of individual learning stems from 
Hilgard & Bower (1975: 17), who define individual learning as follows:
“Learning refers to the change in a subject’s behavior to a given 
situation brought about by his repeated experiences in that 
situation, provided that the behavior change cannot be explained 
on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation or 
temporary states of the subject (e.g. fatigue, drugs, etc.).”
For a better understanding of individual learning, the related theories 
are introduced. The three mainstream individual learning theories^, 
according to Hilgard & Bower (1975), Pautzke (1989: 90-97) and Klimecki 
et al. (1991: 128), are:
(1) the classic learning theory,
(2) the behaviouristic learning theory and
(3) the cognitive learning theory.
(1) The classic learning theory commenced with Ebbinghaus in the 
late 19th century. It concentrated on the research of the human reception of 
knowledge by listening, i.e. the process of acquiring knowledge.
As the classic learning theory focused only on speech recognition, new 
theories were developed, which studied also the changes in the observable 
behaviour.
(2) The behaviouristic theory of learning played a major role 
during the 1930s and the 1950s. At that time the change in observable 
behaviour was the focus of research, but with the learning organism treated 
mainly as a black box. Within a stimulus-response-model researchers 
investigated whether laws could be derived from observable stimuli and 
responses of the organism. The theory of behaviourism is divided into 
“classic” and “operand conditioning”.
 ^For more learning theories see Shrivastava (1983: 8f) and Hilgard & Bower (1975).
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Classic conditioning means the research of bom and bred behaviour. 
The best-known research example originated from the Russian scholar 
Pawlow, who succeeded in replacing a “born reaction” (watering of the 
mouth) of a dog, which was triggered by an “original stimulus” (offering 
of food), with a “conditioned reaction”, caused by a “neutral stimulus” 
(sound of a bell).
With the concept of operand conditioning, especially Skinner explored 
the ties of born and/or socially acquired reactions to stimuli through 
positive reinforcement. The question was whether usual reactions are 
changeable by positive incentives.
Behaviourism was later criticised for neglecting the internal processes 
of the learning subject. Neobehaviourism, which tried to explain the non­
observable internal processes by hypothetical constructs, succeeded only 
partly in addressing this critique.
(3) With the help of cognitive^ theories, whose most important 
exponent was Piaget, the black-box view of the learning objects was 
abandoned. As a result, consciousness and its imminent cognitive processes 
inside the individual were emphasised. The possibilities of action, as well as 
the change of cognitive stmctures (thinking and problem solving abilities) 
of man, were investigated. Cognitive theories form the scientific 
background of individual learning.
After this presentation of individual learning theories, the next sub­
section introduces the concept of team learning theory.
2.1.2. Team Learning Theory
According to Pawlowsky (1992: 221), team^ learning has the vital 
function of knowledge transfer, with which individual learning knowledge 
is transformed into organizational knowledge, which can then be shared by
 ^ The term “cognitive” is derived from “cognoscere”, which is the Latin word for “knowing”, | ,
“realising” or “understanding” (cf. also Menge 1963).
 ^ In this thesis the definition elaborated of a team is as follows; “A team is an informal or formal group 
of at least two people, who act together in order to achieve certain objectives.”
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all other organizational members. Senge (1990: 10) goes even further and 
suggests that “unless teams can leam, the organization cannot leam”.
It is argued here that claiming that only team learning leads to 
organizational leaming might be a too one-sided view, as it would deny the 
fact that individuals can leam directly for the whole organization as well as 
for themselves, and can distribute this explicit knowledge acquired through 
various communication channels. However, the case might look different 
for tacit (implicit) knowledge, which is best transferred through personal 
contacts, i.e. in teams (cf. Chapters 8 and 9).
Individual knowledge and individual abilities to leam are combined by 
team learning, which forms the smallest organizational unit of 
organizational learning (obviously apart from individuals). The 
performance depends on individual learning characteristics and on the 
context of the team within the whole organization. The connective function 
of team learning achievements plays a major role in the transfer of 
individual learning to organizational leaming (Reber 1992: 1243).
2.1.3. Organizational Leaming Theory
The different views about organizational leaming are presented in a 
chronological order, as this might come closest to the evolution of theories. 
How these definitions differ from each other is discussed, and a working 
definition of organizational leaming is elaborated.
One of the first definitions of organizational learning is given by 
Argyris (1977: 116), which focuses only on the process:
“Organizational leaming is a process of detecting and correcting 
error.”
One year later, Argyris & Schon (1978: 29) suggest the following 
expanded definition of organizational learning, which adds individual 
leaming and organizational knowledge:
“Organizational learning occurs when members of the 
organization act as learning agents for the organization, 
responding to changes in the internal and extemal environments 
of the organization by detecting and correcting errors in theory-
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in-use and embedding the results of their inquiry in private 
images and shared maps of the organization.”
Duncan & Weiss (1979: 84) offer a more condensed definition, 
focusing on the process again, which does not include individuals explicitly, 
but mentions organizational knowledge:
“Organizational leaming is defined here as the process within the 
organization by which knowledge about action-outcome 
relationships and the effect of the environment on these 
relationships is developed.”
Fiol & Lyles (1985: 803) suggest the following definition of 
organizational learning.:
“Organizational learning means the process of improving actions 
through better knowledge and understanding.”
This definition includes organizational knowledge, but not individuals 
as learning agents. It implies the limitation that organizational learning 
only happens when actions are being improved, but not when it only 
changes the knowledge of an organization.
Stata (1989: 64) gives a definition which stresses the organizational 
knowledge base, but leaves the rest out:
“First, organizational learning occurs through shared insights, 
knowledge and mental models. Second, leaming builds on past 
knowledge and experience - that is, on memory.”
Staehle (1991: 843, original in German) focuses in his definition also 
on the knowledge base, and includes leaming systems:
“Organizational learning is a further development of a 
knowledge base, which is shared by all members of the 
organization. A decisive difference between the organization and 
the individual lies in the fact that organizations have developed 
more or less as person-independent leaming systems.”
However, Staehle’s reference about “more or less person-independent 
leaming systems” in his definition could be misleading, as it might easily be 1 
misunderstood that organizational learning can happen without the 
interplay between individual and organization. It is further argued in this I
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thesis that formal systems are not necessarily needed for organizational 
learning, as organizational leaming can also occur in informal ways.
Pawlowsky (1992: 204, original in German) tries to formulate a 
definition by combining the various different definitions from other 
authors^ into one single definition:
“Organizational leaming is a process
- that comprises a change in the organizational knowledge base
- that happens in an interplay of individual and organization
- that takes place through the interaction with the intemal 
and/or extemal environment
- that is executed in view of the goveming theory of action
- that leads to an adaptation of the system to the environment
- that helps to gain a higher level of problem solving capacity.”
According to Pawlowsky, there seems to be no other way to do justice 
to the state of discourse about organizational leaming than to combine the 
different views into a long list. However, it is argued here that, on the one 
hand, this definition appears to be not precise enough to be operational as a 
working definition for this thesis and, on the other hand, Pawlowsky also 
used the definitions of Leaming Organizations from Senge and Garratt for 
his own definition of organizational learning. This is not accurate, because ' 
the process (organizational learning) and the subject (the Learning I 
Organization), especially in the perception of an ideal, are two different / >^1^ 9 
things and, therefore, cannot be combined.
Furthermore, as will also be later shown in this chapter, organizational 
learning can also change The ^  verning theory of action (double-loop 
learning), i.e. not only being executed in the view of it, like Pawlowsky T  
suggests. O rgam ^ronal^eanin ig^can  be more than Tnere adaptation, 
namely anticipation, and it does not necessarily imply a higher level of 
problem solving capacity, contrary to Pawlowsky’s definition.
Another definition of organizational leaming stems from Kim (1993:
43 and 1993a: 67):
 ^ Quoted by Pawlowsky are Argyris & Schon (1978), Jeiineck (1979), March & Olson after Duncan & 
Weiss (1979), Duncan & Weiss (1979), Hedberg (1981), Morgan (1986), Garratt (1990), Senge (1990), 
GeiBler (1991) and Staehle (1991).
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O rganizational learning is defined as increasing an
organization’s capacity to take effective action.”
This definition implies the possibility of improved action, but not the 
necessity, as opposed to Fiol & Lyles’ definition above. It also only takes 
individual and organizational knowledge indirectly into account, which is 
included in most other definitions.
Ulrich et al. (1993: 55) also include organizational knowledge only 
indirectly, as well as new individuals:
“Organizational leaming occurs as the systems and culture in the 
organization retain learning and transfer ideas to new 
individuals. This kind of leaming is shared across organizational 
boundaries of space, time and hierarchy.”
However, it is not clear, why there should be a limitation only to new 
individuals, as opposed to all individuals, of an organization.
After having shown this list of definitions, it is not surprising that 
authors like Garvin (1993: 79f) complain that there is considerable 
disagreement in terms of definitions of organizational learning^^. Yet 
Garvin sums up: “Most scholars view organizational leaming as a process 
that unfolds over time and link it with knowledge acquisition and improved 
performance. But they differ on other important matters.”
Unfortunately, Garvin does not explain in which important respects he 
thinks the scholars’ views differ. Again, it is argued in this thesis that an 
improved performance of the organization might be achieved through 
organizational leaming, but it cannot be seen as a necessary outcome.
The definition of organizational learning by Dixon (1994: 5) goes a 
step further, calling it an intentional process which leads to an improved 
performance:
“ [Organizational learning is] the intentional use of learning 
processes at the individual, group and system level to
Garvin (1993: 80) quotes the definitions from Argyris, Fiol & Lyles, Levitt & March, Stata and 
Huber. It can be assumed that Garvin did not know Staehle’s and Pawlowsky's definitions, because they 
wrote their texts in German only.
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continuously transform the organization in a direction that is 
increasingly satisfying to its stakeholders”
However, Dixon (1994: 5) contradicts herself a few lines later, by 
stating that all organizations leam to a greater or lesser extent. Even more 
confusingly, Dixon (1994: XIV) says that organizational leaming “can and 
does occur accidentally”, and not intentionally.
Dixon’s contradictory statements show, like many other definitions in 
the literature on organizational learning, that there is a slight confusion 
about whether organizational learning, on the one hand, happens 
intentionally and, on the other hand, improves the performance of an 
organization. As a consequence, a working definition of organizational 
learning is developed for this thesis, which synthesises the different 
definitions, but also tries to solve the paradox of the statements above.
This thesis concludes that a definition of organizational leaming should 
include the following elements.
The learning process itself appears to be an integral part of nearly all 
definitions mentioned above, starting with Argyris (1977: 116) with a 
“process of detecting and correcting error”, to Dixon (1994: 5) with “use 
of leaming processes”.
Knowledge acquisition or generation refers to the leaming process as 
either incorporating knowledge from outside the organization or creating 
knowledge inside the organization, mostly by trial-and-error. This is not a (cut/ 
reference to the existing definitions, but a new incorporation of insights 
about organizational leaming by Huber (1991) and Dixon (1994) regarding ^  
knowledge acquisition and by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) regarding 
knowledge generation.
Individuals are included as the prerequisite of organizational leaming 
as stated by Argyris & Schon (1978: 29) “members of the organization act 
as leaming agents for the organization”. And Pawlowsky (1992: 204) states 
that “organizational leaming ... happens in an interplay of individual and 
organization”. However, other authors include individual learning only 
implicitly. Whereas individuals are a necessary condition for organizational 
leaming to take place, teams are a sufficient but very conducive condition.
Teams are included as a further part of the working definition of this 
thesis. Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the definitions of other
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authors, except the one by Dixon, this is because some authors, such as 
Pawlowsky (1992: 221), Senge (1990: 10) and Reber (1992: 1243), 
emphasise the importance of team learning as being conducive to 
organizational learning. However, it is expressed in the definition 
formulated below by “can be accomplished” such that teams are only a 
sufficient condition for organizational learning.
Organizational knowledge is also incorporated in the definition given 
below, as it is included by the majority of authors in the definitions 
presented above. However, organizational knowledge is seen in this thesis 
only as a sufficient condition for organizational actions, which is expressed 
by “can improve”, as it does not necessarily lead to improved actions (cf.
Kim’s definition (1993: 43 and 1993a: 67), either because the expanded 
organizational knowledge is not conducive to improve actions or it is not 
in the organization’s interest to improve its a c t i o n s
From the analysis of the literature, this thesis comes to the following 
working definition:
Organizational learning is a process of knowledge acquisition 
or generation of an organization, performed through individuals, 
which can be accomplished by teams. It is based on 2 ^
organizational memory that is expanded, which can improve -
organizational actions.
After this working definition for organizational learning, a deeper 
insight into organizational learning will be presented, focusing on the 
distinction between intemal and extemal organizational leaming.
 ^  ^ Huber (1991: 89), e.g., states that organizations “can correctly learn that which is incorrect.”
For example, an organization in a regulated environment can learn that improved organizational 
action will be penalised by the regulators. In this case organizational learning leads to an expanded 
organizational knowledge, but rarely to an improvement of organizational action.
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2.2. Extemal vs. Intemal Organizational Leaming
Organizational learning can be distinguished between sourced 
extemally (i.e. from outside to inside an organization) and intemally (i.e. 
within an organization).
In order to illuminate how this can look in reality, Dixon’s (1992: 32ff) 
conceptual framework of knowledge acquisition is presented and discussed. 
Additionally, ways of teaching and learning from Hines (1994) are 
introduced. Thereby, a structured way of assessing external and internal 
organizational leaming is synthesised and presented.
It is argued here that information acquisition has in some cases more 
the nature of knowledge generation, which is an important distinction not 
made by the literature mentioned above. Additionally, another useful 
distinction from Nonaka (1994: 19) is included, who suggests that 
knowledge should be divided into explicit and tacit knowledge^^, i.e., 
implicit knowledge. According to him, there are four different forms of 
knowledge conversions (see Figure 2.1). These are “combination” (from 
explicit to explicit knowledge), “internalization” (from explicit to tacit 
knowledge), “extemalization” (from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge) 
and “socialization” (from tacit to tacit knowledge). It is argued here that 
the transfer of tacit knowledge via information (extemalization) is a very 
demanding process and, therefore, does neither happen frequently nor 
automatically.
According to Nonaka (1994: 33) tacit knowledge can be associated with organisational culture and 
procedures, whereas explicit knowledge occurs in form of documents, filing systems, databases, etc.
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Figure 2.1: Modes of Knowledge Creation
Tacit
knowledge To
Tacit
knowledge
From
Explicit
knowledge
Explicit 
knowledge
Socialization Extemalization
Internalization Combination
Source: Nonaka 1994: 19, and also partially Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 72.
The next section starts with extemal organizational leaming and the 
section thereafter with intemal organizational leaming.
2.2.1. Extemal Organizational Leaming
Extemal organizational leaming means that an organization acquires or 
generates new knowledge in an organizational leaming process like 
developed in the section before.
For organizational leaming by extemal information acquisition Dixon 
(1992: 32ff) has compiled the following list of methods by which 
information can be acquired: Borrowing (from conferences, consultants 
and printed materials), searching (by economic, technological or social 
reports), grafting (by new members, acquisitions or mergers) or 
collaborating (by joint ventures or consortiums).
There is no doubt that the sources quoted by Dixon are options for 
extemal information acquisition. However, the labelling of groups seems to 
be slightly confusing because, for example, a report could also be under 
borrowing as well as searching, and consultants could be under grafting as
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well as borrowing. Unethical ways of extemal information acquisition 
could also be added, which are espionage (e.g., overhearing, paying people 
money for valuable information or gaining access to sites illegally), which 
will not be treated here in detail. Moreover, collaboration in form of joint 
ventures or consortiums can often have the purpose of generating new 
knowledge, and not only acquisition of existing information. Dixon also 
fails to mention customers or suppliers as an external source of 
information.
Hines (1994: 152-59) mentions further ways by which suppliers acquire 
extemal knowledge from their customer and vice versa. These he divides 
into “cross-transfer of staff’ and “one-to-one developments”, both of which 
facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge.
Cross-transfer o f  s ta ff is a temporary or permanent exchange of 
employees, common in Japan, which can be in the form of business group 
integration (long-term  transfer o f custom er’s staff to supplier), 
strengthening of management (short-term transfer of customer’s staff to 
supplier), employee release (medium-term transfer of customer’s senior 
staff to supplier), training and education (short- to medium-term transfer 
of supplier’s staff to customer), residents engineers (medium-term transfer 
of supplier’s engineers to the customer for development) and help against 
shortage of staff (short-term transfer of staff from supplier to customer or 
from customer to supplier in case of labour shortage).
One-to-one developments are said to be especially typical for supplier 
associations in Japan, and are normally joint problem-solving: on-site 
training (supplier’s employees are trained on customer’s site), individual 
suggestions (customer’s suggestions after visit of supplier) or technical or 
managerial assistance (customer’s assistance to supplier in technical or 
managerial areas).
Extem al organizational learning is “inter-organizational leam ing”, 
which draws special attention to the leaming from outside from other 
organizations. Inter-organizational leaming concentrates on the leaming of 
individuals and especially teams with members from other organizations. 
These teams can be mixed horizontally across different functional 
departments (cross-functional) as well as vertically across different 
h ierarchical levels (cross-organizational), from  two (or more) 
organizations for joint product improvement, development or production.
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Alternatively, a more informal or formal approach can be taken. Examples 
for a more formal approach are joint ventures or industrial associations.
All these different forms of extemal organizational leaming seem to 
exist in reality, however, there is no clear structure according to which this 
leaming could be analysed in reality in a more systematic way. Therefore, 
this new stmcture of sources is proposed.
(1) External organizational learning can either have the form of
(A) external organizational leaming of implicit knowledge or (B) extemal 
organizational leaming of explicit knowledge.
(IA): External organizational learning o f  implicit knowledge can 
normally only easily be transmitted directly through people and have the 
form of either
a) insiders that turn into outsiders, such as employees acquiring 
information from seminars, conferences, associations/clubs, factory 
visits, social events or joint-development teams of different companies 
(normally for a short- to medium-term period); or
b) outsiders that become insiders, like information via consultants or 
coaches from consultancies, academia, customers, suppliers or other 
organizations; or new employees through hiring, acquisition, merger or 
joint venture (normally for a medium- to long-term period).
(IB): External organizational learning o f explicit knowledge which is 
normally independent of people can be divided into
a) prepared material, from other organizations like social, economic or 
technical reports and news, as well as other printed or stored material; 
or
b) unprepared material, where further work needs to be completed so that 
it is useful, such as, e.g., database research or compiling of special 
studies.
2.2.2. Intemal Organizational Leaming
Intemal organizational leaming means that an organization acquires or 
generates new knowledge inside the organization within an organizational 
leaming cycle like developed in the previous section.
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Dixon (1992: 32ff) suggests a list of methods by which internal 
information can be acquired, which can be congenital (by founders or 
prevailing technology), experim ental (by success or m istakes), 
experim enting (by R&D or pilot projects), continuous process 
improvement (by process improvement teams) or critical reflection (by 
dialogue or questioning assumptions).
Hines (1994: 287) produces more ways of intemal organizational 
leaming, such as regular newsletters to keep employees informed or social 
events, where people can meet and exchange ideas. Although he intended 
this list to be used by supplier associations (i.e. extemal organizational 
leaming), intemal they can also be used intemally.
Again, the sources quoted by Dixon (1992: 32ff) are possibilities of 
intemal organizational leaming, not only information acquisition, with a 
slightly confusing group labelling, which are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, her lines between experimental and experimenting and between 
continuous process improvement are not clear. Therefore, a more clear 
stmcture was developed, in order to have a more analytical approach that 
facilitates the understanding of how intemal organizational leaming is 
performed in reality.
Intemal organizational learning is “intra-organizational learning” , 
which draws special attention to the leaming within an organization. This 
organizational leaming takes place between individuals and/or teams, but 
within the organization. Here, team leaming is focused on the leaming 
inside an organization, and this can happen not only on the same level 
within a department, but also in a vertical and/or a horizontal way, i.e. 
between different hierarchies and/or different departments.
(2) In te rn a l o rgan izational learn ing  can either have the form of
(A) intemal organizational leaming of implicit knowledge or (B) intemal 
organizational leaming of explicit knowledge.
(2A) Intem al organizational leaming o f  implicit knowledge, can be 
based on either
a) individual work in an unstructured approach, like founders’ ideas or 
spontaneous ideas, successes or mistakes of any employee’s project, 
informal individual R&D; or
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b) team work in an unstructured approach, like questioning assumptions, 
informal team R&D or pilot projects (i.e. project to test how something 
on a larger scale would work).
(2B) Internal organizational leaming o f explicit knowledge, which can 
normally be structured and divided into
a) individual work in a structured approach, like systematic and formal 
individual R&D or employee suggestion systems; or
b) team work in a structured approach, like systematic and formal team 
R&D, team improvement systems for processes or formal dialogues.
In summary, the comparison between external and internal 
organizational learning shows that it is helpful for the analysis to ^ 9  
distinguish the different forms of organizational leaming from these points  ^ '
of view. Also, this comprises not only knowledge acquisition, as suggested f
by Dixon (1992) and Hines (1994), but also knowledge creation, as I
suggested by Nonaka (1994) or Nonaka & Takeuchi ( 1 9 9 5 )^  ^ This will I 
also prove to be helpful in the empirical analysis of this thesis and an 
overview is given in Table 2.1.
Knowledge conversion in the form of internalization or extemalization is only implied implicitly 
here in order to avoid over-complexity.
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Table 2.1: External vs. Intemal Organizational Leaming
(11 External organizational learning:
(A) External organizational learning of implicit knowledge
a) insiders that turn into outsiders
b) outsiders that become insiders
(B) External organizational learning of explicit knowledge
a) prepared material
b) unprepared material
(2) Internal organizational learning:
(A) Internal organizational learning of implicit knowledge
a) individual work in an unstructured approach
b) team work in an unstructured approach
(B) Internal organizational learning of explicit knowledge
a) individual work in a structured approach
b) team work in a structured approach
This thesis deals with extemal and intemal organizational leaming for 
different reasons. Inter-organizational learning is investigated in order to 
explore how the characteristics of the Leaming Organization are acquired 
and where they originate. Intra-organizational learning is researched in 
order to explore whether the characteristics of the Leaming Organization 
lead to organizational learning outcomes, i.e. the benefits of organizational 
learning.
The following section gives an overview over a different dimension of 
organizational learning, which refer to its intensity: the three different 
levels of organizational leaming.
2.3. Three Levels of Organizational L e a m i n g
The majority of the literature on organizational learning divides 
organizational learning into three organizational leaming levels. These are
C J X ^ ,
Cf. also Rosengarten 1993; 10-14.
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displayed in a chronological order in Table 2.2 below. This means that the 
higher the organizational leaming levels, the better their quality, i.e. the 
more complex tasks can be solved by organizational leaming.
Table 2.2: Organizational Leaming Levels
Author/s
Learn ing  
Level [
(Adjustment
Learning)
Learning  
Level II
(Change
Learning)
Learn ing  
Level ill
(Learning
Learning)
Argyris & Schon 
1978
Single-Loop
Learning
Double-Loop
Learning
Deutero-
Learning
Miles & Randolf 
1980
Reactive
Learning
Proactive
Learning
Hedberg 1981 Adjustment
Learning
Turnover
Learning
Turnaround
Learning
Fiol & Lyles 1985 Lower-Level
Learning
Higher-Level
Learning
Shrivastava
1983
Adaptive
Learning
Assumption
Sharing
Development of 
Knowledge 
Base
Pautzke 1989 Assimilation Accommodation* Equilibration*
Garratt 1990 Operational 
Learning Cycle
Policy Learning 
Cycle
Integrated 
Learning Cycle
Senge 1990 Adaptive
Learning
Generative
Learning
GeiBler 1991 Mechanistic* Organismic*
Klimecki et al. 
1991
Mechanistic
Learning*
Evolutionary
Learning*
Development
Learning*
Staehle 1991 Adaptation* Learning - i.e. 
Development*
Learning to 
Learn*
Pawlowsky 1992 Idiosyncratic
Learning*
Environment
Adaptation*
Problem
Solving
Learning*
McGill at at. 1992 Adaptive
Learning
Generative
Learning
Probst 1992 Adaptation
Learning*
Change
Learning*
Deutero-
Learning
Watkins & 
Marsick 1993
Action
Research
Action Reflection 
Learning
Action Science
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Nevis et al. 1995 Corrective Generative
Learning Learning
Source: In reference to Fiol & Lyles (1985: 809) and Pawlowsky (1992: 204) with 
modifications and supplements (* = translated from German).
This thesis takes the t e r m in o l o g y , i.e. single-loop, double-loop and 
deutero-learning, of Argyris & Schon from 1978 for three reasons:
Firstly, it is frequently quoted as being the first terminology of three 
organizational leaming levels^^. Secondly, it is used most frequently in the 
literature 18. Thirdly, it is easy to explain by using diagrams.
Argyris and Schon are regarded by Shrivastava (1983: l l f f )  as the 
main representatives of organizational leaming as sharing of assumptions 
Their importance is also suggested by Thurbin (1994: VII): “The 
contemporary notion of the leaming organization has been developed from 
work by leading academics Chris Argyris & Donald Schon in 1978.”
Therefore, their theory of organizational learning is explicitly 
explained, and their leaming levels are used as a working definition for 
this thesis.
1  ^Cf. also Argyris & Schon 1974, Schon 1975, Argyris 1976, Argyris 1977, Argyris & Schôn 1978, 
Argyris 1982, Argyris 1990, Argyris 1991 and Argyris 1993.
This thesis follows the point of view of the majority of authors, which refer to Argyris & Schon 
1978 (see following footnote) as the first source of this terminology. However, the fact is acknowledged 
that the terminology was based on the work of Gregory Bateson’s book “Steps to an Ecology of Mind” 
from 1972, and was published before in previous articles or books by the same authors, e.g., Argyris & 
Schon 1974, Schon 1975 and Argyris 1976.
8^ Cf., e. g., in an alphabetical order: Argyris (1982: 43ff, 1991: 100, 1993: 5f), Barr et al. (1992: 17), 
Dixon (1992: 42f), Fiol & Lyles (1985: 807f), Garrat (1990: 79ff), Hedberg (1981: 7f), Isaacs (1993: 30), 
Kim (1993: 44ff and 1993a: 27-46), Klimecki et a l  (1991: 130-33), Lamming (1993: 101 and 109), 
Luthans et a l  (1994: 12), McGill et a l  (1992: 5), Nevis et a l  (1995: 74), Nonaka (1994: 19), Pautzke 
(1989: 109-30), Pawlowsky (1992: 201-13), Pedler et a l  (1991: 149f and 186), Probst (1992: 473-77), 
Ross (1992: 19), Shrivastava (1983: l lf f ) , Staehle (1991: 844f), Ulrich et al (1993: 53) and Watkins & 
Marsick (1993: 79).
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The theory of action forms the basis of the organizational leaming 
model of Argyris and Schôn^^: Organizations act according to an 
organizational theory of action, which consists of the shared theories of 
action of the organization’s members. Therefore, behind the intended 
actions of an organization stand general convictions, values and norms. 
Theory of action is divided into “espoused theory” and “theory-in-use”.
The espoused theory of an organization is the officially agreed and 
accepted theory of action, according to which individuals and organizations 
officially accomplish their actions. The official theory of action can be 
manifested in leading principles, guidelines or letters of intent.
The theory-in-use can only be derived from daily actions, and it may 
be incompatible with the espoused theory. Therefore, theory-in-use is the 
theory of action, which guides the daily decisions and behaviour of an 
organization, carried out by the organizational members, because they are 
guided by collective mles for decision and delegation. The members of an 
organization are often not aware of their own theories-in-use and, 
therefore, these are not easily detectable. As a consequence they have to be 
carefully observed to be discovered.
If the expectation of actions of an organization does not correspond 
with the results of that action, an organizational leaming process is started. 
Its course and its three organizational learning levels “single-loop 
leaming”, “double-loop leaming” and “deutero-leaming” are explained 
next.
2.3.1. Single-Loop Leaming^o as Adjustment Leaming
The first organizational learning level is labelled s in g le - lo o p  
learning by Argyris and Schon. This can also be explained as adjustment 
leaming. Single-loop leaming takes place when an organization detects and 
corrects deviations from its target, within the given goveming variables or 
theory-in-use. Therefore, single-loop leaming is the correction of the
Cf. Argyris & Schon 1974: 4-7, Schon 1975: 6f, Argyris 1976: 30, Argyris 1977: 115-19, Argyris 
& Schon 1978: 10-16, Argyris 1982: 36, Argyris 1990: 23, Argyris 1991: 103 and Argyris 1993: 5-10.
Cf. Argyris 1977: 116, Argyris & Schon 1978: 3, 18ff and 29, Argyris 1982: 43f, Argyris 1990: 
92, Argyris 1991: 100, and Argyris 1993: 5.
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consequences of organizational action that were originally not intended (see 
Figure 2.2).
Single-loop leaming can also be described as a regulating loop that 
corrects deviations from the aim given.
The essential point is that the goveming values, i.e. the existing theory- 
in-use, are not altered, but only an improvement in effectiveness is 
attained through adjustment within the given frame, set by organizational 
norms. Therefore, effectiveness is a measure for success of single-loop 
leaming.
Figure 2.2: Single-Loop Leaming
Governing
Values
Mismatch 
or ErrorsActions
Single-Loop Learning
Source: In reference to Argyris 1982: 44 and Argyris 1990: 92 with slight 
modifications by the author of this thesis.
Single-loop learning is explained by Argyris and Schon with a 
metaphor of a thermostat for a central heating. A thermostat leams when 
to adjust the heat: if it is too hot, it tums the heat off, and if it is too cold, it 
tums the heat back on. The performance of this task is dependent on the 
information about the room temperature, in order to decide whether to 
take corrective action or not.
Double-loop leaming, however, would occur when the thermostat 
could ask itself why it was set at a certain degree. Thereby, it would be 
able to question the underlying goveming values, and would decide 
whether a certain room temperature is right for the optimal efficiency (cf. 
Argyris 1993: 5).
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This double-loop learning will be explained in the following sub­
section, as a higher level of organizational leaming.
2.3.2. Double-Loop Leaming^i as Change Leaming
Argyris & Schon call the second highest organizational leaming level 
double-loop learn ing , which can also be described as change leaming. 
Double-loop leaming takes place when the goveming values are questioned 
and changed, because the regulation of the leaming process within the 
single-loop leaming process does not appear to be sufficient anymore. 
Thus, the organization’s goveming values, i.e. underlying norms, policies 
and objectives, are modified, which will lead to a different set of possible 
action, (see Figure 2.3)
The question of which new theories of action are adopted, often 
depends on what power positions the different competing opinions have 
within an organization. In any case, the problem -solving capability  of 
the organization is likely to increase every time double-loop leaming takes 
place. Therefore, double-loop leaming can be described as an amplifying 
loop.
Cf. Argyris 1977: 116, Argyris & Schon 1978: 3, 20-26 and 29, Argyris 1982: 43f, Argyris 1990: 
93f, Argyris 1991: 100 and Argyris 1993: 5.
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Figure 2.3: Double-Loop Leaming
Mismatch 
or Errors
Governing
Values
Actions
Single-Loop Learning
Double-Loop Learning
Source: In reference to Argyris 1982: 44 and Argyris 1990: 94 with slight 
modifications by the author of this thesis.
According to Staehle (1991: 846), alternative problem-solving has a 
chance to be accepted only if the members of the organization believe that 
they can more easily attain their targets by this. Chances for a change in the 
paradigm increase to the same extent as the gap between intended and 
actual results widens. That means, if single-loop leaming is no longer 
sufficient to reach the goal, or at least the minimum aim (survival), then 
the goveming values are changed within the framework of double-loop 
leaming.
Both types of organizational leaming can be analysed through deutero- 
leaming, which is presented in the next part.
2.3.3. Deutero-Leaming22 as Leaming Leaming
The third, and highest, organizational learning level of the 
organizational learning model from Argyris & Schon is d eu tero -
22 Cf. Argyris & Schon 1978: 26-29, 308. “Deutero” stems from ancient Greek word “SeuTepoa” and 
means “second” (Menge 1976).
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l e a r n i n g 2 3 ,  which can be regarded as learning leaming, i.e. leaming to 
learn. Deutero-learning has to be understood as a process, wherein the 
single-loop leaming and double-loop leaming processes are considered and 
reflected by at least one observer of the organization (see Figure 2.4).
Deutero-leaming enables the leaming and improving of organizational 
learning processes on the level of single-loop and/or double-loop leaming. 
The thorough reflection of the leaming context, the removal of leaming 
impediments and the promotion of learning supporting mechanisms are 
essential for successful organizational leaming.
Figure 2.4: Deutero-Leaming
Observer
Argyris & Schon (1978: 308) admit, however, that organizational 
learning is normally limited to single-loop leaming, and does not engage in 
double-loop learning. And they also suggest that deutero-learning is 
predominantly used for reflection about single-loop learning, and not 
double-loop learning.
23 Hedberg (1981: 8) and Ulrich et al (1993: 53) equate in their work double-loop leaming and deutero- 
learning, which is not correct.
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A practical application of the three different leaming levels would be 
the case of a typical European organization which finds too many defects in 
its products. Single-loop leaming would apply to the increase of inspection, 
which would be leaming within the normal goveming values. Double-loop 
leaming would be a change towards organizational leaming systems for 
employees or teams, and delegating the quality control to the shopfloor, 
thus copying the successful Japanese way of production. Deutero-leaming 
would try to leam from the analysis of the performance of leaming on 
both levels and try to improve them, as well as implement the lessons leamt 
in other areas of the organization.
Single-loop leaming, double-loop leaming and deutero-leaming, are 
divided by Argyris & Schon (1978: 22, 27)2^ into four phases of an 
organizational leaming cycle, which are discovery of problems, invention 
of a solution, production and evaluation, and generalization of outcome.
This and further organizational leaming cycles are explained in a later 
section of this chapter. Before that this thesis will look at the factors which 
initiate organizational leaming.
2.4. Initiating Factors of Organizational Leaming
The current literature mentions either opportunities or threats as the 
initiating factors of organizational leaming.
Argyris & Schon (1978: 308) suggest:
“Changes in the norms of organizational theory of action, or in 
central elements of organizational theory-in-use, tend to occur 
through the eruptions consequent on ecological adjustment and in 
the face of change in organizational environments.”
That means that according to them double-loop leaming only tends to 
occur after new opportunities or threats.
Although opportunities or threats appear to be necessary conditions, 
they are generally not sufficient alone as initiating factors. A sufficient
Cf. also Pautzke 1989: 129 and Staehle 1991: 854.
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condition is only seen to be given with the help of the right people in the 
right positions as catalysts and they can be either insiders or o u t s i d e r s .
2.4.1. Opportunities as Initiating Factors for Organizational Learning
O pportun ities can induce organizational learning. An organizational 
reserve, i.e. slack, is necessary in order to explore the environment and to 
experiment with innovative projects. But only few successful organizations 
with the necessary reserve seem to do this in reality. The reason might be 
the fact that success seems to confirm the momentary theories-in-use, and 
does not make the organization inclined to try new strategies (Cyert & 
March 1963: 4 Iff). Neither shortage of resources, great problems, nor a 
favourable environment constitute a good climate for learning. Low 
organizational resource slack can induce a search for new opportunities, 
but, paradoxically, a resource surplus is needed for the implementation for 
a new theory of action (cf. Hedberg 1981: 17).
2.4.2. Threats as Initiating Factors for Organizational Learning
Threats26 can also be initiating factors for a learning process. Hedberg 
(1981: 16) is of the opinion that learning is normally initiated by problems.
Argyris (1977: 117) suggests that double-loop learning occurs because 
of “a crisis precipitated by some event in the environment (for example, a 
recession or a competitor producing a better product)”. He also states that 
“a crisis created by existing management in order to shake up the 
organization” can also induce organizational double-loop learning.
Additionally to opportunities and threats, some authors (cf. Hedberg 1981: 3-23 and Nystrom & 
Starbuck 1984: 53-65, but also Klimecki et al. 1991: 133 and Staehle 1991: 846) claim that an 
organization has to go through a process of unlearning the old habits in order to learn new knowledge and 
behaviour. This organizational unlearning is often characterised by the departure of the old top management 
and organizational learning by the arrival o f the new top management. However, as both are normally part 
of the same organizational adjustment, Hedberg (1981: 18) admits that “[ujnleaming and triggering of 
learning can thus be intimately related and sometimes overlapping phenomena.”
Threats normally evolve to problems or crises in organizations and, thus, will be treated 
synonymously with problems and crises in this thesis.
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However, due to the fact that there are perception filters, problems are 
not easily detected. Therefore, many organizations do not react to 
problems early enough. Mainly minor problems are tolerated, which 
aggregated, have a greater impact on the viability of an organization. In the 
long run, this can lead to a decline in organizational performance because 
the problems are often perceived too late.27 This leads to a belated reaction 
in reality, where in turn the reserves tend to be too exhausted to induce a 
suitable, long-lasting turnaround (Hedberg 1981: 16f).
2.4.3. People as Initiating Factors for Organizational Learning
P e o p le  in the right position, as insiders or outsiders of 
organization, can be seen as catalysts for turning opportunities or threats ^
into organizational learning. They can induce this through their knowledge [j-W - 
and actions (Hedberg 1981: I7f, cf. also Pautzke 1989: 121).
Argyris (1977: 117) mentions people, as a condition for organizational 
double-loop learning, either as “a revolution from within (a new 
management) or from without (political interference or takeover)”. For 
example, a leadership crisis which leads to a change of leadership, i.e. an 
outsider enters, often takes place together with a financial crisis. This crisis 
can then facilitate in practice a fast “unlearning” of present theories and 
implementation of a new frame of action. In this respect, an organizational 
unlearning is symbolised by the exit of the former leader; the successor 
then is the trigger for the new organizational learning process.
There can also be different outsiders triggering organizational 
learning. They can be in the form of various shareholders or stakeholders 
of the organization, e.g., outside directors of the board, environmental 
groups, a take-over company or a governmental department.
After having presented different factors which initiate organizational 
learning, the next section deals with the factors which enforce or obstruct 
organizational learning.
27 Cf. also Senge’s (1990a: 22f) “boiled frog-syndrome”: When a frog is thrown into hot water, it will 
jump outside; but if the frog is put in cold water, which is gradually heated, the frog will stay in the water 
and get boiled.
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2.5. Factors that Enforce or Obstruct Organizational Learning
The empirical and conceptual borderline between triggers and 
enforcers is smaller and more blurred than this section and previous one 
might suggest. However, it is obvious that triggers tend to play a more 
important role in the beginning of an organizational learning process, 
whereas enforcers tend to play a more im portant role during the 
organizational learning process. The literature suggests various factors 
which enforce or obstruct organizational learning. This section has a closer 
look at them, starting with the factors that enforce organizational learning.
2.5.1. Factors that Enforce Organizational Learning 7
There are various factors that enforce learning, which are mentioned in 
the literature. Three of them are predominantly referred to, which are
(1) difference in opinions,
(2) thinking in alternatives and
(3) promoting of experimentation.
(1): Nystrom & Starbuck (1984: 59ff) and Staehle (1991: 846) suggest 
that difference in opinions within organizations, i.e. discord about aims 
and strategies, are essential factors that should not be suppressed. A too 
conform ist behaviour should neither be prom oted, as it makes 
organizations blind to changes in the environment.
Dynamic balances can be achieved by special interacting processes of 
dual-management groups, i.e. management in duplicate, in order to provide 
a continuous platform of dialectics, competing world views and alternative 
actions (Hedberg 1981:22).
However, this might be the provision of slack not many companies 
might be able to afford, as well as the negative side effects of competition 
between the teams can outweigh the benefits of this competition.
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Klimecki et al. (1991: 138-47) also make suggestions on how to 
improve organizational learning. Within a heterarchy'^^, i.e. a flowing 
hierarchy, interactive achievements within the organization are considered.
Through “prosociality” (Klimecki et al. 1991: 14If) interpersonal 
relationships are stressed. Presuppositions for this are mutual acceptance, 
trust and tolerance. By this, the conunon purpose of an organization is 
constantly generated by all members of the organization, and is not 
imposed from above. Only true participation accomplishes that the 
concerned actively take part in the decision-making process, and in cases of 
diverging opinions, they have to be able to voice dissent. Opportunities to 
participate in the decision-making process need to be available on a 
permanent basis in order to be effective.
Different opinions can also help thinking in alternatives. This is 
described next.
(2): Thinking in alternatives, i.e. alternative scenarios^^, including 
all sorts of possible consequences for the present and the future, provides 
flexibility through new learning opportunities. This is important, as 
organizational learning processes need sufficient time and resources (Reber 
1992: 1251).
Regulating awareness for signals of change in order to enhance 
sensitivity is done by the removal of some perceptual filters^^. This can be 
promoted, for example, by choosing certain people, who are flexible in 
their view about the environment. However, the organization needs to keep 
some perception filters, in order to avoid an overload of stimuli (Hedberg 
1981: 21f).
In a heterarchy everybody concerned is a potential designer of the organization. The benefits of 
management’s achievements are spread throughout the whole system, and are not only the privilege of the 
professional designer, normally the manager. Management takes place permanently within the whole 
system. An organization with potential to develop has to be structured heterarchically, in order to be able to 
use all its potential (Klimecki et al. 1991: 138).
29 See also de Geus’ article (1989: 28-34) with examples for thinking in alternatives in the oil industry.
30 Perceptual filters are norms and measures. With their help organizational members interpret stimuli 
(cf. Hedberg 1981: 8). Thus, organizations and their members only react to information that they think is 
important for the organization.
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According to Staehle (1991a: 313-42), redundancy and slack help 
thinking in alternatives. R edundancy  means verbosity, repetition or 
duplication of information or tasks (cf. also Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 
80ff). This way, the security and lucidity of information transfer is 
guaranteed. S la ck  describes an abundance of resources within an 
organization (e.g., knowledge, money, time or employees), which serves to 
give the organization a greater potential ability to react within times of 
crisis. Hereby, attention has to be paid to the fact that neither too much nor 
too little slack is of advantage to the organization.
Thinking in alternatives is labelled by Klimecki et al. (1991: 140f) as 
“proactivity”, which is accomplished in order to maximise potential 
chances and possibilities. Thus, activities are anticipated and dominated by 
foresight, because new potentials are recognised early enough.
(3): P rom oting  of experim en ta tion  begins with the selection of 
organizational members, who are interested in experimenting and are not 
averse to uncertainty. Also, the reward systems have to be designed in a 
way to foster experimentation (Hedberg 1981: 20f).
The patterns of new thinking and action should be tested in a limited 
area, which facilitates the organizational learning process. If the trial and 
error strategy turns out to be successful, the experience can be applied to 
the whole organization (Nystrom & Starbuck 1984: 62ff and Staehle 1991: 
846).
Loose coupling, in opposition to a rigid organization, where teams and 
departments work closely together, enables an organization to work with a 
lower probability of disturbance. Due to the fact that mistakes and troubles 
are solved by small units autonomously, they only have a weak influence on 
other units. Thus, higher tolerance of mistakes is achieved, which creates 
an experiment-friendly environment (Staehle 1991a: 313-42 and Klimecki 
e ta l  1991: 143-47).
In summary, difference of opinions, thinking in alternatives and 
promotion of experimentation are three factors which appear to enforce 
organizational learning. These three factors are related to each other and, 
therefore, influence each other.
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The absence of the factors that enforce learning has a considerable 
obstructing impact on organizational learning.
Without difference in opinions it is difficult to learn something new. 
People who always say “yes” confirm the status-quo although it should be 
constantly challenged and, thereby, they are obstruct learning.
The same applies to thinking in alternatives. Without this, the human 
brain becomes inflexible and cannot leam new things, which can be 
essential to know in times of turmoil, when time to think and leam is only 
available in a limited way.
The opposite, i.e. thinking along the lines of “one-best-way”, loses the 
learning ability and, therefore, the flexibility of an organization.
Without promoting o f experimentation only a few experiments will be 
made for the sake of organizational learning from new experiences.
However, there are some theories of authors which identify certain 
factors that obstruct organizational learning, which are not just a converse 
of triggers and/or enforcers. These will be discussed next.
2.5.2. Factors that Obstruct Organizational Learning
This sub-section deals with three factors that obstruct organizational 
learning. They are
(1) double bind,
(2) defensive routines and
(3) anxiety I.
(1): Argyris & Schon (1978: 3ff, 86-127) and Argyris (1990: 45f) 
suggest a situation that obstructs learning, labelled double bind (i.e, 
whatever you do is wrong). This describes a circumstance in which a 
person, or a group of people, is not able to change a situation, which is 
inhibiting organizational learning, because of organizational norms. This is 
especially the case with incorrigible errors, which cannot be solved 
through simple single-loop learning. The exposure of the error would 
question the norms of the organization, which might lead to hiding that
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error. But not disclosing the error will be an obstacle to organizational 
learning.
In some cases, when the double binds in organizations are not 
discussible, the situation gets even worse for organizational learning. This 
reduces performance, commitment and concern for the organization. 
According to Argyris and Schon, organizations normally tend to create 
learning environments, which discourage organizational learning through 
its norms and objectives. In order to stress this, Argyris & Schon (1978: 5) 
even warn: “Unless people acting as agents for organizations and societies 
are able to leam how to detect and correct double-loop errors, the survival 
of the society may be in doubt.” Although this statement may be a little 
overdrawn, it stresses the point that organizations normally do not leam 
automatically.
(2): Argyris (1986: 541, 1989: 7 and 1990: 43, 46) developed another 
concept for teaming obstacles, which he calls defensive routines. These 
are generated by the organization and its members, in order to defend 
themselves against dangers. Defensive routines are all actions and intentions 
that save the organization from danger or damage. However, at the same 
time defensive routines hinder the organization’s ability to learn how 
possible causes of dangers can be removed. Organizational defensive 
routines support overprotection and, thereby, prevent organizational 
learning.
For two reasons individuals feel helpless to change organizational 
defensive routines. Firstly, there is a feeling that it is hopeless to change, 
because this attempt will reinforce defensive routines. Secondly, there is 
the fear of being punished for trying to alter defensive routines, whereas 
the opposite reaction of doing nothing tends not to be punished (Argyris 
1990: 43).
(3): Schein (1993: 86-92) suggests that there is an anxiety to leam. He 
calls it anxiety I, which is “the feeling that is associated with an inability 
or unwillingness to leam something new because it appears too difficult or 
dismptive.” This anxiety is normally eluded by denying the problem, i.e. 
double bind, by simplifying it.
In order to overcome anxiety I, the leaders of an organization must 
create an anxiety that is greater than anxiety I, which is labelled anxiety II. 
It is “the fear, shame, or guilt associated with not teaming anything new”
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(Schein 1993: 89), because the continuation of the usual procedure is 
assumed to lead to failure. However, members of the organization have to 
feel psychologically safe, i.e. the leader must show them a manageable path 
forwards.
In summary, this section introduced the factors which enforce or 
obstruct organizational learning. In order to understand their nature, the 
next section deals with organizational memory, which is the underlying 
knowledge of organizational learning.
2.6. Organizational Memory
The term “organizational memory”31 might be criticised by some 
readers as not existent. However, this term should be seen as a metaphor 
for the ability of an organization to store knowledge. In this section, after 
presenting various views about organizational memory, different 
definitions are discussed and a working definition for organizational 
memory is developed.
2.6.1. Views of Organizational Memory
This section shows with the help of examples that organizational 
memory can be classified in different ways, which are (1) implicit & 
explicit organizational memory, (2) internal & external organizational 
memory and (3) directly & indirectly available organizational memory.
(1): The literature on organizational learning offers a great choice of 
different forms of organizational memory, which can be divided into 
implicit, i.e. tacit, memory and explicit memory (cf. also Nonaka 1994: 
33), as depicted in Table 2.3.
Implicit organizational memory, in this thesis, is the description 
of storage of implicit organizational knowledge that dominantly resides in 
the minds of the organization’s employees. There are various forms, 
starting from world views about organizational cultures to standard
7
c
.u '
3  ^ In this thesis the terms “organizational memory” and “organizational knowledge” have the same 
connotation. (
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operation procedures. These immaterial memories can be implicitly held or 
explicitly stated, and can also be expressed by explicit memory.
E xp lic it o rg an iza tio n a l m em ory, in this thesis, is the label for 
inform ative storage form s, which are stored independently of 
organizational members. However, only a few authors such as Argyris & 
Schon (1978: 160), Kim (1993a: 71), Dixon (1992: 43ff) and Nonaka 
(1994: 33) relate expressly to explicit organizational memory, such as 
documents and reports, files and records or computer data and expert 
systems, i.e. information software.
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Table 2.3: Forms of Organizational Memory/Knowledge
Imolicit Oraanizational Memorv/Knowledae:
- Organizational culture Hedberg 1981: 6, Pautzke 1989: 78, Dixon 1992: 43ff, 
Nonaka 1994: 33
- Mental maps and models Hedberg 1981: 6, Kim 1993: 43 and 1993a: 71
- World views Nystrom & Starbuck 1984: 55, Pautzke 1989: 78, Kim 1993: 45 
and 1993a: 73f
- Meaning of life models Pautzke 1989: 78
- Theories of actions Argyris & Schon 1978:10ff, cf. also Pawlowsky 1992: 
202, Dixon 1992: 43
- Norms & Values Hedberg 1981: 6, Pawlowsky 1992: 202
- Customs & Rituals Hedberg 1981: 6, Nystrom & Starbuck 1984: 55
- Symbols Hedberg 1981: 6, Nystrom & Starbuck 1984: 55
- Myths & Sagas Hedberg 1981: 6, Nystrom & Starbuck 1984: 55, 
Pawlowsky 1992: 202
- Policies Stata 1989: 64, Dixon 1992: 43
- Strategies Stata 1989: 64
- Behaviour Hedberg 1981: 6
- Work instructions Pawlowsky 1992: 202
- Standard operation 
procedures (SOPs)
Hedberg 1981: 6, Pawlowsky 1992: 202, Kim 1993: 45 
and 1993a: 73f, Nonaka 1994: 33
Exolicit Oraanizational Memorv/Knowledae:
- Documents & 
reports
Argyris & Schon 1978: 160, Kim 1993: 43 and 1993a: 71, 
Dixon 1992: 43, Nonaka 1994: 33
- Files & records Argyris & Schon 1978: 160, Kim 1993: 43 and 1993a: 71, 
Dixon 1992: 43, Nonaka 1994: 33
- Computer data & 
expert systems
Argyris & Schon 1978: 160, Kim 1993: 43 and 1993a: 71, 
Dixon 1992: 43, Nonaka 1994: 33
(2): Organizational memory can, however, also be divided into internal 
and external organizational memory (cf. also Dixon 1992: 43).
In tern a l org a n iza tio n a l m em ory is all memory that an 
organization keeps within itself in immaterial or material form, i.e. inside 
the heads of the organization’s employees or inside organization’s 
documents, files, or computers.
External organizational m em ory, however, com prises all 
knowledge that is outside the organization, but retrievable. This memory 
may reside in competing or co-operating organizations, publicly-available
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official records, commercial databases and with former organizational ^
members.
(3): Organizational memory can, lastly, also be classified according to '
whether it is directly or indirectly available to the organization (cf. also 
Pautzke 1989: 63-88).
Directly available organizational memory is labelled “actual 
knowledge base”, and includes only the individual knowledge that is 
available to the organization. The core part of this knowledge is shared by 
all members of the organization.
Indirectly available organizational memory is called “latent 
knowledge base”, and comprises knowledge of the organizational members, 
as well as of the environment, which is not directly available to the 
organization. It is only potentially available knowledge to the organization.
In the “layered m o d e l ” 32 by Pautzke (1989: 63-88), additionally to the 
various classification of organizational memory introduced above, “cosmic 
knowledge” is included, which is not part of the organizational knowledge 
base, i.e. organizational memory (see Figure 2.5). This is because Pautzke 
defines organizational memory as the existence of knowledge that is 
somehow available to the organization.
The layer model gives no clue as to how organizational memory looks 
in reality. This can only be concluded by the views given before. The 
directly available organizational memory, plus the individual knowledge 
which is not directly available to the organization, equates with the internal 
organizational memory.
Organizational learning takes place in this layered model by flows of 
learning from outer levels to the inner levels of organizational memory.
There is a circular learning process inside the centre of the layers model, 
which is called “knowledge shared by everybody” (cf. Pautzke 1989: 111- 
32).
“Schichtenmodell” in German.
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Figure 2.5: Layered Model of the Organizational Knowledge Base
# # # LATENT KNOWLEDGE BASE
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE BASE
Knowledge shared 
by everybody
Individual knowledge available to 
the organization
Individual knowledge which is not 
available to the organization
Knowledge of the environment which exists 
through a meta knowledge in the organization
Other cosmic knowledge ? A
Source: Pautzke 1989: 79, translated from German with minor modifications.
After having presented three distinct views about organizational 
memory, definitions of organizational memory are discussed.
2.6.2. Definitions of Organizational Memory
Argyris & Schon (1978: 160) focus only on maps of the past and define 
organizational memory as follows:
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“Organizational memory is a type of map, a map of the 
organization’s past.”
Although the definition of Argyris & Schon has the advantage of being 
very short, this may also be a disadvantage, as it is incomplete and does not 
recognise individual knowledge gained from somewhere else.  ^l
Hedberg (1981: 6) stresses the perception that an organization has not r-kc -\
only its own way of learning, but also its own knowledge storage, which is ^  ^  in­
different from that of its organizational members: '
“Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive '
systems and memories. As individuals develop their personalities, 
personal habits and beliefs over time, organizations develop 
world views and ideologies. Members can come and go and 
leadership changes, but organizations’ memories preserve certain 
behaviours, mental maps, norms and values over time.”
However, this definition has also to be criticised for its incompleteness 
and inconsistency. On the one hand, it shows that Hedberg does not take 
explicit organizational memory as presented above into account, such as 
documents, files or computer data, which are an important way to make an 
organization independent of the fluctuation of its members. On the other 
hand, the definition might give the impression that the organization is  ^  ^ j 
totally independent of its members, which is not always the case, especially 
if it relies mainly on implicit organizational memory which resides in its 
members.
Another definition of organizational memory originates from Kim 
(1993: 43 and 1993a: 71). It says that organizational memory may contain 
information which is scattered and accessible to the agents of organizational 
learning, however, only inside the organization:
“Organizational memory, broadly defined, includes everything 
that is contained in an organization that is somehow retrievable.”
The idea of Argyris & Schon (1978: 160) to present organizational 
maps as organizational memory which are merged from individual maps, is 
also taken up by Kim (1993: 43 and 1993a: 71), who calls it shared mental 
models. Kim (1993: 44f and 1993a: 69-74) divides shared mental models 
into “Weltanschauung” (German word for “world view”), made from
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individual frameworks, and “organizational routines”, assembled from 
individual routines.
Problems can arise if the memory of an organization is mainly based 
on the memories of its members. If the organization is only dependent on 
individuals, it risks losing experience acquired expensively, and, thereby, 
parts of its memory, if organizational members leave the organization (cf. 
also Stata 1989: 64). It is argued in this thesis that this is mainly the case 
with Learning Organizations, as they rely heavily on people as 
organizational memory. Therefore, it is especially important for these 
types of organizations to create a commitment of their employees, in order 
to retain them for a long period. This can be achieved, for example, by a 
salary which is above average and internal opportunities for personal 
growth.
After discussing different definitions for the organizational memory, 
the following working definition, which limits memory to internal 
knowledge, in order to be operationalizeable, is developed here:
“Organizational memory is normally defined as the internal ^
implicit and explicit knowledge of an organization, which is -yr ^
directly or indirectly available to the organization.”
The next section deals with different forms of organizational learning 
cycles, and provides a synthesis at the end, which combines most of the 
components discussed so far.
2.7. Organizational Learning Cycles
The previous sections introduced the theories for three types of 
learning (individual, team and organizational learning), the three 
organizational learning levels (single-loop, double-loop and deutero- 
learning), the factors which induce, enforce and obstruct organizational 
learning, as well as the concept for organizational memory. This section 
develops an integrated model of these elements, which is developed after 
presenting the organizational learning cycles by other authors.
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There are various organizational learning cycles. Their quality depends 
on whether they are on the organizational single-loop or double-loop 
learning level, as explained above in this chapter. Single-loop learning can 
be described as a regulating loop that corrects deviations from the given 
aim. Double-loop learning, however, as a higher level learning, can be 
described as an amplifying loop.
Organizational learning cycles are presented in three groups. The first 
group consists of “basic organizational learning cycles”, which only take 
place at the organizational level. The second group gets more specific with 
“advanced learning cycles”, which encompass the different levels of the 
organization, i.e. the individual and the organizational level. This is also 
the case with the third group of “advanced learning cycles with memory”, 
which additionally includes the existence of organizational memory or 
knowledge.
2.7.1. Basic Organizational Learning Cycles
This section, which presents four different basic organizational 
learning cycles, describes learning only on an organizational level.
The first basic organizational learning cycle by Argyris & Schon 
(1978: 22, 27 and 14If) divides a organizational learning cycle into four 
phases (see Figure 2.6). Firstly, organizational members “discover” errors 
or problems by carrying out a collaborative inquiry. Secondly, they 
“invent” new strategies, designed to correct the error or solve the problem. 
Thirdly, these strategies are “produced” or implemented. And lastly, an 
evaluation and “generalization” of the implementation is made.
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Figure 2.6: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Argyris and Schon
Discovery
Generalization Invention
Production
Source: In reference to Argyris & Schon 1978: 141, with slight changes.
The second basic organizational learning cycle comes from Draft & 
Weick (1984: 284-95) (see Figure 2.7). It starts with “scanning”, which 
means data collection about the environment through monitoring. Then, 
with the help of “interpretation” concepts and theories are developed to 
enlighten the data with a meaning, which is shared among top management. 
In the end, “learning” takes place when action is taken on the basis of the 
knowledge gained from scanning and interpretation.
Then, the cycle can be re-entered through scanning or interpretation, a 
choice that is not possible within the organizational learning cycles of other 
authors. However, Draft & Weick focus particularly on the interpretation 
only by the higher management level, which might appear a limited view, 
for organizational learning, as this can be done by experts or opinioi 
leaders in the organization as well.
A-
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Figure 2.7: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Draft & Weick
INTERPRETATION 
(Data Given Meaning)
SCANNING 
(Data Collection)
LEARNING 
(Action Taken)
Source: Draft & Weick 1984: 286.
In the third basic organizational learning cycle Carlsson et al. (1995: 
65-75) divide organizational learning into four steps (see Figure 2.8), 
which they base on the experimental individual learning cycle from Kolb 
(cf., e.g., 1984).
Figure 2.8: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Carlsson et al.
Concrete
Experience
DivergenceExecution
Active
Experimentation
Reflective
Observation
Convergence Assimilation
^  Abstract ^  
Conceptualization
Source: Carlsson et al. 1995: 67, with omissions by the author of this thesis.
The “concrete experience” is the basis on which to start with. It is 
examined by “reflective observation” in the next step. Then, an “abstract
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conceptualization” is performed to embed the observations into a 
theoretical framework. Lastly, these theories are used to guide further 
“active experimentation”. This enables the organization and its members to 
gain new insights and experiences to go through the learning cycle again.
For the fourth basic organizational learning cycle by Nevis et al. (1995: 
74) the organizational learning process consists of three steps. Firstly, 
through “knowledge acquisition” skills, insights or relationships are 
developed. Secondly, with “knowledge sharing” everybody receives the 
information that has been acquired by others. Lastly, “knowledge 
utilization” takes place, which means that learning is integrated and, 
thereby, available to everybody and can be applied to new situations.
The organizational learning cycles described above generally consist of 
three to four different steps. They are summarised in Table 2.4 below. Step 
I deals with the organizational learning input, step II and III with the 
learning throughput and step IV with the organizational learning output of 
the basic organizational learning cycle.
Table 2.4: Basic Organizational Learning Cycles
Author/s Step 1 Step II Step III Step IV
Argyris & 
Schon 1978
Discovery Invention Production Generali­
zation
Draft & Weick 
1984
Scanning Interpretation Learning
Carlsson et 
al. 1995
Concrete
Experience
Reflective
Observation
Abstract Con­
ceptualization
Active Ex­
perimentation
Nevis at al. 
1995
Acquisition Sharing Generalization
However, these organizational learning cycles all have in common that 
they neither include individual learning nor team learning as an important 
part of organizational learning, nor organizational knowledge.
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2.7.2. Advanced Organizational Learning Cycles
The second group of organizational learning cycles is called 
“advanced”, because it comprises, besides organizational learning and 
action, also individual learning.
One of the first advanced organizational learning cycles was developed 
by March & Olsen (1976: 12ff, cf. also Hedberg 1981: 3 and Pautzke 1989: 
127f) and is labelled the “complete cycle of choice” (see Figure 2.9).
The learning cycle, according to March & Olsen (1976: 13), is started 
by the fact that some organizational members perceive a discrepancy 
between their “models of the world” and their environment. They try to 
make it fit again by their “individual actions”. This individual behaviour 
becomes “organizational actions”, which are either only choices of actions 
or even outcomes of these actions. Organizational actions provoke 
“environmental responses”, in the form of environmental actions. These 
actions affect again the individuals’ perception and preferences: either the 
perceived discrepancies have been removed now or the learning cycle has 
to be run through again.
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Figure 2.9: The Organizational Learning Cycle by March & Olsen
Environmental actions 
- or "responses"
Organizational actions; 
"Choices" or "Outcomes
Individuals' cognitions 
and preferences, their 
"models of the world"
Individual actions 
or participation in 
a choice situation
Source: March & Olsen 1976: 13.
Pautzke (1989: 128f) develops a further model for an organizational 
learning cycle (see Figure 2.10), which leads to collective learning. 
“Individual learning” conflicts in this model are solved through collective 
“argumentation”. This leads to “collective learning” that has to undergo a 
process of “institutionalization” or “formalization”. This again forms the 
frame for a further individual learning process.
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Figure 2.10: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Pautzke
Individual
learning
Argumentation
Understanding-
orientated
engagement
Collective
learning
Institutionalization
Formalization
Source: Pautzke 1989: 128, translated from German.
The organizational learning cycle by Dixon (1994) consists of four 
imperative steps, which are as follows (see Figure 2.11): (1) Generate 
information, (2) integrate this information into the organizational context,
(3) interpret the information collectively and (4) act responsibly based on 
the interpreted meaning. Dixon (1994: 45f) also suggests that each member 
of the organization must be engaged in all steps of the experimental 
individual learning cycle by Kolb^3 (which is in the centre of the 
organizational learning cycle in Figure 2.11), in order to make the 
organizational learning cycle happen.
33 As shown above, Carlsson et a l 1995 transfer this experimental individual learning cycle from Kolb 
to an organizational learning cycle (cf., e.g., Kolb 1984).
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Figure 2.11: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Dixon
Generate
Concrete
experience
Reflective | 
observation
Active
experimentation
IntegrateAct
V  Abstract ^  
conceptualization
Interpret
Source: Dixon 1994: 46.
In summary, the advanced organizational learning cycles described 
above consist of four different steps, which are all summarised in Table 2.5 
below. Whereas March & Olson focus on the interaction of individual, 
organization and environment, Pautzke focuses here on the transfer from 
individual learning to collective learning, an area which lacks in Dixon’s 
model as individual and organizational learning are two separate cycles.
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Table 2.5: Advanced Organizational Learning Cycles
A u th o r/s Step 1 Step II S tep III S tep IV
March & Olson 
1976
Individual
beliefs
Individual
action
Organizational
action
Environmental
response
Pautzke 1989 Individual
learning
Argumentation Collective
Learning
Institutionaliz.,
Formalization
Dixon 1994 Generate Integrate Interpret Act
However, these organizational learning cycles have in common that 
they do not include either team learning or organizational knowledge as 
important parts of organizational learning, the latter of which is the case 
for the cycles presented next.
2.7.3. Advanced Organizational Learning Cycles with Memory
The third group is called “advanced organizational learning cycles with 
memory”, because, besides embracing individual and organizational 
learning and action, this group also includes organizational knowledge.
Müller-Strevens & Pautzke (1989: 14Iff) present a model for an 
organizational learning cycle which contains elements of the steps of 
gaining knowledge (see Figure 2.12). The learning process is induced by an 
“action”, which leads to individual knowledge, based on individual 
“experience” or the sensing of differences in the environment. Through the 
process of “collective learning”, individual knowledge is transformed into 
organizational knowledge. In order to keep it available for the 
organization, it has to be to be transmitted into the organizational 
knowledge by “institutionalization”. This institutionalized, authorized 
knowledge of the organization again influences future action of its 
individuals.
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Figure 2.12: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Müller-Strevens & 
Pautzke
0)oc
.0
0
Q.
X
LU
L
r Collective learningr
t
Individual
knowledge
Knowledge of 
organization
Realization of 
knowledge
Institutionaliz.
authorized
organizational
knowledge
Action
D0)
o30
n ‘
§ •.o3
Source: Müller-Strevens & Pautzke 1989: 143, translated from German.
Müller-Strevens & Pautzke’s model has a distinct weakness as neither 
experience can be gained in teams nor can learning happen individually.
The model of the organizational learning cycle developed by Nonaka & 
Takeuchi (1995: 56-94) is called the “Five phase model of the 
organizational knowledge-creation^^ process”, and it is complex in its 
structure. The model is based on the spiral of organizational knowledge
Despite the fact that Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995: 44ff) claim that organizational knowledge-creation is 
different to organizational learning, this is regarded as a tautology here, as the reasons given for the need of 
a distinction appear rather weak. However, it was shown in this chapter before that organizational 
knowledge is frequently mentioned in the different definitions of organizational learning (it is certainly a 
part of the definition of organizational learning of this thesis) and the opinions about organizational 
learning do not diverge much. It will also be shown in Chapter 3 that anticipation, and not adaptation, is a 
key element of the concept of the Learning Organization in the literature to date.
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creation, which uses two dimensions: the epistem ological and the 
ontological dimension.
The epistemological dimension has the distinction between tacit and 
explicit knowledge as its key feature (cf. also Chapter 6) and includes the 
shifts between different modes of knowledge conversion. This starts with 
the mode of (1) socialization (field building), continues with (2) 
extemalization (dialogue or collective reflection), then (3) combination 
(linking explicit knowledge) and ends with (4) internalization (learning by 
doing), where the cycle can be re-entered.
The ontological dimension  means the different levels which the 
knowledge creation runs through, i.e. from the individual to the group to 
the organization, and even inter-organizational (which, however, can also 
be seen as a new individual level).
The epistemological and ontological dimensions are combined with five 
enabling conditions (intention, autonomy, fluctuation and creative chaos, 
redundancy, requisite variety, i.e. the in ternal diversity  of an 
organization), in order to create the “Five phase model of the 
organizational knowledge-creation process” (see Figure 2.13).
This starts with (1) sharing of tacit knowledge by the individuals in the 
development team (socialization), goes on to (2) creating concepts by 
converting tacit into explicit knowledge (extemalization), which has to be 
defended by (3) justifying concepts in an explicit way, then there is a focus 
on (4) building an archetype (combination) which includes prototyping, 
finishes by (5) cross-levelling (transfer) of knowledge gained in this 
learning process of one unit all over rest of the organization. This cycle 
can be run through again (internalization), starting from any of these five 
stages, as Nonaka & Takeuchi show in later examples.
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Figure 2.13: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Nonaka & Takeuchi
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Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 84.
V
Despite their useful distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge 
(see also Chapter 2.2), Nonaka & Takeuchi only focus on organizational 
double-loop learning in the form of new product development teams. This 
limits their model as it does not explicitly include individual learning as 
well as single-loop learning, and it also makes extemalization a 
precondition, which might be sufficient but not necessary in order to learn 
organizationally. As such the creation of organizational knowledge by 
improving existing products is omitted, which is surely more a strength of 
Japanese companies on the whole than the development of completely new 
products.
Additionally, Nonaka & Takeuchi do not include an evaluation of the 
interruptions of their model, which happened even in the exemplary 
companies described by them. This is done by the model presented next.
Kim (1993: 43-49 and 1993a: 52-78) claims that his model of an 
organizational learning cycle is the first model of organizational learning.
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which comprises the transfer from individual to organizational learning, as 
y  A^ell as the organizational knowledge base. This is not true as the models of 
March & Olson (1976) and Pautzke (1989) comprise the transfer function, 
and the model of Miiller-Strevens & Pautzke (1989) comprises, besides the 
transfer function, the existence of organizational knowledge. Whereas 
Pautzke and Miiller-Strevens & Pautzke were written in German and, 
therefore, not easily accessible to Kim, the model of March & Olson is 
explicitly described in Kim’s work.
Kim’s “integrated model of organizational learning” (1993: 43-49 and 
1993a: 52-78) is a combination of Kofman’s “observe-assess-design- 
implement individual cycle of learning” (based on his unpublished lecture 
slides at the MIT from 1992), Draft & Weick’s model of “relationship 
among organizational scanning, interpretation and learning” and Argyris & 
Schon’s “mental models”, as well as individual and organizational “single­
loop and double-loop learning” loops.
The actions of the individual learning cycle are divided by Kim (1993: 
38ff and 1993a: 52-57) into two groups, and linked to framework and 
routines (see upper left side of Figure 2.14). The first group is described as 
“conceptual individual learning” (know-why), which consists of assess and 
design and is influenced by frameworks of individual mental models. The 
second group “operational individual learning” (know-how), which consists 
of implement and observe is influenced by the individual mental models of 
routines. “Mental models” are defined as “represent[ing] a person’s view of 
the world, both explicit and implicit understanding.” (Kim 1993: 39 and 
1993a: 53).
In an individual double-loop learning process it is also possible that 
individual learning influences individual mental models. As there are many 
individuals in an organization the figure shows staples of individual 
learning cycles and individual mental models. Shared mental models are a 
combination of “Weltanschauung”, which is the organizational view of the 
world, and “organizational routines”.
The so-called “missing link” between individual and organizational 
learning is constructed by Kim (1993: 42-46 and 1993a: 67-74) through the 
process that individual mental models influence the shared mental models, 
and vice versa. However, the link between individual and organizational 
learning is not missing in the literature, it is only labelled differently, for
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example, being termed “ d i a l o g u e ” 35 . Thus, it is doubtful whether Kim’s 
claim of a new contribution to scientific knowledge is justified here.
It is further argued that team or group learning plays an important role 
for the process of organizational learning, which can, for example, happen 
in the form of a dialogue. This is neglected by Kim (1993a: 70), who 
admits that he is not directly and explicitly dealing with groups and group 
effects in his model. He further proposes to take group as a “mini 
organization” or as “extended individuals”, which appears to add to the 
confusion rather than elicit his position.
Cf. Senge (1990 and 1990a), Isaacs (1993), Kofman & Senge (1993), Luthans et a l  (1993), McGill 
& Slocum (1993), Schein (1993) and Ulrich et a l  (1993).
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Figure 2.14: The Organizational Learning Cycle by Kim
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Source: Kim 1993: 44 and 1993a: 69.
Kim (1993: 46f and 1993a: 75-78) also presents incomplete learning 
cycles, which means that the links are interrupted. These incomplete 
learning cycles are as follows: (1) Role-constrained Learning, (2) Audience 
Learning, (3) Superstitious Learning and (4) Learning under Ambiguity. 
The first four incomplete learning cycles are from March & Olson (1976: 
56-59). Kim adds (5) Situational Learning, (6) Fragmented Learning and 
(7) Opportunistic Learning.
(1): Role-constrained learning means that individual beliefs do not 
affect individual actions.
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(2): Audience learning happens when organizational action is not 
affected by individual action in an unambiguous way.
(3): Superstitious Learning derives from severed connections between 
organizational actions and environmental response.
(4): Learning under ambiguity means that the causal connections 
between individual learning and action, organizational action and 
environmental response are not clear to the individual.
Kim adds the following three possible interruptions of learning cycles:
(5): Situational Learning deals with the problem that an individual 
either forgets, or does not classify its learning for later use. That means the 
link between individual learning and individual mental models is cut off. 
And since the individual mental models did not change, the shared mental 
model cannot alter either.
In this thesis it is argued that it is not only a negative thing to forget, or 
\  to forget to codify, knowledge of problem solving. It can also be an 
important way to prevent individuals from being overloaded by 
 ^ information and, thereby, sheltering the organization from information 
 ^ ^overload. However, the organizational culture must give some basic 
f  guidelines as to what kind of information is unimportant and, thus, can be
' “forgotten”.
(6): Fragmented Learning deals with a situation wherein the individuals 
learn but the organization does not learn, i.e. the link between individual 
mental models and shared mental models is severed. Thus, organizational 
learning is fragmented among isolated individuals or groups, and cannot be 
retrieved from the organizational memory, especially if these individuals 
or groups have left the organization.
It is proposed here that fragmented learning can also be a very useful 
tool, if an organization wants to try out new ways of reacting to the 
environment. If the project of fragmented learning fails, the damage can be 
minimised. However, it is admitted that there can be severe problems of 
knowledge transfer, when the project turns out to be successful. Again, the
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organizational culture and structure will be very influential on whether 
new superior knowledge is adopted or not.^6
(7): Opportunistic Learning takes place when individual action or small 
group action influences organizational action, which does not comply with 
the commonly-shared mental models of the organization. Two examples 
are given for opportunistic learning by Kim. Firstly, IBM ’s fast 
development of its first Personal Computer, which was performed by a 
separate project team, independent of the bureaucratic organization. 
Secondly, GM ’s creation of the Saturn car project^^ is also an example of 
opportunistic learning.
/' In this thesis it is argued that these two examples might be regarded as 
successful opportunistic learning. However, both organizations did not 
manage to transfer the new insights gained to the whole organization, due
to fragmented learning.
c ^ Despite some interesting insights, Kim’s model for an organizational 
 ^^   ^ learning cycle appears to be quite complicated, lacks team learning and is  ^
not easy to follow visually.
a'-V
, ' "5 - In summary, the sub-sections so far discussed the different forms of
organizational learning cycles in listing literature to date. This thesis 
presents an approach for an organizational learning cycle in the next sub­
section, which is not too complex, but comprises all the important elements 
needed: the comprehensive organizational learning cycle.
For example, it took GM nearly 10 years before it decided to apply the new knowledge learnt in 
NUMMI and CAMI, and to build the Eisenach plant in Germany (cf. Ingrassia & White 1994).
There are various experts of the car industry (e.g., members of the International Motor Vehicle 
Program) who would not judge the Saturn project to be a success, because of the extensive development 
time, combined with many delays and high development investments. The NUMMI project, a joint-venture 
with Toyota in California, can be seen as a success for General Motors in terms of operations, however, to 
a less extend in terms of organizational learning, which was slow (cf. also Ingrassia & White 1994).
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2.7.4. Model of the Comprehensive Organizational Learning Cycle
As shown in the previous sub-sections, organizational learning cycles 
can be very complex, and can be defined very differently. The 
organizational learning cycles from the previous sub-sections included, 
besides individual and organizational learning, organizational knowledge.
The working model of the comprehensive organizational learning cycle 
of this thesis also includes team learning, which has not been done 
previously, and the importance of which has already been pointed out in q 
the • definition of organizational learning. Individual, team and ,
organizational learning can take place at a single-loop, double-loop or ^  T 
deutero-leaming level. This is indicated by the circles around each learning 
level and is integrated into a plain model of the comprehensive 
organizational learning cycle (see Figure 2.15).
This model of the comprehensive organizational learning cycle is 
performed with continuous support of organizational knowledge.
Firstly, individual learning is performed, and the lessons learnt are 
codified and, thereby, made accessible to other individuals of a team (or 
optional to the whole organization, as indicated with the thin arrow to 
“organizational learning”)._________________________ ___  —^
Secondly, team learning is accomplished^CThWias been neglected by 
the organizational learning cycle models introduced so far^^, and followed 
by a generalization of this knowledge, which is accessible to the whole 
organization.
Thirdly, organizational learning is conducted, the knowledge is 
institutionalized, and the organizational learning cycle is completed by 
leading to individual learning again. The “organizational knowledge” is 
now available to all individuals of the organization, which then have a 
revised framework for further individual learning.
All these three different types of learning can vary in their intensity, 
and, therefore, be on a single-loop, double-loop or deutero-leaming level.
Obviously, team learning includes individuals, however, at least two individuals together.
Some authors like Senge (1990) generally emphasize the importance of team learning for 
organizational learning, however, not within the context of an organizational learning cycle model.
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All the distinction made here are not that clear cut in practice as the model 
might suggest, however, the model reduces the complexity and helps to 
understand the reality better, making it easier to deal with it successfully.
Figure 2.15: The Comprehensive Organizational Learning Cycle
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tion
Institutionali­
zation
Organizational
Knowledge
Team
Learning
Organizational
Learn ing^
G enerali­
zation
Although there is a way of direct transfer from codifica tion  to 
organizational learning in this comprehensive model, by-passing team 
learning, it is argued here that this predominantly applies to non-complex 
explicit knowledge (this is the reason for drawing only a thin arrow). As a 
consequence, this plain model of the comprehensive organizational learning 
cycle can cope not only with the vast amount of complex knowledge, but 
also with tacit knowledge, which could hardly be transferred without team ^  
learning. Because it facilitates socialization, and does not need 
extemalization, which can be very resource demanding, sometimes even -  
impossible, due to the nature of tacit knowledge. '
Unlike the model of Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), which comprises 
knowledge creation by extemalization of tacit knowledge, this plain model 
of the comprehensive organizational learning cycle includes not only 
knowledge creation of new knowledge, but also acquisition of existing
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knowledge; and not only extemalization, but also other forms of ' .. . 
knowledge conversions (i.e. internalization, socialization and combination). ^
It is important to be aware of the importance of the three types of M r) {
learning - i.e. individual, team and organizational learning. They all need ^  ^
to be supported by incentives, and learning barriers have to be removed in
. . . .  . . .  . . . .  kkorder to establish an organization that can excel in learning.
However, there are still many possibilities for incomplete \  
organizational learning, also within this model of the comprehensive 
organizational learning cycle (see Figure 2.16).
There can be a break between (1) individual learning and 
codification. This means that an individual is not capable, forgot or has 
no incentives to codify newly-acquired knowledge. This is like Kim’s 
“situational learning” introduced above, when individual mental models fail 
to be created from individual learning.
The next possibility of a cut off is between (2) codification and 
team learning, which can be seen as a new contribution to the literature 
on organizational learning. It implies that codified individual knowledge is 
not made accessible to teams, who might be interested in this knowledge.
The reasons for this can be missing incentives in an organization culture or 
a structure, which prevent the individual from passing on valuable 
information (e.g., a competitive organizational culture). Another reason 
could be forgetting or a judgement that the knowledge not important 
enough to be passed on. These effects can be positive, because of efficiency 
gains, if the standards for judgement are commonly agreed upon within the 
organization.
The situation of an interruption between codification and team learning 
is similar to the one between (2) codification and organizational 
learning. The major difference lies in the fact that the codification has 
more the nature of a generalization, including the problem of potential 
conflicts of the codified knowledge with the dominant organizational 
culture.
The third interruption can happen between (3) team learning and 
g en era liza tio n . Here, the new knowledge of the team cannot be 
generalized, in order to be accessible to the whole organization. Reasons 
for this can be missing skills and training to do so, organizational values 
and structure that give no incentive for generalization or that the team
- 83 -
2. Or g a n iz a t io n a l  Lea r n in g
simply forgets the lessons learnt. Alternatively, it can happen when teams 
do not feel inclined to give away their important knowledge to other teams, 
which may even be competitors within the organization. This can be caused 
by a competitive organizational culture and/or structure.
The fourth break between (4) generalization and organizational
learning can occur, for example, when the organization is not willing to 
take up the generalization of team learning, because it conflicts with the 
dominating organizational culture or the team which generalized the 
knowledge has not a high standing within the organization. Also, the rest of 
the organization might not be convinced of the necessity of learning new 
knowledge, as the performance appears to be sufficient enough. Lastly, 
there might also no resources available to teach and learn the new 
knowledge.
The learning cycle can be also severed between (5) organizational 
learning and institutionalization, which means that generalized 
knowledge is not stored in some kind of organizational memory, 
particularly in implicit (tacit) memory forms, as described in this chapter 
before. This can be understood as the organization learnt something new, 
but failed to incorporate what it had learnt in some type of memory store, 
due to various reasons, such as lack of experience, resources or systems to 
do so.
This break is similar to “fragmented learning” in Kim’s model 
mentioned above, where the individual mental models are not transferred 
to organizational mental models. However, fragmented learning includes 
less detail as though it comprises all steps from codification, it leaves out 
team learning and generalization.
The last interruption can happen between (6) institutionalization  
and individual learning. Here the organizational memory has for some 
reasons no effect on individual learning. This can occur when the 
individual is new within the organization, and has had no time to acquire 
institutionalized organizational knowledge. Or the individual does not know 
how to retrieve organizational knowledge, as it has not been sufficiently 
publicised. It can also take place when long-serving individuals do not 
accept newly-acquired institutionalized knowledge.
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Figure 2.16: The Comprehensive Organizational Learning Cycle with 
Possible Interruptions (1 to 6) in the Learning Process
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In summary, this section developed a working model of the 
comprehensive organizational learning cycle, which also added the team 
learning element. Individual, team and organizational learning all flow, 
with mutual impact, around organizational memory. These different types 
of learning can be on a single-loop, double-loop or deutero-leaming level. 
It was also shown that this organizational learning cycle can often be 
incomplete in reality and, therefore, limiting organizational learning. This 
will be researched in practice in detail in Chapter 9.
The next chapter develops a model of an organization that excels in 
organizational learning, which is called the Learning Organization.
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3. The L earning O rganization as an Ideal
Some authors, like Pearn et a l  (1995), suggest that all organizations 
are “learning organizations”, as every organization could learn by chance.
In this thesis, however, the Learning Organization is spelt with a capital 
“L” and “O” and refers to the ideal model of an organization which excels | jb J -  
in organizational learning, as defined at the end of Chapter 2.1. Therefore, ' 
the Learning Organization is the adequate answer to a fast changing 
environment (cf. also Senge 1990a: 7 or Garvin 1993: 78). \
This chapter explicitly deals with the Learning Organization and its 
characteristics. The latter have not been refined, structured and synthesised 
to date in such a comprehensive way, also depending on how conducive 
these characteristics are for organizational learning.
First, different theories of organizations are presented and discussed.
Then, various definitions of Learning Organizations are analysed and a 
working definition is developed. Afterwards, the ten characteristics of the 
Learning Organization are constructed from the examination of nearly 
thirty different pieces of literature about the Learning Organization. The 
theoretical interdependencies and order of importance of the characteristics 
of the Learning Organization are discussed in the end.
3.1. Perceptions of the Organization
There are various different perceptions of an organization, but this 
work will focus on those images which were most important for the 
evolutionary development of the model of the Learning Organization.^o 
These perceptions are: the organization as a machine, as an organism or as 
a learning entity, which will all three be introduced in this section.
3.1.1. Perception of the Organization as a Machine
The classic management theory was predominantly driven by an 
engineering perspective. The concept was mechanistic and perceived the
For an introduction of further viewpoints of the organization as a social system, as a political system 
or as a culture, etc., see Morgan 1986.
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organization as a machine. An organization was seen to be manageable with 
the help of analytical calculations and construction. The aim was to 
structure an organization optimally according to its working techniques, 
independent of the situation, as there was a deep belief in a one-best-way. 
Representatives of this school of thought were Gutenberg, Weber, Fayol 
and Taylor.
In this thesis the “B ureaucratic-T ayloristic O rganization” is
chosen for the image of an organization as a machine, as it is applicable to 
organizations with office as well as shop-floor employees. In addition, 
W eber’s bureaucracy and Taylorism appear to be the most important 
theories of perceiving an organization as a machine.
“Bureaucratic” refers to an office setting of white collar employees. 
This term was made popular by the German sociologist Max Weber, who 
propagated the Bureaucratic Organization as a superior form of 
organization. The reasons for the belief in its superiority as oppose to other 
forms of organizations were as follows (Weber 1947: 324-33, cf. also 
Bendix 1966: 423-30 and Gabier Wirtschafts-Lexikon 1988: 103If):
- Orderly system of rules on basis of a statute
- Legal-rational authority
- Differentiation of positions and distribution of functions, responsibilities 
and authorisation
- Standardization of tasks
- Hierarchically structured non-personal order of positions
- Specialised training for staff
- Division of administration and ownership
- Written capturing of all actions in files
The perceived advantages of the bureaucracy, as opposed to other 
organizations in modem complex societies, are a high degree of labour 
division, differentiation, objectivity, continuity, ability to calculate, ability 
to plan and reliability.
“Tayloristic” refers to Taylorism, i.e. Scientific Management, which 
was developed in a blue-collar setting by Frederick W. Taylor and 
described in his book “The Principles of Scientific Management” in 1911. 
Scientific Management, which meant that engineers designed efficient work
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processes by dividing normal work into its smallest perceivable units of 
action with the help of stop watches. Taylorism meant all in all (cf. Gabier 
Wirtschafts-Lexikon 1988: 1887f and Staehle 1990: 22f):
- Systematic time-and-motion studies
- Pay depends on work efficiency
- Division of planning and execution
- Scientific working methods and standardisation of tasks
- Control of work by management
- Functional organization
Both theories, W eber’s Bureaucracy and Taylor’s Scientific 
Management, which are combined to the Bureaucratic-Tayloristic 
Organization here, refer to the perception of the organization as a machine 
and assume that it only needs to be fine-tuned once it is established. 
Furthermore, employees, white-collars as well as blue collars, can easily be 
exchanged and they are more seen as a simple production factor than 
human beings with more complex personalities.
The problem with the Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organization is that the 
organization is hard to, overlook jor grasp for its employees, as work is 
divided into small bits.^TMs leads to uncomfortable feelings and lower 
participation, aTcatrses and relationships cannot be assessed; and, therefore, 
employees do not feel able change anything (cf. also Gabier Wirtschafts- 
Lexikon 1988: 1887f).
Although the Bureajjeratic-Tayloristic Organization might be useful in 
stable environments^This strength turns out to be a weakness in an unstable 
environment, as it is a major difficulty to change the structure of the 
Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organization in a short time, as this is not its main 
purpose. Change normally only happens when the higher levels of the 
organization’s management perceive a crisis that is caused by a change in 
the environment; however, this can be too late.
In order to overcome the disadvantage of the perception of a one-best- 
way, a different concept was developed, which focused on the metaphor of 
an organism that reacts more flexible to changes in the environment.
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3.1.2. Perception of the Organization as an Organism
This concept of an organization as an organism was developed as a 
result of the criticism of the organization as a machine. Derived from 
biology, the organism concept comprises environmental conditions, 
specifically the relationship between the organization and its environment. 
The organization is determined by the environment and survival is the key 
(cf. Morgan 1986: 39-71, Klimecki et al. 1991: 112ff and Staehle 1991: 
837-41).
Burns & Stalker’s (1961) development of the organic system can be 
seen as one of the most important representatives of the model of an 
organism. They develop it as a counter model to the mechanistic system, 
after researching different industries. They argue that when “novelty and 
unfamiliarity in both market situation and technical information become 
the accepted order of things, a fundamentally different kind of management 
system becomes appropriate [i.e. organic system] from that which applies 
to a relatively stable commercial and technical environment.” (Bums & 
Stalker 1961: XXI).
This model of an organization as an organism represents an important 
step in the direction of the organization as a learning system. However, it is j 
argued here, that with its predominantly adaptive point of view (i.e., that 
the organization adapts to change), the model does not include the ability of 
an organization to anticipate change. It can also be the case that the 
structure of an organization alters its environment, which is not really 
considered by the image of an organization as an organism (cf. also 
Klimecki et al. 1991: 113).
3.1.3. Perception of the Organization as a Learning Entity
Neither the image of an organization as a machine nor as an organism 
includes the capability to anticipate or change the environment. This wasi 
done with the development of the perception of an organization as a| 
learning entity, which was derived from sociology.
The organization as a learning entity has the ability to reflect critically 
through its members and use past experience, in order to anticipate future/ 
events and prepare itself for them. Additionally, the organizations are sea
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as social systems, which secure their continuation through the generation of 
a meaning of life. Therefore, organizations are dissolved or reconstructed 
if they cannot generate meaning anymore, as they are only man-made 
artificial constructs (cf. Klimecki et al. 1991: 114-20 and Staehle 1991: 
842-46).
It is argued here that the perception of organizations as learning entities 
helps to understand and identify the amplifier for, and the impediments 
against, organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The framework of the , i 
Learning Organization is a useful tool to analyse and improve capabilities 
of existing organizations to learn, in order to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their actions, including the capability to anticipate changes 
or change the environment according to their needs.
3.1.4. Perception of the Machine vs. the Learning Entity
This section deals with the differences between the Bureaucratic- 
Tayloristic Organization, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, and 
the Learning Organization^k Although both might not be a perfect picture 5 
of reality, these two archetypes help to decipher organizational structure  ^
and their purpose.
An example is provided to demonstrate the different purposes of 
Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organizations and Learning O r g a n i z a t i o n s . 2^
Firstly, take a Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organization and let all its ^ 
members leave. It will be possible to continue to work with new staff after ^ 
a short while. This is because most of the work in Bureaucratic-Tayloristic
In order to avoid any misinterpretation, it might be added at this point that “high involvement I ,  ^  ^  
organizations”, “high commitment organizations”, or “fun organizations” do not judge an organization on '
the basis of its learning and, therefore, can be classified as Learning Organizations as well as Bureaucratic- 
Tayloristic Organizations.
"^ 2 This example has got a different outcome from the scenario given by Kim (1993: 44f and 1993a:
7 Iff), who claims that it is always easier for all kinds of organizations to survive a loss of all files than a 
loss of all members. The main reason for this is that Kim claims that even in very bureaucratic 
organizations the main essence of the organization is embodied in the people and not in the system. This is 
an argument that cannot be ascribed to bureaucratic organizations (Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organizations) 
here, because one of their main intentions is to be independent of key people.
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Organization is based on the principle ''Quod non est in actis, non est in 
mundo''^^, which means that all proceedings are to be noted in files and 
jobs to be clearly structured. However, when a Bureaucratic-Tayloristic 
Organization is confronted with a loss of site including its files, the 
employees are expected to have a very hard time in trying to make the 
organization work again.
Secondly, take a Learning Organization and let it relocate to a different 
site without files, but with all current staff. The reaction will be that the 
Learning Organization will be able to continue to work, because it is 
people-oriented and does not rely on files to such a great extent. However, 
if current organizational members are replaced by new staff at the old site, 
this can be a catastrophe for the Learning Organization, as knowledge is 
centred on people rather than on media.
Thus, for Learning Organizations implicit knowledge tends to be more‘ ' “' j ^ 9  
important because they are more people driven, whereas Bureaucraticr ^  ^  
Tayloristic Organizations are more dependent on explicit organizational / 
knowledge.
In brief, the ideal of the Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organization is the ; 
adequate answer to stable environments, whereas the ideal of the Learning } ' 
Organization is an adequate answer to fast changing environments, because ' 
it excels in the capability of organizational learning. Thus, the question 
arises whether environments are going to be more and less stable in the /
future. In particular, how does the situation look in the automotive supplier ^  
industry in the UK, being the focus of this empirical research? ^
The European Union (EU) negotiated a “voluntarily agreed limit” 
between the EU and Japan in 1991, in order to protect the car industry in 
Western Europe from Japanese car imports. This lead to vast direct 
investment by Japanese car producers and some of their suppliers in 
Europe, especially in Britain. In 1999, the old agreement runs out and the 
free market rules of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
apply to the European car market (FAZ 2-4-1997, FT 14-7-1992, FT (5)
This can be translated with: What is not laid down in files does not exist. It is a quote of a civil 
servant of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He further gave the example of newly joining an 
embassy, where none of the top civil servants were available for different reasons. However, he could 
quickly take up all major tasks, because there were files about them.
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28-6-1993, FT (9) 28-6-1993 and Welters 1994: 22). All these factors 
accelerate change in the Western European car industry, including car 
component suppliers, especially in Britain - an area this thesis will focus its 
investigation on in more depth.
In summary, the Learning Organization is the adequate organizational 
structure for a fast changing environment, which is especially due to its 
capability to anticipate change. However, one should keep in mind that the 
Learning Organization, as well as the Bureaucratic-Tayloristic 
Organization, are both ideal types of organizations and will rarely be 
found in this purity in reality.
The next section will take a closer look at definitions of the Learning 
Organization, as they are given in the literature.
3.2. Definitions of the Learning Organization
This section presents and discusses some definitions of the Learning 
Organizations in literature. Thereafter, a working definition for this thesis 
is developed as a synthesis.
According to Senge (1990: 3)
“ [Learning Organizations] are organizations where people 
continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly 
desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are 
nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where 
people are continually learning how to learn together.”
The definition of the learning company by Pedler et al. (1991: 1)^  ^ is 
quite similar to the one for the Learning Organization of Burgoyne (1992: 
323):
“A Learning Company is an organization that facilitates the learning of all its members and 
continuously transforms itself.” Pedler et al. (1991: 1) state in their book that they preferred the term 
learning company to learning organizations, because they thought it to be more convenient to practitioners 
for whom their book was intended.
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“a learning organization continuously transforms itself in the 
process reciprocally linked to the development of all its 
members.”
This definition is not very precise and, thus, hard to operationalize, 
which would be needed to be of use for this thesis’s empirical work.
Garvin (1993: 80) presents the following definition of the Learning 
Organization, after reviewing various definitions of organizational ^  
learning. This is inaccurate as organizational learning is not the same as the 
Learning Organization, as the former is a process, whereas the latter is a ^  
system. Therefore, his definition is very process oriented:
“A learning organization is an organization skilled at creating, 
acquiring and transferring knowledge and at modifying its 
behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insights.”
Thurbin (1994: 7) suggests a definition, which is easy to understand 
for practitioners, and appears more operationalizeable than the previous 
definitions. It focuses on individuals as learning agents:
“A learning organization is one which improves its knowledge 
and understanding of itself and its environment over time, by 
facilitating and making use of the learning of its individual 
members.”
These definitions show that the authors have an ideal of the Learning 
Organization in mind, which is not just an organization that learns. 
Developing a working definition for this thesis, it is suggested that only 
those organizations are labelled Learning Organizations, which show a high 
performance in organizational learning. This could be phrased as: The 
Learning Organization is an organization which excels in organizational 
learning.
The reason for this high performance in organizational learning, 
including its agents, is dealt with the next part of the definition: This is 
because this organization possesses a high degree o f certain characteristics 
that foster the process o f acquisition or generation o f organizational 
knowledge through its members.
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And the results of this organizational learning are dealt by: which is 
intentionally used fo r the continuous improvement o f organizational actions 
and its outcomes.
In summary, following working definition of the Learning 
Organization is proposed for this thesis:
The Learning Organization is an organization which excels in 
organizational learning and outcomes. This is because this \/^ f\AfCyr
organization possesses a high degree of certain characteristics 
that foster the process of acquisition or generation of  ^ (
organizational knowledge through its members, which is 
intentionally used for the continuous improvem ent of 
organizational actions and its outcomes.
There is no consensus in the literature on Learning Organizations as to 
what exactly these characteristics of the Learning Organization are. The 
next section develops a synopsis of the characteristics mentioned by the 
literature to date.
3.3. The Ten Characteristics of the Learning O r g a n i z a t i o n ^ ^
The methodological development of the ten characteristics of the 
L earning O rganization of this thesis started with Senge’s f iv e  
disc ip lines. Senge (1990: 5) argues that what “fundamentally will 
distinguish learning organizations from traditional authoritarian 
‘controlling organizations’^ 6 will be the mastery of certain basic disciplines.
That is why the ‘disciplines of the learning organization’ are vital.”
Senge (1990) names five different critical disciplines, as a set for the 
Learning Organization. They are as follows:
(1) Systems thinking refers to a certain conceptual framework, 
which makes the pattern of the events clear, and enables to change those
Cf. also parts of Rosengarten (1993: 29-36), but especially the ECLO (European Consortium of the 
Learning Organization) Conference Paper (Rosengarten 1995: 231-52) and the LILO (Learning Individual 
Learning Organization) Meeting Paper (Rosengarten 1996a: 1-15).
In this thesis, Senge’s “traditional authoritarian controlling organization” is called “Bureaucratic- 
Tayloristic Organization”; it is compared to the Learning Organization at the end of Chapter 3.1.
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patterns if needed. (2) Personal mastery refers to a certain standard of 
proficiency in terms of continuous clarification and intensification of the 
personal vision of what really matters in life. This is applicable to each 
member of the whole organization. (3) Mental models are the world­
views which impact people in their understanding of the world and how 
they act; and these have to be made explicit to be analysed and exchanged.
(4) Building shared vision is the key for gaining commitment of all 
members of the organization, in order to make them excel and leam by 
themselves. (5) Team learning, last but not least, is suggested by Senge to 
be the fundamental learning unit of the Learning Organization. This 
implies not only communication, but also communal thinking.
Senge’s five disciplines are taken into account when some of the ten 
characteristics o f the Learning Organization are developed in this thesis; 
but these are not necessarily exactly the same like the disciplines, due to 
suggestions by other authors as well as further an a ly ^ an d  evaluation.
Systems thinking alone, for example, would limit the potential breadth ^
of this characteristic, as the former is a specific tool of “systemic thinking”. ' I  ^  
In fact, this characteristic systemic thinking is not necessarily limited to one 
tool and could also be described as the thinking of “a wise old man”, which 
takes interacting variables of a decision into account. Personal mastery, in 
the context of developing the characteristics of the Learning Organization, 
is seen as the ability to generate and pursue a supportive organizational 
learning culture, which fosters dialogue, personal interpretation of reality 
and personal vision of the future as well as openness and commitment.
These enable the creation of shared mental models and shared visions, 
which are regarded as a shared interpretation of reality and shared vision 
of the future. They are subsumed as parts of the “supportive corporate 
learning culture” here. With respect to team learning, as opposed to 
Senge’s suggestion (1990: 10) that “unless teams can leam, the organization 
cannot learn” ?^, it is shown in th is^esis  that an organization, particularly 
the Learning Organization, can also learn through individual learning - Sù-^ 
alone. ^
____________________________  U r
Admittedly, Senge (1990: 139) later also suggests in his book: “Organizations leam only through 
individuals who learn. Individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning. But without it no 
organizational learning occurs.” Still, this does not contradict the statement referred to in the text.
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Scanning the literature on Learning Organizations, one can find 
similar, but also further, suggestions for the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization that are conducive to organizational learning, and, therefore, 
organizational learning outcomes. These various characteristics of the 
Learning Organization are analysed and transformed into a list, which is 
presented here. Then their interrelationship is discussed and an initial 
ranking according to their importance for organizational learning is 
suggested.
&
This thesis’ contribution is that these characteristics of the Learning ^
Organization have not been refined, structured and synthesised to date in 
such a comprehensive way, also according to how conducive they are for 
organizational learning. This becomes clear in an overview of how these 
characteristics’ appear in literature (see Table 3.1), where only maximal 
seven out of the ten are mentioned in one single source and this only in tw o ^  % ^  
out of twenty eight cases. In addition, many models in/existing literature 
seem to be piecemeal and sometimes diffuse in their structure.
These ten characteristics of the Learning Organization's^ crucial to 
excel in organizational learning and its outcomes, are as follows:
• Team work and team learning, in order to facilitate organizational 
learning in cross-functional and/or cross-hierarchical project work.
• Systemic thinking and mental models to (re)structure an organization 
according to its current and future organizational learning requirements.
• Free vertical and horizontal flow o f information to enable a continuous 
information exchange, needed for organizational learning.
• Education and training o f the whole workforce, in order to ensure that 
organizational learning can takes place in the most efficient way.
• Learning reward system fo r employees, in order to keep organizational 
learning going in a self-perpetuated systematic process.
• Continuous improvement o f work, in order to ensure steady 
organizational learning regarding efficiency and effectiveness of tasks.
This order does not indicate any specific ranking, this will be done later in this chapter.
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Flexibility o f company strategy and employees, in order to provide 
enough flexibility and variety for organizational learning.
Decentralized hierarchies and participative management, in order to 
guarantee speed of organizational learning and its implementation.
Learning laboratories and constant experimentation, in order to enable 
organizational ‘Teaming by doing” while limiting the potential risk.
Supportive corporate learning culture, in order to facilitate and foster 
organizational learning by a clear set of assisting values and goals.
Each of these elements of the Learning Organization will be discussed 
in more detail below, including the corresponding sources in literature.
But first, in order to gain a better overview of the characteristics of the 
Learning Organization, a list of authors and their works about Learning 
Organizations, most of them quoted in the last section, is given in Table
3.1. Characteristics of the Learning Organization which have been covered 
by authors are marked with an “X”.
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Table 3.1: Available Literature Covering the Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
A u th o r ( s ) Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Argyris & Schon 1 9 7 8 X X X X X X X X
Hedberg 1 981 X X X
Shrivastava 1 9 8 3 X X X X X
Fiol & Lyles 1 9 8 5 X X X
Puick 1 9 8 8 X
Pautzke 1 9 8 9 X
Stata 1 9 8 9 X X X X X
Senge 1 9 9 0 X X X X X X X X X
Senge 1990a X X X X X
Sirkin & Stalk 1 9 9 0 X X
Klimecki et al 1 991 X X X X X X X
Leonard-Barton 1 9 9 2 X X X X X X X X X
McGill at al 1 9 9 2 X X X X X X X
Nonaka 1 9 9 2 X X X
Pawlowsky 1 9 9 2 X X
Probst 1 9 9 2 X X X X
Sonnenberg & G. 1 9 9 2 X X
Adler 1 9 9 3 X
Adler & Cole 1 9 9 3 X
Garvin 1 9 9 3 X X X X X X X
Isaacs 1 9 9 3 X X
Kim 1 9 9 3 X X X X
Kofman & Senge 1 9 9 3 X X X X
McGill & Slocum 1 9 9 3 X X X X X X X X X X X
Schein 1993a X X X X
Ulrich et al 1 9 9 3 X X X X X X X X X
Luthans et al 1 9 9 4 X X X X X X
Nevis et al 1 9 9 5 X X X X X X X X X
E xplanation  of n u m b ers on th e  top:
1 = T eam  work and team  learning
2 = S y s te m ic  thinking an d  m ental m o d e ls
3  = F ree  vertical and horizontal flow of information
4  = E ducation  and  training of th e  w h o le  w orkforce
5  = L earning rew ard sy s te m  for e m p lo y e e s
6  =  C on tin u o u s im provem ent of work
7  = Flexibility of co m p a n y  stra tegy  and  e m p lo y e e s
8  = D ecen tra lized  h ierarch ies and  participative m a n a g em en t
9 = L earning lab oratories and  co n sta n t experim entation
1 0  =  S u p p ortive  corp orate  learning culture;
10.1 = D ia lo g u e , 1 0 .2  = S h a red  interpretation of reality, 1 0 .3  = S h a red  v ision  of th e  future,
1 0 .4  = O p e n n e s s  & trust, 1 0 .5  = C om m itm en t & to leran ce , 1 0 .6  = R isk  taking & responsib ility
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3.3.1. Team Work and Team Learning
Team  work and team learning is necessary for facilitating 
organizational learning in cross-functional and cross-hierarchical project 
work inside the organization or between different organizations. This is 
because it is not dependent on official hierarchical ways, which slow down 
the organizational learning process and often filter vital information 
needed for the project.
“Team learning is vital because teams, not individuals, are the 
fundamental learning unit in modem organizations”, Senge (1990: 10) 
points out. The great importance of teams (or groups) in an organization is 
often stressed as being the key element of the Learning Organization, 
whether in short-term problem task forces or in long-term project teams.
Team work and team learning are vital elements for the Learning 
Organization, because organizational learning, i.e. the gathering or 
creating, processing and dissemination of knowledge, is done by co­
operating work groups (cf. Shrivastava 1983: 22).
These teams can be mixed horizontally as well as vertically (McGill et 
al. 1992: 12 and Sirkin & Stalk 1990: 28). Even mixed teams, consisting of 
suppliers, customers or competitors are common practice for Learning 
Organizations (Leonard-Barton 1992: 35 and Sirkin & Stalk 1990: 28).
Are teams autonomous or not? Do they have team leaders? If yes, how 
are they chosen? And are teams in the Learning Organization formal or 
more informal, and what impact does the degree of formalization have on 
the effectiveness of a team? Additionally, do intra-organizational or inter- 
organizational teams play a more important role for organizational 
learning?
3.3.2. Systemic Thinking and Mental Models
Systemic thinking and mental models are the basis for the process of 
structuring and restructuring the Learning Organization according to its 
current and future organizational learning requirements.
Systemic thinking is an essential tool to make individual and 
organizational learning much more simple. The whole organization is seen 
as a nexus of knots. For example, changes that are intended to improve
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some things in one part of the organization, might have a negative 
influence on other parts of the organization. Normal human cognitive 
abilities hinder the understanding of what is really going on in complex 
organizations. Feedbacks and delays are quite often vastly underestimated 
(cf. Senge 1990, 1990a, Kofman & Senge 1993: 7-15).
It is essential to take the time to see events as developing patterns within 
their context. The better the members’ perception of the whole situation, 
the better they can create links and leam (Sonnenberg & Goldberg 1992: 
55). Thus, ineffective short-term solutions are avoided that do not address 
long-term, systemic problems (Luthans et al. 1994: 13).
Systemic thinking, and the resulting sensitiveness for interactive 
relationships, leads to the collective learning of an organization, which is 
the basis of a future competitive edge (McGill et al. 1992: 12, Senge 1990: 
15 and Kofman & Senge 1993: 16f).
According to Kim (1993: 39), “mental models play an active role in 
what an individual sees and does”, because they “represent a person’s view 
of the world, including explicit and implicit understandings.” By the 
explicit description of mental models, an organizational member creates a 
precise form of expression to further enhance mutual understanding within 
the organization. Via interpersonal comparison of these different models, a 
shared mental model of the organization can be developed that is accepted 
by everyone (Stata 1989: 65ff, McGill et al. 1992: 12, Kim 1993: 44-48 
and Schein 1993a: 41). Schein (1993a: 41) even stresses: “Any form of 
organizational learning, therefore, will require the evolution of mental 
models that cut across the subcultures of the organization.”
But it seems questionable that every person in the organization will 
really reveal his/her model, unless there is an atmosphere of deep mutual 
trust. Trust building, however, is a task that needs a long time and common 
experience, and even then it is not certain that every person feels obliged to 
reveal his/her interests, because for example they sense that if they do so, 
they become too vulnerable.
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3.3.3. Free Vertical and Horizontal Flow of Information
Free vertical and horizontal flow of information helps to enable a 
continuous information exchange between different departments and layers 
of the organization, which is needed for organizational learning.
In the Learning Organization the boundaries are highly permeable 
(McGill & Slocum 1993: 77). Not only must internal flow of information 
across functions and projects be guaranteed, but also the integration and, 
thereby, usage of external information from, e.g., suppliers, customers and 
even competitors (Leonard-Barton 1992: 25, Garvin 1993: 86f, Luthans et 
a l  1994: 12, McGill & Slocum 1993: 77 and Ulrich et a l  1993: 60-65).
Free flow of information should not only occur between specialists. All 
members of the organization should share information by communication 
with each other constantly and in an unlimited way (Leonard-Barton 1992: 
30). The ideal buildings for the office or shopfloor of the Learning 
Organization should be constmcted in such a way that employees meet as 
often as possible by chance and, thereby, communicate informally with 
each other. This facilitates the flow of information (Leonard-Barton 1992: 
29).
Face-to-face communication (Shrivastava 1983: 22 and McGill & 
Slocum 1993: 77) is the preferred method of interaction. Supporting ways 
and means for this are conferences, meetings, seminars and intra- or inter- 
organizational project teams (Garvin 1993: 91 and Ulrich et a l  1993: 61- 
65).
The organization should actively support the communication of its 
members “by providing easy access and proximity in location” (Shrivastava 
1983: 22), and by keeping the lines of communication open and flexible (de 
Geus 1989: 34, Klimecki et a l  1991: 14I f  and Garvin 1993: 91). 
Everybody has to be able to share his/her experiences and conclusions 
derived from this with other members of the organization (Probst 1992: 
476). Space for dialogue, in a context which is free of hierarchies, is an 
essential condition for discussion between employees in the Learning 
Organization (Pawlowsky 1992: 223).
However, how is it decided which information is valuable for other 
members and the organization? One can easily imagine that it cannot be
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efficient for the organization when everybody produces information and, 
therefore, real action is suffering.
In reality, there are impediments which hinder the flow of information 
within an organization, and there is no indication in the literature about 
how organizational learning can deal with this problem.
As people are normally raised with the wisdom of “knowledge is 
power”, they instinctively know that knowledge should be kept for oneself, 
if possible. So how can, for example, senior employees be convinced to 
pass over information to less senior employees, without fearing a loss of 
power and influence? Also, the flow of information can be hampered, for 
example, by the sheer fact that people dislike each other, which sometimes 
cumulates into a refusal to speak to each other directly.
3.3.4. Education and Training of the Whole Workforce
Education and training of the whole workforce is done in the Learning 
Organization to ensure that organizational learning happens in the most 
efficient way. An important issue here is that this education and training 
must be adequate to achieve the aim of organizational learning
Team members should be trained to engage in dialogue and discussion: 
dialogue in the form of free and creative investigation of complex and 
deep-rooted problems, discussion to present and defend diverse opinions 
and views (Senge 1990: 237).
In order to become and stay a Learning Organization, considerable 
investments have to be made by the Learning Organization into the human 
capital on a continuous basis, whereby learning abilities plays a major role.
A decisive part of the learning infrastructure of the Learning 
Organization is that education and training is done at all levels and in all 
functions (Puick 1988: 81 and Leonard-Barton 1992: 30f). This can be 
achieved, for example, by systematic job rotations across organizational 
units or by promoting forces which drive learning (Ulrich et al. 1993: 65).
Garvin (1993: 83) stresses that “managers and employees . . .  are 
trained in the skills required to perform and evaluate experiments”. These 
comprise skills like statistical methods, graphical techniques and creativity 
techniques (Garvin 1993: 83).
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Attention has to be drawn not only to financial, but also to non- 
financial investments into learning, like senior management attending 
seminars, or the permanent sharing of best practices across the 
organization, in order to increase the commitment of its members (Ulrich 
et al. 1993: 61).
Acquiring new abilities can also be rewarded monetarily, to give an 
incentive for education and training (Leonard-Barton 1992: 27).
The question remains how to handle the teaching of certain 
interpersonal skills, such as communicating, listening and facilitating, 
which are very important within Learning Organizations.
If employees (especially management) fail to adopt the required 
interpersonal skills, because they are not willing to change, can they stay in 
the Learning Organization or do they have to leave? This problem will 
occur especially when an organization is in the process of being 
transformed into the Learning Organization.
3.3.5. Learning Reward Systems for Employees
Learning reward systems for employees, which can constitute a 
combination of different incentives, are important for the continuation of 
organizational learning, in a self-perpetuated systematic process.
“Reward systems in the Learning Organization recognise and reinforce 
learning", they “are tied to risk-taking, flexibility, continuous improvement 
and other behaviour that Learning Organizations require. More than this, it 
means that punishments for failure and dissent are eliminated.” (McGill & 
Slocum 1993: 78).
“Reward systems can be designed to favour organizational curiosity and 
to discourage complacency”, suggests Hedberg (1981: 21). Additionally, 
management actions in Learning Organizations are mostly aimed at a long­
term rewarding system that motivates the employees to leam (McGill et al. 
1992: 13).
“Successful ongoing programs also require an incentive system that 
favors risk-taking. Em ployees m ust feel that the benefits of 
experimentation exceeds the costs, otherwise, they will not participate.” 
(Garvin 1993: 83). Performance judgement and an incentive system have to
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honour learning actions and outcomes, as well as experimentation (Ulrich 
et al. 1993: 65).
The bonus plans for employees of all hierarchies can be linked to the 
personally-susceptible profits and turnovers, but they have to be in 
harmony with the profit and turnover of the whole company (Sirkin & 
Stalk 1990: 27 and Leonard-Barton 1992: 28). With the distribution of 
shares as boni, the feeling of belonging together is additionally 
strengthened (Leonard-Barton 1992: 28).
It would be interesting to know what form non-monetary incentives 
may take, and whether they are more or less successful than monetary 
incentives, in eliciting learning-oriented behaviour. Do these incentives 
have any significant influence at all?
3.3.6. Continuous Improvement of Work
Continuous improvement of work is vital for Learning Organizations 
to ensure steady organizational learning regarding efficiency and 
effectiveness of tasks. Work comprises, e.g., standard of work and work 
flow, service or job safety. For example, with a permanent improvement 
of quality in production, it is possible to reduce waste and repairs and, 
thereby, costs. Thus, better quality with lower prices can be achieved at the 
same time.
“Continuous improvement requires a commitment to learning”, states 
Garvin (1993: 78). Learning Organizations rely on scientific methods when 
they diagnose problems, and base their decision-making on data rather than 
assumptions (Garvin 1993: 81).
To perpetuate the learning process, competition among different teams 
can be encouraged. For example, if there is time pressure, different 
groups, competing with each other, can try to reach a goal independently 
(Nonaka 1992: 101).
Every employee is tied into projects to improve processes (Leonard- 
Barton 1992: 27). With the help of a standardised system of work, the 
learning process is more effective in view of achieving continuous 
improvements. By detailed standardization of work methods, the new 
knowledge can be disseminated easily throughout the whole organization 
(Adler 1993: 103f and Adler & Cole 1993: 89).
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“The use of process measures can build the learning commitment.” 
(Ulrich et al. 1993: 61). An example of how this is done is described by 
Adler & Cole (1993: 89f) as “democratic Taylorism”, which means that 
working methods and standards are imposed by the working team itself: the 
workers are trained to measure their work with a stopwatch, in order to 
compare the times with different working methods, and to decide which 
one is the most efficient.
Is this continuous process initiated by management, by employees or 
both? And how do Learning Organizations keep the wheel of continuous 
improvement going? Is it by systems, by people or by culture or by a 
combination of these elements?
3.3.7. Flexibility of Company Strategy and Employees
Flexibility of company strategy and employees provides the Learning 
Organization with enough flexibility and diversity for a broad scope of 
organizational learning.
Flexibility, especially at the cognitive level, is a decisive preposition to 
leam organizationally (Klimecki et. al. 1991: 143).
The strategic position of an organization influences the capacity to 
leam in two ways. On the one hand, it poses a boundary to the scope of 
decision-making, and, on the other hand, it builds a context for the 
reception and interpretation of the environment (Cyert & March 1963: 
171-76, Daft & Weick 1984: 284-95 and Fiol & Lyles 1985: 805).
Strategic planning has to include scenario analysis, which is a 
managerial exercise to think through the reaction given different possible 
future scenarios (Luthans et al. 1994: 13). Flexibility becomes the essence 
of strategic planning (McGill & Slocum 1993: 77).
The potential flexibility of a strategy is vital to quickly react to change.
As a potential flexible strategy can hardly be measured with the help of 
pace of change, particularly in a stable environment, the question arises, 
how can the evaluation be operationalized? The best potential flexible 
strategy is useless, if the organization fails to transform it into action when 
needed.
However, not only the strategy, but also the members of the 
organization have to be flexible. A strategic rotation of employees between
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Y ..(' 'various divisions and functions is suggested to be an essential contribution 
to promote the flexibility of the employees. Garvin (1993: 87) suggests 
“personnel rotation programs are one of the most powerful methods of 
transferring knowledge.” This contributes to the process of organizational 
learning (cf. McGill et al. 1992: 12f, Nonaka 1992: 101 and Garvin 1993:
87f).
Despite the advantages of strategic rotation, it appears that too many 
rotations may harm the integration into teams. And when people come and 
go, it is harder to attribute the achievements and failures to those 
employees who were responsible for it. Thus, it is not necessarily the case 
that more rotation of employees is better for the organization. This is 
especially the case when specialists do not feel inclined to pass on their 
knowledge to other employees.
3.3.8. Decentralized Hierarchies and Participative Management
Decentralized hierarchies and participative management give the 
Learning Organization its guarantee for speed of organizational learning 
and its implementation, as the decisions are made there where they are 
implemented.
Decentralization creates closeness to the markets that is especially 
essential for the survival of an organization in our times of rapid change.
Top management’s control of the local employees is obtained by shared 
visions, values and mental models, i.e. in an intrinsic way. Senge (1990:
299, 340-5) sees the new role of the leaders as researcher and designer:
Researcher in terms of understanding the organization as a system and 
its internal and external forces and trends, which drive change.
Designer in terms of an organizational architect of learning processes.
The leaders build a shared vision with the help of systems thinking.
This role of a researcher and designer of organizational learning 
processes cannot be delegated to local managers, because they tend to be 
too involved in day-to-day business, and generally have an inferior 
perspective to see major, long-term issues and forces (Senge 1990: 287- 
302).
The structure of an organization plays a decisive role in influencing the 
learning processes (Fiol & Lyles 1985: 805). Through participation, the
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employees, who are affected by a particular organizational decision, can 
truly take part in the decision-making process (Klimecki et al. 1991: 142). 
Participative decision-making is also one of the most decisive factors for 
learning in organizations (Shrivastava 1983: 25).
A decentralized and participative structure for a Learning Organization 
reduces the need at the top for information at local level and the overall 
information overload of employees can be diminished. Therefore, the 
structure of an organization plays an important role in determining these 
organizational learning processes (Hedberg 1981: 14 and Fiol & Lyles 
1985: 805).
Do decentralized hierarchies mean that there is no need for middle 
management, or does the organizational structure just focus on project- 
based hierarchies? This style of participative management appears to 
require top managers as well as middle managers, who are able to lead 
within a context of the Learning Organization. The question is whether this 
ability can be taught, or whether only certain personalities have this 
ability?
In reality, shared visions, values, and mental models may be enough to 
guide people, but are they sufficient to control them adequately? Are all 
employees enthusiastic about participative management, or does this model 
only apply to a limited group of people, who are able and willing to make 
their own decisions?
3.3.9. Learning Laboratories and Constant Experimentation
Learning laboratories and constant experimentation play an important 
role for Learning Organizations as they enable organizational learning by 
trial and error, while limiting the potential risk for the whole organization 
in case of failure.
The fear of failure is one of the biggest obstacles to learning (Kofman 
& Senge 1993: 9). Small units of the organization^^ as well as “micro-
Contrary to the rest of the literature, Leonard-Barton (1992: 23) regards the whole Learning 
Organization as a learning laboratory. However, this does not exclude a division o f the organization, in 
order to avoid a total collapse, if only one division breaks down because of failed experimentation.
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worlds”5o are labelled learning laboratories. They are defined by relatively 
risk free learning environments for the members of the organization.
For Senge (1990a: 21) the exercise of common learning in teams is a 
crucial aspect that leads to the development of individual learning 
capability, and, thereby, promotes organizational learning. Best practice, 
found out by experiments in one part of the organization, is shared with 
other units (Ulrich et al. 1993: 60).
Experimenting includes systematic searching for and testing of new 
knowledge (Garvin 1993: 81-83). In the Learning Organization everybody 
must be able to experiment, and eventually even make mistakes, which 
must have no adverse consequences for those employees (Probst 1992: 
476). Everybody is somehow involved in research and development 
(Leonard-Barton 1992: 31).
McGill & Slocum (1993: 77) state that “management is committed to 
continuous experimentation as a means of institutionalizing learning.” It is 
the task of the management “to encourage experimentation . . . and to 
facilitate the processing of experience.” (McGill & Slocum 1993: 74).
Lastly, Hedberg (1981: 20) explains: “Organizational designs should 
encourage experimenting so that organizations attain long-term viability.”
Questions arising from these theories are for instance the following:
Are small and medium enterprises capable of using sophisticated and 
expensive micro-worlds for training and evaluation, or is it only restricted 
to larger organizations? Are learning laboratories generally more used for 
training or for model evaluation?
Are there more areas than product development and production process 
introduction, where experimentation plays a role? Where is the border 
drawn in reality between experimenting which could not harm the 
company, and experimenting which might put the company at risk?
“Micro-worlds” are computer programs that generate situations and procedures in a simulation very 
close to reality, in order to help people learn more easily and obtain a more profound understanding of 
reality (Senge 1990a: 313-38).
-  1 0 8  -
3. T h e  L e a r n in g  O r g a n iz a t io n  a s  a n  Id e a l
3.3.10. Supportive Corporate Learning Culture
Supportive corporate learning culture, supportive to organizational 
learning, helps the Learning Organization to facilitate and foster 
organizational learning by a clear set of assisting values and goals.
The characteristics of the Learning Organization mentioned above have 
to be embedded in a supportive corporate learning culture, and value set, 
which promotes learning (McGill et al. 1992: 13, McGill & Slocum 1993: 
76 and Ulrich et a l 1993: 64f).
The main responsibility of leaders is to create and foster a climate that 
promotes learning. McGill & Slocum’s (1993: 74) advice to achieve this is: 
“encourage experimentation, create a climate for open communication, 
promote constructive dialogue and facilitate the processing of experience”.
A supportive corporate learning culture consists of the following 
elements:
- Dialogue: Fp r some authors the word dialogue has its roots in the 
two Greek words “0ioc^n2r''A,UYOtT^and means “flowing through” (Isaacs 
1993: 25) or “moving through” (Kofman & Senge 1993: 16).5i “Dialogue, 
as a discipline now emerging, is a technique for helping individuals 
recognise and put aside these basic differences. Consequently, higher levels 
of collaboration are possible.” (Luthans et a l 1994: 13).
Dialogue is declared to be the first fundamental step for organizational 
learning, because it facilitates and provides real communication in groups 
and is a forum for collective talking and thinking (Isaacs 1993: 25, McGill 
& Slocum 1993: 76f and Schein 1993a: 41).
Dialogue should support the process of communication, not only on 
managerial level, but throughout the whole organization, and should be 
particularly used to break hierarchical barriers (Schein 1993a: 5Of and 
Ulrich et a l  1993: 65). Senge (1990: 243) quotes Bohm’s three basic 
conditions that are necessary for dialogue: “ 1. all participants must
The word dialogue comes in fact from the ancient Greek word "ôtaÀoyoo" which simply means talk 
or conversation (the word "Aoyoo" alone has more than hundred meanings). The translation “moving 
through” originates from Bohm’s book “The Special Theory of Relativity” (cf. Senge 1990a: 239f), and has 
to be regarded as more or less as a definition than a translation. 7
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‘suspend’ their assumptions, literally to hold them ‘as if suspended before 
us’; 2. all participants must regard one another as colleagues; 3. there must 
be a ‘facilitator’ who ‘holds the context’ of dialogue.”
These conditions seem to have a very positive underlying picture of 
man, but it is doubtful whether it is possible to get all people of one 
organization to fulfil these demanding requirements. To what extent can 
dialogue be useful when these conditions are not fully reached?
- S h a re d  in te rp re ta t io n  of re a lity : In ter-personal shared 
interpretation of reality means the basic consensus consisting of various 
subjective interpretations of reality within the organization about the way 
of interpreting reality (Argyris & Schon 1978: 160, Senge 1990: 8f and 
174-204, Klimecki a/. 1991: 121f and Pautzke 1989: 11 If).
- S h ared  vision of the fu tu re : The shared vision is created by 
personal visions, i.e. the personal mental maps are merged into an 
organizational mental map. It is essential to give employees the feeling of 
taking part in the vision of the company. Organizations that want to build a 
shared vision must continuously encourage their members to develop their 
own personal vision which is blended into a shared vision, and this again is 
a guideline for all members (Argyris & Schon 1978: 160, Senge 1990: 9, 
205-32, 274f and 1990a: 13f). A shared vision creates commitment and 
helps to gain support for organizational activities (Luthans et al. 1994: 13).
The difference between the shared interpretation of reality and shared 
vision generates creative tension (see Figure 3.1), which is of vital 
importance for the organization to enable it to act with anticipation (Senge 
1990: 9-11, 150ff, 211-32 and 1990a: 9f). The way of getting from the 
shared map of reality to the shared vision of the future is by merging both 
into one organizational map as a guideline for organizational action (cf. 
also Argyris & Schon 1978: 160).
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Figure 3.1: Creative Tension and its Origin
Shared inter­
pretation of 
reality
Creative
tension Shared 
vision of 
the future
0  = Subjective interpre­
tation of reality
O  = Subjective vision 
of the future
Source: The author’s own drawing in reference to Senge (1990: 151 and 1990a: 9).
Does this process apply to Learning Organizations of all sizes, or only 
to small and medium enterprises, because only their members can meet 
each other on a regular basis? And how do Learning Organizations treat 
conflicting subcultures?
- Openness and trust: In order to sense trends and take anticipatory 
decisions, learning needs a true openness of all members of the 
organization (McGill et al. 1992: 11). Openness means the willingness of 
all members to put their cards on the table, in order to generate inter­
personal trust (Shrivastava 1983: 20 and Stata 1989: 70).
Senge (1990: 273-86) divides openness into participative and reflective 
openness. Whereas the participative openness helps individuals to say what 
they think, the reflective openness helps individuals to look into themselves. 
Open communication has to be made possible, in order to enable 
participative management.
Within Learning Organizations also an openness to knowledge from 
outside the organization exists. New values are not created by redeveloping 
already existing things, but by building on the latest existing knowledge 
(Leonard-Barton 1992: 23).
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Does openness mean that all information must be disclosed, or only 
information regarding the company? Trust normally takes a long time to 
establish, but can it be established quickly as well?
- C o m m itm en t an d  to le ra n ce : Personal com mitm ent of all 
employees means the willingness to identify with the company and its aims 
(Nonaka 1992: 96). As the main aim of the Learning Organization is 
learning, a commitment to learning is crucial (Ulrich et al. 1993: 61), 
because only that way employees pay enough attention to the growth in 
knowledge, which is essential for the successful development of the 
Learning Organization (Sonnenberg & Goldberg 1992: 55). “Without 
commitment, the hard work required will never be done.” (Kofman & 
Senge 1993: 5).
According to Pawlowsky (1992: 215), tolerance for different 
perceptions and for subjective interpretation of reality is an essential 
condition for organizational learning. This tolerance is vital for the 
development of an organization. Different points of view should even be 
constantly provoked to enable different perceptions of complex problems 
(Klimecki et al. 1991: 123f and 141f).
However, what happens to people who are not committed; are they 
trained or do they have to leave the company? The question also arises - 
does tolerance only apply to minor differences in opinion or also to 
fundamentally contradictory positions?
- Risk taking and responsibility: Two aspects of creativity, which 
are important for learning, are the above mentioned personal flexibility as 
well as the willingness to take risks (McGill et al. 1992: 12). The 
management of an Learning Organization in particular has to tolerate 
certain risk, even force it, in order to acquire new knowledge (Leonard- 
Barton 1992: 32). A culture must be created in which organizational 
members feel that they may take informed risks (Ulrich et al. 1993: 56). 
This can go so far as to the management rejecting riskless projects, because 
they do not generate a decisive competitive edge (Leonard-Barton 1992: 
32).
However, despite tolerance of mistakes, it must be ensured that 
mistakes do not happen twice (Schein 1993: 87). As every member of the 
organization constructs its own reality, each member is responsible for its 
own thinking and actions. That means that in the case of failure one has to
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take personal responsibility. This has to be made clear to every 
organizational member. (Klimecki et al. 1991: 125 and Probst 1992: 462ff)
To put it into the words of McGill & Slocum (1993: 76): “A learning 
culture is characterised by its clear and consistent (1) openness to 
experience; (2) encouragement of responsible risk taking and (3) 
willingness to acknowledge failures and leam from them.”
This raises the question what the optimal level for taking risk should be 
so that effective learning can take place without endangering the 
organization? Also, can single employees be made responsible for their 
actions, when the predominant way of working in a Learning Organization 
is by team work?
In summary, all these ten characteristics above, synthesised from 
current literature and discussed, appear to play an important role for the 
Learning Organization as an ideal. It also shows, what the Learning 
Organization not only could, but also should look like, as current literature\ 
is predominantly written in an instructive “management book style”. Some 
of the questions raised in the discussion will be dealt with in the empirical 
work of this thesis, which consists of exploratory interviews (Chapter 7), 
questionnaires (Chapter 8) and in-depth interviews (Chapter 9).
Besides these ten characteristics there are some other elements, which " 
are mentioned in the literature. However, they are not considered as being 
genuine characteristics of the Learning Organization. For example, 
following three elements have been mentioned:
“Closeness to the market” ( Senge 1990: 287-302 and Ulrich et at.
1993: 55), i.e. a close relationship with the customer in order to understand 
the needs of the customer, is seen as self-evident for the Learning 
Organization and is included in “inter-organizational team work” as well as 
in “decentralized hierarchies” in this thesis.
“Leadership” (Senge 1990 and McGill & Slocum 1993: 78), is part of 
“systemic thinking and mental models” as well as “participative 
management”. Latter plays a significant role in the creation of the Learning 
Organization, as the interviews show.
“Information systems” are only mentioned by McGill & Slocum (1993:
77) as a characteristic. However, this thesis does not classify information
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systems as a separate characteristic, as it is indirectly included in “free 
vertical and horizontal flow of information”, which can also indicate the 
extent of usage of information systems.
How the different Learning Organization’s characteristics interact, and 
how they can be ranked in terms of impact on organizational learning, will 
be discussed in the next section.
3.4. The Ten Learning Organization’s Characteristics: ^
Interdependencies and Ranking
This section gives more detail about the ten characteristics of the 
Learning Organization: an evaluation of interdependencies and a theoretical 
evaluation of the impact of the characteristics on organizational learning.
3.4.1. Interdependencies between the Characteristics of the Learning 
Organization
The main interdependencies among the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization are shown in Figure 3.2 below.
-  L '
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Figure 3.2: Interdependencies between the Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
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(1) Team work and team learning facilitates (3) free vertical and 
horizontal flow of information, especially when team members come from 
different departments and different hierarchical levels. Again, the free 
information flow helps the teams to work and leam. Another advantage of 
(1) team work and team learning is that team members receive (4) 
education and training from other members during the project. However, 
(4) education and training of the whole workforce also enables staff to (1) 
work and leam in teams. Lastly, (1) team work and team teaming is one of 
the key elements of (6) continuous improvement of work, because the 
permanent exchange of information fosters an innovative environment.
(2) Systemic thinking and mental models are pursued and 
designed by groups of people and, thereby, facilitate (3) free flow of 
information. Also, the amount of (3) free vertical and horizontal flow of 
information has a positive impact on (2) systemic thinking and mental
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models. (2) Systemic thinking and mental models keep (6) the continuous 
improvement of work going, as it is the logical answer to a changing 
environment, and (7) the company’s flexible strategy, especially scenario 
analysis induces thinking in alternatives, which creates flexibility.
(3) Free vertical and horizontal flow of inform ation has a
positive impact on (4) education and training of the whole workforce 
(inclusive management), whenever information is valuable. And where (4) 
education and training improves communication, it promotes (3) the free 
flow of information. If (3) free vertical and horizontal flow of information 
is enforced by scientific methods, it contributes to the (6) continuous 
improvement of work.
(4) Education and training of the whole workforce also has 
various interdependencies. By teaching the knowledge needed, it enables 
staff to do (2) systemic thinking and talk about their mental models, to (6) 
improve work continuously and to (7) be more flexible, which in turn can 
provide a more flexible strategy. (4) Education and training has also a 
positive impact on (8) decentralized hierarchies and participative 
management, which presumes that certain prevailing attitudes can be 
improved. (4) Education and training even improves the usage of (9) 
learning laboratories and constant experimentation, whereas the usage of 
these techniques helps to (4) educate and train the workforce through 
learning by doing.
A (5) learning reward system for em ployees fosters, when it 
depends on the performance of the whole team, (1) team work and team 
learning; when it rewards acquiring of new skills, (4) education and 
training. The (5) reward system also provides incentives for (6) continuous 
improvement of work and (9) constant experimentation.
(7) Flexibility of company strategy and employees has, because 
of teams designing strategies and the rotation of employees, a fostering 
effect on the (3) free flow of information within the organization.
(8) Decentralized hierarchies and participative management
influences the (6) continuous improvement of work, as direct and 
unconventional action as well as (7) flexibility of employees and company 
strategy are facilitated. This is because the organization can react faster 
upon changes in the market.
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(9) Learning laboratories and constant experimentation help to 
broaden the capabilities of (2) systemic thinking and creating mental 
models. (9) Learning laboratories and constant experimentation also induce 
(6) continuous improvement of work and (7) flexibility of strategy and 
employees.
Last, but not least, a (10) supportive corporate learning culture,
as part of the ideal Learning Organization, has interdependencies with all 
characteristics mentioned above. As it would be confusing to draw all links 
into the exhibit, and in order to underline the supportive character of the 
corporate culture, it has been presented in the exhibit above by the grey 
dotted area, which surrounds all other characteristics depicted in the white 
area. The main elements of this corporate culture are
- dialogue,
- shared interpretation of reality,
- shared vision of the future,
- openness and trust,
- commitment and tolerance and
- risk taking and responsibility.
These different elements of a supportive corporate learning culture 
seem essential to make the other characteristics of the ideal Learning 
Organization work.
In summary, this sub-section explained how the different characteristics 
of the Learning Organization should interact with each other. The next 
sub-section will discuss how these characteristics can be ranked in terms of 
their impact on performance of organizational learning.
3.4.2. Ranking of the Learning Organization’s Characteristics
The characteristics of the Learning Organization can be ranked 
according to their impact on the outcome of organizational learning. This 
order is mainly dependent on whether the elements are sufficient and/or 
necessary for enhancing organizational learning. However, it is only a 
theoretical discussion at this stage. The empirical work in Chapter 8 will be 
able to give a picture what the ranking looks like in reality. Still, first the 
theoretical discussion on the ranking will follow.
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The two characteristics of the Learning Organization, “systemic 
thinking and mental models” and “continuous improvement of work”, are 
seen to be necessary and sufficient for becoming a Learning O rg a n iz a tio n ,^ ^  
as through them an organization can be developed logically towards the 
Learning Organization. As a consequence, it is proposed that “systemic 
thinking and mental models” and “continuous improvement of work” 
represent the core characteristics of the Learning Organization.
“Systemic thinking and mental models” can be regarded as the nucleus 
of the Learning Organization (cf. also Senge 1990: 12f). It could also be 
described as the “common sense” of an organization, which follows the 
goal of perfection in organizational learning: a process with a moving 
target that can never be reached. A further indicator for the importance of 
systemic thinking and mental models is the fact that it is the most 
frequently-mentioned characteristic, as shown above in Table 3.1.
“Continuous improvement of work” can be the improvement of work 
methods, products, processes or safety. Continuous improvement is the 
only adequate answer to the insight of the Learning Organization that 
nothing can ever be perfect, and everything is in a steady flow. Therefore, 
continuous improvement is an important imperative, which keeps the 
Learning Organization going.
The other eight characteristics of the Learning Organization are 
suggested to be necessary, but not sufficient, as their existence alone is not 
enough for becoming a Learning Organization:
A “supportive corporate learning culture” is suggested to be one of the 
major characteristics of all the necessary but not sufficient characteristics.
This is indicated by the impact it has on other characteristics, as 
demonstrated in the sub-section above. This supportive corporate learning 
culture consists of the following six elements:
Firstly, the existence of “openness and trust” does not mean that new 
things are leamt automatically. It only provides a solid basis for further 
mechanisms of knowledge acquisition.
The same applies to “dialogue”, because a company can talk about 
various issues without attaining the (learning) point.
Furthermore, the third element “shared interpretation of reality” and 
the fourth element “shared vision of the future” do not necessarily facilitate
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learning. Both elements could exist, but members of the organization could 
be misinterpreting reality, or the shared vision of the future might be a 
wrong one.
Similarly, the fifth element “commitment and tolerance” alone can exist 
in any form of organization, and without any challenge, can lead to a 
company keeping its status quo and as a consequence not encouraging 
organizational learning.
Finally, the sixth element “risk taking and responsibility” can also lead 
to an organizational breakdown. Taking too high risks can destroy the 
organization. This might happen despite employees taking responsibility, 
which normally anyway is more of a symbolic nature.
In conclusion, other necessary but not sufficient characteristics are 
required in addition to the supporting Learning Organization’s culture. 
These characteristics enable the Learning Organization to leam, as a sort of 
mechanism for organizational learning:
“Team work and team learning” is important as a structure, or catalyst, 
that enables individual learning to be transferred into organizational 
learning.
“Free vertical and horizontal flow of information” is important to 
enable individual and team learning, and, therefore, organizational 
learning. The right balance of amount of information and content is 
important in order to avoid information overload.
“Education and training of the whole workforce” is another means to 
foster organizational learning; not necessarily the time spent in teaching, 
but the content is especially important. Sometimes, content can only be 
taught in an informal way, and this applies particularly to tacit knowledge. 
Thus, it is harder to recognise for an observer.
A “learning reward system for employees” need not only be monetary, 
which in fact can also have dysfunctional effects on organizational learning. 
The learning reward system can also be manifested in a subtle way in the 
form of promotion, or merely the praise by superiors for achieving an 
improvement.
“Flexibility of company strategy and employees” is not only an 
important instrument to make the strategy and employees flexible, in order 
to improve organizational learning, but it is also a selection mechanism that
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attracts flexible people and distracts inflexible people from joining, or 
staying with, the company.
“Decentralized hierarchies and participative management” is another 
tool to enable organizational learning in all different parts of the 
organization. It also enables a smoother transformation of organizational 
knowledge leamt into organizational learning outcomes.
“Learning laboratories and constant experimentation” is the last but not 
least characteristic that enhances organizational learning, as new things can 
be leamt without putting the whole organization at risk.
In summary, all these are the characteristics of an ideal Learning 
Organization as described in literature. Whether they appear in reality and 
in what combination, is investigated in the empirical chapters below. 
Furthermore, a final ranking is done in Chapter 10, which also draws from 
the empirical insights of this thesis.
This chapter elaborated the model of the Leaming Organization witl 
its characteristics, which are conducive to organizational leaming.
The next chapter presents the history of learning of Japan a i ^  the 
Japanese car industry, to gain a better theoretical insight into why many 
Japanese companies are claimed to be Learning Organizations in  current 
literature.
- 120 -
4. Le a r n in g  H ist o r y  of Ja p a n  a n d  t h e  Ja p a n e s e  C a r  In d u s t r y
4. Learning History of Japan and the Japanese Car Industry
So far, this thesis so dealt with organizational leaming in Chapter 2 and 
the Learning Organization in Chapter 3, both with a theoretical focus, 
which will be concluded in this chapter. Chapter 4 explores the generation 
of the Leaming Organization by Japanese car assemblers, and the transfer 
of this model to their car component suppliers. This path has been chosen
because literature on organizational learning and the Learning 
Organization states that many Japanese companies, in particular car 
companies, are Learning Organizations (cf., e.g., Senge 1990, Adler & 
Cole 1993 and Garvin 1993).
In order to fully comprehend why this is the case, it is worth looking at 
Japanese history to understand how important organizational leaming was 
to Japan’s rise in terms of economic power, and why leaming, especially 
organizational leaming and the Leaming Organization, has been, and still 
is, very popular in Japan.
To put it in Cole’s words (1989: 114): “The Japanese have, of course, a f 
long history of borrowing ideas from foreigners, most notably from the 
Chinese in the premodem era and from the West over the past one hundred 
years as they sought to “catch up” with the advanced industrial nations. 
Based on theses historical experiences, they have instutionalized a highly 
eclectic approach to leaming.”
This chapter deals with the Japanese history of leaming and teaching, in 
particular the Japanese car industry. Firstly, the reasons for and roots of 
learning of the Japanese state in the second half of the last century are 
presented. Then, the organizational learning process of Japanese 
automobile producers in this century in conjunction with their suppliers is 
explored. Lastly, the influence of internationalization of Japanese 
companies on spreading organizational learning and the model of the 
Leaming Organization world-wide is analysed.
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4.1. Leaming in Japan from 1867 to World War
Since 1600-3, Japan had been a country cut off from nearly all foreign i  
influences for more than 250 years by a decree of the Tokugawa shoguns 
that did not allow foreigners to stay in Japan. International trade was also 
banned.
In 1854, the Americans forced the Japanese to sign the Treaty of 
Kanagawa, which was very unfavourable for the latter. Similar treaties 
with other imperial powers like Russia, Britain and France followed. This 
caused a broad discussion in Japan of how to deal with foreigners. They 
were not welcome, but these militarily superior countries could not easily 
be expelled. The only realistic way of catching up with Western science and . 
technology was to leam from them very quickly. ^
By then, Japan had been a feudalistic state with a shogun of the g 
Tokugawa clan in power. The emperor had virtually no political power at 
all. However, the more obvious it became that the economic and military 
power of the Tokugawa clan was in decline the stronger the opposition 
became.
In 1867, emperor Komei died and his son Mutsuhito, who also is 
known as emperor Meiji, succeeded him. The opposition, consisting of four 
important clans and some wealthy merchants from Osaka, took the chance 
and won the support of the emperor Meiji for their plan to modemise 
Japan.
At the beginning of 1868 the power of the emperor was instituted 
within months and the last shogun Keiki driven out of power. This marked 
the beginning of the Meiji restoration, which was an age of eager 
modemization in Japan. It was driven by an elite of bureaucrats, who saw 
that it was essential to close the gap to the Westem technological advantage, 
in order to be able to defend themselves against foreign invaders.
This meant that Japan had to leam from the West very fast in order to 
survive. Thus, the reform included all aspects of Japanese life. People from
Cf. Crome 1994: 21, Lorenz 1994: 12-19, Ploetz 1991: 203f and Westney 1987.
- 122 -
4. LEARNING HISTORY OF JAPAN AND THE JAPANESE CAR INDUSTRY
England, America, France and Germany were called into the country^^ to 
help as railway or shipbuilding engineers, tax and law consultants, farmers 
and university professors, military advisors and diplomats. At the same 
time Japanese students were sent to England, America, France and 
Germany. Additionally, an infrastructure was set up, which helped fuel the 
Japanese industrial revolution.
The organizational models to leam from were selected -^benchmarking 
of the best world-wide performer in their specific field. For example, the 
navy was structured on the lines of the successful British navy and the 
army first after the French army, until it was defeated in 1871 by the 
Prussian army, which then served as a model (see Table 4.1).
7
Table 4.1: Major Cases of Organizational Emulation in Meiji Japan
Source Organization Year Initiated
Britain Navy 1869
Telegraph system 1869
Postal system 1872
Postal savings system 1875
France Army 1869
Primary school system 1872
Tokyo Keishi-cho (police) 1874
Judicial system 1872
Kempeitai (military police) 1881
United States Primary school system^ 1879
National bank system 1872
Sapporo Agricultural College 1879
Germany Army^ 1878
Belgium Bank of Japan 1872
® R eorgan ization  on a  n ew  m odel. 
Source: Westney 1987: 13.
According to Westney (1987: 19) the Japanese government employed over 2,400 foreigners from 
twenty-three different nations.
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It was the rapid leaming and use of foreign knowledge that not only 
enabled Japan to win the war against China in 1887, and against Russia in 
1905, it also gave Japan the power to get rid of the unequal treaties with 
western imperial nations, and sometimes even change them into more 
favourable agreements.
4.2. Learning in Japan since the end of World War
According to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) the label 
“Made in Japan” was once synonymous with bad quality and cheap products 
(Trevor 1986, cf. also Russell & Taylor 1995: 75).
A considerable change in the countries that provided a learning role 
model took place after World War 11, which can be described as the 
Americans replacing the Europeans as a role model. Well-known names 
like Edward Deming and Joseph Juran stood for successful promoters of 
qualityin Japah.^—  ^
Cole (1989: 272-303) describes the work of the Japanese Union of 
Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) as being the major organization in Japan 
guiding the diffusion of quality-control (QC) c i r c l e s ^ ^ .  This started more 
informally directly after World War 11, but was institutionalized in 1962 as 
a unit of JUSE, called QC Circle Centre, in order to promote circle 
activities. In 1964, over 1,000 QC circles were registered, and by 1987 
about 250,000 QC circles. Thus, JUSE provided strong guidance and co­
ordination for the QC circle movement in Japan. Its QC circle chapters 
(i.e. outlets) provided for blue-collar workers an effective learning 
network across firms with the help of strong management support.
However, there was also an official U. S. Training Within 
Industries” (TWI) Programme, which is worth mentioning.
After the Americans had occupied Japan after World War 11 Japanese 
industrial production fell to a level of 10% of the value of 1935-37. This 
caused the Americans under the guidance of General Mac Arthur to do 
something against this economic decline which threatened the stability and 
the democracy of the country.
u
Robinson & Schroeder 1993: 35-57.
For a description of Quality Circles see Dore & Sako 1989: 94 or Russell & Taylor 1995: I06f.
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As there was a lack of skilled labour, it was decided to introduce the 
“U. S. Training Within Industries” Programme, which was developed and 
introduced in war-time America between 1941 and 1943. The programme 
was supposed to boost productivity and quality on a national scale, as well 
as train the specialists needed quickly. As the time available was short 
people had to be trained with the help of multiplier effects^^, which was 
quicker than providing support on an one-by-one basis. Starting in 1951 in 
Japan, TWl was very successful in increasing the number of skilled 
workers by breaking down the work into small steps.
TWI consisted of three major modules, which were Job Instruction 
Training (principles of instruction). Job Method Training (continuous 
improvement) and Job Relations Training (human relations).
The main objective of TWTs Job Instruction Training (JIT) was 
to help supervisors develop a well-trained workforce (i.e. less scrap, 
rework and rejects; fewer accidents; less tool and equipment damage).
The seminar training method of JIT consisted of four steps:
1 ) the trainee is put at ease and made interested;
2 ) the job is taught with key points identified;
3) trial runs are made and the trainee is obliged to explain and demonstrate
the reasons for each step; and
4) coaching is tapered off and the trainee is told whom to see if he or she
has any problems or further questions.
As leaming-by-doing was emphasized, the approach was trained with 
the help of models at the end of the seminar.
The aim of TW Fs Job M ethod Training (JMT) was to help 
companies produce better quality products in less time, by making the best 
use of the manpower, machines and materials available.
JMT taught the following four step method:
1 ) break down the job into its constituent operations;
2 ) question every detail (why? what? where? when? who? how?);
With the help of training the trainers that trained trainers again cumulative returns were achieved in a 
very short time. In order to keep the quality standards, precise instructions about the way of presenting the 
material were developed.
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3 ) develop the new method by eliminating, combining, rearranging and
simplifying all necessary details; and
4) apply the new method by selling it to everyone.
The fourth step was seen to be the crucial one for spreading new 
knowledge throughout the company, which was the essential step from the 
organizational learning point of view. For the instructors JMT even 
provided answers to possible trainee’s q u e s t io n s ^ ^ .
The goal of TWTs Job Relations Training (JRT) was to improve 
and accelerate the training of supervisors in handling human problems 
under their charge so as to secure maximum co-operation.
The four steps of JRT to deal with job-related problems were:
1) get the facts (be sure you have the whole story); ^
2 ) evaluate and decide (do not jump to conclusions);
3) take action (do not pass the buck); and
4) check results (did your action help production?).
In order to demonstrate how widespread the system of TWI is in Japan 
today, Robinson & Schroeder (1993: 49) provide a picture each of a small 
American JMT card from 1945 and a small Japanese JM card from 1992, 
which have the same in layout and the same content (i.e. a summary of the 
three modules) and only differ in the characters of the two languages.
As many companies incorporated TWI Programmes with a different 
label, the real effect is hard to measure, because the internal programs 
within the companies are hardly identifiable. However, the overall number 
of all Japanese TWI Programme graduates is certainly higher than the 
official number of 64,000 graduates alone in 1991. Toyota, for example, 
was one of the earlier adopters of TWI called “Toyota TWI”, which even 
played an important role in designing the Toyota Production System (TPS), 
according to a former Japanese managing director of Toyota, who helped 
to design and introduce TPS (Robinson & Schroeder 1993: 5 If).
For example, TWI Service suggest in 1945 (cf. Robinson & Schroeder 1993: 42):
“[Question]: What should be done if employees are eliminated as a result of a methods change?
[Answer]: This problem is solely one for the company to handle. . . . [however] it is recommended: that no 
one ever is laid off as a result of a methods change but that an employee thus affected be transferred.”
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I .
This speedy introduction of the TWI programme in Japan (double-loop I 
learning) seemed to have been only possible with the pressure of the severe I 
economic crisis after the war that amplified change, because it showed that' "
the old business governing values in Japan were not successful anymore.
Thus, on the macro level of Japan’s economy a change learning process was 
performed, installing new governing values, which enabled or^^izational 
learning on the micro level of companies. However, although(the Robinson 
& Schroeder (1993: 45) state that TWI was introduced in Great Britain in 
1944, they give no reason why Britain failed to be successful in quality 
and, therefore, did not show a similar economic success. y
The reasons for the lack of success of the TWI Programme in Great ? 
Britain can be summarized as follows: British government and British 
firms lacked the vast experience of Japan since 1868 of identifying the best i 
practice world-wide and quickly introducing it on a national level. 
Additionally, Britain did not have such a severe economic crisis compared \  ,
to the one Japan had after World War II, which did not make British 
companies so receptive for change.
Whitehead & Partners (1976) give the following reasons why the TWI 
programme in Great Britain faded. Firstly, the competition for the 
traditional TWI supervisor courses from other agencies, offering similar 
courses of a lower quality standard, increased. Secondly, the length of the 
courses offered was considerably longer than the original limit of 1 0  
bourses. Thirdly, there was a lack of marketing for the courses, because 
TWI was performed by a governmental agency. Lastly, the service was not 
free for the users.
After having pre^e^ed the Japanese learning up to the present, this -j- 
thesis now focuses on the specific development of the automobile industry 
in the 2 0 th century in the light of this learning experience.
Some courses lasted between 25 and 50 hours (Training Service Agency 1977: 48), which was 
against the initial aim of the programme of . . utilizing a minimum of time” (Training Within Industry 
Service 1945: 32).
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4.3. Learning History of Japan’s Automobile Industry^^
Although the first automobile was built in Japan in 1902, it took a long 
time to build up a larger automobile industry against strong foreign 
competition, especially from America.
An important reason for beginning automobile production on a large 
scale was the Automotive Manufacturing Industries Law (Jidosha Seizo 
Jigyo Ho) of 1935. It enabled two companies, namely Toyota and Nissan, to 
start automobile production under newly-erected tax barriers against 
foreign competition. World War II ended the foreign car manufacturing in 
Japan and a third Japanese producer, Diesel Jidosha Kogyo, joined.
However, there was a significant difference in the way Nissan and 
Toyota were managed. Nissan had strong links with General Motors in the 
1930s and, therefore, relied more on Taylorist/Fordist methods. Toyota, 
however, tried to develop its own system through an iterative 
organizational learning process. The Toyota system was developed under 
the aegis of Taiichi Ohno, which involved kanban^o and just-in-time 
techniques, including a well-designed system of sub-contracting (cf. also 
Cusumano 1985: 27-72, 375-81 and Warner 1994: 518).
The early 1950s were marked by severe strikes at Toyota (1950) and at 
Nissan (1953), which induced organizational learning on the double-loop 
level for both companies. Whereas Toyota learnt co-operation between 
labour and management with the help of discussions^^, Nissan first 
dismissed many old union members, but then leamt co-operation with the 
new union. In 1952, passenger car production was resumed again after the 
strikes, mainly to supply taxis.
Based on Shimokawa 1994, unless other authors are quoted (see also Cusumano 1985).
Kanban means pull-delivery; new parts are ordered by sending emptied boxes of them back to the 
supplier. Thus, new parts should be only produced when they are needed (cf. also Womack et al. 1990: 62).
Shimokawa (1994; 36) notes that Toyota introduced management and labour council meetings, 
which discussed all major problems regarding the relationship between management and labour.
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There was also an organizational learning process going on in form of 
a transfer of technology from European car p r o d u c e r s ^ ^  and their 
suppliers, in order to improve design, engineering and the production of 
cars and components. This trend was backed by the MITI (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry), which supported and protected its own 
domestic automobile industry.
In the early 1950s, Toyota also started to improve its suppliers, by 
teaching them organizational learning, which involved the areas of 
systematic cost reduction, technological improvements and information 
sharing (i.e. inter-organizational learning). In order to secure quality, 
techniques like Statistical Process Control (SPC)^^^ Total Quality Control 
(TQC) and Quality Circles (QCs)^4 were employed (cf. also Hines 1994: 
128). This knowledge was not only spread to suppliers, but also to other 
Japanese car companies.
In the 1960s, the car industry started to boom and many other Japanese 
producers joined, such as Daihatsu, Honda, Mazda and Subaru. Following 
MITI’s encouragement, automotive suppliers started with restructuring and 
concentration in the first half of the d e c a d e ^ s .  In the second half of the 
decade the automobile producers followed this example.
One reason for choosing European partners was that they were producing small ca r / Another reason 
becomes clear from a statement by Morita (1986: 3f) about his insights after visitingFord’s Rouge car 
production complex: “I was surprised and puzzled and disappointed to see the very same scenes that I 
remembered from that film made almost twenty years before - the same equipment seemed to be in service, 
and it made me wonder then about the future of America’s industrial plant and its supreme position, the 
envy of the world.”
Womack et al. (1990: 159) provide^ollowing explanation: “With SPC, tool operators record the 
dimension of each part - or sample of parts - produced. If they notice these dimensions straying from what *'
they should be, they either make the necessary adjustments to the machine, or, if it’s a more difficult 
problem, such as machine malfunction, call for help. In theory, no defective parts should be produced.”
^  For a description of Quality Circles see Dore & Sako 1989: 94 or Russell & Taylor 1995: 106f.
Although some component manufacturers had introduced just-in-time and quality circles in 
combination with team structure previously, an extensive adoption of these techniques did not exist before 
the end of the 1960s (Shimokawa 1994: 70-74).
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By the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s the exports of 
Japanese cars began to grow rapidly.
The 1980s were marked by the establishment of Japanese car plants 
overseas either in sole ownership or in joint ventures. In America, Honda^^ 
started car production in 1982, Nissan in 1983, Toyota in 1984 and Mazda 
in 1987 (Mair et a l 1988: 356f).
Then, in the 1990s, Japanese assemblers started production in Britain, 
with Nissan commencing in 1986, Honda in 1992 and Toyota in 1993 
(Lamming 1993: 21 and Shimokawa 1994: 151).
In view of the theory of organizational learning and the Learning 
Organization, Japanese companies in the car industry not only showed 
good capability of double-loop learning (i.e. change learning), but with the t M ^  ^  
help of the government agencies this new knowledge leamt was quickly^^/^ 
spread around the industry, including the suppliers. The strikes at Nissan 
and Toyota in the 1950s showed the management their dependency on the 
workforce and helped to create an atmosphere which enabled an improved 
capability for systemic thinking. The history also shows that many other I 
characteristics of the Learning Organization were acquired or improved/^
over time in the car industry, as, for example, continuous improvementJ^^P 
team work and learning or training. ^
U iiL sr \ — ] ^
The organizational learning experience of Japanese car producers 
abroad will be looked at more closely in the next section.
4.4. Learning and Teaching of Japanese Automobile Companies in America
The first Japanese company to start producing cars in America was 
Honda in 1982. Honda had only entered the Japanese car market in 1963 
and, therefore, the American market provided a better growth opportunity 
for Honda than the Japanese market. However, there were growing trade 
frictions between America and Japan that were caused by high Japanese 
exports to the US. Thus, Honda decided to start assembling cars in Ohio, 
America. Although being the first Japanese car producer to do so, Honda’s 
risk was hedged, because it first tested assembling motorcycles in the US
Honda had already gained experience by producing motor cycles in America since 1979 (Mair et al. 
1988: 356 and Mair 1994: Ilf).
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starting in 1979. This was a much smaller investment, and valuable 
experience was gained (Ingrassia & White 1994: 326-28, Mair 1994: 77f 
and Shimokawa 1994: 117).
In 1983, only one year after Honda, Nissan started production in the 
U.S., also without any partner (Shimokawa 1994: 150).
In 1984, Toyota started a joint venture with GM for car production, 
called NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.) (Shimokawa 1994: 
150). As a latecomer, Toyota was under time pressure. With the help of the 
alliance with GM it established a factory site and access to the list of GM’s 
preferred American component producers. However, in return GM was 
allowed to leam from the Toyota Production System; GM seconded 16 
managers to NUMMI and was allowed to send employees through the 
factory on tours to get insights into the superior Japanese production 
technique (Ingrassia & White 1994: 4 If).
Florida & Kenney (1991: 381-98) suggest that the Japanese automobile 
manufacturers influenced and shaped their environment in the US from a 
non-supportive one at the start to a supportive environment, by producing 
cars there. This means, they not only brought Japanese suppliers to produce 
in America, but they also changed the way of production of American 
suppliers.
According to Florida & Kenney (1991: 389) it was not the American 
shopfloor workers who had problems with adaptation, but the middle 
management, which found it difficult to change their attitude and 
prejudices towards shopfloor workers.
Florida & Kenney (1991: 391) conclude: “Whereas the literature 
predicts convergence of Japanese transplants towards the U.S. model, the 
reverse is occurring as U.S. producers adopt elements of the Japanese 
model. This further reinforces the contention that the Japanese model is a 
potentially generalisable successor to fordist mass production.” And they 
state that their “findings indicate that both transplant assemblers and 
suppliers have been remarkably successful in implanting the Japanese 
system of work organization in the U.S. environment.”
But it is not only America that plays an important role for Japanese 
foreign direct investments, but also Europe at a slightly later stage.
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4.5. Flow of Japanese Knowledge and Know-How to Europe
Fujimoto et al. (1994: 381-86) state that the Japanese foreign direct 
investments in the automotive industry can best be described by a 
“triangular-unidirectional model” (see Figure 4.1). This configuration 
shows a repeated and successive flow and application of Japanese 
knowledge and know-how from Japan to North America, and then from 
both areas to Europe. A typical example of this triangular-unidirectional 
model on the supplier level is the case of knowledge and know-how 
transfer of Nippondenso America to Nippondenso Europe.
The focus of Fujimoto et a l  is only restricted to the flow of knowledge 
and know-how through foreign direct investments. Also, no empirical 
evidence is given on a larger scale. For example, there are also other ways 
of transfer such as co-operations between European-based suppliers and 
Japanese suppliers in Japan or North America, or transfer from Japanese 
car assemblers in Europe to component suppliers in Europe. This thesis 
will investigate these cases later on.
Figure 4.1: Triangular-Unidirectional Model
USA
Japan
Europe
Source: Fujimoto et al. 1994: 384.
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Case study literature on component suppliers changing to the Japanese 
model in Europe is very scarce. Therefore, the following section deals with 
one level higher, i.e. automobile producers, and mainly plants in America, 
which reveal some interesting insights for the purpose of this thesis.
4.6. Change Learning of NUMMI vs. Other Car Assembly Plants
Unfortunately, little literature is available how automotive component 
suppliers conduct change learning in order to become a Learning 
Organization.67 Thus, in this section a higher level, i.e. car assembling 
plants and their change learning, is analysed by comparison to gain some 
insight into the reasons for successful or unsuccessful change.
NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.) is chosen as a 
successful example of change, as this has been discussed in previous 
literature (cf. Krafcik 1986, Womack et a l  1990: 82ff, Adler 1993: 97- 
108, Adler & Cole 1993: 85-94 and Mahoney & Deckop 1993: 27-38), and 
is compared to other change projects. Although the US differs in various 
aspects from the UK (e.g.. Industrial Relation System, the supplier base, 
market and political context), some generalizations can be made, which 
help to provide a deeper understanding of the whole context and process.
NUMMI is a joint venture between General Motors and Toyota in 
Fremont, California. The assembly plant was a brownfield site^s and was 
turned from a worst performer under GM into a best performer, in terms 
of productivity and quality, under Toyota. As other attempts to change
67 Krafcik (1986: 25-30, cf. also Womack et al. 1990: 163) gives only one short example of A ^  
“successful learning” of a supplier: Packard Electric’s Mexican plant learnt to improve quality dramatically/
by stationing a resident engineer in NUMMI as well as getting assistance from a Toyota supplier from|^^^^^_^ 
Japan. ^
68 Brownfield site usually means that a former defunct plant has been used to produce a new product 
normally with the former workforce, but sometimes a new method of management is introduced. This 
usually means more resistance to change, mostly because of old employee habits, than building a factory 
from scratch, which is called greenfield site. Although there was a time lapse of nearly two years before 
NUMMI started after the close down of the old GM plant, it still can be considered as a brownfield site, 
because over 80% of the old shopfloor workers were rehired (cf. Krafcik 1986, Mair et al. 1988: 367 and 
Womack et al. 1990: 82ff).
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towards the Learning Organization, or at least introduce parts of it, appear 
not to have been so successful as in NUMMLs case, it is worthwhile 
comparing NUMMI to six other different plants.
Furthermore, it is interesting to see the different strategies of Toyota 
and GM to leam from NUMMI and diffuse that knowledge, as suggested by 
Krafcik (1986: 13-20). Generally, Toyota had not only a core staff of 30 to 
35 managers, but also a support staff of 30 to 60 lower level management 
and engineers, which were rotated every three months. In comparison, GM 
had only 15 managers at NUMMI which stayed for three years and this 
time period was then reduced to two years. Also, GM had a liaison office 
that was responsible for systematic examination of NUMMI’s management 
techniques and the sharing of this information across GM with the support 
of videos, memos and a computer data base. GM’s learning style, which 
also included short factory tours, is criticised by Krafcik as being “too 
passive in nature” (1986: 18).
This difference in learning techniques can be interpreted as follows. 
Toyota put emphasis on learning of tacit knowledge through socialization 
(rotating team managers at a high frequency) and placing them at the new 
production facilities in the US. GM put emphasis on making the tacit 
knowledge explicit through extemalization (videos, memo and data base), 
which seems to be not sufficient to grasp the knowledge targeted.
4.6.1. New NUMMI vs. Old GM-Fremont
Adler (1993: 97-108) describes in his article how NUMMI encourages 
organizational learning and, therefore, continuous improvement. He praises 
the plant as not only showing world-class productivity and quality, but also 
increasing worker motivation and satisfaction.
This success was possible, although NUMMI was built on the old GM- 
Fremont site, which was known to be one of the worst performing plants in 
the world, and NUMMI even employed 85% of the old shopfloor workers. 
The introduction of a new management style had been smoothed by the 
selection of a new management (cf. also Krafcik 1986: 2ff, Mair et al. 
1988: 367 and Womack et al. 1990: 82ff).
The success of NUMMI can best be described in comparison to the old 
GM-Fremont plant. NUMMI’s productivity was twice as high as GM-
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Fremont, and better than any other GM plant at the end of 1986. 
Absenteeism dropped from 20 - 25% to 3 - 4%. NUMMFs quality of 
products was also higher than that of any other GM products, whereas GM- 
Fremont’s product quality was the worst of all. Participation in quality 
programs rose from 26% in 1986 to 92% in 1991. And the number of 
workers who indicated they were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” was over 
90% in the same year.
Adler (1993: 102-5) suggests that fear, selection and socialization were 
some important factors contributing to the successful turnaround of 
NUMMI. However, they were not sufficient to explain it entirely. Thus, he 
adds two further factors, which are standardized work and an atmosphere 
of trust and common purpose.
The standardized work includes detecting faults automatically, 
improving work continuously and rotating within standardized jobs.
An atmosphere o f trust and common purpose was created by building 
consensus for major decisions, a no-lay-off policy, so that employees could 
be sure that nobody was to be fired because of a productivity improvement, 
and by management actions that helped worker problem-solving and 
showed that they were on their side and were dependent on the workers.
A further reason for the success of NUMMI’s change, which is not 
indicated by Adler’s paper, is the selection of a new management. None of 
the former management was hired again after the pause between the closing 
down in 1982 and the reopening in 1984. Instead the old management had 
been transferred to other places in the GM-world. Furthermore, Krafcik 
(1986: 16) and Ingrassia & White (1994: 4 If) indicate that only around 15 
to 16 GM middle managers were working for NUMMI, and that they all 
were selected by Toyota. Thus, it was easier to implement a new corporate 
culture with a different, i.e. positive, attitude of management towards 
employees.
The fact that NUMMI had no special parking and catering facilities for 
management, and uniforms were identical for everyone, was also a passive 
selection mechanism, because this did not appeal to status-dependent 
managers. Through their action the new management gradually gained the 
confidence and trust of the shopfloor workers. And in difficult situations 
they tried to keep the good relationship and did not destroy it, e.g., in an 
economic downturn no employees were fired.
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Adler (1993: 108) labels NUMMI a “leaming-oriented bureaucracy”, 
because according to him it is a formal system which encourages learning. 
After training, team members analyse their work with stopwatches, 
describe it and improve it. However, the term “learning-oriented 
bureaucracy” can be highly misleading, as in a bureaucracy the experts 
learn for the workers, according to Weber (1947), because of the concept 
of division of labour into thinking and manual work. And when a one-best 
way is found, it is hardly possible to make an improvement, especially for 
the shopfloor workers, who are not expected to think. Thus, Adler’s term 
of a “leaming-oriented bureaucracy” neither seems adequate to describe the 
novelty of the NUMMI (or Toyota) Production System, nor are 
institutionalized systems for learning enough for being successful at a car 
assembly plant, as the next sections will show.
4.6.2. NUMMI vs. Uddevalla
Adler & Cole (1993: 85-94) compare NUMMI with Uddevalla, a car 
assembly plant of Volvo in Sweden, which was closed down in 1993. They 
especially concentrate on the different modes of learning. They conclude 
that the main difference lies in the aims of the two production plants.
The NUMMI efficient-production approach is driven by the consumer 
market, and, thus, is designed to maximise organizational learning. This 
ensures a growth in productivity as well as in quality.
Uddevalla’s human-centred approach is driven by the labour market, 
and, thus, is designed to maximise individual learning. It was hoped that 
this would improve workers’ satisfaction.
Adler & Cole (1993: 8 6 ff) argue that organizational learning is much 
harder to pursue at Uddevalla, as there was no exchange of information 
between teams; and work cycles at Uddevalla were less standardized and 
took much longer than at NUMMI.
Although Uddevalla’s main design purpose was human-centred, its 
absenteeism was at 22% about seven times higher than at NUMMI with 3%. 
Additionally, satisfaction at Uddevalla was not very different from 
traditional Volvo plants, whereas internal worker surveys at NUMMI 
showed that over 90% of the workers were satisfied or very satisfied. 
However, Adler and Cole state that NUMMI might be a modified version
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of the Japanese production model, which is designed to achieve a higher 
employee satisfaction in the different environment of America, in order to 
avoid problems with the workforce.
Adler & Cole (1993: 89) call the well-documented process of NUMMI 
“democratic Taylorism”. This can be misleading, as can the labelling 
“learning-oriented bureaucracy” (Adler 1993). Firstly, this type of  ^
management is not necessarily only based on democratic decisions, 
Secondly, it would be too simplistic to explain NUMMFs successful 
performance only monocausally. Therefore, it is suggested, especially as 
Adler & Cole praise NUMMFs ability at organizational learning, that it is 
more appropriate to call it a Learning Organization as it shows various of 
its characteristics, previously explained in Chapter 3.
Berggren (1994: 37-45) tries to defend the position that Uddevalla w a s ^  
successful in organizational learning in a later article. He criticises Adler 
and Cole for not studying learning as a process over time and shows a chart 
of Uddevalla’s productivity improvements.
However, this chart shows steep productivity improvements only after 
the summer vacation in 1992 when a new management took over that 
introduced new organizational learning techniques, which did not exist 
when Adler & Cole visited the plant. Among these new techniques were 
inter-team learning, involvement of salaried employees in direct 
production activities, procedure documents and a plantwide kaizen 
(continuous improvement) programme (cf. also Adler & Cole 1994: 45- 
49).
4.6.3. NUMMI vs. GM-Van-Nuys
A further comparison of NUMMI to another car manufacturing plant 
originates from Mahoney & Deckop (1993: 27-38) with the GM-Van-Nuys 
car assembly plant in California, which was closed in 1992. Discussing the 
reasons for the difference in the success of the turnaround, the shock of 
plant closures and selective rehiring are judged by Mahoney and Deckop to 
carry similar weight and are, thus, of minor impact. Therefore, they 
mainly focus on the creation of creating mutual trust and co-operation.
The specific difference in teamwork is seen in the building-up of trust 
and co-operation by the management of NUMMI, which was not done in
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the GM-Van-Nuys plant. Intensive training was done with both workforces, 
which indicates that training alone is not sufficient, but it also raises the 
question about the content of the training given.
Furthermore, management at NUMMI did not intervene in internal 
union decisions. However, GM-Van-Nuys’ management did not even seek 
consultation with the union in cases of differing opinions and preferred to 
act on their own, which did not encourage the creation of mutual trust.
Additionally, NUMMI recognised the role of job security and gave a 
pledge that it would not lay-off workers unless, after cuts in management 
salaries, the viability of the company was at stake. Van-Nuys, on the other 
hand, made a similar pledge, but made several lay-offs without cutting 
management’s salary before closure, which destroyed any trustworthy 
relationship. This shows that indicators like a commonly agreed “no-lay-off 
policy” are not enough to establish respect and trust between management 
and shopfloor workers. It was not only the case that the no-layoff pledge at 
Van-Nuys was violated, but there was also no indication that management 
would try everything to avoid redundancies.
As a result, the quality of products at NUMMI improved dramatically 
to levels comparable with Toyota Japan, whereas Van-Nuys’ bad quality 
did not improve at all.
According to Mahoney & Deckop (1993: 31) one influential reason for 
the differing managerial values was that NUMMI’s management was 
selected by Toyota, while Van-Nuys’ management was the old GM 
management a GM culture and philosophy that had not changed materially.
4.6.4. NUMMI vs. CAMl
Robertson et al. (1992: 77-106) outline different aspects of CAMI 
(Canadian Auto Manufacturing Inc.), which is a joint venture between 
Suzuki and General Motors. It is a greenfield site and the only unionised 
assembly plant in Canada. The publicly-stated values of CAMI, which are 
empowerment, kaizen (i.e. continuous improvement), open communication 
and team spirit, do not seem to be in operation, apart from intense kaizen. 
Robertson et al. (1992: 87) see kaizen as the “primary source of profits at 
CAMI through the elimination of waste”. However, it should be noted that
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this does not include the importance of the fact that kaizen can also make 
work easier and reduce injuries to employees.
This point is made by Toyota (TOYOTA 1994): “Kaizen is the dynamic 
of continuous effort to make standardised work ever-more efficient and 
enjoyable.” Thus, it would be misleading to give the impression that the 
CAMI version is an exemplary Japanese production system, as Robertson et 
al. (1992: 77-106) suggest, because it is just an adapted form of the Suzuki 
production system and cannot be generalized.
In fact, according to Ingrassia & White (1994: 359) a Suzuki advisor to 
GM staff for CAMI told them that Suzuki had studied the Toyota 
Production System (TPS), then adapted it to Suzuki’s needs and called it the 
N agare^9 Production System. This adaptation by Suzuki might have 
changed the TPS considerably.
The suggestion progranune at NUMMI registered over 10,000 
suggestions in 1991, of which more than 80% were implemented (Adler 
1993: 104). In comparison, CAMI registered 81,254 suggestions (teian) in 
the first ten months of 1990, of which 76% were implemented and another 
2 2 % were approved or under evaluation according to the management.
There are three major possible reasons for this significant difference in 
the number of suggestions received. Firstly, NUMMI started production in 
1984, whereas CAMI started in 1989 (Shimokawa 1994: 150f). This means 
that NUMMI was in a relatively mature state after having operated for six 
years, whereas CAMI was in its first year of operation, and thus had many 
more things to improve being in the start-up phase. Secondly, as Robertson 
et al. (1992: 89f) state, a decreasing number of employees took part in 
teians at CAMI when they visited the plant for a second time (which 
underlines the first point). Thirdly, it is not clear what kind of measures 
were used to classify an improvement. It could be that a teian at CAMI was 
a smaller measurement unit than suggestion at NUMMI.
Interestingly enough, a strike at CAMI in 1994, which was caused by 
intense working conditions (Konig & Riecker 1994: 247), seems to have
“Nagare” means according to Ingrassia & White (1994: 359) “flow like a river”. Ikeda et a l  (1988) 
describe that Toyota also calls its production system “nagare production system”, with the U-line 
technology (i.e. arrangement of production machines in an U-shape) as an essential part.
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been routed the pressure at CAMI to submit improvement suggestions, 
which was perceived as being too high by employees. This direct increase 
in pressure to achieve the goal of continuous improvement, which had the 
opposite effect of a strike, appears to reflect a falling back into old 
management values and habits by GM management as regards employee 
treatment.
4.6.5. NUMMI vs. Saturn
Novak & Fine (1996) compare NUMMI with GM’s Saturn plant (the 
first plant built after the NUMMI experience by GM), and focus on the 
different management styles of the two plants with respect to how team 
structure can impact on performance, which is said to be better at NUMMI.
Whereas NUMMI uses a manufacturing process, which it could copy 
from Toyota’s Takaoka plant in Japan, Saturn had to develop everything 
from scratch. For this reason, Saturn involves workers in the complete car 
development process, whereas NUMMI limits empowerment to the 
continuous improvement process. And, last but not least, at Saturn there is 
a radical “total consensus planning”, which can slow down the decision 
making process considerably, whereas at NUMMI the project leader can 
and has to take the decision, but also the responsibility.
This comparison between NUMMI and Saturn shows, similar to 
Uddevalla, that team work alone does not seem to guarantee efficient 
organizational learning. It rather appears that team work organization has 
to be purposefully constructed, in order to enable the organization to 
perform at a high standard.
4.6.6. NUMMI vs. GM-Eisenach
The Eisenach plant belongs to the German affiliate of GM Opel and 
started operation in October 1992 (Gottschall & Him 1992: 204). GM 
hoped to apply here what it had leamt from NUMMI. For example, the 
team size at Eisenach was the same as at NUMMI with around 6 - 8  people. 
Originally, the team leader used to be elected by the team members. 
However, this has been changed and is now done by management, and a 
vacant position is advertised intemally.
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The suggestions per employee were 9 in 1993, 13 in 1994 and 18 
projected for 1995. Unfortunately, nothing is indicated about the 
implementation rate. Konig & Riecker (1994: 234-47) criticise that not the 
human being, like in the 70s or still at Volvo, but productivity is the aim of 
the “new German Toyotism”. Work breaks are reduced to increase 
productivity by the teams themselves now, as the chief shop steward 
complains.
The Eisenach example shows how long it can take for a Bureaucratic- 
Tayloristic Organization like GM to leam from best performers (nearly a 
decade). And this is only one new plant and does not yet mean that the 
whole of GM has leamt the lessons.
Ingrassia & White (1994: 56ff) describe how Toyota was puzzled by 
GM’s approach to teaming from NUMMI, which offered insights into the 
Toyota Production System. There were only a lot of factory visits by GM 
managers, and instead of senior managers, junior managers (not even 
including plant managers) were transferred from  GM to NUMMI. 
Furthermore, there was no coherent plan of GM’s top management to use 
and apply the knowledge employees gained at NUMMI. Those NUMMI 
employees that did not leave GM after their time with NUMMI were 
spread within the huge organization of GM without any lever to apply the 
newly-leamt lessons.
Now at Eisenach, GM employees who have leamt Japanese production 
techniques at NUMMI in America, CAMI in Canada and Isuzu in England 
were brought together in one plant, in order to demonstrate that GM was 
capable of producing cars efficiently. The opportunity of having people 
with relevant tacit knowledge and East Germans who were in the process 
of unleaming, together with the perceived threat from more efficient lean 
production technologies within GM Europe, made a change in teaming for 
GM possible in theory. Only the combination of top managers from GM 
Europe and Germany, who were convinced by one-week kaizen courses 
about the necessity of change and acted as a catalyst and driver for change 
teaming, made Eisenach happen (cf. also Ingrassia & White 1994: 349-57 
and Gottschall & Him 1992: 205).
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4.6.7. Lessons Leamt from the Comparative NUMMI Case Studies
What can be deutero-learnt (learning learnt) regarding single-loon/ 
learning (adjustment learning) and double-loop learning (change learning; 
in the examples discussed above?
Regarding single-loop learning, a problem arises concerning “the 
rate of suggestions per employee” and their “implemented percentage”, 
when shopfloor workers can hardly stand the stress anymore and are ready 
to strike (as happened in CAMI). This shows that measurable indicators 
cannot always describe the real situation in a company, apd more has not 
necessarily to be better. It is more a sensible balance of different measures, 
"vdïïcTTsêémTîard to identify in a quantitative way. The only way to get an 
accurate picture is to talk to people at different hierarchy levels in the 
company. Thus, this research will combine questionnaire-based empirical ^  
research with exploratory interviews and in-depth interviews w ithC ^^ 
representatives of management and the shopfloor.
Concerning double-loop learning, only NUMMI appears to have 
made an overall successful change to the Toyota (Japanese) Production 
System. Therefore, it appears to have a lot of the ten characteristics of the 
Learning Organization. The major reason for this is a new management, 
selected according to new organizational values, which stress mutual 
openness and trust. Without these values either continuous improvement 
does not work in the short run (e.g., Van-Nuys), or at least industrial 
relations are severely undermined and do not work in the long run (e.g.,
CAMI). These new values have to be lived by the management to be 
implemented, because they are based on the assumption that not only are 
workers dependent on management, but management is also dependent on 
workers. This is because only through continuous improvement on the 
shopfloor, together with management actions, can the competitiveness of 
the company be secured.
This relationship between mutual dependence and the need for building 
up trust in a game theoretical a p p r o a c h ^ o  is shown in Figure 4.2.
In the case of employees’ and managers’ distrust, although it is a stable 
equilibrium (e.g. Van-Nuys), it will lead to an undesirable inefficient
For more information about game theory see Gibbons 1992.
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outcome for both sides (lose, lose), i.e. plant closure in the long run. The 
situation of trust only on the employees’ side does work for a short period 
but is unstable (e.g., CAMI) and will turn into a situation with distrust on 
both sides in the long run, which is inefficient (lose, lose), e.g., a strike at 
CAMI. Mutual trust on both the employees’ and the management’s side, 
however, can to lead to an efficient outcome in productivity and quality 
(win, win), which has to be carefully nurtured through permanent open 
conununication that is going in two directions.
Figure 4.2: Strategic Choice of Co-operation Based on Trust
trust
Employees
distrust
lose, win
lose, lose win, lose
distrust trust
Management
Note: “win, lose” or “lose, win” situations are normally unstable in the long run; in 
the short run the person who trusts loses and the person who distrusts wins.
However, the example of Uddevalla shows that, although trust is on 
both sides, there can be an ineffective outcome as well, which appears to be 
caused by insufficient organizational learning. This shows again that trust is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective and efficient 
organizational learning, as already proposed in Chapter 3.
Additionally, intensive training of employees can be useless for 
organizational learning when it is has the wrong content (e.g., Uddevalla)
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or happens without training of management in “soft skills”, such as 
communication and team work (e.g., Van-Nuys), that changes their attitude 
towards employees. This shows again that training is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for effective and efficient organizational learning.
The last part of this chapter looks at the different theories which try td ^  
explain similar occurrences like the theory of organizational learning and] 
the Learning Organization. ^  7  1 1
4.7. Overview of Overlapping AreaTvTthOrganizational Learning
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is some literature which overlaps 
with the theory of organizational learning and the Learning Organization, 
as developed in this thesis. This is partially because these other models deal 
with the same phenomenon as part of this thesis does, i.e. what makes the 
competitiveness of Japanese production companies? The most significantly 
overlapping areas selected here are innovation theory as well as operations 
management, including just-in-time and total quality management, but also 
lean production, which deals extensively with the car industry.
4.7.1. Innovation Theory
Innovation theory deals with innovation as a whole and starts with 
Schumpeter’s innovation theory in 1908: the creative destruction in the 
market place by the dynamic entrepreneur as the driving force. This 
includes three different phases: firstly, the invention as the origination, 
secondly, the innovation as the first usage and, thirdly, the imitation as the 
diffusion stage of the invention (cf. Gabier Wirtschafts-Lexikon 1988: 
1414 and 2564).
There is also some further work (Nelson & Winter 1977: 36-76, Dosi 
1982: 147-62 and Dosi 1988: 221-38) available about a theory of 
innovation, which researches the nature of the innovation process. It tries 
to explain the innovation process with the help of macro-economical 
perspectives on trends and patterns of technical change.
However, innovation theory focuses explicitly on the innovation 
process and less on incremental improvements, as well as predominantly on 
the macro perspective of theory of economic change. Thus, innovation
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theory regards the innovation process very much as part of the ^ 7  
development within an industry. ^  '
4.7.2. Operations Management
A s  opposed to innovation theory, operations management looks at the 
micro-economic perspective of the firm, including its operations and 
increasing its efficiency, i.e. incremental improvements. Operations 
management, which deals with the management of throughput, the process 
between input and output of an organization, has recently also embraced 
total quality management and just-in-time management'll, due to the 
relevance of both to current operations management (cf. Dilworth 1993,
Finch & Luebbe 1995 and Russell & Taylor 1995).
Total quality management (TQM) is normally mentioned in conjunction 
with its most influential proponents, i.e. Deming, Juran and Crosby. 
Especially Deming’s teaching to the Japanese industry in the 1950s is seen ^  '
to be key for its latter’s development. It included the “Deming Wheel” (also 
called the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle as these are the four steps of the 
Deming Wheel, which can be repeated over and over again) as well as the 
Deming’s overall 14 point philosophy for achieving improvements. The 
latter, despite a lack of theoretical underpinning, has many commonalties 
with the Learning Organization’s characteristics (e.g., purpose towards | I 
product improvements, constant improvement of the production process, 
establishment of worker training, diminution of the fear of reprisal or  ^ ^
promotion of co-operation and a team approach for working together), i 
Other overlapping areas are quality circles, employee suggestions 
programs and ad-hoc teams for solving problems (cf. Dilworth 1993: 460- 
83, Finch & Luebbe 1995: 92-161 and Russell & Taylor 1995: 73-128).
Just-in-time (JIT) management deals with the finding that pull-delivery 
of components in small batches (also called “kanban” when empty 
containers are returned, being an order for a new delivery), only at the 
time when the components are needed in the production process, is 
designed to reduce waste and stock as well as to improve quality. 
Originating from Japan, especially Toyota with its proximity of suppliers
E.g., Finch & Luebbe 1995 call those two areas: “new direction in operations management.
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in Toyota City, it has been regarded as one of the major reasons for the 
Japanese global competitiveness in the 1980’s (cf. Dilworth 1993: 340-65,
Finch & Luebbe 1995: 162-91 and Russell & Taylor 1995: 711-42).
Mair (1992), however, argues that just-in-time management is 
dependent on a short distance between the plants. Thus, the inherited 
geography of the plant locations can be of advantage (as in Toyota’s case ç 7  
with Toyota City where assembly plants and suppliers concentrate) or of  ^
disadvantage (as in Nissan’s case with Tokyo, where the assembly plants are 
dispersed) for JIT. The inherited geography is suggested to be a major f  
reason for the limited use of JIT by Mitsubishi and Mazda.
Elements of JIT and TQM appear again in lean production which will 
be dealt with in the next sub-section.
4.7.3. Lean Production
The term “lean production” was coined by Krafcik in 1988, who found 
that lean production systems^2 conveyed various advantages over “buffered 
production systems”, in terms of impact on operating performance, 
measured in levels of productivity, quality and model mix complexity.
However, only when Womack et al. published their successful and 
influential book “The Machine that Changed the World” two years later in 
1990, within the framework of the IMVP^s, they drew the attention of 
management as well as researchers in the Western world to the concept of 
lean production management. This should explain the international su c c e s sc ^ ^ ^  
of the Japanese automobile industry, with the Toyota Production System in 
focus. Womack et al. (1990) definition of lean production management 
comprises the endless quest for perfection with regards to continually 
declining costs, zero defects and zero inventory (through kaizen, just-in-
22 The variable “lean production system” was constructed from the four variables: (I) team work (degree 
of team work employed in the plant), (2) worker span of control (level of visual control), (3) unscheduled 
absenteeism (indicator of worker participation and management expectation) and (4) percentage of floorspace 
dedicated to repair facilities (indicator of management expectation about process capabilities) (Krafcik 1988: 
52). However, it did not comprise the level of inventory, as one might have expected.
23 IMVP stands for the International Motor Vehicle Program at the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology), a large research project on the future of the automobile industry.
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time system and close supplier relationships), and endless product variety, 
as well as team work, in combination with delegating responsibility to the 
shop floor and flat hierarchies.
Hentze & Kammel (1992: 631-39) argue that the term “lean 
production” has the disadvantage that it does not directly indicate that an 
integrative concept is meant, which comprises the management at the whole 
value c h a i n . 74 Furthermore, Hentze & Kammel argue that, from a critical-  ^
rational point of view, lean production is not satisfactory, as a d a ta -^^U   ^
oriented populist approach was preferred, which did not have a firm 
theoretical underpinning.
There n ^ h t  be some strong criticism coming from people like Hentze 
& Karnmel,[f^t is that the concept of lean production played an important 
role in changing the old paradigm in the Western business world which 
believed in the superiority of Western mass production because it is based 
on economies of scale. Besides lean production, the paradigm of 
organizational learning and the Learning Organization also offers an 
exp lanation^^  why Western mass production failed to live up to its 
expectations, but it includes a coherent underling theory.
In addition, the paradigm of lean production showed^  some shortcoming 
in recent years, which the following three examples illustrate.
Firstly, the latest Toyota plant in Japan, built on the Island Kyushu in 
the early 1990s, does not pursue a pure lean production strategy anymore.
The assembly line is split into mini conveyor belts, and there are buffer 
areas for up to five vehicles in between production islands and mini 
conveyor belts with assembly teams, called kumi. These teams can fix 
problems stopping their mini conveyor belt (which is normally done within 
5 minutes in 95% of the cases) or perform kaizen activities (continuous 
improvement), without disrupting the overall assembly process, and then 
catch up again. Therefore, this new Kyushu production system is able to 
produce at the lowest defect rate of all Toyota plants, as well as with a 
higher productivity than comparable plants, but also makes shop floor 
work more attractive again by limiting the stress generated by the old
74 Womack & Jones try to address this shortcoming by repositioning and re-labelling “lean production’ 
to “lean enterprise” (1994), and then “lean thinking” (1996).
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system (Shimizu 1994: 20-25 and N. A. A. (Automobil-Produktion) 1994:
110- 12).
This means that a decrease of leanness here increases the aim of zero 
defects, and this is implemented by the “lean producer''" loyota. It is an 
occurr£nce which does not fit into the lean model paradigm anymore, as ^ ^ / i f  
suggested by Womack et al. (1990). However, from the point of view of 
the Learning Organization it makes still sense, as Toyota has > jjüs^ 
organizationally learnt to make a further step forward in the process of 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness of its production operation in 
Kyushu, but a the same time even making shop floor work more attractive 
within a tight labour market.
Secondly, the fire at one of Toyota's low tech suppliers for key brake 
valves stopped the production of these parts on 1st February 1997. Without 
these parts, two plants that produce master brake cylinders and clutch 
master cylinders were forced to stop production. Due to the just-in-time 
system, this lead to a production stop in all of 18 Toyota's Japanese 
assembly plants only three days later. In addition, as the kanban system was 
in use this lead to a halt in production at all other suppliers for these 
Toyota assembly plants. Thus, the fire at one supplier lead to a loss in 
production of 70,000 cars for Toyota, costing nearly US$200m. Now,
Toyota looks to at least double-source some components again, which were 
previously single-sourced (cf. Automotive News 3-3-1997).
This anecdotal evidence shows that single-source supply per se, as 
suggested by Womack et al. (1990), is not the only issue for the “lean 
producer" Toyota anymore. It makes more sense to say that Toyota leamt 
organizadonally that the advantages of single-sourcing have to be carefully 
weighted against the risk of stopping the complete production in case of a 
hazard.
Again, this case can be explained by the theory of organizational 
learning and the Learning Organization, but not anymore by the paradigm 
of lean production management.
Thirdly, as regards to product variety, the trend looks as follows for 
some Japanese producers in 1998: Nissan is in the process of reducing its 
model range from 50 to 40 models, Mazda stops the production of the 
Lantis and the Revue, and Toyota takes a similar step by merging the 
Camry with the Vista (Auto Zeitung 11-3-1998).
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Again, as opposed to the view of Womack et al. (1990) that lean 
producers are very efficient in producing large model varieties, they 
appear to be doing the opposite by diminishing their model range. These 
Japanese manufacturers have learnt organizationally that, instead of 
increasing the model variety, diminishing it lean sometimes have a more 
positive effect on the bottom line. \  . «A ^
In summary, it appears as if the paradigm of lean production is a 
collection of symptoms of a Japanese, especially Toyota, production system 
at the end of the 1980s. However, the focus on the leanness of the system 
alone has some disadvantages. As the three examples have shown, there are 
cases in the 1990s which cannot be explained by the lean production 
paradigm anymore. Additionally, lean production fails to acknowledge the 
fact that the existence of those kaizen teams (i.e. continuous improvement 
teams) is not lean, this especially applies to those which are only dealing 
with improvements of the system. They are rather the purposeful provision 
of non-lean slack (i.e. redundancy) in order to enable organizational
4.7.4. Conclusion of the Discussion of the Overlapping Areas: 
Organizational Learning as a Meta-Theory
All in all, lean production, ^operations manag e m e n fr^ d  innovation 
theory offer different points of view on a similar topic, which is: why are 
some companies more competitive than others? As Japanese companies 
were perceived as being very competitive in the 1980s, they also are the 
focal point in many research studies. After the discussion of these models, 
it was shown that they overlap in some ways with the theory of 
organizational learning and the Learning Organization. All these 
overlapping areas deal with the question of how to structure an 
organization in a way to be more effective.
Whereas innovation theory focuses predominantly on the efficient 
innovation process and operations management on the efficient production 
process, lean production tries to combine the two areas under a new 
paradigm of eliminating and avoiding waste.
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V
It has been shown in this thesis that these areas are covered by the 
theory of organizational learning and the Learning Organization, but it also 
provides an underlying coherent framework with its focus on 
organizational learning as a sort of meta-theory. It can also explain recent 
developments, especially in the Japanese car industry, which lean 
production cannot do anymore, due to the conceptual limitations of its 
paradigm. This is a further reason why it is worthwhile to explore the 
theory of organizational learning and the Learning Organization in more 
depth with the help of empirical research.
In summary, this chapter looked at the history of organizational 
learning and the Learning Organization of Japan, with special focus on the 
Japanese automobile industry. It showed that taking this theoretical I 
perspective of the car industry can be very useful for analysis, and that the V 
process of learning and teaching has not yet ended. Additionally, other 
overlapping areas of research with the theory of organizational learning 
and the Learning Organization were discussed, and it was shown that the 
latter can well serve as a meta-theory of the former.
The next chapter looks at the automobile industry in Great Britain, 
shifting the focus to the empirical side of this thesis.
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5. Situation and Trend of the Car Industry in Great Britain
After this thesis had a more theoretical focus in Chapters 2 to 4, 
Chapters 5 to 9 have a more empirical focus. Chapters 5 and 6  set the scene 
for the empirical work, with Chapter 5 dealing with the research subject 
and Chapter 6  dealing with the research methodology. The latter also 
concludes the development of the two main hypotheses.
This chapter presents a snapshot of the current situation and trend in 
the global and Western European car industry with a focus on Great 
Britain, as this will be the focal point of the empirical research. British car 
production has undergone a significant change since the beginning of the 
1990s, as there is a growing presence of Japanese car assemblers and 
Japanese car component suppliers in the UK. As some of the former areV ^ 
d a s s if i^ d ^  Learning Organizations in current literature (see Chapter 4), 
thë transfer of this knowledge to direct car component suppliers in Britain ' 
is researched. This positive impact is the core of Hypothesis 2.
5.1. Car Sales and Production in the World, Western Europe and Britain
This section deals first with car sales and then with car production p 
world-wide, focusing on Western Europe and in particular Great Britain.
5.1.1. Car Sales in the World, Western Europe and Britain
World-wide car sales amounted to 37.4m units in 1997, which 
represents an increase of more than 13% compared to 1993. However,
1993 was a weak year, hit by an economic recession.
About one third of car sales world-wide are transacted in Western 
Europe. This is an important share in a global market, and according to the 
forecast of the Global Automotive Group of Standard & Poor’s DRI 
(1998), the proportion of car sales in Western Europe will stay about the 
same until 2 0 0 1 .
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Table 5.1: Car Sales in Western Europe, NAFTA^s, Japan & World-
Wide (in 000’s, 1993 to 1997 actuals, 1998 to 2001 forecast)
Region Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
W .Europe Austria 285 274 280 308 276 282 294 295 293
Belgium 417 417 386 427 428 435 441 443 458
Denmark 84 140 136 142 151 130 132 136 141
Eire 64 80 87 115 137 103 96 107 112
Finland 56 67 80 96 105 111 122 132 141
France 1,721 1,973 1,930 2 ,1 3 2 1 ,713 1 ,883 2 ,0 0 0 2,091 2 ,154
Germany 3 ,194 3 ,209 3 ,314 3 ,496 3 ,5 2 8 3 ,6 7 7 3 ,753 3 ,800 3 ,878
G reece 148 110 125 143 160 181 182 191 203
Italy 1,694 1 ,686 1 ,738 1 ,732 2 ,4 1 2 2 ,0 5 9 1,788 1,976 2 ,103
N etherlands 392 434 446 473 478 490 488 478 471
Nonway 61 85 91 125 128 117 125 131 136
Portugal 243 233 201 218 213 237 261 264 275
Spain 744 908 834 911 1 ,014 1 ,045 1,081 1 ,085 1,073
Sw eden 124 156 170 184 225 243 247 236 231
Switzerland 259 266 268 272 275 291 297 291 291
UK 1,778 1,911 1 ,945 2 ,0 2 5 2,171 2,201 2 ,1 1 8 2 ,0 3 9 2 ,106
W.Europe Total 11,263 11 ,949 12 ,032 12 ,800 13 ,413 1 3 ,486 13 ,426 13 ,694 14,067
NAFTA Canada 739 747 681 661 739 763 719 731 728
M exico 399 411 142 197 268 405 420 452 445
USA 8 ,502 8,981 8,631 8 ,5 2 6 8 ,2 7 2 8 ,0 7 8 7 ,9 7 2 7 ,7 6 7 7 ,609
NAFTA Total 9 ,640 10,139 9 ,4 5 4 9 ,3 8 3 9 ,2 7 9 9 ,2 4 6 9,111 8,951 8 ,782
A sia Japan 4 ,199 4 ,2 1 0 4 ,4 4 4 4 ,6 6 9 4 ,4 9 2 4 ,3 9 8 4 ,5 5 2 4 ,653 4 ,605
World Total 32 ,980 3 4 ,643 34 ,8 0 8 36,381 37 ,4 4 3 3 7 ,1 2 4 37 ,405 38 ,379 39 ,267
Source: Global Automotive Group of Standard & Poor’s DRI 1988: 17.
The next sub-section looks at the corresponding car production.
5.1.2. Car Production in the World, Western Europe and Britain
Similarly to car sales, according to the Global Automotive Group of 
Standard & Poor’s DRI (1998), about one third of all car production 
world-wide originates in Western Europe (see Table 5.2).
NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico,
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Table 5.2: Car Production in Western Europe, NAFTA, Japan & World- 
Wide (in 000’s, 1993 to 1997 actuals, 1998 to 2001 forecast)
Region Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
W .Europe Austria 41 45 58 97 90 86 97 103 99
Belgium 347 408 386 368 360 337 304 288 363
France 2 ,8 3 6 3 ,175 3,051 3 ,1 4 8 3 ,3 4 6 3,381 3 ,2 6 4 3 ,1 8 5 3 ,303
Germany 3 ,794 4 ,0 9 4 4 ,360 4 ,5 4 0 4 ,6 7 8 5 ,0 0 0 5 ,1 3 3 5 ,0 8 5 5 ,106
Italy 1,117 1,341 1,422 1 ,318 1 ,563 1 ,430 1 ,292 1 ,387 1,398
N etherlands 80 92 100 147 197 224 257 243 244
Portugal 0 0 41 119 130 125 118 115 103
Spain 1 ,506 1,822 1,959 1 ,942 1 ,990 1 ,899 1 ,873 1,851 1,892
Sw eden 279 354 388 370 376 393 444 459 451
UK 1,376 1,467 1,532 1 ,686 1 ,698 1 ,764 1 ,820 1 ,858 1,899
Double Count -531 -687 -686 -669 -638 -641 -657 -657 -657
W.Europe Total 10,845 12 ,110 12 ,612 13 ,063 13 ,790 13 ,998 13 ,945 13 ,917 14,199
NAFTA Canada 1,353 1,216 1,337 1 ,280 1 ,372 1 ,483 1 ,458 1 ,420 1,413
M exico 835 857 699 800 842 811 922 954 989
USA 5,982 6,601 6 ,340 6 ,0 8 3 5 ,9 1 2 5 ,8 0 6 5 ,7 5 2 5 ,6 7 4 5 ,547
NAFTA Total 8 ,1 7 0 8 ,674 8 ,376 8 ,1 6 3 8 ,1 2 7 8 ,1 0 0 8 ,1 3 2 8 ,0 4 8 7 ,948
A sia  Japan 8 ,499 7,801 7,611 7 ,8 6 4 8 ,4 9 2 8 ,2 1 5 8 ,1 5 5 7 ,8 8 7 7 ,9 1 4
World Total 33 ,689 34 ,902 35 ,455 3 6 ,6 9 2 3 8 ,8 7 0 3 8 ,5 6 4 3 9 ,1 5 4 3 9 ,5 4 5 40 ,5 2 2
Source: Global Automotive Group of Standard & Poor’s DRI 1998: 20.
The figures above show that Western Europe has played and will 
continues to play an important role in the global car market and industry.
The next section focuses on Japanese car sales and production in 
Western Europe.
5.2. Japanese Car Sales and Production in Western Europe and Britain
According to Mair (1994: 219f), the attitude towards Japanese car 
manufacturers in Western Europe differs strongly from country to 
country, which has led to diverging policies. Southern European countries 
have a strong tradition of protecting their markets (Spain: SEAT, Italy: 
FIAT and France: Renault and PSA (i.e. Peugeot and Citroen) [examples 
are provided by the author of this thesis]). Other countries, in particular 
Germany (because of a heavily export-oriented car industry) and Denmark 
(no car industry at all), have a more liberal approach. This difference in
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national policies explains a lot of the divergence in Japanese sales across 
Western Europe.
“The average Japanese car market share in Western Europe stood at 12 
per cent in the early 1990s, compared to 30 per cent in North America” 
(Mair 1994: 221).
The European Commission tried to avoid a similar high market share 
in Western Europe and, therefore, in 1991 self-limiting treaties with Japan 
were signed, in order to protect the car production in the European Union 
and limit the Japanese import market share to 16%.
This, however, fluctuated around 10% in 1996 and the strong yen 
encouraged Japanese production inside Western Europe, as imports from 
Japan became increasingly expensive. And with 808,000 imported Japanese 
cars in 1996, only 75% of the “voluntarily agreed limit” between the EU 
and Japan was reached (FAZ 2-4-1997).
Figure 5.1: Japanese Car Sales and Production in Western Europe
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Griffiths (1996: 11) expects that in 2000 nearly 50% of Japanese cars 
sold in Western Europe will have been produced in Western Europe (see 
Figure 5.1).
Japanese car assembly in Western Europe has been to date and will in 
the future be primarily focused on Great Britain, with a share of about 
90% in 1996 (see Figure 5.2). This share, which was even higher in the 
past, shows that the UK is the best location in Western Europe to analyse 
the impact of the Japanese car assemblers on car component suppliers.
Figure 5.2: Japanese Car Production in W. Europe and the UK (in 000’s)
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Source: DRI’s Global Automotive Group 1996, author’s own calculations.
Since the start of production in 1990, the Japanese share of car 
production in Great Britain has risen continuously, reaching 26% in 1995 
(see Figure 5.3). This has helped to offset the declining production of non- 
Japanese makes in the UK, and has led to an overall growth in car 
assembly.
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Figure 5.3: Japanese and Non-Japanese Car Production in the UK (000’s)
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Taking a closer look at the start of Japanese car production in Britain, 
Nissan started production in 1986 (Nissan Primera and Bluebird), Honda in 
1992 (Honda Accord) and Toyota in 1993 (Toyota Carina) (Lamming 
1993: 21 and Shimokawa 1994: 151).
Figure 5.4 shows that Nissan started with a clear lead, but suffered 
from the recession in 1993, leading to falling production numbers in 1994. 
However, in absolute numbers, Nissan is still the largest Japanese car 
producer in Great Britain. Honda’s long established co-operative 
relationship with Rover led to sufficient knowledge acquisition so that 
Honda could start production on its own in 1992. Toyota’s production start 
in Britain followed one year later.
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Figure 5.4: Japanese Car Production in the UK by Manufacturer 
(in 000’s, 1991 to 1995 actuals, forecast 1996 to 2001)
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Source: DRI’s Global Automotive Group 1996, author’s own calculations.
This production trend has some impact on the car component suppliers 
of these Japanese assembly plants. As the majority of Japanese car plants in 
Western Europe are in Britain (cf. also Lamming 1993: 21), this thesis will 
focus on the car components suppliers in Great Britain, in order to 
investigate the process of organizational learning of these suppliers from 
Japanese car producers.
Thus, the next chapter will elicit the situation of those car component 
suppliers in Great Britain who deliver to Japanese car assemblers.
5.3. Situation of the Automotive Component Suppliers in Britain
Due to vast direct investments by Japanese car producers and some of 
their suppliers in Western Europe, especially in Britain, the situation of 
British suppliers to the automobile industry has changed dramatically in 
recent years.
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These direct investments were triggered by trade frictions and import 
restrictions of the European Community (EC), as well as the appreciation 
of the Yen. The production facilities were generally located in Britain; the 
reasons for this were as follows (Fujimoto et al. 1994: 372, Fujimoto et al. 
1994a: 5 and cf. also Truesdale & Carr 1991: 3):
- government and regional incentives,
- comparatively low wages in Western Europe (i.e. Germany and France),
- the Anglo-American business atmosphere (transferable US experience),
- language familiarity (English), and
- access to the entire EC market.
Additionally, the historic ties, derived from licensing of British car 
patents by Japanese car producers, were an important reason as well.
Lamming (1993: 20f and 263-8) observes that Japanese component 
suppliers established themselves in Britain either by founding a new 
company or by entering into a joint-venture, starting with Yuasa Battery in 
1981. Of the Japanese car assemblers which came to Britain to found their 
own production companies, Nissan was first in 1984.
For car component suppliers in Britain, Japanese car assemblers 
represented, on the one hand, an opportunity to gain new customers (FT 
(5) 28-6-1993 and FT (9) 28-6-1993). On the other hand, it was not easy to 
fulfil the quality standards required by the Japanese car producers and to 
survive against the new Japanese competition (FT 14-7-1992).
Truesdale & Carr (1991: 1) are convinced that “Japanese car makers in 
the United Kingdom want to establish a close, long-term relationship with 
their suppliers, similar to relationships in Japan.”
The relevant number of British suppliers to the automobile industry is 
about 300 major companies and 1,500 minor companies (Lamming 1989: 
13, cf. also Lamming 1993: 46). As regards to number of large suppliers, 
Britain is third after West Germany and France in Western Europe (see 
Table 5.3).
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Table 5.3: Numbers of Automotive Component Suppliers in W. Europe
M ajor M inor
West Germany 450 5,000
France 400 1,500
UK 300 1,500
Italy 250 1,000
Spain 50 500
Others 50 500
Total 1 ,5 0 0 1 0 ,0 0 0
Source: Lamming 1989: 13.
The Boston Consulting Group & PRS Consulting (1991: 6 ) compiled a 
list of only 350 suppliers in the UK, which, however, seems to include only 
major components suppliers.
Wolters (1994: 23) has tried to assess the number of direct suppliers to 
a selection of major Western European car companies, indicating a general 
trend of declining numbers, which is shown in Figure 5.5.
However, not all direct suppliers to a car manufacturer in Britain are 
located in Britain. Thus, they can also be located elsewhere in Western 
Europe, or even in the world. Additionally, as the same suppliers deliver to 
various manufacturers, calculating the number of direct suppliers in the 
UK by adding these numbers would lead to double counting.
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Figure 5.5: Number of Selected Car Producer’s Suppliers in W. Europe
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Unfortunately, current literature at the time of the questionnaire 
research in 1995 did not distinguish whether car component producers 
supply car assemblers in Western Europe directly or indirectly. 
Additionally, there was no indication as to in which country component 
suppliers produce their products.
In 1995, even The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders 
(SMMT), which represents the car assemblers and component suppliers in 
Britain, could not give an accurate answer to the question of the number of 
direct suppliers which produce their car components in Britain. Thus, their 
total number could not be accurately assessed.
Still, this was not the key issue of this thesis. Instead, the thesis focuses 
on a comprehensive understanding of the impact of Japanese companies in
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the car industry, in particular Japanese car assemblers Jin the United 
Kingdom, on car component suppliers in Great Britain. ^
However, in 1998, the SMMT started to publish “The UK Motor 
Industry Directory 1998”, which had sufficient information to identify 
roughly 400 major and minor car component producers assembling in 
Britain and directly supplying to car manufacturers. This number is 
considerably lower than the original sample of this thesis, because supplier 
of machinery and software as well as of engineering and prototyping could \
be excluded this time, both not being car component suppliers and thus not ^
the research target of the questionnaire.
Oliver et al. (1996: 29-44 and 1996a: 85-97) have tried to make a 
global assessment of the differences in lean production in the car  ^
component industry with special focus on the UK. Both papers are based on 
a study from 1994^6, which comprises the analysis of 71 automotive 
component plants, of which 12 plants were located in the UK. From this 
sample they draw conclusions on the state of the car component industry in 
the UK.
“Leanness” of a plant was measured by Oliver et al. (1996: 32) with the 
help of plant performance (units per labour hour), quality (defective parts 
reported by customers), management practice (hours of plant inventories 
and rework, less of both also means lower costs), production teams and 
their amount o f responsibly (e.g., areas), continuous improvement 
activities (suggestion schemes, number of suggestions and activity of 
problem solving groups) as well as human resource policies (questions for 
“certain ‘high commitment’ human-resource policies” (Oliver et al. 1996:
32), which were, however, not specified in more detail). Sometimes these 
areas were extended to assess leanness of the customer and supplier 
relationships of the plants, e.g. inventories of raw materials and finished 
goods.
In summary, Oliver et al. (1996: 29-44 and 1996a: 85-97) give an 
interesting insight into the use of lean production on the supplier level.
Oliver et al. also participated in the study which was published as the “Worldwide Manufacturing 
Competitiveness Study - The Second Lean Enterprise Report” (Andersen Consulting 1994). This study was 
preceded by another study called “The Lean Enterprise Benchmarking Project” (Andersen Consulting 1992), 
which compared 9 auto component plants each in the UK and Japan.
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However, they admit that they were not able to show a clear link between 
team work, operator responsibility, problem-solving as well as visual 
control and performance.
This again gives the impression that the model of lean production is 
more a collection of symptoms than a coherent theory, as it has been 
discussed in Chapter 4.
In addition, Oliver et al. leave some interesting questions open, which 
will addressed be later on in this thesis. For example, an analysis of how 
car component suppliers in the UK adopt lean techniques and adapt these 
for their own needs, might have been useful. However, due to the low 
number of companies assessed this would have been hardly possible. 
Furthermore, where have UK suppliers_acq^ i n t e d ^ eir knowledge about 
lean production from. If this knowledge was acquired from Japanese car 
companies, are there any differences between the various manufacturers, 
and how has this the knowledge been transferred?
When Honda, for example, established production in Great Britain, it 
announced that a high share of components would be sourced locally. The 
British government ensured that Honda is kept to the agreed share of 
European locally components and helped Honda to keep other Western 
European markets open for its exports from the United Kingdom (Mair 
1994: 343). And by 1992, when production of the Honda Accord began, 
more than 100 component producers based in the United Kingdom had 
been assigned by Honda (Mair 1994: 264).
Nissan’s approach in Great Britain has been characterised by its 
suppliers as follows (Truesdale & Carr 1991: 17): “Firstly, the emphasis is 
always on trying to improve, rather than ‘relaxing’ when a standard is 
achieved. The informal, flexible Nissan approach is contrasted with the 
‘mechanistic’ systems approach of other car makers.” It should be noted 
that theses aspects are similar to “continuous improvement of work” and 
“flexibility of strategy and employees”, which are both characteristics of 
the Learning Organization. Furthermore, Truesdale & Carr (1991: 20) 
also indicate a trend towards an “open style of management” at these 
suppliers, reflecting and reinforcing team work, communication and 
common decision making.
Toyota has been concerned to establish stable, long-term supplier 
relationship and also intends to help its components makers in Europe:
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“Specific advice has also been provided in quality control - building quality 
into the process - the introduction of “Kaizen” continuous improvement 
methods and training in Japan on all aspects of the Toyota Production 
System” (Toyota 1994).
To summarize, this chapter explains why Britain is an interesting 
location in Western Europe for empirical research into the organizational 
learning of direct car components suppliers in the UK from Japanese 
companies in the car industry, which can be car producers or car 
component suppliers.
In order to research what component suppliers in Great Britain have 
really leamt from Japanese car companies, the next chapter will develop 
the approach of the empirical analysis of this thesis.
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6 . Research M ethodology and Model
This sixth chapter discusses and completes the conceptual framework 
(including the operationalization^^ of the two main hypothesis) used for the 
empirical research of this thesis, which is presented in Chapters 7, 8  and 9.
The chapter starts with a detailed analysis of the limited amount of 
empirical work that is currently available on the Learning Organization 
and organizational learning in general, which proved to be of little help for ^ 
this thesis. Then, the selection of the empirical research philosophy 
(phenomenology) and method (cross-sectional study) is discussed, as well as 
the empirical research procedure, which consists of three different steps: 
exploratory interviews (Chapter 7), questionnaire survey (Chapter 8 ) and 
in-depth interviews (Chapter 9).
6 .1. Empirical Studies on Organizational Learning and Learning
Organizations in Existing Literature '
It has been suggested in Chapter 3 that certain characteristics of the 
Learning Organization influence organizational learning within an [JUm  w 
organization, and also amongst different organizations. Both in turn have 
an impact on the organizational learning outcomes. In this section the 
operationalization of the characteristics of the Learning Organization and 
their implications will be considered in terms of the questions for the 
questionnaire.
The problem arising for this thesis is that, on the one hand, the 
dominant share of literature on organizational learning is normative and, 
therefore, not easy to operationalize. On the other hand, empirical workL^^yv^^ 
which used questionnaire-based research is scarce. '
Çi>^a?.At the tin^  of developing the empirical framework for this thesis. 
there were only four empirical studies available, which tried to grasp ^  
Learning Organizations and/or organizational learning in reality. These are 
studies by (1) Shrivastava (1983), (2) Ulrich et al. (1993), (3) Inkpen
Operationalization is the transformation of a theory so that it can be used for empirical research.
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(1992) and (4) Dierkes & Raske (1994 and 1994a), which are now 
discussed.
6.1.1. Study by Shrivastava
The empirical work of Shrivastava’s paper (1983: 7-28) is based on the 
research for his unpublished thesis in 1981. He took account of 32 different 
businesses and clustered them according to two dimensions. The first is the 
in d iv id u a l- o r g a n iz a t io n a l  d im e n s io n , which ranges from an 
individual-dependent system to a learning system that is impersonal and 
independent of individuals. The second is the e v o lu tio n a ry -d e s ig n  
dim ension, which ranges from learning when not consciously making an 
effort to design learning mechanisms and the implementation of learning 
instruments by management.
He identified six different types of learning systems (see Figure 6.1), in 
order to develop a typology of organizational learning systems.
(A) One man institutions have one single person acting as the central 
point of knowledge acquisition, evaluation and dissemination. Thus, this 
person is central to organizational learning for this institution.
(B) Mythological learning systems exist where organizational learning 
takes place through stories, actors or activities. Thus, myths are generated 
that are the basis for norms for organizational learning.
(C) Information seeking cultures foster a culture of inquisitiveness and 
curiosity for information. They also give easy access to all information 
available and promote communication.
(D) Participative learning systems are based on a system of flexible 
groups and teams, which are created to solve major problems with the help 
of a participative process. The acquisition, processing and transfer of 
information is done by teams and groups as well as informal inter-personal 
communication.
(E) Formal management systems are learning systems that provide 
information, planning and control for organizational learning. Established 
systematic procedures not only incorporate knowledge gained from a single 
person’s experience, but also employ standardized management techniques.
(F) Bureaucratic learning systems include a system of rules and 
regulations that guide exactly what kind of information goes to whom and
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for what purpose. The system tries to be objective and impersonal, and the 
decision-making process has to follow detailed procedures that are featured 
in guidelines.
Figure 6.1: A Typology of Organizational Learning Systems
Individual-organizational dimension
Individually ^  ^  Oroanizatio-
oriented nally oriented
Evolutionary A  Mythological Information
institution learning seeking
Evolutionary- system culture
design
dimension Participative Formal Bureaucratic
learning management learning
Designed T  system system
Source: Shrivastava 1983: 18.
It is not easy to decide whether an organizational learning system has 
been developed by evolution or by design, as it often is a mixture of both. 
Furthermore, six types of Learning Organizations are slightly confusing, 
especially because there are more different dimensions included in the 
model than explicitly stated. For instance, one man institutions can be 
organizationally oriented in the same way as an information-seeking 
culture can be individually oriented. Lastly, mythological learning seems to 
be a part of every learning system.
Summing up, Shrivastava delivers a typology of different 
organizational learning systems in order to get a more concise view of 
organizational learning systems, which is a mere clustering of 
organizations. Therefore, he does not suggest why (learning triggers) and 
how (learning amplifiers and obstacles) organizational learning occurs, and 
at what level (single-loop, double-loop or deutero-leaming).  ^ .
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6.1.2. Study by Ulrich et al.
Ulrich et al. (1993: 52-66) cluster their research sample in a similar 
way, focusing on an evaluation of the different groups. A world-wide 
qualitative study is undertaken on the difference that organizational 
learning makes as ideas generating strategies. A sample of 380 
companies is used.
The paper starts with the question of learning capability as an ability to 
transfer new knowledge beyond boundaries. The study shows that learning 
capability and Learning Organizations are a part of the evolution of 
management thinking in the 1990s. There is also an overview of the 
different possibilities of how organizational capabilities can look like (see 
Figure 6.2). "— "
Figure 6.2: Integrating Change Initiative, Learning Organization and 
Culture Change
high
Extent to which 
change initiative 
is adopted
low
2
change initiatives 
variations 
experimentation
4
cultural change through 
learning capability
1
status quo
3
blind variation 
individual learning
low high
Extent to which learning organization exists
Source: Ulrich et al. 1993: 59.
The two dimensions are the extent to which change initiative is adopted 
and the extent to which a learning organization exists.
In cell 1 organizations focus on the status quo. Organizations in cell 2 
are in a series of change initiatives, but fail to change. In cell 3 
organizations learn without change. This can happen in two ways:
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individuals leam but not the organization, or units of the organizations 
experim ent but fail to share their knowledge across boundaries. 
Organizations in cell 4 both change and learn, which is the aim 
management should strive for, according to Ulrich et al. That means they 
possess learning capability in terms of the capacity to generate and 
generalize ideas with impact. The generalization can only be accomplished 
by penetrating boundaries, such as time, vertical, horizontal, external and 
geographic boundaries.
For Ulrich et al. (1993: 60-66) the two main reasons for management’s 
failure to create a Learning Organization are (1) “generation without 
generalization”, i.e. no sharing across boundaries, and (2 ) “ideas without 
impact”, i.e. even if ideas have been generalized they do not improve 
companies’ competitiveness. However, it is not clear whether Ulrich et al. 
gained this insight from their questionnaire-based research or not.
In order to enable the capability to leam Ulrich et al. advocate three 
steps for management:
Firstly, management should build a com mitment o f  all employees to 
develop the capability to leam. This includes making learning a visible and 
strategic intent; investing in learning; talking publicly about learning; the 
measuring, benchmarking and tracking of learning; and creating symbols 
of learning (e.g., an award for excellent learning performance or setting a 
personal example of learning).
Secondly, management should work to generate ideas with impact. 
From the their survey data collected, Ulrich et al. could identify four 
different ways how organizations generate ideas: (1) Continuous 
improvement is a way of making things better, (2 ) competence acquisition 
is a way of buying in knowledge, (3) experimentation is a way of trying 
out new ways and (4) boundary spanning is a way of adapting knowledge 
of other organizations to their own needs. These four different ways to 
create new knowledge indicate that there is a great variety generating new 
ideas.
However, the rigidity of clustering (i.e. grouping) of the companies in 
the survey, the attributes which defined these clusters and the companies 
provided as an example by Ulrich et al. appear to be slightly misleading
The rigidity of four clusters according to one dominant learning 
strategy each hides the fact that companies can also employ a combination
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of different strategies of knowledge generation at one single point of'timeT ' ^ 
Furthermore, the items for constructing of the clusters are not explained. It 
is also unclear how “competitiveness” is defined by Ulrich et a l,  which 
correlates positively with the capability to change and the use of 
experimentation as the dominant learning type. Ulrich et al. come to the 
conclusion that those companies that have the highest capability to change 
are the most competitive. To underline this finding, GM is given as an 
example with its two subsidiaries NUMMI and Saturn. However, 
automotive experts would not judge GM and Saturn to be very competitive, 
and NUMMI’s success is mostly due to Toyota and not to GM (cf. Adler 
1993: 97-108, Adler & Cole 1993: 85-94, Mahoney & Deckop 1993: 27-38 
and Ingrassia & White 1994).
Thirdly, Ulrich et al. suggest that management should strive to 
generalize ideas with impact. The creation of an infrastructure that moves 
knowledge across boundaries is characterised by a culture of shared 
mindset, competence (staffing, training/ development), consequence 
(appraising, rew ards), governance (organization, design and 
communication), capacity for change through work process and system 
(change initiatives, work processes and systems) and leadership 
(demonstration of learning commitment).
However, apart from the “shared mindset”, an advice for a culture of 
open communication and trust is totally missing from the recommendations 
of Ulrich et a l.  However, for the “empowerment of the employees” 
suggested, a culture of open communication and trust are vital. They are 
important as they encourage employees to share their ideas, as Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4.6. show.
It was not possible to use Ulrich et al. ’ s q u e s t i o n n a i r e ^ ^  f o r  the research 
of this thesis because their investigation only focuses on qualitative 
evaluation of information gathering strategies and the clustering of these, 
whereas this thesis focuses on the characteristics, outcomes and sources of _
the Learning Organization. _
Dave Ulrich kindly sent a copy of the questionnaire to the author, which is gratefully acknowledged.
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6.1.3. Study by Inkpen
The third empirical work on organizational learning and the Learning 
Organizations is a Ph. D. thesis by Inkpen (1992), which looks at the 
learning of 40 North American and Japanese jo in t ventures in the 
automobile supply industry. He, therefore, focuses on only one special case 
of inter-organizational learning (i.e. jo int ventures) and, in addition, 
restricts his point of view only to learning from a managerial perspective.
Inkpen’s study suggests three findings: Firstly, in most cases learning 
was a joint venture motive, though not the most important one. Secondly, 
those parent companies which Inkpen classified as Learning Organizations 
had a m anagem ent which recognised the existence of learning 
opportunities, and made serious efforts to transfer knowledge from the 
joint venture to the parent company. Thirdly, the intention to leam, i.e. 
“learning intent”, was clearly associated with the initiation of learning 
efforts. However, there was a weak relationship between learning intent 
and the learning outcome, which Inkpen explains by the influence of 
unrealistic or inaccurate learning expectations.
Inkpen’s (1992) investigation of joint ventures was of limited value for 
this thesis due to its specific nature and the fact that the questionnaire 
focused only on the learning of different departments in the companies 
analysed. In addition, Inkpen does not deal with characteristics of the 
Learning Organization, which play a pivotal role in this thesis. 
Furthermore, Inkpen only uses a very subjective indicator for learning 
outcome, i.e. asking in his questionnaire whether the experience of joint 
venture learning was useful. He admits that the “measures of learning 
variables were less than ideal” (Inkpen 1992: 236). Nevertheless, Inkpen’s 
work can be useful further reading for those interested in an in-depth 
analysis of joint ventures as a special case of inter-organizational learning.
6.1.4. Study by Dierkes & Raske
The fourth and last empirical study by Dierkes & Raske (1994: 140-54, 
cf. also 1994a: 8-10) looks at the change processes of 40 large German- 
based companies. Although these companies were selected randomly, the 
authors judge them to be representative for larger groups of companies 
from different sectors in Germany. The companies are clustered into two
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groups, which are called hierarchical and decentral organizations^^ (hybrid 
structures are observed as well in their empirical work).
H ierarch ical organizations are depicted as follows:
The top management keeps contact with the outside world. Competencies 
are well defined. The relationship between management and employees is 
patriarchal. Communication is effected via new sletter. Flows of 
information are only one way, i.e. top-down. After reaching a goal the 
status quo is preserved. Corporate strategy does not set future trends. 
Cultural values are: solvency, stability, “uprightness”, being long- 
established, reliable and trustworthy.
Dierkes & Raske see the dangers with this kind of organization that 
good ideas of employees peter out and warning signals are only taken 
seriously when top management perceives them.
D ecentral organizations are characterised as follows:
Everybody in the organization has contact with the outside world. 
Responsibility is vastly delegated. Top management sees itself as a partner 
of the employees. Communication is direct within meetings or informal. 
The aim is continuous improvement. Corporate identity tends to set future 
trends. Cultural values are: openness, team  orientation, creativity, 
flexibility, mistake tolerance and ambition.
Dierkes & Raske see the dangers of this type of organization to be the 
time-consuming process of continuous consultation, that ideas grow to be 
occasionally overvalued or that synergy effects are not used at all.
The research from Dierkes & Raske (1994a: 10) further identifies four 
different obstacles to change: Firstly, success is a major barrier, especially 
for hierarchical organizations. Secondly, employees’ limited ability and 
unwillingness to change is another obstacle, which is rooted in a deep fear 
of losing power or even the job. Thirdly, the lack of usability of employees 
and managers for change. The fourth and last obstacle is the difference 
between generations (i.e. younger and older employees), which is 
exacerbated by the difference between leavers and the newcomers.
Hierarchical organizations resemble Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organizations and decentral organizations 
resemble Learning Organization (see Chapter 3), but Dierkes & Raske fail to quote any literature.
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Dierkes & Raske identify three driving forces of change: (1) 
involvement of more representatives of top management, (2) crises or (3) 
unexpected success in the market, in a number of limited cases.
The authors use company age as an indicator for successful change 
learning (i.e. the older a company the more successful its ability to change) 
and then conclude that company age makes no difference in showing 
successful change capability. However, they do not suggest any logical 
argument to validate their choice and conclusion or posit any theoretical 
construct. For example, other indicators for successful change learning 
could have been the pace of change or the rate of successful implementation 
of change programmes.
They neither give any indication of which type of organization is 
dominant in which industry. Based on the discussion at the end of Chapter
3.1., Bureaucratic-Tayloristic Organizations appear to be similar to 
hierarchical organizations and are adequate for stable environments. In 
contrast. Learning Organization appear to be sim ilar to decentral 
organizations and are adequate for unstable environments. Indeed, Dierkes 
and Raske report from their study that hierarchical organizations saw their 
strength in their stability whereas decentral organizations saw their 
strength in their flexibility, both times corresponding to their respective 
environment.
Furthermore, Dierkes & Raske (1994a: 10) add that their research 
yielded the identification of a third type of organization: hierarchical 
organizations, which had either strong elements of the information and 
communication found in decentral organizations or which deliberately 
effected a process of change towards a decentral organization structure. 
This implicitly shows a clear trend of hierarchical structures evolving to 
decentral ones, i.e. the development of a stable to an unstable environment, 
which makes the flexibility of an organization increasingly important. This 
is what Dierkes and Raske fail to realise.
Additionally, it appears that Dierkes & Raske only stayed at the official 
formal level of “artefacts of the corporate culture” (cf. Schein 1992). 
Because in their analysis of company culture Dierkes & Raske only 
compare the values (as a part of the “company culture”), which were stated 
in the interviews (i.e. 50 interviews for 40 companies) with the wording in 
the corporate brochures (marketing brochures). These values of the
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company culture gained from the interviews were identical with the official 
statements. However, both are likely to be the official values, where the 
companies would like to be, but in fact unlikely are. As Schein (1992) 
points out, official formal values of company culture (as stated in 
interviews and brochures) cannot necessarily equated with the real 
informal values of a company.
6.1.5. Conclusion from the Empirical Studies
In summary, all four studies above deal with a different aspect of 
organizational learning. The first study by Shrivastava develops a set of six 
different types of organizational learning systems. The second empirical 
research by Ulrich et al. clusters a set of four different knowledge- 
acquisition strategies. The third work by Inkpen only deals with the 
learning in joint ventures. And the fourth study by Dierkes and Raske 
investigates the change learning process of companies and derives a set of 
two dominant organizational forms.
All this empirical work tends to cluster samples without any apparent 
theoretical underpinning of the methodology used. This applies even more 
to the measures of organizational learning outcomes. No indicators for 
organizational learning or learning outcomes are given in the first study by 
Shrivastava. It is neither clear from where the learning indicators are 
derived in Ulrich et aV s  paper. Inkpen s work only uses a very subjective 
indicator for organizational learning outcomes, which would not have been 
satisfactory for the standard of this thesis. And in Dierkes and Raske’s 
study the success indicator for organizational learning is the age of the 
company, which is seen to be more than inappropriate, as has been 
explained above.
Therefore, this thesis develops not only a set of more objective 
indicators for organizational learning outcomes, but it also investigates the 
sources and nature of organizational learning capabilities.
However, first the selection of the research philosophy and method is 
explained in the next section.
- 1 7 3  -
6. Re s e a r c h  M e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  M o d e l
6.2. Discussion and Selection of Research Philosophy and Method
This section presents the foundation for the empirical research 
procedure by explaining the research philosophy and methods of research 
used. Any decision on the choice of research philosophy has naturally also 
an impact on the choice of the research methods used. Therefore, the 
choice of research philosophy is discussed first.
6.2.1. Discussion and Selection of Research Philosophy
With respect to the research philo^xmhy, there was a choice to be made 
between different schools of thoughtç^o^hich was between “positivism” or 
“phenomenology”8i, i.e. between a predetermined or a socially constructed 
world-view. Positivism vs. phenomenology can also be seen as naturalism 
vs. interpretation (Rosenberg 1988: 24) or natural science vs. an 
interpretative school of thought (Singleton et al. 1988: 36).
Positivism, on the one hand, aims to conduct social science like natural 
science, including developing laws and performing objective research of an 
objective world, focusing on facts. Phenomenology, on the other hand, 
accepts that social science has to deal with a socially constructed and 
subjective world, where the researcher is part of the observed and driven 
by human interests, focusing on meanings. The high attention positivism 
paid to numbers and computer modelling caused a counteraction of 
phenomenology in the 1970s, criticising positivist methods as not being 
objective, independent and value-free as claimed. Therefore, proponents of 
phenomenology advocated to bar empirical measurements and instead focus 
on meanings and understanding only (cf. also Easterby-Smith et al. 1991: 
24ff).
This thesis takes the philosophical standpoint of the phenomenological 
paradigm, including the items like shown in Table 6.1. This applies
This sub-section also uses Gabier Wirtschafts-Lexikon (1988) as a source.
For more information about positivism see Alexander (1985: 63Iff) and about phenomenology see 
MacLeod (1968: 68-72) or Lassmann (1985: 587f). For a discussion of positivism vs. phenomenology see 
Rosenberg (1988: 1-27), Singleton et al. (1988: 35-38), Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 20-43) or Blaikie 
(1993: 1-160).
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especially to all the “basic beliefs”, such as that the world is socially 
constructed and subjective, that the observer is part of what is observed and 
that science is driven by human interests. The theory of organizational 
learning and the Learning Organization is seen as a help to understand a 
learning process in a holistic approach. Analytical tools included 
exploratory interviews, a questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews, 
which in turn were used to refine and extend the theory developed at the 
beginning of this thesis.
Table 6.1: Key Features of Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms
Positivist paradiam Phenomenoloaical paradiam
Basic beliefs: The world is external 
and objective
The world is socially 
constructed and subjective
Observer is independent Observer is part of what is 
observed
Science is value-free Science is driven by human 
interests
Researcher focus on facts focus on meanings
shouid: look for causality and 
fundamental laws
try to understand what is 
happening
reduce phenomena to 
simplest elements
look at the totality of each 
situation
formulate hypotheses 
and then test them
develop ideas through 
induction from data
Preferred
methods
include:
operationalising con­
cepts so that they can 
be measured
using multiple methods 
to establish different views 
of phenomena
taking large samples small samples investigated 
in depth or over time
Source: Easterby-Smith et al. 1991: 27.
The operationalization and questionnaire-based testing of two
hypotheses, with the help of a larger sample, could be regarded as a \ (
positivist element of this research. However, using multiple methods, this 
was preceded and followed by discussions and interviews with a more 
phenomenological character such as developing ideas through induction as 
well as investigating smaller samples. This mixing is not an unusual
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practice, as according to Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 31) there are an 
increasing number of authors and researchers in social science who “argue 
that one should attempt to mix methods to some extent, because it provides 
more perspectives on the phenomena being investigated.” In case of 
contradictory results between the different methods employed, this thesis 
rather follows the phenomenological approach, i.e. focusing on meanings, 
than the positivist approach, i.e. focusing on facts. This is because the 
world is not seen as being external and objective, but rather as being 
socially constructed and subjective.
Although this thesis uses a more positivist paradigm when testing 
hypotheses (after having developed the hypothesis through induction from 
data according to the phenomenological paradigm), this was not done to 
establish fundamental laws about organizational learning, but rather to try 
to challenge the understanding of it. Thus, this more positivist part does not 
employ “logical positivism”, which is about confirming hypotheses. 
Instead, this thesis uses Popper’s “critical rationalism’’^  ^ for empirical null- 
hypotheses testing, which is about trying to reject hypotheses in order to 
investigate the viability of the theory developed, i.e. the interaction 
between the Learning Organization’s characteristics, its outcomes and 
sources.
After classifying the thesis from a philosophical point of view, the 
choice of the research method is addressed.
6.2.2. Discussion and Selection of the Research Method
When selecting the research method for this thesis, especially when 
preparing the questionnaire, it was necessary to determine which would be 
the most appropriate, either (1 ) a longitudinal (i.e. monitoring over time) 
or (2 ) a cross-sectional study (i.e. a snapshot view).
(1): The main advantage of longitudinal studies is the comparability of 
two or more investigations at different times. When some sort of change is 
introduced at a certain point in time, one can compare two or more stages
82 Cf. Popper (1959), but also Bartley (1985), Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 39f), Flor (1992) and 
Blaikie(1993).
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of the change process (e.g., before and after a change) in order to gain 
insights into its effects.
This advantage can turn into a disadvantage, if there is no specific point 
of change available or if different research subjects perform their changes 
at different times.
The comparability of the different investigations is also questionable 
for various reasons: Firstly, there is a fluctuation in people, and the 
response rate is normally not high enough to guarantee that the same 
people answer the questions. This means that it is almost impossible to have 
the same sample of research within different runs of the investigation. 
Secondly, the same people tend to answer the same questions differently for 
the first time compared to the following times, because the primary effect 
is gone (there is obviously a difference if one answers a new question or 
answers a question already known to oneself). Thirdly, there is a possible 
bias described as the “honeymoon effect” by Oliver & Wilkinson (1992:
143 and 162f), which means that changes are sometimes greeted with 
enthusiasm that fades away after being confronted with the real problems 
of implementation. Fourthly, the questionnaires are rarely identical in 
different investigations as they are normally modified for reasons of 
improvement by the authors.
Additionally, a longitudinal study normally requires a lot of time (cf. 
also Easterby-Smith et al. 1991: 35) and monetary resources compared to 
cross-sectional studies.
(2): Cross-sectional studies not only have the advantage that they can be 
performed with limited resources of time and money, but cross-sectional 
studies can also ask for past figures, therefore, comparing the change of 
some variables in a more reliable way than in longitudinal studies, as 2  
discussed above.
The disadvantages of cross-sectional studies are that occasionally a lot 
of time has passed since some of the relevant occasions occurred, and there 
is a major problem remembering quantitative data, if it is no longer 
available to the respondent. On the other hand, sometimes past events aret<^r-y^ 
seen more clearly, i.e. without the “honeymoon effect”.
This thesis is based on a cross-sectional approach for those variables at 
different times, which tried to measure the outcome of organizational 
learning. However, this was not possible for variables of the characteristics
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of the Learning Organization, as the questionnaire was already relatively ^ _ 
comprehensive. Furthermore, Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 35) address the 
problem that cross-sectional designs cannot explain why correlations exist.  ^ ,
In summary, a cross-sectional study for this thesis was more 
appropriate than a longitudinal study out of following reasons:
Firstly, there is no single point, but a span of time, where one can 
assume that British suppliers started to acquire the characteristics of the 
Learning Organization. If changes happened they will vary considerably in 
their date and duration. Secondly, one would expect that many of the 
changes of suppliers towards the Learning Organization had already 
happened. Lastly, only limited resources were available for research.
However, in order to offset some of the disadvantages of the cross- 
sectional approach of the questionnaire-based research, it was combined 
with initial exploratory interviews and concluded which in-depth 
interviews. This combination of three different methods of investigation 
was developed to have a solid balance between empirical research 
procedures and to be able to confirm why correlations exist and whether 
they can be interpreted as causation.
6.3. Procedure for Empirical Research
This section deals with the procedure for empirical research in this 
thesis, which includes a description of the initial research procedure as well 
as the design of the research model.
6.3.1. Initial Research Procedure
The empirical work started with a newspaper, magazine and report 
research about the automobile industry, focusing on Great Britain. Then a 
list of nearly 650 direct suppliers in Britain was compiled, including the 
names of the Managing Directors of each company. The sources were car 
p r o d u c e r s 8 3  and trade associations in Great Britain (e.g., SMMT’s Buyers’
Guide 1993).
The names of the car assemblers are not disclosed for reasons of assured confidentiality.
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6.3.2. Exploratory Interviews with Car Component Suppliers
The next step was exploratory interviews (for a guideline see Part 2 of 
the Appendix), which were conducted with six direct car component 
suppliers in early spring 1995. The results of these exploratory interviews 
are presented in Chapter 7. The companies were selected randomly from 
the list of all firms included in this survey.
In conjunction with the literature review, the insights gained from these 
interviews were used to design a research model, which is introduced in the 
next sub-section.
6.3.3. Questionnaire-based Survey with its Research Model
The design of a research model for the questionnaire based survey is 
outlined here (the survey results are presented in Chapter 8 ). By this, the 
concepts of organizational learning and the Learning Organization are 
operationalized through survey questions. The questionnaire is presented in 
Part 1 of the Appendix at the end of this thesis. Its questions had to be 
satisfactory in terms of testing the hypotheses^^ developed below.
The key hypotheses investigate organizational learning in two ways:
The first hypothesis puts forward a positive impact of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristic of car component suppliers in Britain on their 
organizational learning outcomes (intra-organizational learning)
The second hypothesis proposes that these characteristics of a Learning 
Organization of car component suppliers in Britain are predominantly fj 
acquired through some form of relationship with Japanese car producing 
or component supplying companies (inter-organizational learning). OTlLr
6.3.3.1. Elaboration of the First Hypothesis
The first research question explores the empirical relationship betweei 
the characteristics of the Learning Organization of companies and their 
capability to learn organizationally, i.e. to generate outcomes of 
organizational learning. The reason for this being that the literature to
Note: These hypotheses have to be converted to null hypotheses for empirical testing.
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date, as outlined in the first section of this chapter, has not yet approached 
analysis in this way. Although many authors refer to a link between the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization and the capability to learn 
organizationally, this has only be weakly underpinned by anecdotal 
evidence of some case studies (cf., e.g., Senge 1990, Leonard-Barton 1992 
and Garvin 1993).
The first hypothesis is designed to test the impact of the characteristics 
of the Learning Organization found at car component suppliers in Britain 
on organizational learning outcomes. Therefore, the first hypothesis 
explores intra-organizational learning.
Hypothesis 1: Those car component suppliers in Britain who show 
higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization have 
better organizational learning outcomes.
In connection with this hypothesis further analysis is undertaken on 
whether or not characteristics of the Learning Organization are essential 
for a good performance in organizational learning.
The characteristics of the Learning Organization included in the 
hypothesis testing are as follows (see Chapter 3):
(1) Team work and team learning, (2) systemic thinking and mental 
models, (3) free vertical and horizontal flow of information, (4) education 
and training of the whole workforce, (5) learning reward systems for 
employees, (6 ) continuous improvement of work, (7) flexibility of 
company strategy and employees, (8 ) decentralized hierarchies and 
participative management, (9) learning laboratories and constant 
experimentation and (1 0 ) a supportive corporate learning culture.
This was combined with a research on organizational learning 
systems, which could either be team improvement systems or employee 
suggestion systems. A team improvement system is a formalized technique 
that enables the generation and implementation of ideas within teams which 
solve problems of an organization. An employee suggestion systems is a 
formalized technique that provides the opportunity for employees to voice 
their ideas on possible improvements in an organization (cf. also Ishikawa 
1985, Dale 1994, Oakland 1995 and Russell & Taylor 1995: 106ff).
As has been explained in the first section of this chapter, current 
literature does not provide any information on how organizational learning
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outcomes are to be measured. According to our definition of organizational 
learning (presented at the end of Chapter 2.1.), organizational learning 
outcomes must be a function of at least individual learning which can be 
accompanied by team learning. Organizational learning outcomes manifest 
themselves in tangible improvements of efficiency and/or effectiveness of 
organizational performance. As a proxy, three groups of organizational 
learning outcomes variables were developed with the help of a theory- 
driven approach, and it turns out that the data allows to do so:
Firstly, the amount o f  individual learning which turns into 
organizational learning, measured by suggestions per employee 
implemented and team improvements implemented.
Secondly, the speed o f  organizational learning, gauged through the 
ratio of new products introduced compared to existing ones and the new 
product introduction compared to competitors. 655^
Thirdly, the amount o f  quality improvements, measured by 
improvement of internal quality per units produced (i.e. quality during the 
production process) and improvement of external quality per un its^^  
produced (i.e. quality the customer receives).
6.3.3.2. Elaboration of the Second Hypothesis i
The second hypothesis tests the impact of ^ rsonaK contact between car
component suppliers in Britain and Japanese SQflapames in the automobile
industry on acquiring the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
Japanese companies are frequently quoted to be Learning Organizations 
(e.g., Toyota (Adler & Cole 1993), Honda (Garvin 1993 and Senge 1990) 
and Canon (Nonaka 1992)), though this might be not the case for all of 
them. ' ' r -
There are also some examples of Learning Organizations in the TJS 
(e.g.. Home Depot (McGill & Slocum 1993), Chaparral Steel (Leonard- 
Barton 1992), Analog Devices and Hanover Insurance (Senge 1990)). In 
Europe, however, literature seems to be unsure about whether or not an 
ideal of the Learning Organization exists. And, except Royal Dutch/Shell
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(de Geus 1988), there are discussions about companies like Volvo^s (cf. 
Berggren 1994) as to whether they can be defined as such, or if they only 
are special forms of evolving organizational structures (e.g.. Rover 
Learning Business (Thurbin 1994 and Pedler et a l  1991)).
It is suggested that for the acquisition of characteristics of the Learning 
Organization an extensive knowledge transfer of explicit and especially 
tacit knowledge from Learning Organizations is needed. Krafcik (1986;
25-30, cf. also Womack et a l  1990: 163) mentions an example where an 
American supplier learns from Japanese companies in the car industry, and 
suggests that “considerable learning is occurring among American 
suppliers” (Krafcik 1986: 28). Andersen Consulting (1994: 5) state that the 
“UK has benefited from foreign investment and the plants supplying 
Japanese customers appear to be learning from these customers.” Both do 
not go into further detail, therefore, this is addressed in the second 
hypothesis.  ^ ?
The literature quoted above^ssume^that Japanese car companies come
close to the ideal of the Learning Organization. For transfer of tacit 
knowledge about the Learning Organization intensive personal contact is 
required. This leads to the second hypothesis, which investigates inter- 
organizational learning.
Hypothesis 2: Those car component suppliers in Britain who have a 
relationship with Japanese companies have higher scores in the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization.
Hypothesis 2 tests whether it is appropriate to say that knowledge 
transfer of the characteristics of the Learning Organization is related to 
intensive contact with Japanese companies in the car industry as the 
important source of tacit knowledge.
The importance of personal contact in the form of “socialization” to 
transmit tacit knowledge is also mentioned by Nonaka (1994: 19) (see 
Chapter 2.2.). This thesis concludes that only a limited amount of tacit 
knowledge is transformed into explicit knowledge (externalization).
In contrast to Berggren, Adler & Cole 1993 and 1994 doubt that the Volvo plant Uddevalla (which 
was shut down in May 1993) really was a Learning Organization. This discussion has been more closely 
analysed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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because of its implicit nature, but also because it would be very demanding 
and resource-consuming to do so. Therefore, the most common way to pass 
on tacit knowledge is by personal contact (socialization).
The characteristics of the Learning Organization mainly originate in 
Japanese car assemblers in Japan, America or Britain, but also Japanese car 
component suppliers in Japan or America (see Figure 6.3).
The most important reasons for the generation and acquisition of these 
characteristics by Japanese car assemblers were (see Chapter 4):
- The Training Within Industries Programme from America, which 
helped to build the characteristics of continuous improvement and of 
training and education.
- The Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) guiding the 
diffusion of quality-control (QC) circles, which was institutionalized as a 
unit of JUSE, called QC Circle Centre, in order to promote circle 
activities.
- And severe strikes at Toyota and Nissan in the beginning of the 
1950s, which developed a different approach towards employees in terms 
of more information exchange and a corporate culture supportive of 
learning, therefore, contributing to the development of systemic thinking.
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Figure 6.3: Sources for Characteristics of the Learning Organization
AMERICA
Jap. car 
producer supplier
JAPAN
Jap. 
supplier p. car 
producer
Jap. car 
producer Jap. 
supplier
supplier
BRITAIN
track of knowledge/know-how flow
There are various flows of knowledge about the characteristics of the 
Learning Organization. This knowledge influences the intensity of deutero- 
leaming (learning learning) and double-loop learning (change learning) 
with which car component suppliers in Britain acquire the characteristics 
of the Learning Organization.
There are five potential categories (combinations are also possible) of 
direct sources of knowledge (i.e. Japanese car companies or 
component suppliers) for component suppliers in Britain:
(A) Owner
(B) Customer
(C) Partner
(D) Supplier
(C) Co-member
Whereas Japanese car producers can only be (A) owners or (B) 
customers, Japanese component suppliers can be (A) owners, (B) 
customers, (C) partners, (D) suppliers to component suppliers in Britain or 
(E) co-members in the same supplier organization, which can include 
competitors. This thesis proposes to use this entire list as direct sources for
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the characteristics of the Learning Organization of the suppliers in Britain. 
The following explains, how the relationships may look in detail.
(A): A Japanese owner of a supplier in Britain as a source can be in 
the form of a Japanese car producer or a Japanese component supplier, 
which can range from sole ownership to co-ownership.
The transfer of knowledge through personal contact can be made in 
two ways. This can either be through the owner’s experts being sent to the 
supplier, who teach, advise or work in a team together, in order to 
improve existing processes or products, or solve problems. Alternatively, 
it can be through the suppliers’ employees being trained by or working at 
the owner’s site. It is assumed that the flow, especially of tacit knowledge, 
goes more or less in one direction only, i.e. from the owner to its 
subsidiary supplier.
(B): A Japanese customer of a supplier in Britain, as another source, 
can be either a Japanese car assembler or a Japanese component supplier. 
The types of learning can take various forms again. One way is that the 
Japanese customer sends experts to the supplier in Britain, these experts 
then teach, advise or work in a team together with the supplier’s 
employees, in order to improve existing processes, products or solve 
problems. Another way can be through the supplier’s employees being 
trained by, or working at the site of, the Japanese customer and bringing 
back the essential knowledge for the generation of the characteristics of the 
Learning Organization.
(C): A Japanese partner as a further source can be in the form of 
various co-operative relationships. This can be licensing of a patent, 
owning a joint venture together or some other different form of strategic 
alliance with a Japanese supplier. Depending on the type of such co­
operation this can involve significant exchange of explicit knowledge, but 
particularly tacit knowledge, through personal contact.
(D): A Japanese supplier for components or materials is regarded as 
another possible major source of the Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics for a supplier in Britain. This relationship can include 
various forms of tacit knowledge transfer like joint project teams for 
improvements or for the development of new products. This can imply 
exchange of employees, even for long periods.
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(E): A Japanese co-member in the same supplier association, last but 
not least, can also be a source. The relationships in supplier associations can 
rank from very lose meetings to focused teachings, from including only top 
management to including employees from different levels of hierarchy, in 
order to transfer knowledge.
These five sources are regarded as an “essential” but not necessarily 
“sufficient” cause for the variations^ in strength among the different 
Learning Organization’s characteristics found at car components suppliers.
In order to explain these variations, the following causes for deviation 
are listed:
(1) Resources for implementing change
(2) Receptivity of management and employees ^
(3) Duration of a relationship ^  ^
(4) Intensity of this relationship ^  ^
These factors are looked at closer below. I
(1): Resources for implementing change influences both the 
duration and the intensity of change towards the ideal of the Learning 
Organization. The resources have to be sufficient to enable a change; but if 
there are too many resources, change is perceived to be unnecessary. 
Alternatively, if the resources are not sufficient, change is not possible due 
to a lack in capacity.
(2): Receptivity of management and employees deals with the 
openness of management, on the one hand, and of the employees, on the 
other. It is not enough for management alone to be convinced that the 
organization should become a Learning Organization, but the employees 
have to be convinced, too, because they play an important role in 
organizational double-loop learning. Both, management and employees, 
live in a corporate culture and this can sometimes be a filter for 
receptivity.
(3): Duration of a relationship simply deals with the assumption 
that the longer a relationship lasts the more opportunity there is to transfer
A further explanation for the variation could be a heterogeneous impact of different Japanese 
companies.
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explicit and tacit knowledge about the Learning Organization. Thus, the 
longer a relationship with a Japanese company in the car industry lasts, the 
more distinct are the characteristics of the Learning Organization with a 
supplier in Britain.
(4): Intensity of a relationship is another variable that applies only 
to suppliers that have Japanese companies as owners, customers, partners, 
suppliers or a combination thereof. Intensity refers to the form of 
horizontal and vertical personal contact (e.g., visits, meetings, project 
work, long-term exchange of personnel or training) as well as its 
frequency. The more intensive a relationship is the more explicit and 
especially tacit knowledge is transferred. Therefore, it is suggested that a 
supplier in Britain has more distinct attributes of the Learning 
Organization the more intense the relationship is with a Japanese supplier 
in Japan or a Japanese car producer.
In summary. Hypothesis 2 c la im s^ a t characteristics of the Learning 
Organization are mainly derivpa from intensive personal contact with 
Japanese car assemblers or Japanese car component suppliers. In order to 
differentiate which Japanese car assemblers and car component suppliers 
were responsible for the transfer of characteristics of the Learning 
Organization, the name of the company was asked for in the questionnaire.
After the elaboration of the two main hypotheses, the next part deals 
with the operationalization of the questionnaire items and its design.
6.3.3.3. Operationalization of Items and Questionnaire Design
This thesis operationalizes items (i.e. normally an answer to one 
question) and develops a questionnaire in conjunction with the semi­
structured exploratory interviews mentioned above, which were piloted 
and sent out to direct car component suppliers in Britain.
The preferred target group for the questionnaire is Managing 
Directors, because they have the best overall view of the company, but also 
other members of the top management. Senge (1990: 299f and 1990a: lOf), 
for example, emphasizes the pivotal role of top management for being the 
“constructor” of the Learning Organization. Additionally, because of their 
status of power, it is easier for top managers to get all information
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required for answering the questionnaire, i.e. get other employees to 
answer specific questions.
However, these top managers, like anybody else in a company, also 
have a subjective view. This can make them see the reality of their 
company sometimes more as they would like it to be, instead of as it is.
Thus, later in this thesis, the spectrum of people questioned will be 
broadened to the shopfloor workers with the help of in-depth interviews, in 
order to gain a more objective insight into the companies’ reality, as
different subjective views are balanced.
--------------------------- L.
The questionnaire attached in Part 1 of the Appendix shows the J  
structure of the questions. There are ten question units for each element of 
the Learning Organization, and a further unit each for organizational^ 
learning, organizational change, company data, including selected factors"^'^^"^^^ 
for successful organizational learning as well as relating to customers and 
suppliers. These questions were derived from statements in the literature 
about organizational learning, experience from former research and 
exploratory interviews with car component suppliers in Britain, as well as 
analytical research and the development of the theory of organizational 
learning and the Learning Organization.
6.3.4. In-depth Interviews with Selected Suppliers
Four car component suppliers who completed the questionnaire were 
selected for in-depth interviews (for a guideline see Part 3 of the 
Appendix), in order to get some deeper insight into the characteristics of 
the Learning Organization, their outcomes and their origins. These four 
component suppliers consist of two different groups made up of two 
companies each.
Two companies had high overall scores as far as the characteristics of 
the Learning Organization are concerned as well as organizational learning 
systems. They were examined because they were exemplary companies, 
therefore, it was interesting to describe the process of how they became 
Learning Organizations. The other two companies had low scores, the 
reasons for this were worth investigating as well.
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6.3.5. Summary of the Research Methodology and Model
In summary, this chapter introduced the research methodology and 
model in this thesis, which is a combination of three steps:
Firstly, exploratory interviews were conducted, in order to test the 
general approach of this thesis and elaborate the hypotheses.
Secondly, a questionnaire was mailed, in order to empirically test the 
two hypotheses developed with a larger sample.
And thirdly, in-depth interviews with selected companies were held, in 
order to obtain a coherent picture to support the findings and to confirm 
the interpretations of the questionnaire survey.
The next chapter provides an analysis of the exploratory interviews 
with representatives of the management of six different components 
suppliers.
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7. Analysis of the Exploratory Interviews
As the first of three different steps of the empirical research procedure 
of this thesis, this seventh chapter deals with exploratory interviews. They 
show some first evidence supporting the Hypotheses 1 and 2. Both 
hypotheses are tested in a more formal approach with the help of a 
questionnaire survey in Chapter 8 and are corroborated in the concluding 
in-depth interviews in Chapter 9.
Six car component s u p p l i e r s ^ ^  were chosen for the initial research 
about the characteristics of the Learning Organization, their outcomes and 
sources. Exploratory interviews (for a guideline see Part 2 of the 
Appendix) were conducted with representatives of the management of these 
companies. All had in conunon that they were producing car components in 
Great Britain and usually the plant visited was the one including the 
headquarters of the company.
This research developed measures to benchmark the characteristics of 
the Learning Organization and outcome of organizational learning. These 
measures could then be used in the subsequent empirical, questionnaire 
based analysis with a larger sample. Using this larger sample, the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization could be investigated more 
reliably and in greater depth than it would have been possible in the 
exploratory work.
The exploratory interviews lasted between 45 to 60 minutes and were 
conducted in early spring 1995.
Company A, the first car component supplier visited, was a joint- 
venture between a Japanese and a non-Japanese company. Both, the 
Commercial Director and the Personnel Manager were interviewed. 
Additionally, a factory visit was made, in order to get an insight into the 
working methods and the changes the company went through since it 
became a joint venture.
'>
Because of assured confidentiality, no names of components supplying companies and persons are 
mentioned in this thesis. The six suppliers are referred to as Company A, B, C, D, E and F according to the 
order of interview dates. For the same reasons the products and size are not divulged, as it would be 
relatively easy to identify the companies and their plants for industry insiders.
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At Company B a meeting was arranged with the Team Learning 
Project Manager. It also included a factory tour. Company B took part in 
the “Learning from Japan Initiative”, sponsored by the DTI (the 
department for Enterprisej^s, which introduced selected British car 
component suppliers to Japanese counterparts, enabling the former to learn 
from the latter.
At Company C the Managing Director was interviewed. The Human 
Resources Manager conducted the factory tour, which also included the 
learning and training facilities.
Company D was the fourth one, with interviews of two managers of the 
Human Resources Department, which again included a factory tour.
At Company E the fifth exploratory interview was conducted with the 
District Manager, who guided a factory tour as well.
Company F was the sixth and last car component supplier visited, and 
this time the Engineering Manager was interviewed.
This chapter investigates the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization and the outcomes of organizational learning, followed by an 
analysis of the origins of these characteristics.
7.1. The Characteristics of the Learning Organization^^
All ten characteristics of the Learning Organization dealt with in this 
chapter were developed in Chapter 3.3. from the current literature. 
Whether and how these characteristics exist in reality, and in which 
combination, were some of the questions posed during the exploratory 
interviews of the six car component suppliers. The results of these 
exploratory interviews are outlined next.
7.1.1. Systemic Thinking and Mental Models
As explained in Chapter 3, the characteristic “systemic thinking and 
mental models” is theoretically the most important characteristic of the
Eor more detailed information see DTI - Vehicle Division (1994). 
Cf. also Rosengarten 1995.
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Learning Organization. In reality, it is not easy to identify, especially if 
this is done only through interviews with management representatives. 
Nevertheless, some interesting insights for later research have been gained.
In order to illustrate the way “systemic thinking and mental models” 
work, this sub-section focuses on two examples.
The first example is about why most suppliers, except Company A, did 
not give financial rewards to their employees for implemented team 
improvements, as this had negative side effects (see Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1: Side Effects of Financial Rewards for Team Improvements
First Final 
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Negative side effects > Solution: Only non-financial rewards for 
implemented team improvements
Although, at first sight financial rewards have a positive effect on the 
generation and implementation of team improvements, there is especially 
one side effect that can have a very negative influence on the effectiveness 
of continuous improvement teams in the long run. This side effect on the 
second level is caused by the fact that only big problems are attractive to 
employees or management, because of the high payoff and, thus, small 
problems are neglected. This leads on the whole to a loss of a potential 
increase in quality and productivity, because of the negative impact on 
generation and implementation of team improvements.
There is an attempt to avoid this side effect by the majority of suppliers 
interviewed by relying heavily on non-financial rewards like token, gifts.
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medals, certificates, presentations of achievements or public appraisal 
through different communication channels.
Where financial rewards for continuous improvements were given, it 
was mainly done indirectly. This means instead of directly paying a lump 
sum, the involvement of an employee in continuous improvement activities 
was taken into account when there was a decision to be made about salary 
increase or promotion (normally linked to a salary increase as well).
The manager of Company C, describing the problem and its solution, 
said aptly:
“We decided not to give a monetary reward, because it is 
divisive, it creates jealousy, it makes people always focused on 
big things, and all these little things get left; and for all these 
people getting less money - you stop those. The idea is to get 
everybody - some people may make a big gain some people may 
make a little gain, but you want all of them. No money, no 
monetary reward.”
A similar logic of systemic thinking applies to the second example of 
how to implement team improvements successfully (see Figure 7.2). They 
normally lead to more participation in activities of improvement teams 
because success normally amplifies the behaviour pattern of participation.
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Figure 7.2: Side Effects of Successfully Implemented Team 
Improvements
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However, on the second level a negative effect of these implemented 
improvements can be the rationalization of jobs, which again leads to group 
pressure to save jobs. As a consequence, this has a negative side effect on 
the participation in improvement teams in the end.
In order to avoid this negative side effect, an agreement between 
employees and the management can be negotiated, which commits the 
company not to make anyone in the company redundant because of 
successfully implemented team improvements. Instead potentially 
redundant staff are employed somewhere else.
This was done for example in Company A, which tried to keep to this ^  
policy even in the recession of the early nineties. The manager c o m m e n t^ ^  
as follows:
“1 think that brought us a lot of respect and commitment from 
people [working for Company A].”
Continuous improvement of work is discussed now as the second most 
important characteristic of the Learning Organization.
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7.1.2. Continuous Improvement of Work
For “continuous improvement of work” there are theoretically two 
methods. Firstly, an employee suggestion system and, secondly, a 
continuous improvement team system. The two could also be combined.
However, the majority of the companies interviewed had either 
abandoned their employee suggestion scheme or it only played a minor 
role. The main reason for this was bad experience in the past: the time 
needed to implement the improvements generated was normally too long 
(if they were accepted by the management at all). This caused a lower 
participation rate of the employees, and normally led to a decline in 
employee suggestions.
A manager of Company D remembered:
“In the engineering department it took often months to evaluate it 
[the suggestion], in which time the people had sometimes 
forgotten that they made them - a nightmare, and according to 
my experience that is not uncommon.”
This seemed to be caused mainly by a bureaucratic system, which was 
not focused on the quick processing of employee suggestions.
The manager of Company F described the situation as follows:
“We used to have one [an employee suggestion system] a long 
time ago . . . .  A traditional scheme "win a Mini or some money", 
but that was disbanded a long time ago and we just have the 
[continuous improvement team] scheme I described.”
Five of the six companies had introduced a continuous improvement 
team system. Company B did not have it, but intended to introduce one in 
1995/6. Continuous improvement teams were generally self-organizing 
teams. This means that when an employee has an improvement idea, he/she 
selects the people for his/her continuous improvement team (who may be 
engineers as well). The team leader is sometimes chosen by the team 
sometimes by the management (not necessarily by the person with the idea) 
and a plan for problem solving and implementation is designed.
The fact that this procedure is sometimes an outcome of experience, 
derived from trial and error, is shown by the following quotation from the 
manager of Company C:
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“We started to select team leaders for the improvement teams, 
but the more you force it the more it does not work. It is better 
if you can find a natural leader and a natural level.”
And another manager from Company E explained:
“The teams themselves would generally appoint their own 
chairman, who would be the best person, or they may be shared 
depending on how it is organized.”
In order to keep the wheel of continuous improvements going, besides 
the reward systems for employees, there were frequently people, who acted 
as co-ordinators, installed at middle management level. They monitored the 
continuous improvement teams, helped them when appropriate, and they 
were sometimes also responsible for spreading the new knowledge gained 
to other departments or units in the company. Describing the co-ordinator, 
the manager from Company C commented:
“He [the co-ordinator] encourages the teams and if it gets to a 
stage where they’re having difficulties he all sorts it out. He also 
ensures that things, as such as the room, is available. . . .  He 
makes sure that the meetings are actually run and that minutes 
[are taken], he keeps record of all things that moved along so that 
we can look back at the end and see if they have actually been 
progressing”.
Other factors that were seen to be helpful by management for the 
ongoing process of continuous improvement were peer pressure on the 
“push” side and the feeling of success on the “pull” side.
It was emphasized by the manager of Company E that the first team 
members must be carefully selected by management, as motivation and 
experience is important to ensure success when introducing continuous 
improvement teams.
The manager from Company C was convinced that suggestions for 
improvements have to come from inside the team:
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“I think if you make this process led by supervisors, and if you 
make it punitive, make it dictatorial, it will fail. Also, if you 
make it look at a specific problem and the suggestion for looking 
at that problem comes from outside the group.” *
7.1.3. Team Work and Team Learning
The majority of the companies introduced team work in the early 
1990s. This means that before that there was a more Tayloristic structure, 
which included supervisors and foremen (their change of roles are 
discussed later in this chapter), and no explicit team work nor team 
learning took place in the companies interviewed before the nineties.
“Team work and team learning” applied to intra-organizational teams 
as well as inter-organizational teams at all the companies interviewed.
In tra-organiza tional teams  were predom inantly continuous 
improvement teams (e.g., improvement of machines), but also product 
development teams, which would consist of people from different 
departments and levels of hierarchy.
Inter-organizational teams were established for co-operation with 
customers, suppliers and partner companies. Teams with customers led to a 
higher responsiveness to their needs. All teams consist of a mixture of 
employees from different companies. Again, people from different 
departments and levels of hierarchy ensure an efficient exchange of 
information by this kind of teamwork and learning.
For example, the planning of change and improvement of the 
distribution system of Company C was done with 6 - 8  own employees 
together with employees of its customer. Rover, and a forwarding agency, 
all in one team.
The team can also take the form that one employee of a different 
company is included in an intra-organizational team. For example, an 
engineer of Company B joined another company for the purpose of 
product development. The manager of Company B described the 
relationship with one customer like this:
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“That’s a sort of: they come here and do it, and we go there and 
do it, and it is very much a crossing of information both ways.”
Regarding team size, a distinction has to be made between the teams for 
shopfloor work (on-line teams) and the teams for team learning (off-line 
teams), which do not exclude each other. For example, in Company A the 
team size for shopfloor work was between 8 and 15 staff.
In Company C the team size for team work and team learning was kept 
to around 12 people, because it was perceived that staff were able to relate 
to each other and work with each other only up to this size. The manager 
of Company C explained:
“More than 12 is too many. . . . 12 is a manageable number, 
because it means that you can talk to everybody about problems 
if you need to. . . . And I would say, we are three years into this 
now, the smaller the teams the more effective they are.”
Effectiveness was measured in Company C by the rate at which teams 
solve problems and the speed with which problems are solved.
In Company D the team size for shopfloor work in production was 
only 3 to 4 staff, depending on the size of operation. Teams for learning 
(suggestion teams) were up to 8 people, which was seen as the maximum 
manageable size in Company D.
It appeared that the size of the team depended more on the kind of 
operation, as well as the philosophy of the company, rather than its 
absolute size.
7.1.4. Free Vertical and Horizontal Flow of Information
“Free vertical and horizontal flow of information” was assured by 
various measures such as the intra- and inter-organizational teams 
mentioned above. Other forms for securing information flow were daily 
briefings, meetings (in periods of weeks, months or years, depending on 
the size of the meeting and the company), newsletters or even videos.
The manager of Company C stated:
“Once a quarter, I talk to all of the workforce in groups - not 
more than 30. I won’t talk to more, because you lose the 
attention. . . . So, yes, we encourage that the communication is
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going in two ways. Then there is a quality newspaper that is 
produced once a month by the em ployees, not by the 
management.”
Regarding the source of better communication Company B’s manager 
recalled organizational double-loop learning from Japanese companies:
“We are a lot better informed now than we had been before, and 
1 think a lot of that is due to the Japanese Initiative [DTI initiative 
on Learning from Japan]. Communication is a big thing, is a 
definite thing, that has come out the Japanese Initiative, and we 
realized that we didn’t communicate at all, what we should have 
been doing. And we now have a com pletely different 
conununication structure to prior the Japanese Initiative. We are 
sure it does not work for a hundred per cent, but it works a hell 
of a lot better than when we first set out.”
How far communication with customers can go was explained by the 
manager interviewed for Company A, who focused on ways of tacit 
learning of the whole organization through personal contacts:
“Chemistry has to be good between supplier and customer. The 
Japanese, and we do it now ourselves, see the organization as a 
three dimensional cube, which layers have to be interconnected. 
Chief must know chief, technician must know technician - the key 
connections must be identified, even going into private sphere.”
Spreading of knowledge about newly implem ented continuous 
improvements was done by project presentation by the continuous 
improvements teams (e.g.. Companies C and F), newsletters which were 
published monthly or bi-monthly (e.g.. Companies A, C and D), or it was 
done by the staff who were responsible for the supervision of the 
continuous improvement process (e.g.. Company D).
7.1.5. Education and Training of the Whole Workforce
All companies interviewed preferred to train their workforce in-house. 
Depending on the company’s size, this training was effected either by 
employees, or whole HRM or Personnel departments, i.e. specialists who 
were responsible for education and training. The majority of companies
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interviewed preferred to develop their own range of courses for educating 
and training employees in a modular structure. Platforms for the course 
design were either the modification of courses from somewhere else for 
their own specific needs, or the use of “Training Within Industries” 
modules (see Chapter 4.2.) as a design platform.
The in-house training was also combined with standardized training 
courses on cassettes, interactive videos or laser discs. Staff at higher levels 
of the hierarchy were additionally sent to attend courses accredited by the 
National Vocational Qualification Council. Further sources for education 
and training from outside were trainers from the customers, consultants or 
seminars.
The training requirements were generally not prescriptive, as a 
statement of the manager of Company C best described:
“We try not to dictate in training. What we insist on is that every 
employee has a minimum level of training in quality, a minimum 
training about the products we make and a minimum training 
about the job they do and the job that is done before that and the 
job that is done after that - that’s it for everybody.”
Another manager from Company D explained:
“We are looking at competence-based training based on skill 
elements in the jobs, which includes quality and safety specific to 
that job. And we’re looking at - separately and simultaneously - 
at core modules which are knowledge-based modules about 
safety, quality, continuous improvement and training with the 
idea that each employee should really be able to train others in 
job and other related matters.”
Most of the companies also employed people or whole teams, in order 
to train their own supplier companies in working or problem-solving 
techniques (e.g.. Companies A, D, E and F). In a sense this can be seen as 
education and training of the extended workforce. Company E ’s manager 
indicated that during this teaching process his company is open to leam 
from their suppliers as well.
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7.1.6. Learning Reward System for Employees
Among the suppliers interviewed there seemed to be a trend of not 
giving direct rewards to their employees for acquiring new skills. For 
them it went without saying that employees who have learned more, were 
more capable of achieving a better performance, which in term leads to an 
increase in salary and/or to a promotion.
For participation in continuous improvement the situation was similar 
insofar as management preferred to give non-financial rewards as has been 
indicated above. However, not every company had reached its goal of 
recognising team improvements at the time of the interview. In fact, one 
manager from Company D regretted that the recognition and reward did 
not yet favour team improvements enough:
“We are not giving emphasis to people who actively take part in 
continuous improvement or take part in team work. And I think 
we have to change that.”
7.1.7. Flexibility of Company Strategy and Employees
The example of Company B that revised its mission once a year, and 
adjusted it if appropriate, shows how extreme the flexibility of a car 
component supplier’s strategy can be.
The other companies showed their flexibility through the considerable 
changes they had gone through in the previous years, especially concerning 
the change towards team-based structures on the shopfloor as well as in the 
offices.
Regarding the flexibility of the employees, the majority of the 
companies indicated that with the introduction of team work employees 
should be able to perform at least three different jobs. This served the 
purpose of employees being flexible to do the job of other team members 
who were not available for various reasons. However, it also gave the 
companies the opportunity to rotate jobs to make work less monotonous, 
which made the jobs more interesting and avoided injuries caused by 
repetitive work.
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7.1.8. Decentralized Hierarchies and Participative Management
The move towards having a decentralized hierarchy and participative 
management was normally introduced in the companies when team 
structures were introduced. Whereas the latter was clearly in place, the 
process of decentralizing hierarchies and participating employees in 
management appeared to be far from complete.
The introduction of a team structure changed the role of the 
supervisors on the shopfloor. Instead of being in the office separated from 
the production process, the team leader spent about 80% of his time in 
productive work (on line) and 20% with supportive work (administration). 
This had been the other way round in the past, according to Companies A 
and B. This is only one example to show how the work content for 
supervisors has changed.
All suppliers interviewed reported problems in making the old 
supervisors change their role to take on more responsibilities and the need 
for social competence. The most favoured option was to train them with 
the newly required skills. However, some did not want to change or could 
not change.
A conunent from Company B was:
“Some of the old supervisors have resigned from the process [of 
applying for team leader] when they found out what we were 
looking for because they thought it was too different from that 
what they were actually doing.”
Therefore, they had to find another job in the company or had to leave.
7.1.9. Learning Laboratories and Constant Experimentation
Learning laboratories were hard to identify through interviews. 
However, during the factory tours it became obvious that some suppliers 
(e.g.. Companies A, B, D and E) had some machines on the factory floor 
with which they could experiment. This was done besides or as a part of 
the normal production process, until the companies were sure that these 
new machines were reliable enough to be introduced in a larger quantity; 
either to be added to the existing machines or to replace old ones.
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Regarding experimentation the manager from Company C stated:
“We don’t do experimenting in a formalized role. I think that the 
concept is part of the task of whoever the chief executive in a 
company is to try to encourage his people to come up with ideas 
and then let them experiment. I think rather than formalizing that 
by having a department for ideas and for experimentation the 
view is then it is somebody else’s [task]. . . . It’s the same with 
experimentation and creativity and wanting to try a new thing,
[it] is, I think, the part of what all of them do and within 
reasonable levels ought to be encouraged.”
However, he also admitted that this was a lot easier to do in a small or 
medium-sized enterprise compared to a large one. The underlying reason 
was that communication tends to be easier and, therefore, better the smaller 
a company is.
7.1.10. Supportive Corporate Learning Culture
Most of the car component suppliers were still in the process of 
changing their culture towards being more supportive to organizational 
learning. A manager of Company D, who was pushing this process of 
change, complained:
“Unfortunately, changing culture is not just a matter of changing 
views of the people on the shopfloor itself, it’s also changing 
managerial perceptions as well.”
The manager interviewed from Company E gave the following 
impression of his company’s culture:
“Regardless of what you are doing the culture is always 
changing, and really what we try to do is to show to the people 
that the culture is just a mirror image of themselves. So, if they 
are not happy with how the culture of the company is, then it’s 
their own fault in a way and that everybody has it within 
themselves to influence the culture of the company. So we don’t 
have a position of saying ‘this is where we want to be’, we have a 
position saying we are a company that is continually improving, 
have an open management style and an open approach so that
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people are here encouraged to say what they think and not say 
‘yes, yes, yes’ and then walk out the room and say ‘that’s a lot of 
rubbish’.”
However, he admitted that this cultural change takes time:
“It’s more a way of saying what you do and how you behave in 
the company is the culture of the company.”
Openness was also stressed by another manager of Company C as being 
important regarding communication to the employees.
Additionally, communicating the truth is seen to be important to create 
trust among all members of the company. A comment about trust by the 
interviewed manager of Company E was:
“Oh, I think trust is an important issue. And to be quite honest in 
some cases we have to build that trust. You don’t break down this 
barrier just by saying ‘right, you’re now on staff status and we 
think you’re equal to us’ and so on. So it isn’t finished - it’s still 
continuing to be important. But what we’re trying to do is to 
create the environment for the people to be involved and to 
express themselves, and we still have some way to go, but we are 
moving in the right direction.”
These changes include the introduction of the same staff status and its 
terms and conditions for the shopfloor employees as for the people in the 
offices, as well as the introduction of learning incentives for employees.
7.1.11. Summary and Conclusion
These six exploratory interviews could answer a limited number of 
questions raised in the theoretical part of this thesis. As originally intended, 
they helped to gain an insight into how the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization are manifested in reality. These characteristics of the 
Learning Organization appeared to be multi-dimensional in the exploratory 
interviews and are, therefore, measured along a scale rather than a 
dichotomous variable (e.g., “yes” or “no”) in the questionnaire.
The various characteristics of the Learning Organization, which have 
been detected in some form or another are compiled below in Table 7.1. It 
is only an overview of the observations made from the interviews and
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factory tours, which were not strictly standardized. Therefore, one should 
be aware of the limitations of this overview and that the research method 
of the exploratory interviews was not intended to achieve an accurate 
comparison. This will be the objective of analysing the questionnaires in 
Chapter 8.
Table 7.1: Observed Characteristics of the Learning Organization
C om p. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
A X X X X X X X X X X X
B X X X X X X X X X X X X
0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
D X X X X X X X X X X X
E X X X X X X X X X X X X X
F X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X = C h aracteristics of th e  Learning O rganization , w hich a p p ea red  to b e
o b serv a b le  in so m e  form during th e  exploratory interview s or factory tours  
E xplanation  of th e  num bers:
1 =  S y s te m ic  thinking an d  m ental m o d e ls  ^  ^
2  = C on tin u ou s im provem ent of w ork ,
3  = T eam  work and team  learning \
4  = F ree  vertical and  horizontal flow of information
5  = E ducation  and  training of th e  w h o le  w orkforce
6  = Learning reward sy s te m  for e m p lo y e e s
7  = Flexibility of co m p a n y  stra tegy  an d  e m p lo y e e s
8  = D ecen tra lized  h ierarch ies and  participative m a n a g em en t
9 =  L earning laboratories and  co n sta n t exp erim en tation
10  =  Su p p ortive  corp orate  learning culture:
10.1 = D ia logu e , 1 0 .2  = S h a red  interpretation of reality, 1 0 .3  = S h a red  v ision  of th e  future,
1 0 .4  = O p e n n e s s  & trust, 1 0 .5  = C om m itm ent & to le r a n c e ,1 0 .6  = R isk taking & responsib ility
In summary, the major findings of the exploratory interviews and 
factory tours with the six car component suppliers were as follows:
Firstly, the characteristics of the Learning Organization appear to be 
observable at car component suppliers in Great Britain to a varying extent.
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Therefore, it seems to make sense to explore these in greater detail in the 
questionnaire analysis.
Secondly, the majority of the companies have either abandoned the 
employee suggestion scheme or it only played a minor role, because it did 
not work as successfully as intended. Amongst the reasons indicated for this 
the most dominant appeared to be inappropriate management or structure. 
However, it is suggested that the failure of this scheme is multi causal. The 
most important reason appeared to be an inadequate bureaucratic system 
that was not capable of working quickly and efficiently. The nature of the 
inappropriateness and inadequacy will be explored further in the in-depth 
interviews in Chapter 9.
Thirdly, continuous improvement teams were dominant and seemed to 
work successfully. They were mainly self-organizing and largely acted 
independently from management. This means that these teams chose their 
own team members, team leaders and problems as well as developed 
implementation plans for the solutions predominantly themselves. In some 
cases co-ordinators of continuous improvement teams were appointed at the 
middle management level. They kept the continuous improvement process 
going, and sometimes also tried to disseminate the new knowledge 
generated inside or acquired from outside.
Fourthly, the majority of companies did not pay direct financial 
rewards to employees, neither for continuous improvement activities and 
outcomes nor for acquired skills. The reason for this was that these 
suppliers assumed that consideration would be better given indirectly 
through pay rises and/or promotions, in order to avoid negative side 
effects, like only focusing on big problems.
These exploratory interviews showed that car component suppliers 
constitute interesting subjects for research, because they show some distinct 
characteristics of the Learning Organization. However, it is not possible to 
make accurate statements about which of the companies investigated can be 
regarded as being more a Learning Organization and which less. This will 
be possible when .appropriate selection criteria have been developed. 
Therefore, future work concentrates on the development of measures for 
the Learning Organization’s characteristics, which allows to identify 
Learning Organizations. This will be pursued in Chapter 8 with the help of 
questionnaires.
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7.2. Japanese Sources of the Learning Organization’s Characteristics for 
the Car Component Suppliers Interviewed
The exploratory interviews which were conducted with the six 
companies gave some indications about the sources of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics. As has been explained in Chapter 6, there 
were different ways of learning from Japanese companies: either directly 
from Japanese car assemblers or car component suppliers, or indirectly 
from sources which have leam t from Japanese companies in the car 
industry, as, for example, supplier associations, consultants or some forms 
of British learning initiatives.
7.2.1. Direct Japanese Sources as Indicated in the Interviews
Firstly, a closer analysis was conducted of the different types of direct 
sources of learning from Japanese companies in the car industry, and these 
were tested in Hypothesis 2.
Table 7.2 below shows an overview of the different forms of Japanese 
companies as direct sources, as they have been indicated by the car 
component suppliers interviewed.
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Table 7.2: Japanese Companies as Direct Sources of Suppliers’
Characteristics of the Learning Organization as Established 
through the Interviews
C o m ­
pany
Japanese Car Japanese 
Assembler(s) Supplier(s) 
f Customer! ^Customer!
Japanese
Supplier(s)
(Owner!
Japanese
Supplier(s)
(Partner!
Japanese
Supplier(s)
(Supplier!
A 3 1
B 2 1
C 1 1
D
E 3
F 1 3
Note: The numbers show the amount of different Japanese companies indicated.
Company A had a Japanese components supplier as a parent company. 
This takeover had been encouraged by management because market 
competition became more intense in the late eighties. This new ownership 
helped to gain new customers in the long run, such as Honda, Toyota and 
Suzuki.
The organizational double-loop4eam ing process for Company A was 
mainly facilitated by the Japanese parent company, a large car component 
supplier, which organized extensive exchange of personnel in both 
directions. The Japanese customers were convinced that this method of 
teaching would be sufficient and decided that Company A did not need 
their help to leam.
“Being part of [name of the Japanese supplier, who was the 
parent company] pushed this learning along. We all recognised 
that the Japanese are very, very good at going out in the world 
and picking up what other people are doing.”,
said the first manager interviewed from Company A.
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At the site where the interview took place there were about 10 
seconded Japanese workers plus about 4 to 5 other Japanese staff who were 
spending a short-term period at Company A during their business trips 
from overseas. People from this company were sent to Japan or America, 
where the Japanese parent company had a similar facility to the newer of 
the two facilities at Company A. The other manager of Company A said 
that the parent company
“gave me a lot of contacts around the world, where I could 
develop ideas from.”
The diffusion process from old to new system was not easy. In order to 
facilitate the change, particular emphasis was placed on communication: 
management talked a lot to the employees, established training courses and 
held briefing sessions. The second manager of Company A put it into the 
following words:
“We did things gradually, so like small improvements, rather 
than big steps.”
And he concluded that there was always an awareness with regards to 
trying to achieve increased productivity and increased quality.
Company A’s parent company took staff from Company A to various 
other sites of the parent company world-wide and encouraged them to meet 
with as many people as possible. The parent company also sent a lot of 
employees to Japan or to the United States to make contact with other 
people there. Maintenance personnel, fitters and electricians from 
Company A went to Japan.
“If there is a need for it and a benefit to [parent company’s name] 
and whoever it is, goes.”,
said the second manager. When the construction of the new factory 
started, two team leaders, two section leaders and one production leader 
followed by two fitters and two electricians spent three months in Japan, 
working on the line with resident staff and then spent three months in 
North America. Through this work experience, employees from Company 
A became familiar with the equipment and the systems of their Japanese 
parent company. Since that time, a lot of other employees have been to 
Japan or the United States.
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“Things changed, we actually found more value from our 
American sister company”,
concluded the second manager after comparing the two. The reason 
was mainly communication, as not many Japanese speak English. There ^  
were two identical plants to the one in Britain, belonging to the parent 
company: one in Japan and one in America. Therefore, the employees from 
Company A had the opportunity of picking up ideas from plants which 
were exactly the same. However, the preferred way of learning was from 
Japan via America. This was because it took twice as long with an 
interpreter to learn in Japan, and because the Americans had already 
adapted those things from Japan, which could not simply be copied but 
needed modifications.
The exchange of information was seen to be going in both direction by 
the managers, but the impression gained from the interview and the factory 
tour was that the dominant direction was from overseas to Britain.
To conclude from these interviews, the role of learning from the 
Japanese via their North American plants plays an important role in the 
knowledge transfer, which sometimes can be even more important than the 
direct transfer from Japan (cf. also Mair 1994: 279-97).
Company B had two Japanese car assemblers as customers, which 
could have been sources of the Learning Organization’s characteristics.
One of the two car assemblers, Toyota, was directly supplied with parts 
by Company B, not only in the UK, but also in Japan. The manager 
interviewed commented on this relationship as follows:
“Working with them [Toyota] over the last 5 to 6 years now, 
since 1989, and we had to visit them quite considerably in the 
early days, this gained quite an insight in how they operated and 
how far we were behind them.”
The other car assembler, Nissan, was only indirectly supplied with car 
parts via a Japanese direct supplier, i.e. who supplied directly to Nissan. 
However, because of a good personal relationship and because of the way 
the parts were designed, there was also a close relationship between Nissan 
and Company B.
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Notwithstanding, there was a good supplying relationship with the 
Japanese direct supplier as well. An example of this relationship is given by 
the manager:
“We were out there this week on pre-production control systems, 
which was how to improve production trials.”
Examples of learning systems taken from Japanese companies were the 
5S housekeeping system, in order to clean the shopfloor and keep it tidy, as 
well as the ILU skills matrix system, in order to train the people in 
different steps according to the company’s needs.^o
Com pany C had the opportunity to leam directly from Honda, as a 
Japanese car assembling customer as well as from a Japanese direct 
supplier, who was based in Great Britain. Things leamt were, e.g., Y  A /YE  
techniques (value added/value engineering) or waste watch techniques 
(wastes of time and material are recorded and their improvement is 
discussed).
The manager of Company C described the difference in the initial 
negotiation process between Honda and VW (the latter of which was 
described as doing adversarial purchasing taken to a fine art):
“Honda’s approach would be different: ‘W e’re going to buy that!’
And so we have a fair discussion about what application is being 
used and so on and we look at altematives. Then you put your 
costs in. Their inquiry hasn’t gone to four or five other people, 
they only send the enquiries along. And then they would put 
VA/VE [value added/value engineering] teams in the group. They 
will try to improve cost stmctures or processes.”
A similar procedure was performed with a Japanese direct supplier 
based in Great Britain. Company C had a 100% of their business, which is 
an example of single-sourcing.
“They have a VA/VE team  with our engineering and 
manufacturing people and see what we can do”,
said the manager. And he continued with some examples of learning:
For more detail about 5S see Osada 1991, or for ILU see Part 4 o f the Appendix.
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“Maybe they change the specification of material, which saves 
10% of the material costs. Maybe they will look at automating 
the feed and saving some money there. So they work with you, 
i t ’s a hard process, but i t ’s not confrontation, i t’s not 
adversarial.”
The manager also said that the Japanese companies try to work with 
you in a team to enable the supplier to leam. A team consists of two to 
three employees from the Japanese company and two to five employees 
from Company C. The following examples were given:
“Maybe they want to have the machinery moved around, the 
conveyors, or something else. There don’t need to be enormous 
problems.”
Company C ’s manager recalled the process of establishing the 
relationship:
“It takes a long time before establishing a relationship. They tend 
to survey the possible suppliers, they maybe sample the prices, 
and they maybe come around and visit you, and just look at you.
You don’t know whether you get any business. And maybe what 
they’re going to say is: ‘That is the company we want to work 
with.’ And they maybe give you one or two sorts of sample or 
trial, just to see how you perform and how you react. And then, 
if that seems to be OK, then they will give you some more 
orders, and then they will bring in the VA/VE people. And they 
say: ‘On the first two orders we gave you, we think you can do 
better than that.’ So it’s afterwards, they don’t put that effort in 
until they’ve decided that they selected the company.”
These two examples show that Company C was able to leam from 
Japanese companies. However, this required substantial effort and patience, 
which might not have occurred with other companies put in the same 
situation.
C om pany D was the only one interviewed, which had no direct 
contact with Japanese companies in the form of customers, owners, 
partners or suppliers. However, there were some indirect sources for 
learning, which will be described in the following section.
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Com pany E supplies three Japanese car assemblers, Toyota, Nissan 
and Isuzu. They are supplied inside and outside Japan.
The manager interviewed remembered:
“With Nissan, when they opened the factory here in the UK we 
thought this was our - because we were not supplying Nissan 
when they opened their factory here - opportunity to break into 
Nissan. As it turned out we started to supply Nissan in Japan.”
Normally parts from Company E were assembled in Japan and 
imported as complete units. This meant limited opportunities for Company 
E because they could not assemble the parts they delivered themselves, 
according to the manager. He declared:
“We have always fulfilled their standards in terms of quality and 
performance of the product.”
The manager was not aware of much team support from Japanese car 
customers. However, as company E has had a sales and technical centre in 
Japan for at least 20 years, staffed with Japanese nationals, it might be hard 
to judge over such a long period how much was actually leamt.
“We would always, if we had the opportunity, look to leam from 
other organizations, but I wouldn’t say it’s exclusively Japanese”,
the manager from Company E also stated. This teaming could also 
include Company E ’s suppliers:
“We have always had people that had gone to look at our 
suppliers. Two ways really, one, to look how they do things so 
that we could perhaps help them to improve and, two, looking to 
see how they do things that maybe we could also leam from 
them.”
However, comparing it to Company E ’s customers he admitted:
“What we tend to do more is, perhaps, go to our customers and 
look how they are, because our customers have many similar 
processes and practices. Most customers, because we have got 
long-term business relationships, would have some difficulties in 
explaining why they shouldn’t help us to improve ourselves.
-213 -
7. A n a l y s is  o f  t h e  E x p l o r a t o r y  In t e r v ie w s
because they are putting us under enough pressure to reduce our 
costs.”
C om pany F supplies Honda as a Japanese car producer, and, apart 
from that, has co-operation with three Japanese car component suppliers in 
Japan, which are predominantly technology agreements, including licensing 
and training.
This meant that there was a continuous exchange of people in both 
directions. This was described by the manager interviewed as follows:
“We formed relationships with Japanese companies and leamt 
very much from them. We have exchanged visits and we’ve 
bought [manufacturing] facilities from them and we’ve worked 
very closely over recent years.”
He explained that the partners, also suppliers to Honda, were part of the 
Honda family. And he described the co-operation in more detail:
“We requested to visit to discuss with a view to buying 
technology from them, and we formed relationships with those 
companies. They are companies that make similar products for 
Honda, but don’t compete directly with us in Europe, because 
they do not have a European base. So we formed relationships 
with those companies, and they supported us on several projects 
since.”
Of the three partnerships with Japanese car suppliers, two were strong 
in the form of technical agreements. The manager explained:
“Technical agreement means that they will support us with their 
technology and know-how. It means that we send personnel to 
Japan for training and they have sent people across here to help 
train our people, and they help make improvements.”
The manager himself had been in Japan 15 or 16 times, normally for 
one or two weeks, mainly for meetings with Honda or one of the technical 
partners, which was for talks and discussions on process planning. He 
visited the shopfloor on many occasions, but never to work on the 
shopfloor. Some of the operators and maintenance staff from Company F 
have been out for a longer period of training of maybe four weeks.
The impressions of Company F ’s manager were as follows:
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“My learning is mainly done by talking, exchanging views and 
debating different ways of doing things, and understanding their 
philosophy and explaining our philosophy. So we have a very 
good exchange. . . .  I think their attention to detail impressed me 
considerably and they simplify things very much. I think 
sometimes, certainly in the UK, we tend to overcomplicate 
things, they tend to make a basic strategy and they stick to that 
strategy and make things very simple - attention to detail.”
Concerning Honda’s relationship with Company F the manager 
interviewed compared it to the relationship it had with Rover:
“Honda is much more paternal, 1 think, than Rover. Honda, 
although they demand continuous improvement and reduction in 
cost, they work much more together to help to develop. And 1 
don’t think Rover has quite gone as far as Honda as they like to 
think in that area. 1 think they still very much beat the table and 
use competitive pressure by getting quotations from different 
suppliers.”
He specified this by explaining:
“1 wouldn’t like to say that Honda is a soft option, but it seems to 
be more partnership, more paternal and more logical sometimes 
than pure dogmatic ‘you must reduce the cost and I don’t care 
how you do it’, as Rover has done. Whereas Honda is always 
looking for improvements, and there is a great deal of pressure, 
but they don’t want it necessarily to be just taken off the profit 
margin, and end up with a supplier that makes loss and maybe go 
out of business.”
He described the help of Honda in a different way:
“1 think it depends on the supplier, it is case by case. If they think 
the supplier needs some assistance in developing their process 
then they will put experts in, who develop that process.”
Honda has been at Company E for many times, and Company E ’s 
technical partners joined in best practice exercises in trying to reduce waste 
and cost.
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“They are also interested in cost down ideas - design cost down.
So they look for proposals, they look for anything rather small
that may improve the cost or the quality”,
he concluded his explanations. Therefore, it appears that Honda’s 
approach was more conducive than Rover’s for the learning of Company 
E. One major feature of Honda’s teaching techniques appears to be 
bringing its suppliers in Britain together with its suppliers from Japan, in 
some form of technical co-operation relationship.
In summary, there are different ways of learning directly from 
Japanese companies in the car industry.
Company A represents learning from a Japanese supplier as a parent 
company in Japan as well as in America.
Companies B and C had the opportunity to leam from Japanese car 
assemblers as well as from Japanese direct suppliers, both as customers.
Company D did not have the chance to leam directly from a Japanese 
company in the automotive industry.
Company E supplied three Japanese car assembling customers, but 
claimed not to have too much leamt from them.
Company F leamt from one Japanese car assembler and three suppliers 
to this car assembler in Japan as co-operating partners.
Altogether, there is some indication that direct intensive learning of car 
component suppliers in Great Britain from Japanese car companies takes 
place.
7.2.2. Indirect Japanese Sources as Indicated in the Interviews
There are also other indirect ways of learning from Japanese 
companies in the car industry, indicated in Table 7.3 below. With this form 
of indirect knowledge transfer, some of its content is diluted, which 
particularly applies to the complex transfer-process of implicit knowledge. 
This, however, plays an important role in the acquisition of the Teaming 
Organization’s characteristics.
The indirect sources indicated in the interviews are as follows:
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(1) Supplier associations, common in Japan, which are becoming 
increasingly popular in Great Britain. (2) Consultants, who normally have 
predominantly explicit knowledge about the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics that is gathered from various explicit sources (e.g., from 
books, seminars, etc.). (3) Learning initiatives, launched by the British 
Department of Trade and Industry, also seem to provide the basis for 
explicit learning. Therefore, even when they imply short contact with 
Japanese companies, learning initiatives will still be regarded as indirect 
sources.
Table 7.3: Indirect Sources of Characteristics of the Learning
Organization as Indicated by the Suppliers Interviewed
C o m ­
pany
Supplier
Association
Con­
sultants
Learning 
from Japan 
Initiative
Lean
Benchmark
Project
A X
B X X
C X
D X X X
E X
F
Company A is a member of the Yorkshire Automotive Group, which 
was founded in 1992 and has around 14 members. It is an informal group, 
which meets about six times a year and consists of automotive industry 
manufacturers. There are two representatives from every company, one 
responsible for manufacturing and one for the commercial side. No 
company is in the same market as there are no direct competitors in West 
Yorkshire.
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In the beginning, Company A thought that it could not leam very much 
from the other suppliers. However, in practice it had turned out that 
Company A learnt a lot from other companies. For example, on 
absenteeism, where Company A had problems, one of the other members 
had a particularly low rate of absenteeism (below 1%), and Company A 
tried to copy the methods that had been employed successfully. This was 
regarded as a kind of benchmarking. The meetings take place at a different 
plant every time and include a factory visit, where the suppliers acquire 
new ideas, e.g., depicting absenteeism on a chart.
As the companies are very different, different subjects are chosen. The 
manager interviewed said:
“We did it because it seemed to be a good idea. We did it because 
we felt we could leam even from unlikely places. Skill and 
expertise can be found in the most unlikely places.”
C om p an y  B was participating in the “Learning From Japan 
Initiative”. This is a two-year programme that started in September/ 
November 1993. It was a DTI initiative, where 12 companies were chosen 
after a pre-selection by Japanese car assemblers in Great Britain, i.e. 
Nissan, Honda and Toyota, that were already doing business with them (this 
means that there was no control group of companies available, who did not 
do any business with Japanese assemblers previously, in order to compare 
the effects). The benchmarking of suppliers in Japan and Great Britain was 
done by an extemal consultancy.
The interviewed manager of Company B stated:
“We are a lot better informed now than we had been before, and 
I think a lot of that is due to the Japanese Initiative [Teaming 
From Japan Initiative]. . . . Communication is a big thing - is a 
definite thing - that has come out the Japanese Initiative, and we 
realized that we didn’t communicate at all what we should have 
been doing. And we now have a com pletely different 
communication stmcture prior to the Japanese Initiative.”
However, he also admitted:
-2 1 8 -
7. A n a ly s i s  OF THE E x p l o r a t o r y  I n t e r v ie w s  1
“We are sure it does not work a hundred per cent, but it works a 
hell of a lot better than when we first set out.”
Company B has a daily briefing session every morning for 10 minutes, 
which is supposed to be passed down to every employee within 24 hours so 
that it catches every shift pattern. There are also monthly reports and 
meetings, quarterly information sessions on how the company is 
performing and where it is going. In addition, there are bi-annual and 
annual meetings. There is no company newsletter, but presentations of 
about two hours by selected employees of the company will be written 
down.
Four employees from Company B have been to Japan: the Managing 
Director and Production Director in February 1994 for about a fortnight, 
the interviewed manager together with one of the prospective team leaders 
in November 1994 for 10 days. 12 other companies were also involved in 
the visit to Japan as part of the “Learning From Japan Initiative”, most 
were visiting companies similar to themselves. There is still a dissemination 
and cross-fertilisation of ideas, because the 12 companies are supposed to 
visit each other to see how they are progressing and if they can use any of 
the ideas implemented by others.
“Some companies may have leamt more than others from that”,
said the interviewed manager, because the actual placement of the 12 
companies in terms of world-class (i.e. best in the world) would show a 
progression as some are better than others.
Upon a question regarding the source of learning he claimed:
“We definitely learnt more from the Japanese [than from the 
other 11 companies involved].”
And the importance of the Learning from the Japan Initiative for 
Company B was again mentioned during the factory tour when the 
manager concluded:
“A lot of these visuals, and things like that, have come on board 
since the Japanese Initiative. Probably the biggest benefits we 
have seen are in communication, visual displays. The 
information, which is actually moving around is a hell of a lot
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better than it used to be. We were probably a bit naive about 
information in the first place.”
C om pany C received some training from an outside consultant in 
1991, which can be regarded as a possible indirect source of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics. The consultant stayed for three weeks and 
went to other companies in the group as well. The consultant was described 
as “good value for money”. He had worked with Harley Davidson in the 
USA and with a variety of companies in the UK before.
All Company C’s employees received a minimum of 10 hours off-the- 
job training and education about total quality, starting with the basics about 
what TQM is, and then going on to the basics of how it works: team work, 
problem analysis, fishbone diagram, etc.
The room for continuous improvement teams showed frequent use. 
Compared with statements from managers of other companies this seemed 
to be a implementation that worked. However, it cannot be said whether 
this was due to the consultant only, or if it could be related to the multi- 
causal influences of Japanese car companies and component suppliers 
together with the consultant, which sounds more plausible.
C om pany D was a member of a supplier association, had some 
consultants at its site and had taken part in “The Lean Benchmarking 
Project”. The latter was funded by the Government and performed by joint 
consultancy and university research. It compared selected companies from 
Britain and Japan with each other (for more details cf. Andersen 
Consulting 1993).
Company D could not directly leam from Japanese companies through 
personal contact, but it could see its own position compared to Japanese 
companies in Japan. The benchmarking itself was confidential, so no 
learning on the tacit level was possible among the companies participating 
in the “The Lean Benchmarking Project”.
One of the two managers interviewed commented:
“The results of the first [benchmarking] were quite obvious 
differences of 100 to 1 on quality and so on. That showed us 
really that we were way behind many of these world-class 
companies. We weren’t the worst - far from it. Surprisingly we 
thought our quality was very good and the productivity was not
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so good. The study suggested that our productivity was quite 
good, but our quality wasn’t quite good. So it was interesting.”
And he concluded:
“I think it stems from the fact, if you took it from the point of 
reference, the quality assessments made by our customers. Ford 
and General Motors. As you are aware, they don’t adopt the sorts 
of standards that perhaps Toyota adopts, in term of parts per 
million, they still think in terms of percentages. That was the 
spur, and from there we tried to establish a way forward, and we 
were very careful not to adopt some sort of magic formula 
solution.”
This shows that the benchmarking study was somehow helpful to start a 
learning process for Company D (although some managers of the company 
doubted the benchmark figures, such as quality and productivity, in the 
first instance). However, there was no easy way to embark on a journey 
towards the Learning Organization. One method employed was the 
contracting of consultants, which was described like this:
“We involved some consultants at the end of 1992. 
Unfortunately, they had this prescriptive approach. In a sense this 
prescriptive approach reinforced the Western managers’ typical 
conceptions to act - relationships to be the cause and effect 
relationships; in fact there isn’t such direct relationship.”
This indicated how complex the knowledge of the “right way” was 
perceived to be by management, which might be an indicator for the 
perception that tacit knowledge cannot easily to be transferred by 
consultants alone, who have lim ited knowledge of the Learning 
Organization. This was also shown by other statements such as:
“One of the problems that we since experienced, it is with any 
organizational change, there are - it’s not an analytical process - 
there are political dimensions and educational dimensions, and 
these were not considered by consultants at the time. We were 
for ourselves in a sense learning as we perceive.”
And an example for the problems was given:
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“In a sense, they raise the expectations, these expectations were 
subsequently dashed by the fact that we had questions like: ‘What 
happens when kaizen or continuous improvement results in 
processes capable of operating with fewer people what happens to 
the other people?’ It’s all these things one might expect.”
The membership of a supplier association was described as not very 
inspiring. This is because the lead of the supplier association was taken by a 
consultancy which recommended that the clients take some training 
provided by the same consultancy. However, Company D had already 
either done this kind of training or did not perceive to need it.
So, the learning process for Company D from Japanese companies was 
indirect and not always easy, as the manager stated:
“Although we are not supplying to Toyota, we use Taichi Ohno’s 
concepts of waste production and continuous improvement. We 
have done for example fast interchange of dies, we are looking at 
total productive maintenance, again all part of the Toyota 
Production System. There are some areas where we are 
particularly weak, and we think we can gain from looking at 
other companies.”
The manager also envied other car component suppliers which were 
supplying Toyota:
“And one of the advantages to work for a world-class customer 
like Toyota is they force you to be better.”
Com pany E was a member of a supplier association, organized by 
Rover.
“With Rover we are a part of the network. So I went to a 
meeting a few weeks ago to launch a new network and there were 
ten suppliers”,
explained the manager interviewed. And he continued:
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“It is just UK supplier base and they try to get a mixture of 
different types of supplier base so that there are no competitors 
in the same group.”
The supplier network was not regionally based like other supplier 
associations in Britain, explained the manager, who said:
“The idea of the network is to identify areas where we have 
problems with Rover and where they should improve their 
systems and processes. And [we participating suppliers] try to 
identify areas where we could work with each other to improve 
ourselves.”
There was no indication of participating Japanese companies.
Company F did not have any indirect sources for learning from 
Japanese companies at all. But, as shown above, it had many direct sources.
In summary, it can be concluded from this analysis that indirect sources ^  ^  
of knowledge do play a role in reality. compared to direct
sources of knowledge their significancp-ltught be lo w T \^  ■
7.3. Conclusions Drawn from the Exploratory Interviews cj~
These six exploratory interviews suggested in the first section that the 
ten characteristics of the Learning Organization appear to be observable to 
a varying extent at car component suppliers in Great Britain. Therefore, it 
makes sense to explore the characteristics in greater detail in the 
questionnaire analysis of the Hypotheses 1 and 2.
These exploratory interviews helped to focus not only on improvement 
systems as an important element of research, but also on differentiating 
between team improvement and employee suggestion systems. 
Furtherm ore, the rewards for organizational learning are also 
distinguished between being financial and non-financial nature.
The second section suggested that the direct way of acquiring the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization from some of the Japanese car 
companies or suppliers seems to be the most effective one (which would 
support Hypothesis 2). Whether this predominantly tacit knowledge about 
the Learning Organization’s characteristics could be leamt indirectly from
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non-Japanese transmitters might be doubtfpî; as the tacit part seems to be at 
least as important as the explicit part.
The next chapter will deal with these issues in more detail with the help 
of the analysis of questionnaires from car component suppliers in Britain.
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8. Data Analysis of the Questionnaire
In order to refine the empirical approach of this thesis, exploratory 
interviews with car component suppliers have been presented in Chapter 7. 
These exploratory interviews focused on the measures of organizational 
learning, characteristics of Learning Organizations and their sources.
This chapter describes the process of the second step of the empirical 
research of this thesis, which is based on a comprehensive questionnaire 
survey. The responses of the seventy questionnaires were examined and 
interpreted with the help of correlation and regression analyses. The 
advantage of using these two methods is that correlation analysis is more 
sensitive, as it can be used for testing one directional (one-tailed) 
relationships, whereas regression analysis is able to measure the combined 
impact of different variables through multiple regression analysis.
The first question to be subjected to statistical data analysis is: in what 
way do the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization affect the 
organizational capacity to learn and consequently lead to organizational 
learning outcomes?
The research model is depicted in Figure 8.1. It shows the assumed 
direct influence of the characteristics of the Learning Organization 
(independent variables) on the organizational learning outcomes (dependent 
variable), indicated with a “H I” for Hypothesis 1.
The second research question is: in what way does the presence of 
Japanese companies in the car industry contribute to the degree to which 
the characteristics of the Learning Organization can be found at direct car 
component suppliers in Britain?
Figure 8.1 shows the assumed direct influence of Japanese companies 
(independent variable) on the characteristics of the Learning Organization 
(dependent variables), indicated with a “H2” for Hypothesis 2.
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Figure 8.1: Assumed Impact of the Hypotheses 1 and 2 (HI & H2)
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the 
method of data collection and the attributes of the sample, the second 
section analyses Hypothesis 1 and the third section reports the results of the 
analysis of Hypothesis 2.
8.1. Method of Data Collection and Sample Attributes
This section explains the method used to collect data employing a 
questionnaire as well as the general attributes of the sample.
8.1.1. Method of Data Collection
The “Questionnaire for Suppliers” (see Section 1 of the Appendix for 
the questionnaire and Chapter 6 for its d e ^ n )  was sent to direct car
component suppliers with manufacturing 
delivering components directly to car
ites in Great Britain, which were 
ssemblers. A list of nearly 650
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companies was compiled from various sources, such as car producers^! and 
trade associations in Great Britain (e.g., SMMT^z Buyers’ Guide 1993).
After piloting the questionnaire design, questionnaires were sent out 
from late May to July 1995 to mainly either the Managing Directors or 
Plant Managers, but later also Human Resources/Personnel Managers, 
Training Managers or Quality Managers, if the former’s responses were 
not available, as the latter were anyhow often delegated to answer the 
questionnaires.
From the 642 supplier companies, which had received a questionnaire, ^  ^  
75 returned them, of which 70 were usable for data analysis. These 70 
questionnaires, which could be employed for empirical analysis, constituted 
a usable response rate of 11% (= 70/642*100). Most of the missing data in 
some questionnaires, which were essential for analysis, were completed 
with the help of telephone calls and faxes. This was not possible with three 
questionnaires that had been completed anonymously.
At the time of the questionnaire mail-out in 1995, there were no 
accurate statistics about the population of car component suppliers in 
Britain that directly supplied car manufacturers (not to speak of the 
suppliers that actually produce in this country and not only distribute). But, 
the actual population was not of major concern for the purpose of this 
research, which was more aimed at empirical testing of a newly-designed 
theoretical model.
However, in 1998, the SMMT started to publish “The UK Moto 
Industry Directory 1998”, which had sufficient information to identify 
about 400 car component producers that assemble in Britain and directly 
supply car manufacturers. This population is considerably lower than the 
original sample of this thesis, as it was possible to exclude suppliers of 
machinery and software as well as of engineering and prototyping, both no tc^^ /iA  
being actual car component suppliers. As both groups were not the 
research target of the questionnaire, they did not complete it. If the 
population of this 400 car component producers would have been used, the 
I adjusted response rate would have been lifted to 17.5% (= 70/400*100).k ------------------------------------------
The names of the car assemblers are not disclosed for reasons of confidentiality.
SMMT = Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd., London.
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The next section also shows that, with regard to turnover and employees, 
the 70 responses were statistically not significantly different from the 
overall population. This means that the sample can be seen as being 
representative for all those car component producers in Britain that supply 
to car manufacturers directly.
Altogether, 70 questionnaires was seen as being sufficient for the ^ 
purpose of this research. This was also the case because of the analysis of 
the questionnaires having been combined with exploratory interviews 
beforehand and in-depth interviews afterwards.
The next sub-section presents the general data of the questionnaire 
about the car component companies and looks at their representativeness.
8.1.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
The general descriptive data of the 70 car component suppliers who 
responded to this survey are presented in this subsection. If a company had 
more than one production site, the questionnaire asked the respondent to 
answer the questions only with respect to the production site to which the 
questionnaire was sent.
Firstly, the descriptive statistics of the size in terms of sales turnover in 
1994 is shown in Table 8.1. The smallest company or site (which cannot be 
distinguished from the questionnaire) had a turnover of only £140,000, 
whereas the largest had a turnover of £160 million. The average sales 
turnover was £30 million.
Table 8.1: Turnover of the 70 Component Suppliers (1994, in million £)
Mean: Median: Minimum: Maximum: Valid cases:93
30 15 0.14 160 51
Mean is the mathematical average of all numbers of the group. Median is the value in the middle of 
he group. Valid cases are the number of companies which indicated a turnover figure usable for this table.
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Secondly, the descriptive statistics of the size in terms of the number of 
employees in 1994 are shown in Table 8.2. The smallest company or site 
had only six employees and the largest 2,300 employees. The average 
number of employees was 377 staff.
Table 8.2: Number of Employees of the 70 Component Suppliers (1994)
Mean: Median: Minimum: Maximum: Valid cases:
377 200 6 2300 68
Thirdly, the descriptive statistics of the founding years of the 70 car 
component suppliers are shown in Table 8.3. The oldest company or site 
was founded in 1740, whereas the youngest one was founded in 1994. The 
mean year of foundation was 1955 and the median year was 1969.
Table 8.3: Founding Years of the 70 Car Component Suppliers
Mean: Median: Minimum: Maximum: Valid cases:
1955 1969 1740 1994 60
Lastly, how representative is this sample in terms of the values 
turnover and employees compared to the population in SMMT’s UK Motor 
Industry Directory?
From the population of roughly 400 car component producers that 
directly supply car manufacturers, 327 valid cases were listed in terms of 
turnover and 366 valid cases in terms of employees. The hypothesis 
suggests that there is a difference between the population values and the 
sample values, thus the null hypothesis would suggest that there is no 
difference. To reject the null hypothesis for a two-tailed test, Z critical 
would be > +1.65 or < -1.65 at an alpha level of 0.10. The Z score is 
computed by the formula of Z = (mean of sample - mean of population) 
/(standard deviation of population/V number of valid sample cases) (cf. 
Healey 1993: 177-199).
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For turnover the Z obtained is - 0.51 (= (^Om - 3 6 .6 m )^2 .8 ^V  51)), 
which is not smaller than -1.65 (Z critical), thW-die-^nniînypütKesis cannot 
be rejected. This means that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the turnover of the sample and the population as a whole.
For employees the Z obtained is - 0.22 (= (377 - 399)/(833/V‘68)), 
which is not smaller than -1.65 (Z critical), therefore the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. This means that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the employees of the sample and the population.
As the data of the values in the questionnaire originates from 1994 and 
the data from SMMT’s “The UK Motor Industry Directory 1998” is from 
1997, it is makes sense to adjust the latter data set to 1994 and check 
whether there is a significant difference in outcome. According to the 
Global Automotive Group of Standard & Poor’s DRI (1998), UK car 
manufacturing increased by an average of 5% p.a. between 1994 and 1997.
Assuming that this had about the same impact on suppliers’ turnover 
and employees, i.e.J^ th  growing b y ^ % p.a. over the three year period ‘ 
and adjusting them for that time period, the picture does not look much 
different for failing to reject the null hypothesis (the Z obtained is - 0.14 
for turnover (mean: 31.5m) and 0.38 for employees (mean: 344)).
Altogether, the sample values turnover and employees of the 70 
suppliers that responded were statistically not significantly different from 
the overall population. This means with regard to turnover and employees 
the questionnaire sample can be regarded as representative for the 
population of car component producers in Britain that directly supply car 
manufacturers. Testing of further values for representativeness (like e.g., 
type of component) was not possible due to a lack of data available.
In summary, this section described the method of data collection with 
the help of the questionnaire as well as the sample attributes and 
representativeness of the completed questionnaires.
The next section deals with the empirical analysis of the first hypothesis 
of this thesis.
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8.2. Analysis of the First Hypothesis
This section examines in what ways the ten characteristics of the 
Learning Organization affect the capacity of organizations to engage in 
organizational learning, and whether these characteristics lead to desirable 
organizational learning outcomes. Thus, the first hypothesis was designed 
to test the impact of the characteristics of the Learning Organization on the 
performance in organizational learning (see also Chapter 6).
H ypothesis 1: Car component suppliers in Britain that show higher 
scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization have better 
organizational learning outcomes.
The first Hypothesis was analysed by splitting it into Hypothesis lA, IB 
and 1C (see Figure 8.2 below). This was done because it was assumed that 
the impact of the characteristics of the Learning Organization on the 
outcomes of organizational learning is not only of a direct nature 
(Hypothesis IB), but also of an indirect nature via organizational learning 
systems94 (Hypothesis lA  and 1C). This intermediate variable could either 
take the form of a team improvement system, an employee improvement 
system or both.
These three hypotheses were as follows.
Hypothesis lA : Those car component suppliers in Britain who show 
higher scores in the characteristics o f  the Learning Organization have 
organizational learning systems for team improvements and/or employee 
suggestions.
Hypothesis IB : Those car component suppliers in Britain who show 
higher scores in the characteristics o f  the Learning Organization have 
better organizational learning outcomes.
H ypothesis 1C: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems have better organizational learning 
outcomes.
This research approach of Hypothesis 1 is depicted in Figure 8.2.
See Chapter 6.3.3.1. for more details about organizational learning systems.
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It shows the assumed direct influence of the characteristics of the 
Learning Organization (independent variables) on the organizational 
learning systems (dependent variable), which is indicated with an “A”.
The direct influence of Learning O rganization’s characteristics 
(independent variables) on organizational learning outcomes (dependent 
variable) is indicated with a “B”.
And the direct influence of organizational learning systems 
(independent variable) on organizational learning outcomes (dependent 
variable) is indicated with a “C”.
Figure 8.2: Hypothesised Impact of the Learning Organization’s Charac­
teristics on Organizational Learning Systems and Outcomes
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The split of Hypothesis 1 generated Hypotheses lA , IB and 1C, which 
were then transformed into corresponding null hypotheses for testing, i.e. 
the hypotheses are converted to enable its rejection (cf. also Popper 1959).
The selected methods to examine the hypothesised relationships were 
correlation analysis and regression analysis, which are presented in this
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order. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the advantage of using 
both methods is that correlation analysis is more sensitive, as it could be 
used for testing one directional (one-tailed) significant relationships, 
whereas regression analysis is able to measure the combined impact of 
different variables together through multiple regression analysis.
The null hypotheses were judged according to the level of significance 
of correlation and regression coefficients, through one-tailed correlation 
analysis and through regression analysis.
The null hypotheses were generally rejected when the significance level 
“p” was smaller than 0.1. This means that “p < 0.1” indicated a weakly 
significant rejection (a significance at the 10% level was marked with 
“p < 0.05” indicated a significant rejection (a significance at the 5% level 
was marked with “**”) and “p < 0.01” indicated a strongly significant 
rejection (a significance at 1% level was marked with “***”).
Additionally, the number of valid cases were indicated by an “n”. 
Generally, correlation coefficients were indicated by an “r” and regression 
coefficients by a “be” (cf. Bühl & Zôfel 1994: 237-86, Healey 1993: 253- 
477, SPSS/PC+ Base Manual 1990: B95-135, SPSS/PC+ Statistics 4.0 
1990a: B 15-216 and Kahlerl993: 140-75, 284-317).
The items which were used to test the first hypothesis are explained in 
the following sub-section.
8.2.1. Items for Empirical Analysis of the First Hypothesis
The constructed variables, which have been operationalized in the 
questionnaire, are explained in more detail below.
Firstly, the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization were 
operationalized. In order to assess to what degree a particular characteristic 
of the Learning Organization exists, constructs, each derived from a set of 
observable items, were developed for the questionnaire.
Then, indicators measuring the organizational learning outcomes were 
developed, in order to gauge which organizations perform better than 
others in terms of organizational learning.
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8.2.1.1. Statistical Description, Analysis and Composition of 
the Ten Characteristics of the Learning Organization
Nine of the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization 
(independent variables) were measured in an ordinal scale (ranking scale) 
from 1 to 5, with 1 being at the low end and 5 being at the top end of the 
scale.
The ten characteristics were generated by adding their items together 
and dividing them by the number of items from which they were 
constructed, in order to standardize them on a scale from 1 to 5. Then they 
were all tested for reliability by Cronbach’s Alpha (cf. Kahler 1993: 312f). 
An exception was made with the constructed characteristic “team work and 
team learning”, because it was measured in numbers of teams on a cardinal 
scale (metric scale) (cf. also Bamberg & Bauer 1989: 7). However, in 
order to approximate an ordinal scale (ranking scale) from 1 to 5, the 
variable was standardized (from 0 to 5) by adding the occurrences of the 
six different forms of teams together, giving each form of team a score of 
one, except cross-functional or cross-hierarchical teams, which were given 
a value of 0.5, in order to adjust for combined cross-functional and 
-hierarchical teams.
It was decided not to apply any weighting to the different! 
characteristics of the Learning Organization. This was because this thesis ! 
could not draw on any validated experience from previous studies. \ 
Furthermore, the absence of weighting was intended to help in the process 
of em pirically distinguishing the im portance of the different 
characteristics.
The ten characteristics of the Learning Organization were constructed 
in the questionnaire (see Part 1 of the Appendix) as follows:
(1) “Team work and team learning” with six items (see 1.2.).
(2) “Free vertical and horizontal flow of information” with seven items 
(see II.2.).
(3) “Education and training of the whole workforce” with thirteen items 
(see III.2.).
(4) “Systemic thinking and mental models” with eight items (see IV. L).
(5) “Learning reward system for employees” with six items (see V.I.).
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(6) “Continuous improvement of work” with twelve items (see VI.3.).
(7) Learning laboratories and constant experimentation” with nine items 
(see VII. 1).
(8) “Decentralized hierarchies and participative management” with eleven 
items (see VIII. 1.).
(9) “Flexibility of company strategy and employees” with eight items (see 
IX. L).
(10) “Supportive corporate learning culture” with fifteen items (see X .l).
These ten characteristics of the Learning Organization were tested for 
reliability with the help of the Cronbach’s Alpha, as shown in Table 8.4.
A Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of 0.6 was selected to be an adequate 
threshold for the reliability testing of variables, which are constructed 
from different items (cf. also SPSS/PC+ Statistics 4.0 1990a: B 187-199).
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient was above 0.6 for all ten characteristics 
of the Learning Organization, most of which were even above 0.8, and, 
therefore, all ten variables passed the reliability criterion (see Table 8.4).
Table 8.4: Reliability Testing of the Ten Constructed Variables (Cha­
racteristics) with the help of Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficients
No (Items) Variable (Characteristic) R eiiabiiity
1 (6) Team work and team learning _ 1
2 (7) Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 0.802
3 (13) Education and training of the whole workforce 0.902
4 (8) Systemic thinking and mental models 0.695
5 (6) Learning reward system for employees 0.650
6 (12) Continuous improvement of work 0.841
7 (9) Learning laboratories and constant experimentation 0.820
8 (11) Decentralized hierarchies and participative management 0.831
9 (8) Flexibility of company strategy and employees 0.791
10 (15) Supportive corporate learning culture 0.850
 ^ Not measured on an ordinal scale.
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The descriptive statistics of the ten characteristics of the Learning 
Organization are presented in Table 8.5. It shows the mean, i.e average, 
(range: 0 to 5), the standard deviation (range: 0 to 2.5), the maximum 
(range: 5 to 0), the minimum (range: 0 to 5) and the number of valid 
observations “n” (range: 0 to 70).
Table 8.5: Descriptive Statistics for the Constructed Variables 
(Ten Characteristics of the Learning Organization)
No (Items)
1 (6)
2 (7)
3 (13)
4 (8)
5 (6)
6 (12)
7 (9)
8 (11)
9 (8)
10 (15)
Variable n
Team work and team learningi 70
Mean: 2.96 St. Dev.: 1.53 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 5.00
Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 70
Mean: 3.79 St. Dev.: 0.57 Min.: 2.71 Max.: 5.00
Education and training of the whole workforce 69
Mean: 3.22 St. Dev.: 0.79 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 4.92
Systemic thinking and mental models 69
Mean: 3.41 St. Dev.: 0.51 Min.: 2.25 Max.: 4.75
Learning reward system for employees 70
Mean: 2.72 St. Dev.: 0.71 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 4.33
Continuous improvement of work 70
Mean: 3.42 St. Dev.: 0.67 Min.: 2.08 Max.: 4.91
Learning laboratories & constant experimentation 69
Mean: 2.92 St. Dev.: 0.76 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 4.22
Decentr. hierarchies &^-pafticipative management 70
Mean: 3.80 St. Dev.: (^ O O ^  Min.: 1.72 Max.: 5.00
Flexibility of company strategy and employees 68
Mean: 3.29 St. Dev.: 0.60 Min.: 1.37 Max.: 4.75
Supportive corporate learning culture 67
Mean: 3.22 St. Dev.: 0.55 Min.: 2.13 Max.: 4.66
 ^ N ot m e a su r e d  on an ordinal s c a le .  In stead , a  ranking s c a le  w a s  d e v e lo p e d  to ap p roxim ate  
an  ordinal s c a le  from 1 to 5. T h e  variab le w a s  stan d ard ized  by dividing th e  n um ber of te a m s  
by th e  n um ber of e m p lo y e e s . T h en , th e  7 0  valid c a s e s  w ere  c la ss if ie d  into a  ranking s c a le .
n = number of valid cases, items = number of items used to construct a characteristic
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Each of the ten different characteristics of the Learning Organization 
(already sets of variables) were purposely developed previously to be 
analysed individually. Thus, there was no need to do a factor analysis of 
these characteristics (cf. also SPSS/PC+ Statistics 4.0 1990a: B126 for 
purpose of factor analysis).
However, the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization were 
combined by adding to an overall “scale of the ten Learning Organization’s 
characteristics”, which was tested for reliability.
The outcome of the analysis of the scale of the ten Learning 
Organization’s characteristics was a Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of 0.80 
(n = 64). This was more than acceptable, as the threshold of reliability 
testing with Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients was again suggested to be at 
least at a level of 0.6.
The descriptive statistics o f the “scale of the ten Learning 
Organization’s characteristics” are shown in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6: Descriptive Statistics for the “Scale of the Ten Learning 
Organization’s Characteristics”
_________________________Variable____________________________ n_
Scale of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics 64
Mean: 32.9 St. Dev.: 4.6 Min.: 21.9 Max.: 45.1
n = number of valid cases
A correlation matrix was computed, in order to show the positive 
inter-correlation between the ten different Learning Organization’s 
characteristics in the research sample (see Table 8.7).
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Table 8.7: Correlation Matrix of the Characteristics 
of the Learning Organization
charac
teristic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
1 1 .0 0 0
2 - .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0
3 0 .3 4 2 0 .2 7 3 1 .0 0 0
4 0 .1 4 0 0 .5 2 5 0 .4 5 5 1 .0 0 0
5 0 .0 9 1 0 .1 0 1 0 .2 6 6 0 .3 4 1 1 .0 0 0
6 0 .3 7 3 0 .4 0 7 0 .6 1 4 0 .5 8 1 0 .3 8 6 1 .0 0 0
7 0 .2 3 8 0 .1 5 7 0 .3 7 8 0 .4 6 2 0 .4 8 2 0 .5 0 1 1 .0 0 0
8 0 .1 5 6 0 .3 9 9 0 .4 3 2 0 .6 1 2 0 .3 6 7 0 .5 4 2 0 .5 0 5 1 .0 0 0
9 0 .2 9 6 0 .4 2 5 0 .3 8 7 0 .3 7 1 0 .1 0 7 0 .3 5 4 0 .3 1 2 0 .5 4 4 1 .0 0 0
1 0 0 .1 6 8 0 .4 3 9 0 .3 3 9 0 .5 1 6 0 .1 4 1 0 .5 0 4 0 .3 1 3 0 .5 1 3 0 .5 1 1 1 .0 0 0
Note: For key of number (No) of characteristics see Table 8.5.
This correlation matrix showed that, except for the first characteristic, 
“team work and team learning”, there is a positive correlation of around 
0.4 among the different characteristics, as expected in the theoretical 
discussions at the beginning of this thesis.
An explanation for the reason that the variable “team work and team 
learning” had some very low correlation coefficients compared to the other 
nine characteristics might be the fact that it was not measured on an ordinal 
scale, but on a cardinal scale (although it was converted into a ranking scale 
in order to approximate an ordinal scale from 1 to 5).
Having presented the construction of the ten Learning Organization’s 
characteristics, the next step is to look at the six indicators of 
organizational learning outcomes.
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8.2.1.2. Statistical Description, Analysis and Composition of
the Six Indicators of Organizational Learning Outcome
The indicators measuring the existence of and the degree to which 
organizational learning outcome exists, consisting of three groups of two' 
measures each.
These three groups measuring the outcome of organizational learning 
were (a) “team improvements implemented per employee” and (b) 
“employee suggestions implemented per employee” in the first group, (c) 
“ratio of new products introduced compared to existing ones” and (d) “new 
products introduced compared to competitors” in the second group, and (e) 
“im provem ent of internal quality per units produced” and (f) 
“improvement of external quality per units produced” in the third groupes.
The first group of organizational learning outcomes, the amount of 
individual learning which turned into organizational learning
was measured in two different ways. The first was (a) “team improvements 
implemented” and the second was (b) “number of suggestions per 
employee”. Both measures were analysed in three separate years in order 
to see the developing trend. This means that each of the three items (for the 
three different years: 1990, 1992 and 1994) were divided by the current 
number of employees in order to be standardized for comparison.
The variable (a) “team improvements implemented per employee” was 
generated by the following question and items, which was divided by the 
number of employees:
- How many continuous improvement team projects did you implement? 
in 1990: in 1992: in 1994:_______ O Not counted.
The variable (b) “employee suggestions implemented per employee” 
was gauged by the following question and items, which then was divided by 
the number of employees. This was finally multiplied with the percentage 
share of suggestions implemented, in order to measure the successful 
implementation:
Whereas the former measures the product quality during the production process inside the company, 
the latter measures the quality of the products in terms of customer rejects or producer recalls.
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How many employee suggestions for continuous improvement were 
generated?
in 1990:______  in 1992:___ in 1994:  O Not counted.
What percentage of all these suggestions was implemented?
in 1990:_____% in 1992:_____ % in 1994:_____ % O Not counted.
In the order of the years 1990, 1992 and 1994, the number of valid 
cases for companies with implemented continuous team improvements were 
23, 33 and 43; and the corresponding company figures for implemented 
employee suggestions were only 12, 16 and 22.
Table 8.8: Descriptive Statistics for “Team Improvements Implemented,
per Employee” and “Employee Suggestions Implemented per 6^ " ^ ^  
Employee”
No
(a)
(b)
Variable n
Team improvements implemented per empl. in 1990 23
Mean: 0.01 St. Dev.: 0.02 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 0.08
Team improvements implemented per empl. in 1992 33 
Mean: 0.03 St. Dev.: 0.05 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 0.24
Team improvements implemented per empl. in 1994 43
Mean: 0.06 St. Dev.: 0.14 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 0.81
Employee suggestions impl. per employee in 1990
Mean: 0.03 St. Dev.: 0.09 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 0.30
Employee suggestions impl. per employee in 1992 
Mean: 0.04 St. Dev.: 0.07 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 0.24
Employee suggestions impl. per employee in 1994
Mean: 0.74 St. Dev.: 3.18 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 15.00
r  7
n = number of valid cases
The second group of organizational learning outcomes, speed of 
organizational learning, showed how fast an organization has been able 
to learn with the help of individual and team learning. The measures of 
these outcomes were (c) “ratio of new products introduced compared to
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existing products” and (d) “new products introduced compared to 
competitors”.
The variable (c) “ratio of new products introduced compared to 
existing ones” was developed from three items. These were the percentages 
of new products compared to old ones developed within one year, two 
years or four years. The question looked like this:
2. What percentage of your products in the market are newer than . . . 
a) one year? %. b) two years? %. c) four years? %.
The variable (d) “new products introduced compared to competitors” 
was tested with a five point scale ranging from 1 (later) over 3 (same time) 
to 5 (earlier), for which the following question was asked:
3. At what stage does your company introduce new products compared 
to direct competitors? Choice:
1 (later) - 2 (a bit later) - 3 (same time) - 4  (a bit earlier) - 5 (earlier)
The number companies with valid cases for “new products which were 
newer than one year” was 56, “ . . . than two years” was 58 and “ . . than 
four years” was 55.
For “new products introduced compared to competitors” there were 56 
valid cases.
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Table 8.9: Descriptive Statistics for “Ratio of New Products Introduced 
Compared to Existing Products” (in %) and “New Products 
Introduced Compared to Competitors”
No______________________ Variable____________________________ n
(c) Ratio of new compared to existing products: 1 year 56
Mean: 14.1 St. Dev.: 13.6 Min.: 0.0 Max.: 50.0
Ratio of new compared to existing products: 2 years 58 
Mean: 29.3 St. Dev.: 21.9 Min.: 0.0 Max.: 100.0
Ratio of new compared to existing products: 4 years 55
Mean: 54.8 St. Dev.: 29.4 Min.: 0.0 Max.: 100.0
(d) New products introduced compared to competitors 56
Mean: 3.66 St. Dev.: 1.03 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 5.00
n = number of valid cases, Mean: 14.1 = 14.1% of the products are new on average
The third group of organizational learning outcomes, the extent of 
im provem ents in  quality was measured with the help of the change of 
intemal and external quality in 1990, 1992 and 1994. This group was 
divided into the variables (e) “improvement of intemal quality per units 
produced” and (f) “improvement of extemal quality per units produced”.
The items, measuring percentage improvement in quality, were 
generated by subtracting the newer failure rate from the older failure rate, 
i.e. the value of 1992 from 1990, 1994 from 1992 and 1994 from 1990, 
and then calculating the percentage of this difference with the older year’s 
number as a basis^^.
The variable (e) “im provem ent o f internal quality per units 
produced”97 was measured by three items in the following question:
4. How was your overall p roduct quality  in terms o f . . .
The fact is acknowledged that companies on a high quality level cannot improve in the same way as 
a company which starts at a low level o f quality. However, there were no indications for a significant bias.
This means product quality during the production process inside the company. According to the 
questionnaire’s questions this included work-in-progress as well as off-line products.
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(note: - a 'unit' can be a part, a square metre, etc.; example: _4_ u.p. 1.000 (u.p. = units per)
- if you do not measure your quality, please indicate with 'N/M' (= not measured))
a) first-pass yield (= number of units (specify:____ ) which did not pass
through the production process without being scrapped or reworked)
in 1990: . u.p. in 1992:__ u.p. in 1994: _  u.p.
The sixth and last variable (f) “improvement of extemal quality per 
units p r o d u c e d ” 98 was measured by three items through the following 
question:
4. How was your overall product quality in terms o f . . .
b) units shipped to customers which were rejected or recalled 
in 1990: u.p. in 1992: u.p. in 1994: u.p.
The number of 
1990/94 were %  29 
units which did not pas 
scrapped or reworked) 
customers which were re
of companies for 1990/92, 1992/94 and 
for first-pass yield quality (here: numbers of 
through the production process without being 
and 18, 27 and 19 for the units shipped to 
ecte(forreZaîïedT^
O'
-7
This measures the quality of the products in terms of customer rejects or producer recalls.
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Table 8.10: Descriptive Statistics for “Improvement of Intemal Quality 
per Units Produced” and “Improvement of Extemal Quality 
per Units Produced” (both changes in %)
No______________________ Variable____________________________ n
(e) Improvement of Int. quality per units prod. 1990/92 20
Mean: 26.7 St. Dev.: 22.0 Min.: 0.0 Max.: 66.7
improvement of Int. quality per units prod. 1992/94 29 
Mean: 28.1 St. Dev.: 44.2 Min.: -150.0 Max.: 80.0 
Improvement of Int. quality per units prod. 1990/94 20
Mean: 40.6 St. Dev.: 52.5 M in .:-150.0 Max.: 90.0
(f) Improvement of ext. quality per units prod. 1990/92 18
Mean: 37.4 St. Dev.: 30.0 Min.: 0.0 Max.: 100.0
Improvement of ext. quality per units prod. 1992/94 27 
Mean: 38.4 St. Dev.: 48.4 Min.: -150.0 Max.: 100.0
Improvement of ext. quality per units prod. 1990/94 19
Mean: 51.0 St. Dev.: 57.0 Min.: -150.0 Max.: 100.0
n = number of valid cases, Mean: 26.7 = quality improved by 28.1% on average
The three groups of six indicators of organizational leaming outcome 
were introduced in this part. The next part deals with organizational 
leaming systems.
8.2.1.3. Statistical Description, Analysis and Composition of 
Organizational Leaming Systems
This research model includes a variable for organizational leaming 
systems. Its existence is measured by the items “team improvement system” 
and “employee suggestion system”, which were included in the data analysis 
as a combined variable, but sometimes also as separate variables in more 
detailed analysis.
The combined variable was called “organizational leaming system”, 
and was defined by the existence of at least one of the variables “team
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improvement system” or “employee suggestion system” 9^. This means that 
the variable “organizational leaming system” takes a value of “1” if either a 
“team improvement system” or an “employee suggestion system” exists. If 
neither system is found with a company the value “0” is accorded. This 
dichotomous approach has also allowed a separate comparable analysis of 
team improvement systems and employee suggestion systems.
The item “team improvement system” was gauged by the following 
question:
- Do you employ continuous improvement project teams? 
O No O Yes, since 19  .
And the item “employee suggestion system” was asked for as follows:
- Has your company installed an employee suggestion system?
O No O Yes, the latest version was introduced in 1 9  .
The descriptive statistics show that “organizational leaming system” 
had the highest overall mean of 0.87 (it applied to 61 of the 70 suppliers 
with either a “team improvement system” and/or an “employee suggestion 
system”). “Team improvement system” was second with a mean of 0.79 
(indicated by 55 companies positively and 15 negatively) and “employee 
suggestion system” with 0.43 was last (marked positively by 30 companies).
A non-dichotomous variable (which would indicate either a 2 if  both systems exist together, a 1 if 
either of the system exists and 0 otherwise) was not generated, as it would automatically assume that the 
more organizational systems the better. In-depth interviews revealed that most companies, which introduced 
a team improvement system, abandoned their employee suggestion system in the first instance (but most of 
them intended to reinstall it as a revised system at a later stage).
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Table 8.11: Descriptive Statistics for “Organizational Leaming System”, 
“Team Improvement System” and “Employee Suggestion 
System”
Code Variable n
OLS Organizational Learning system 70
Mean: 0.87 St. Dev.: 0.34 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
IIS Team improvement system 70
Mean: 0.79 St. Dev.: 0.41 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
ESS Empioyee suggestion system 70
Mean: 0.43 St. Dev.: 0.50 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
n = number of valid cases (i.e. with and without an organizational leaming system)
In summary, this was the introduction of the three sets of variables, 
which were used to test the first hypothesis.
There are three parts in the following statistical analysis of the first 
hypothesis.
The first part of the statistical analysis of the first hypothesis deals with 
the impact of the Learning Organization’s characteristics on organizational 
leaming systems.
The second part deals with the impact of the Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics on the organizational leaming outcomes.
The third part deals with the impact of organizational leaming systems 
on the organizational leaming outcomes.
8.2.2. Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis lA
The first part of the statistical analysis of Hypothesis 1, i.e. testing of 
Hypothesis lA, was accomplished by measuring the impact of “the scale of 
the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization” (independent variable) 
on “organizational learning systems” (dependent variable) (see Figure 8.3).
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Figure 8.3: Hypothesised Impact of the Leaming Organization’s 
Characteristics on Organizational Leaming Systems
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As mentioned previously, the research starts with correlation analysis.
8.2.2.1. Correlation Analysis of Hypothesis lA
The first hypothesis to be examined (converted to a null hypothesis for 
empirical testing) is the following.
Null Hypothesis lA: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Leaming Organization have 
no organizational learning systems for team improvements and/or 
employee suggestions.
Null Hypothesis lA  could be rejected, as the correlation coefficient 
of “the scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics” with the 
dependent variable “organizational learning systems” was strongly 
significant with an r of 0.383*** (p = 0.001, n = 64).
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Consistent with the theoretical argument of this thesis, this correlation 
is interpreted as an impact of the independent variable “the ten Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics” on the dependent variable “organizational 
learning systems”. This finding and interpretation will be corroborated by 
the in-depth interviews in Chapter 9.
Figure 8.4: Correlation Analysis: Impact of the Leaming Organization’s 
Characteristics on Organizational Leaming Systems
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= w eak ly  sign ifican t (p < 0 .1 ), ** = sign ifican t (p < 0 .05 ), an d  *** = strongly  sign ifican t (p < 0 .01).
n = number of valid cases, r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level
A closer look at the organizational leaming systems revealed that the 
correlation coefficients of “the scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics” with “continuous team improvement systems” was strongly 
significant, with an r of 0.430*** (p < 0.001, n = 64), whereas it was not 
significant for “employee suggestion systems”, with an r of 0.046 (p = 
0.358, n = 64). This showed that the ten Learning Organization’s
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characteristics play a much more important role for the former compared 
to the latter.
This finding was consistent with the impressions gained from various 
interviews: car component suppliers which introduced continuous team 
improvement systems normally abolished employee suggestion systems, as 
these had not worked properly in the past. Team improvement systems 
appeared to need enough characteristics of the Leaming Organization, in 
order to be installed and continue existing, whereas employee suggestion 
systems did not appear to need these characteristics. The implementation 
rates for employee suggestion systems indicated a relatively poor 
performance for those still in place (e.g., a mean of 37% in 1994 (standard 
deviation: 30%, minimum: 0%, maximum: 90%, n: 15)). Chapter 9 will go 
into greater detail of this issue with the help of in-depth interviews.
Null sub-hypotheses were derived from Null Hypothesis lA  for a more 
detailed insight into the various Leaming Organization’s characteristics.
Null Hypothesis lA .1-10: Those car component suppliers in Britain 
who show higher scores in each of the ten characteristics of the Leaming 
Organization have no organizational leaming systems.
The analysis of these ten null sub-hypotheses of Hypothesis 1 A, that test 
the influence of each of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics on 
organizational learning systems was done with the help of correlation 
analysis in the first instance. Derived from the theoretical argument, the 
correlation coefficients were interpreted as an impact of the independent 
variables on the dependent variables, as explained above.
The results of the correlation analysis of the null sub-hypotheses of 
Hypothesis lA  are shown in Table 8.12 below. The results of this sub-null 
hypotheses testing show that for at least nine out of the ten characteristics 
of the Leaming Organization it holds true that a high scores in the 
characteristics of the Leaming Organizations correlates with the existence 
of organizational learning systems, which is interpreted as a positive 
impact.
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Table 8.12: Outcome of Testing of Constructed Variables for Significant 
Correlation of Hypothesis lA
No (Items) Variable r n
1 (6) Team work and team learning 0 4 2 1 * 70
2 (7) Free vertical and horizontal flow of information /" o W 70
3 (13) Education and training of the whole workforce lfÎ390*** 69
4 (8) Systemic thinking and mental models / 0.345*** 69
5 (6) Learning reward system for employees / 0.362*** 70
6 (12) Continuous improvement of work / 0.402*** 70
7 (9) Learning laboratories and constant experimemation 0.318*** 69
8 (11) Decentralized hierarchies and particip. management 0.179* 70
9 (8) Flexibility of company strategy and employees 0.191* 68
10(15) Supportive corporate learning culture / 0.198* 67
= w eak ly  sign ifican t (p < 0 .1 ), ** = sign ificant (p < 0 .05 ), anc/*** =  strongly  sign ificant (p < 0 .01).
r = correlation coefficient, n = number of valid c^es
Null Hypothesis lA .l  could be reacted, because the independent 
variable “team work and team learning/ showed a significant correlation 
with the dependent variable “orgaiyizational learning systems”. The 
interpreted impact was weakly signittcant, as the correlation coefficient r 
had a value of 0.173* (p = 0.076, n ^70).
Null Hypothesis 1A.2 was not rejected, as the independent variable 
“free vertical and horizontal flow of information” showed no correlation 
with the dependent variabi^^organizational learning systems”. The 
correlation value of r with (^^6^ was not significant (p = 0.298, n = 70).
Null Hypothesis 1A.3 had to be rejected, as the dependent variable 
“education and training of the whole workforce” had a strongly significant 
effect on “organizational learning systems”, with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.390*** (p < 0.000, n = 69).
Null Hypothesis 1A.4 had to be rejected as well, as the characteristic 
“systemic thinking and mental models” had a strongly significant impact on 
the dependent variable “organizational learning systems”, with an r of 
0.345*** (p = 0.002, n = 69).
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Null Hypothesis 1A.5 had to be rejected, because “learning reward 
system for employees” had a strongly significant impact on “organizational 
learning systems”. The correlation coefficient r was 0.362*** (p = 0.001, n 
= 70).
N ull H ypothesis 1A.6 had to be rejected, as the impact of 
“continuous improvement of work” on “organizational learning systems” 
was strongly significant, with a correlation coefficient of 0.402*** (p < 
0.000, n = 70).
Null Hypothesis 1A.7 had to be rejected as well, as the correlation 
of “learning laboratories and constant experimentation” had a strongly 
significant impact on “organizational learning systems”, with a strongly 
significant r of 0.318*** (p = 0.004, n = 69).
Null Hypothesis 1A.8 could be rejected, because the independent 
variable “decentralized hierarchies and participative management” had a 
weakly significant impact on the dependent variable “organizational 
learning systems”. The correlation coefficient of 0.179* was only weakly 
significant (p = 0.068, n = 70).
Null Hypothesis 1A.9 could be rejected as well, because “flexibility 
of company strategy and employees” had a weakly significant impact on 
“organizational learning systems”, at the nearly significant r of 0.191* (p = 
0.059, n = 68).
Null Hypothesis lA.lO , last but not least, could be rejected as 
“supportive corporate learning culture” had a weakly significant impact on 
“organizational learning systems”. The correlation coefficient r was 0.198* 
(p = 0.054, n = 67) and, therefore, again close to being significant.
Taking a closer look at the insignificant correlation revealed an 
interesting deeper insight into the nature of the construct “free horizontal 
and vertical flow of information”. It was split into its items again for 
investigation of its properties. But none of the items showed any significant 
impact on the variable “organizational learning systems”.
Further investigation tried a new construction of the characteristic 
“free vertical and horizontal flow of information” for a new Null 
Hypothesis 1A.2, this time with different items. The problem of the items 
about information and communication was that they were focusing on the
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way information was transferred, and not on what was transmitted through 
information and communication.
Therefore, a new independent variable was constructed from those five f .  
items, which asked about the kind of information that was disclosed in the ^  ^  
company. This could be information about five areas such as financial 
performance, quality performance or productivity performance, as well as 
production plans or investment plans
Then, Null Hypothesis 1A.2 was tested again with a newly-constructed 
independent variable for “free vertical and horizontal flow of 
information”.
New N ull H ypothesis 1A.2: Those car component suppliers in 
Britain who show higher scores in “free vertical and horizontal flow of 
information” have no organizational learning systems.
The new Null Hypothesis 1A.2 could be rejected this time, as the 
newly constructed independent variable “free vertical and horizontal flow 
of information” showed a significant correlation with the dependent 
variable “organizational learning systems”. Thus, it showed a significant 
influence (r = 0.207**, p = 0.045, n = 68) on the variable “organizational 
learning systems”.
Furthermore, when the new Null Hypothesis 1A.2 was only applied 
to the item “team improvement system”, it was rejected because of a 
strongly significant influence (r = 0.317***, p = 0.004, n = 68), whereas it 
had no significant influence on “employee suggestion system” at all (r = 
0.045, p = 0.255, n = 68). This again fits with the impression from the 
factory visits, which showed that information was used to keep the wheel of 
continuous team improvement systems going, but not necessarily for 
employee suggestion systems.
This renewed analysis shows that it has been advisable to focus research 
more on the content than on the mode of “free horizontal and vertical flow 
of information”. A further reason for the difference in impact between the 
two could be that the questions about information content are harder to 
indicate wrongly in the questionnaire than about the mode of information 
flow.
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In summary, with the help of the theoretical argument, the correlation 
analysis of the Learning Organization’s characteristics showed a significant 
impact on the dependent variable “organizational learning systems”. The 
impact of “the scale of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics” 
proved to be strongly significant with an r of 0.383*** (p = 0.001, n = 
64). This means that the degree to which the characteristics of a Leaning 
O rganization exist plays an im portant role for the existence of 
organizational learning systems, however, more for continuos team 
improvement systems and less for employee suggestion systems. Later on, 
the in-depth interview analysis also underlines this point, by showing that a 
lack of organizational learning characteristics leads to a failure in 
successful implementation of organizational learning systems.
The impact of the ten separate characteristics of the Learning 
Organization is summarised again in Figure 8.5 below. With the help of 
slight modification of its composition, the initial problem in the validity of 
the second characteristic could be overcome. Amongst others, this problem 
was due to the lack of questionnaire-based studies on Learning 
Organizations, which could have helped in the validity issue from the 
beginning.
C oncluding from  the correlation analysis o f the different 
characteristics, in line with the theoretical argument in Chapter 3, it 
showed that the characteristics “systemic thinking and mental models” (r = 
0.345***) and “continuous improvement of work” (0.402***) both had a 
strongly significant impact on the dependent variable “organizational 
learning systems”. But this was also the case for “education and training of 
the whole workforce” (r = 0.390***), “learning reward system for 
em ployees” (r = 0.362***) and “learning laboratories and constant 
experimentation” (r = 0.318***).
However, the multiple regression analysis of Hypothesis lA  in the 
following part gives a clearer picture about the difference in impact of the 
ten different characteristics.
- 253 -
8. D a t a  A n a l y s is  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
Figure 8.5: Correlation Analysis; Impact of the Learning Organization’s 
Characteristics on Organizational Learning Systems in Detail
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
Team work and 
team  learning
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
whole workforce
System ic thinking and 
mental models
Learning reward system  for 
em ployees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative managem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy 
________and em plovees_______
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
r = 0.362***  
r = 0 .402**V n = 7 0
r =
Organizational
Learning
Systems
Team
Improvement
System
Employee
Suggestion
System
* = w eak ly  sign ifican t (p < 0 .1 ), ** =  sign ificant (p < 0 .0 5 ), an d  *** =  strongly  sign ificant (p < 0 .01 ). 
 ^ =  sign ifican t if c o m p o s e d  of inform ation co n ten t on ly  (r = 0 .207** , n = 6 8 ).
n = number of valid cases, r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level
8.2.2.2. Regression Analysis of Hypothesis lA
For the regression analysis of Hypothesis lA , logistic regression 
analysis was the appropriate regression method. This was because of the 
dichotomous nature of the combined variable “organizational learning 
systems”, composed of “team improvement system” and “employee 
suggestion system” (cf. SPSS/PC+ Advanced Statistics 4.0 1990b: B39-62).
To evaluate the order of importance of the ten different characteristics 
of the Learning Organization, a detailed logistic regression analysis, 
including each of the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization, was 
performed.
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Firstly, the “Goodness of Fit” of the model was analysed. The 
classification table showed that 93.75% of the companies (n = 64) were 
correctly classified, i. e. predicted and observed, in the table regarding the 
variable “organizational learning systems” (see Table 8.13).
Table 8.13: Classification Table of “Organizational Learning Systems”
Predicted
0 1
P ercent
C orrect
O bserved 0 
1
5 3 62.50%
98.21%1 55
Overall: 9 3 .7 5 %
This pattern also held true for the last check of the “Histogram of 
Estimated Probability”, where only “organizational learning systems” 
showed no cluster in the middle of the scale, which is desirable.
The “-2Log L ikelihood” significance level for the variable 
“organizational learning systems” had a value of 0.998. And the “Goodness 
of Fit” had a value of 0.123 (see Table 8.14). Both values should not be 
significant for null hypothesis rejection.
Table 8.14: Significance Levels of “Organizational Learning Systems”
C h i-
S q u are
Degrees of 
Freedom
S ign ificance
-2 Log Likelihood 26.98 53 0.998
Model Chi Square 21.24 10 0.019**
im provem ent 21.24 10 0.019**
Goodness of Fit 65.06 53 0.123
This finding was confirmed by further assessment of the significance of 
“organizational learning systems” with the “Model Chi-Square”, which 
showed a value of 0.019**, as well as of the “Improvement”, which showed 
a value of 0.019**. This time the significance was important for null
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hypotheses rejections. This means that the variables “organizational 
learning systems” complied with the test.
In conclusion, the logistic regression analysis with its sub-tests of 
Hypothesis lA  showed that the ten characteristics of the Learning 
Organization can be used to predict the existence of organizational learning 
systems. In detail, this prediction is possible for continuous team 
improvement systems alone, but not for employee suggestion systems; the 
reasons for this have already been discussed in the preceding part.
Lastly, all variables in the logistic regression equation are shown in. 
Table 8.15. Only the characteristic (4) “systemic thinking and mental 
models” had a weakly significant explanatory power with a standardized 
regression coefficient of 0.146* for the dependent variable “organizational 
learning system”.
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Table 8.15: Logistic Regression of the Ten Learning Organization’s 
Characteristics on Organizational Learning Systems
V a ria b le
(Charact.
B e ta  S ta n d .
) Coeff. Error Wald d f SIqnIf. R Exp(B)
(1) Team work and team learning
-0.227 0.402 0.318 1 0.572 0.000 0.796
(2) Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 
-1.513 1.805 0.702 1 0.401 0.000 0.220
(3) Education and training of the whole workforce 
1.409 1.015 1.924 1 0.165 0.000 4.092
(4) Systemic thinking and mental models
4.032 2.315 3.031 1 0.081 0.146* 56.395
(5) Learning reward system for employees
0.757 1.108 0.467 1 0.494 0.000 2.133
(6) Continuous improvement of work
1.724 1.694 1.035 1 0.308 0.000 5.607
(7) Learning laboratories and constant experimentation
-0.055 1.265 0.019 1 0.965 0.000 0.946
(8) Decentralized hierarchies and particip. management
-2.499 1.680 2.313 1 0.136 -0.066 0.082
(9) Flexibility of company strategy and employees 
0.929 1.475 0.396 1 0.528 0.000 2.533
(10) Supportive corporate learning culture
0.285 1.300 0.048 1 0.825 0.000 1.331
Const. -10.374 5.579 3.456 1 0.063
Note: Wald = Wald statistic, df = degree of freedom, Signif. = significance of Wald 
statistics, R = partial correlation, Exp(B) = regression coefficient.
In summary, the multiple logistic regression analysis of Hypothesis 1A 
showed that only the Learning Organization’s characteristic (4) “systemic 
thinking and mental models” had a significant impact on “organizational 
learning system”. This was in line with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 
3.4., which argued that the ability of systemic thinking was the key 
characteristic for becoming a Learning Organization. However, (6) 
“continuous improvement of work” does not play the same role here, as the 
theoretical argument suggested. This outcome from the logistic regression 
analysis was also more precise than the correlation analysis in the sub­
section before.
After the statistical analysis of Hypothesis lA , i.e. the first part of 
Hypothesis 1, the next sub-section will deal with Hypothesis IB.
-257 -
8. D a t a  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
8.2.3. Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis IB
The second part of the statistical analysis of Hypothesis 1 was made by 
m easuring the impact of the ten characteristics of the Learning 
Organization (independent variable) on organizational learning outcomes 
(dependent variables) (see Figure 8.6).
The three groups of measures of organizational learning outcome were
(a) "team improvements implemented per employee” and (b) "employee 
suggestions implemented per employee” in the first group, (c) "ratio of 
new products introduced compared to existing ones” and (d) "new products 
introduction compared to competitors” in the second group, and (e) 
"im provem ent o f internal quality per units produced” and (f) 
"improvement of external quality per units produced” in the third group.
Figure 8.6: Hypothesised Impact of the Learning Organization’s 
Characteristics on Organizational Learning Outcomes
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Team work and 
team  learning
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
w hole workforce
System ic thinking and 
mental m odels
Learning reward system  for 
_________em p loyees________
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and  
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy  
and em p loyees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
Organizational
Learning
Systems
©
Team
Improvement
System
Em ployee
S uggestion
System
Organizational
Learning
Outcomes
Team  improve­
m ents implemented
Em ployee 
su ggestion s implemented
Ratio of new  vs. old 
products introduced
N ew  products introduced 
com pared to competitors
Improvement of internal 
quality per units produced
Improvement of external 
quality per units produced
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The correlation analysis of Hypothesis IB was conducted to gauge the . r
direct impact of the independent variables of the characteristics of the ;
Learning Organization on the dependent variables of organizational -
learning outcomes. ‘. '=‘ ‘^ 1t r u
Hypothesis IB was tested as a whole, as well as each of the ten sub- 
hypotheses, for correlation with organizational learning outcome. But 
before that Hypothesis IB was translated into a null hypothesis for " If 
statistical testing, as well as into the ten sub-null hypotheses.
Null Hypothesis IB: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization do 
not have better organizational learning outcomes.
Analogous to the testing of Hypothesis lA, the sub-null hypotheses of 
the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics have been analysed. 
However, in order to keep this chapter short, the sub-null hypotheses will 
not be repeated for each of the six dependent variables of organizational 
learning outcome. Furthermore, not significant correlation coefficients of 
sub-null hypothesis will not be mentioned for the same reason.
Null Hypotheses IB .1-10: Those car component suppliers in 
Britain who show higher scores in each of the ten characteristics of the 
Learning Organization do not have better organizational learning 
outcomes.
Firstly, analysis was conducted with scales that measure the amount of 
team and individual learning, which turned into organizational 
learning.
These scales were (a) “team improvements implemented per employee” 
and (b) "employee suggestions implemented per employee”. The null 
hypotheses were as follows.
Null Hypothesis IBa: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization do 
not have more team improvement projects implemented.
The analysis showed that Null Hypothesis IBa could be rejected, this 
was possible in two of the three years. The correlation coefficient between 
the “Learning Organization’s characteristics” variable and the “team 
improvements implemented per employee” was significant in 1990 with an
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r of 0.392** (p = 0.039, n = 21) and in 1992 with an r of 0.338** (p = 
0.034, n = 30), but not in 1994 for which an r of 0.206 (p = 0.100, n = 40) 
was registered.
Null Hypothesis IBb: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization do 
not have more suggestions per employee implemented.
Again, Null Hypothesis IBb could not be rejected, as the variable 
“Learning Organization’s characteristics” showed only one weakly 
significant impact on “employee suggestions implemented per employee” 
which was in 1990 (r = 0.504*, p = 0.057, n = 11), but no significant 
impact in 1992 (r = 0.174, p = 0.267, n = 15) and in 1994 (r = 0.158, p =
0.247, n = 21). The number of valid cases was even lower here and, 
therefore, the outcomes in should be treated with caution.
The sub-null hypotheses of Null Hypothesis IBa could be rejected for 
seven of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics alone for 1990 and 
1992, and three out of ten for 1994. This impact of varying significance on 
“team improvements implemented per employee” is shown in Table 8.16.
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Table 8.16: Correlation Analysis of the Ten Learning Organization’s 
Characteristics on Team Improvements per Employee 
Implemented
S u b -n u ll 1 9 90 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4
hypothesis r n r n r n
1Ba1 0.363** 23 0.059 33 0.046 43
1Ba2 0.486**’ 23 0.301** 33 -.077 43
1Ba3 0.287* 23 0.366** 33 0.206* 43
1Ba4 0.349* 22 0.282** 32 0.081 42
1Ba5 0.329* 23 0.275* 33 0.337** 43
1 Ba6 0.385** 23 0.148 33 0.192 43
1Ba7 - .117 22 0.174 32 0.144 42
1Ba8 0.042 23 0.265* 33 0.286** 43
1Ba9 0.286* 23 0.474*** 33 0.124 43
1Ba10 0.167 22 0.282* 31 0.143 41
r = correlation coefficient, n = number of valid cases,
For the key of the characteristics see Table 8.15 above
Compared to “team improvements implemented per employee” (IBa), 
the variable “employee suggestions implemented per employee” (IBb) 
registered a much less significant im pact from  the ten different 
characteristics of the Learning Organization, as shown in Table 8.17.
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Table 8.17: Correlation Analysis of the Ten Learning Organization’s 
Characteristics on Employee Suggestions per Employee 
Implemented
Sub-nul l 1990 1992 199 4
hypothesis r n r n r n
1Bb1 0.350 12 0.122 16 -.257 22
1Bb2 0.043 12 - .251 16 0.297* 22
1Bb3 0.634"* 12 0.346* 16 0.278 22
1Bb4 0.221 12 0.289 16 0.338* 22
1Bb5 0.374 12 0.360* 16 0.363** 22
1Bb6 0.350 12 0.081 16 - .023 22
1Bb7 0.399* 12 0.357* 16 0.361** 22
1Bb8 0.013 12 0.009 16 0.343* 22
1Bb9 0.451* 12 - .094 16 - .161 22
1Bb10 0.026 11 - .147 15 0.239 21
r = correlation coefficient, n = number of valid cases 
For the key of the characteristics see Table 8.15 above
Most of the characteristics showed no significant correlation, i. e. the 
null sub-hypotheses could therefore not be rejected. The few rejections, 
however, have to be treated with caution, because of the low number of 
valid cases.
Secondly, the speed of organizational learning was investigated, ; 
which was measured with thëlïëIp^{c)^T atio  of new products introduced | 
compared to existing products” and (d) “new products introduced 
compared to competitors”.
Null Hypothesis IBc: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization do 
not have a higher ratio of new products introduced compared to existing 
ones.
Analysis of Null Hypothesis IBc revealed only one weakly 
significant impact of the independent variable “Learning Organization’s
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characteristics” on the dependent variable “ratio of new products 
introduced compared to existing products”.
The correlation coefficients were neither significant for the share of 
new products introduced within one year (r = 0.141, p = 0.156 n =53) nor 
for two years (r = 0.059, p = 0.111, n = 54), but significant for four years 
(r = 0.251**, p = 0.036, n = 52). This means that the null hypothesis could 
not be rejected in this case.
Null Hypothesis IBd: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization do 
not have a quicker product introduction compared to competitors.
Correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis IBd revealed that it could 
not be rejected, as no significant effect of “the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics” on “new products introduced compared to competitors” 
could be found (r = 0.150, p = 0.143, n = 52).
The direct impact of each of the ten Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics, derived from Null Hypothesis IBc, are shown in Table 
8.18.
The impact of “team work and team learning” on “ratio of new 
products introduced compared to existing products” (IB c l)  was weakly 
significant for the two years average (r = 0.196*), but reached the highest 
level of all correlation coefficients with a strong significance for the four 
years (r = 0.331***).
This significance applied especially to “inter-organizational team work 
and team learning”, which had a weakly significant impact on the one year 
average (r = 0.192*), two years average (r = 0.224**) and a highly 
significant impact on the four years average (r = 0.363***); this was 
especially the case for teams with customers (r = 0.268**70.339***/ 
0.317***), but also with suppliers (r = 0.181*70.213*70.391**). No 
significant correlation could be found between “intra-organizational team 
work and team learning” and any of the dependent variables; apart from 
“cross-departm ental and hierarchical team s” which showed some 
significance for the four years average (r = 0.273**).
This can be interpreted as follows: the age of the products range of the 
car component companies was dependent on a product development, which
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included close co-operation with customers, but also with suppliers, 
through inter-organizational project teams. This would also be in line with 
observations about product development processes in Japanese car 
companies, which include their suppliers in new product development (cf. 
also Womack et a l 1990 and Mair 1994).
“Continuous improvement of work” (lBc6) had a significant impact on 
“ratio of new products introduced compared to existing products” in all of 
the three periods (r = 0.224**/0.280**70.236**). It was the only 
characteristic showing this high degree of impact, demonstrating its j 
importance for new product development. But also “education and training 
of the whole workforce” (lBc3) had some considerable direct impact on 
the new products ratio (r = 0.177*70.211*70.234**).
Table 8.18: Correlation Analysis of the Ten Learning Organization’s
Characteristics on Ratio of New Products Introduced /
S u b -n u ll one year two years fo u r years
hypothesis r n r n r n
1Bc1 0.129 56 0.196* 58 0.331**'' 55
1Bc2 0.124 56 0.165 58 0.007 55
1Bc3 0.177* 55 0.211* 57 0.234** 54
1Bc4 0.191 56 0.190* 58 0.167 55
1 Bc5 0.005 56 - .194 58 0.237** 55
1Bc6 0.224** 56 0.280** 58 0.236** 55
1Bc7 0.042 56 0.002 58 0.220* 55
1Bc8 - .041 56 - .041 58 - .036 55
1Bc9 - .060 55 - .051 57 0.045 54
1Bc10 0.160 54 0.177* 55 0.050 53
r = correlation coefficient, n = number of valid cases, 
for the key of the characteristics see Table 8.15 above
The sub-null hypothesis of Null Hypothesis IBd again showed some 
impact of “team work and team learning” (r = 0.214*, p = 0.56, n = 56), 
the only characteristic to do so for the two measurements of speed of 
organizational learning via new products introduced. There was also some
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significant impact of “free vertical and horizontal flow of information” ( r 
= 0.264**, p = 0.025, n = 56) and “flexibility of company strategy and 
employees” (r = 0.238**, p = 0.041, n = 54).
Thirdly, the extent of improvements in quality was analysed by 
the items (e) “improvement of internal quality per units produced” and (f) 
“improvements of external quality per units produced”. The generation of 
these variables was explained at the beginning of this chapter. The null 
hypotheses were as follows.
Null Hypothesis IBe: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization do 
not have a high improvement rate of internal quality of units produced.
Testing of Null Hypothesis IBe revealed that ^im provem ent of 
internal quality per units produced” was in one case w^eklWinfluenced by 
the variable “the Learning Organization’s ch arac te ris tic^  This was the 
case for the period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.291*, p = 0.066, n = 28), but 
neither for the period 1990 to 1992 (r = -0.183, p = 0.227, n = 19) nor for 
the period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.190, p = 0.217, n = 19). The null hypothesis 
could therefore not be rejected as a whole.
Null Hypothesis IBf: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
show higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization do 
not have a higher improvement rate of external quality of units produced.
Correlation analysis showed that Null Hypothesis IB f could also not 
be rejected, as there was no significant effects of “the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics” on “improvements of external quality per 
units produced”. They were not significant for the period 1990 to 1992 (r 
= 0.238, p = 0.187, n= 16), for the period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.200, p =
0.168, n = 25) and not significant for the period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.277, p 
= 0.141, n =17).
The sub-null hypothesis of Null Hypothesis IBe testing showed there 
were also direct effects of some of the Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics, though only from  three variables. The impact of 
“continuous improvement of work” was strongly significant in the period 
1992 to 1994 (r = 0.489***, p = 0.004, n = 29) and significant for the
-265 -
8. D a t a  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.404**, p = 0.038, n = 20), showing its 
importance once again with a direct impact. “Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation” also had a significant impact in the period 1992 
to 1994 (r = 0.322**, p = 0.044, n = 29) and weakly significant for the 
period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.330*, p = 0.077, n = 20). And “free vertical 
and horizontal flow of information” was only weakly significant for the 
period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.283*, p = 0.068, n = 29).
The sub-null hypothesis of Null Hypothesis IB f of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics which could be rejected included again 
“continuous improvement of work”, which had a weakly significant impact 
for the period 1990 to 1992 (r = 0.335*, p = 0.087, n = 18) and significant 
for the period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.347**, p = 0.038, n = 27) and 
significant for the period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.437**, p = 0.031, n = 19). 
“Flexibility of company strategy and employees” showed significance for 
the period 1990 to 1992 (r = 0.444**, p = 0.037, n = 17), weak 
significance for the period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.268*, p = 0.092, n = 26) 
and significance for the period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.477**, p = 0.022, n = 
18). Lastly, “free vertical and horizontal flow of information” only had a 
significant impact for the period of 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.345**, p = 0.039, 
n = 27).
Comparing the impact of the characteristics on improvement of 
internal and external quality, “continuous improvement of work” is the 
only variable which plays a significant role in both cases, which shows its 
outstanding importance as a directly impacting variable. “Learning 
laboratories and constant experim entation” plays a major role for 
improvement of internal quality, whereas “flexibility of company strategy 
and employees” has a significant impact on the improvement of external 
quality. However, this is not enough to enable an overall direct impact of 
the characteristics, which enables a rejection of the null hypotheses. It must 
be kept in mind that the sometimes low level of valid cases must lead to a 
cautious approach when interpreting this data.
In summary, the correlation analysis of Hypothesis IB showed virtually 
no significant correlation betw een the Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics and organizational learning outcome (see Figure 8.7), which 
was not sufficient to enable a rejection of the whole Null Hypothesis 1 B.
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Figure 8.7: Correlation and Impact of the Learning Organization’s 
Characteristics on Organizational Learning Outcomes
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Organizational
Learning
Outcomes
Team work and 
team learning
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
whole workforce
System ic thinking and 
mental models
Learning reward system  for 
em ployees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy 
and em ployees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
n = 2 1 /3 0 /4 0
r = 0 .3 9 2 * * /0 .3 3 8 * * /0 .2 0 6
r = 0 .5 0 4 7 0 .1 7 4 / 0 .1 5 8  
n = 11 /15 /21
n = 5 3 /5 4 /5 2  
r = 0 .1 4 1 /0 .1 6 9 /0 .2 5 1 * *
r = 0 .1 5 0  
n = 5 2
n = 1 9 /2 8 /1 9  
r = -0 .1 8 3 /0 .2 9 1  * /0 .1 9 0
r = 0 .2 3 8 /0 .2 0 0 /0 .2 7 7  
n = 1 6 /2 5 /1 7
Team improve­
m ents implemented
Employee 
su ggestions implemented
Ratio of new vs. old 
products introduced
New products introduced 
com pared to competitors
Improvement of internal 
quality per units produced
Improvement of external 
quality per units produced
* = w eak ly  sign ifican t (p < 0 .1 ), ** = sign ificant (p < 0 .0 5 ), and  *** =  stron g ly  sign ifican t (p < 0 .01).
n = number of valid cases, r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level
The first group, measuring the amount o f team and individual learning 
which turned into organizational learning, showed a weakly significant 
impact on team improvements on average, but none on employee 
suggestions. The former appears to be the only direct impact of “the scale 
of the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization” on organizational 
learning outcomes, according to the correlation analysis of Hypothesis IB.
The second group, dealing with the speed o f organizational learning,
i.e., speed of product development, showed virtually no significant impact 
from “the variable of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics”. A 
closer look at each of the ten characteristics revealed that a couple of the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization alone, in particular “team 
work and team learning” and “continuous improvement of work” had some 
significant impact. This means, whereas the former plays a major role in
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product development of complete new products, the latter is more helpful 
for improving old products.
The third group, the extent o f improvements in quality, did not show 
much significant impact from the variable consisting of “the scale of the ten 
Learning Organization’s characteristics”. However, when looking closer at 
each of the ten characteristics, “continuous improvement of work” showed 
some form of significance in five of the six cases. This can be seen as an 
indicator for the paramount importance of this characteristic for this 
specific organizational learning outcome in the form of the improvement in 
quality.
However, some of these correlation coefficients were computed with a 
very small number of valid cases, which should be a caveat for their 
interpretation.
Having investigated the correlation analysis of Hypothesis IB, the same 
method of analysis is applied to the testing of Hypothesis 1C.
8.2.4. Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis 1C
The third part of the statistical analysis of Hypothesis 1 is conducted by 
measuring the impact of “organizational learning systems” (independent 
variable) on “organizational learning outcomes” (dependent variables) (see 
Figure 8.8).
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Figure 8.8: Hypothesised Impact of Organizational Learning Systems on 
Organizational Learning Outcomes
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Team work and 
team  learning
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
whole workforce
System ic thinking and 
mental models
Learning reward system  for 
em ployees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation
Decentralised hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of company strategy 
and em ployees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
Organizational
Learning
Systems
Team
Improvement
System
Employee
Suggestion
System
©
Organizational
Learning
Outcomes
Team improve­
m ents implemented
Employee 
suggestions implemented
Ratio of new vs. old 
products introduced
New products introduced 
compared to competitors
Improvement of internal 
quality per units produced
Improvement of external 
quality per units produced
Correlation analysis of Hypothesis 1C, the last part of Hypothesis 1, 
was done for the assessment of the direct impact of organizational learning 
systems on organizational learning outcome. As has been introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter, Hypothesis 1C was as follows.
Hypothesis 1C: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems have better organizational learning 
outcomes.
Before Hypothesis 1C was tested it was transformed into a null 
hypothesis for empirical testing.
Null Hypothesis 1C: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems do not have better organizational 
learning outcomes.
ji f
,  ^ y
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Firstly, an analysis was conducted with scales that measure the am ount 
o f te a m  a n d  in d iv id u a l  le a rn in g  w h ich  tu r n e d  in to  
o rg an iza tio n a l learn ing .
They were (a) “team improvements implemented per employee” and
(b) “employee suggestions implemented per em ployee”. The null 
hypotheses were as follows.
Null Hypothesis IC a: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems do not have more team 
improvement projects implemented.
Correlation analysis showed that Null H ypothesis IC a  could be 
rejected, as there was a significant impact of “organizational learning 
systems” on “team improvements implemented per employee”. Significance 
could be shown in 1990 with an r of 0.362** (p = 0.045, n = 23), in 1992 
with an r of 0.319** (p = 0.035, n = 33) and in 1994 with an r of 0.221* 
(p = 0.077, n = 43).
Null Hypothesis IC b: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems do not have more suggestions per 
employee implemented.
Testing of Null Hypothesis IC b  indicated that it could be rejected, 
because the average significant impact of “organizational learning systems” 
on “employee suggestions implemented per employee” varied strongly, 
however, with low valid cases as a caveat. Whereas 1990 was significant 
with an r of 0.615** (p = 0.017, n = 12) and 1992 was even strongly 
significant with an r of 0.644*** (p = 0.004, n = 16), but 1994 was not 
significant with an r of 0.197 (p = 0.189, n = 22).
The correlation analysis of the first group of organizational learning 
variables showed that there is a slight difference between the organizational 
learning systems, when comparing the outcome of team improvements per 
employee implemented to the outcome of suggestions per employee 
implemented. Both showed a significant impact on average, but the latter in 
conjunction with considerable lower numbers of valid cases.
In-depth analysis showed a similar picture regarding the significance. 
The performance of team improvements systems alone had a significant 
impact on team suggestions (same outcome as Null Hypothesis ICa testing 
above in 1990 (r = 0.362**, p = 0.045, n = 23), in 1992 (r = 0.319*, p =
- 2 7 0 -
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0.035, n = 33) and in 1994 (r = 0.221*, p = 0.077, n = 43)). Whereas the 
impact on employee suggestions implemented was still significant in 1990 
(r = 0.615**, p = 0.017, n = 12), it was only weakly significant in 1992 (r 
= 0.3851*, p = 0.070, n = 16) and not significant in 1994 (r = -0.1511, p = 
0.251, n = 22). The negative value of the correlation coefficient in 1994, 
although not significant, can be explained by the impressions gained from 
the in-depth interviews that companies with a continuous team 
improvement system tend to focus more on team improvements rather than 
employee suggestions, the latter are even abandoned sometimes.
Secondly, the speed of organizational learning was researched, 
which was measured by the scales (c) “ratio of new products introduced 
compared to existing products” and (d) “new products introduced 
compared to competitors”.
Null Hypothesis ICc: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems do not have a higher ratio of new 
products introduced compared to existing products.
Correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis ICc revealed a significant 
impact of “organizational learning systems” on “ratio of new products 
introduced compared to existing products”. This was not the case for a 
period of one year (r = 0.160, p = 0.119, n = 56), but for two years (r = 
0.219**, p = 0.049, n = 58) and four years (r = 0.229**, p = 0.046, n = 
55). This meant that the null hypothesis as a whole could be rejected^oo.
The independent variable “team improvement system” (which could include suppliers with a 
“employee suggestion system” but did not need to) had an even stronger impact on the “ratio of new 
products introduced compared to existing products”. It was significant for product introductions newer than ^ 
one year (r = 0.246**, p = 0.034, n = 56), it was strongly significant for introductions newer than two 
years (r = 0.345***, p = 0.004, n = 58) and four years (r = 0.347***, p = 0.005, n = 55). This would mean 
a rejection of the hypothesis without any objection.
The independent variable “employee suggestion system” (which could include companies with a “team 
improvement system”, but did not need to) did not show any significance at all (one year: r = - 0.026, p = 
0.423, n = 56, two years: r = - 0.104, p = 0.217, n = 58 or four years: r = - 0.073, p = 0.297, n = 55).
This comparison indicated that continuous team improvement systems were was significantly conducive 
to the speed of the development process and output of new products (this was measured with the help of the
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Null Hypothesis IC d: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems do not have a quicker product 
introduction compared to competitors.
The correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis IC d  revealed no effects 
of “organizational learning systems” on “new products introduced 
compared to competitors”, as the correlation coefficient was not significant 
(r = - 0.002, p = 0.494, n = 56)i®i.
There are many explanation for this poor impact. On the one hand, it 
could be that measurement of the company’s own position was highly 
subjective, and comparing one’s position to others also depends on the 
ability to monitor the market, which makes the judgement worse the better 
a company is in monitoring the competition. On the other hand, the nature 
of the new products introduced can vary from an improved version of an 
existing product (involving team improvement systems) to the completely 
new development of a product (involving project teams), the distinction of 
which could not be measured here. However, the characteristic “team work 
and team learning” of Null Hypothesis IB cl and IB dl showed the impact 
of project teams on new products introduced, which underlined the 
assumption that especially “new products introduced compared to 
competitors” applies more to the complete new development of a product 
rather than to an improved version of an existing product.
Thirdly, the extent of im provem ents in quality  was analysed by 
the items (e) “improvement of internal quality per units produced” and (f) 
“improvements of external quality per units produced”. The generation of 
these variables was explained at the beginning of this chapter. The null 
hypotheses were as follows.
ratio o f new products compared to existing ones). Employee suggestion systems did not have any such 
impact on the speed of new products introduced. An explanation for this might be the fact that product 
development, mainly seen as a new improved version o f the old product, is a complex process, where 
problems are easier to solve in teams.
101 Neither the detailed analysis of a “team improvement system” (r = 0.073, p = 0.296, n = 56) nor an 
“employee suggestion system” (r = - 0.182, p = 0.447, n = 56) alone revealed any significant impact.
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Null Hypothesis ICe: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems do not have a higher improvement 
rate of internal quality of units produced.
Testing of Null Hypothesis ICe revealed that “improvement of 
internal quality per units produced” was strongly influenced by 
“organizational learning systems”, therefore, the null hypothesis could be 
rejected. Even though this was not the case for the period 1990 to 1992 (r 
= 0.156, p = 0.255, n = 20), but significance was strongly significant for 
the period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.497***, p = 0.003, n = 29) and the period 
1990 to 1994 (r = 0.644***, p = 0.001, n = 20).
However, this time the existence of a “team improvements system” had 
a highly significant impact on improvement of internal quality, though not 
for the period 1990 to 1992 (r = 0.156, p = 0.255, n = 20), but strongly 
significant for the period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.520***, p = 0.002, n = 29) 
and over the whole period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.644***, p = 0.001, n = 20). 
But the impact of “employee suggestion system” alone was not significant 
for any of the periods.
Null Hypothesis ICf: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
employ organizational learning systems do not have a high improvement 
rate of external quality of units produced.
Analysis of Null Hypothesis IC f showed that it could be rejected as 
there were significant effects on the dependent variable “improvements of 
external quality per units produced” by the independent variable 
“organizational learning systems”. They were significant for the period 
1990 to 1992 (r = 0.486**, p = 0.020, n = 18), not significant for the 
period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.134, p = 0.252, n = 27), but again strongly 
significant for the period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.659***, p = 0.001, n = 19).
In detail, the existence of a “team improvement system” had a highly 
significant impact on improvement of external quality for the period 1990 
to 1992 (r = 0.615***, p = 0.003, n = 18), and weakly significant for the 
period 1992 to 1994 (r = 0.258*, p = 0.096, n = 27), but again strongly 
significant for the whole period 1990 to 1994 (r = 0.708***, p = 0.000, n 
= 19). The existence of an “employee suggestion system” showed a less 
strong impact: it was only significant for the period 1990 to 1992 (r =
0.422*, p = 0.040, n = 18) and for the whole period 1990 to 1994 (r =
0.355*, p = 0.068, n = 19).
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All in all, this group comprising the degree of improvements in quality 
showed at least a strongly significant impact for the period from 1990 to 
1994. This shows that the organizational learning systems played a major 
role in the process of improving internal as well as external quality. 
However, the impact of the “team improvement system” was considerable 
stronger than that of the “employee suggestion system”, which showed no 
significant impact on the improvement of internal quality at all. Besides the 
caveat of a high level of missing values, the reason for this is that team 
learning systems were not only more effective, but that the improvement of 
quality represents a complex task of organizational learning which can 
rarely be solved by individuals alone.
In summary, the correlation analysis of Hypothesis 1C showed that 
there was a predominantly significant impact of organizational learnin 
systems on organizational learning outcomes (see Figure 8.9), which co 
be measured. Albeit sometimes low numbers of valid cases, the patterns 
and the interpretation are straightforward.
.V
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Figure 8.9: Correlation and Impact of Organizational Learning Systems 
on Organizational Learning Outcomes
Organizational
Learning
Systems
Organizational
Learning
Outcomes
n = 23/33/43
r = 0.362*70.319**/0.221*
Team improve­
m ents implemented
r =0.615**/0.644***/0.197 
n = 12/16/22
Employee 
suggestions implemented
Team
Improvement
System
n = 56/58/55
r =0.160/0.219**/0.229*V
Ratio of new vs. old 
products introduced
Employee
Suggestion
System
r = -0.002, n = 56 New products introduced 
compared to competitors
n = 20/29/20
r =0.156/0.497***/0.644***
Improvement of internal 
quality per units produced
r =0.486**/0.134/0.659*** 
n = 18/27/19
Improvement of external 
quality per units produced
* = w ea k ly  significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0.05), and *** = strongly significant (p<0.01).
n = number of valid cases, r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level
On average, the impact of “organizational learning systems” on “team 
improvements per employee implemented” and on “suggestions per 
employee implemented” was significant. There was a clearly significant 
impact on the ratio of new products introduced compared to existing 
products, but none on the new products introduced compared to 
competitors. Lastly, a significant impact could be shown on the 
improvement of internal quality as well as of external quality.
The next sub-section concludes the analysis of the second section of this 
chapter. It provides an overview of the analysis of Hypothesis 1.
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8.2.5. Results of the Analysis of the First Hypothesis
The second section of Chapter 8 analysed the first hypothesis: is there 
an influence of the Learning Organization’s characteristics and/or 
organizational learning systems on organizational learning outcomes?
The data analysis, aided by the theoretical argument, showed that there 
was a stron gly  sign ifican t d irect im pact of “the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics” on “organizational learning systems” 
(rejection of Null Hypothesis lA), but not on “organizational learning 
outcomes” (no rejection of Null Hypothesis IB).
However, as there is ( [o n "^ w e ra ^  a s ig n if ica n t im pact of 
“organizational learning systems” on “organizational learning outcomes” 
(rejection of Null Hypothesis 1C), this leads to the conclusion of an 
indirect impact of “the Learning Organization’s characteristics” on 
“organizational learning outcome” (see also highlighted symbols in Table 
8.19).
Table 8.19: Summary of the Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1: Impact of LOCs of LOCs of OLSs
on OLSs 1 A 1B 1 C
Organizational Learning Systems * * *
on OLOs
a) Team Improvements impl. * * *
b) Employee Suggestions impl. - * *
c) New Product Share - * *
d) New Product Introduction - -
e) Internal Quality Improvement - * *
f) External Quality Improvement - * *
LOCs = the Learning Organization’s characteristics, OLSs = Organizational learning 
systems, OLOs = Organizational learning outcomes, - = no significance, * = signifi­
cant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1% (all on average)
Correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis lA  showed a highly significant 
impact of the “scale of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics” on 
the dependent variable “organizational learning systems” (r = 0.383***, n
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= 64). In detailed analysis the “scale of the ten Learning Organization’s 
characteristics” had a varying role: it had a strongly significant impact 
when applied to “team improvement systems” alone (r = 0.430***, n = 64), 
but none when applied to “employee suggestion systems” alone (r = 0.046, 
n = 64). This suggested that the degree of the ten Learning Organization’s 
characteristics played a much more important role for the successful 
installation and running of the former compared to the latter.
Multiple logistic regression analysis of Hypothesis lA  showed that only 
the Learning Organization’s characteristic “systemic thinking and mental 
models” had a significant impact on the existence of an “organizational 
learning system”. This was in line with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 
3, which argued that systemic thinking was the key characteristic for an 
organization to become and continue to be a Learning Organization.
Correlation analysis of Hypothesis IB showed on average only one ^ 
weakly significant correlation coefficient between “the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics” and the six constituents of “organizational 
learning outcomes”. Weakly significant correlation existed in particular 
with “team suggestions implemented” and “employee suggestions 
implemented”. This was not sufficient to reject the second part of Null 
Hypothesis 1.
This means that the degree of the “characteristics of the Learning 
Organization” tended to influence “organizational learning outcomes” fj 
indirectly via “organizational learning systems”, as testing of Hypothesis 1C 
revealed.
Correlation analysis of Hypothesis 1C showed that there was a 
predominantly significant impact of “organizational learning systems” on 
“organizational learning outcomes”. This enabled a rejection of this third 
part of the Null Hypothesis 1. On average, the impact on “team 
improvements per employee implemented” and on “suggestions per 
employee implemented” was significant. There was also a clearly 
significant impact on the “ratio of new products introduced compared to 
existing products”, but none on^tbs^new products introduced compared to 
competitors”. Furthermore,/6n average^^  significant impact could be 
shown for “improvement of internal quality” as well as “improvement of 
external quality”.
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Analysis of the second group of “organizational learning outcomes” 
clearly demonstrated that “team improvement systems” played a pivotal 
role for new product introduction measured by the “ratio of new products 
introduced compared to existing products” . There was no significant 
impact on the variable which measured “new products introduced 
compared to competitors”. It has been suggested that this was mainly 
because this variable applied more to a completely new development of a 
product (influenced by project teams) than to an improved version of a 
product.
Detailed analysis of the third group of “organizational learning 
outcomes” relating to quality improvement again emphasised the picture 
that “team improvement systems” were much more important (with a 
strongly significant impact) for the improvement of internal as well as 
external quality than “employee suggestion systems” (which on average was 
only weakly significant for the improvement of external quality). Besides 
the caveat of a high level of missing values, the reason for this is that “team 
learning systems” were not only more effective, but that the improvement 
of quality represents a complex task of organizational learning which can 
rarely be solved by “individual learning systems” on their own.
In summary, the interpretation of the outcome of the correlation and 
regression analysis of Hypothesis 1 was threefold.
Firstly, the research suggests that the degree to which “the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics” exists is conducive to the successful ^  
implementation and running of “organizational learning system(s)”. 
Moreover, “the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics” have a 
strongly significant impact on “team improvement systems” alone, but none 
on “employee suggestion systems” alone. This shows that the characteristics 
apparently play a much more important role for the successful 
implementation of “team improvement systems” compared to “employee 
suggestion systems”. This picture will be confirmed in the in-depth 
interviews in Chapter 9.
Secondly, there was no significant direct impact of “the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics” on the extent of “organizational learning 
outcomes” to be shown by hypothesis testing with this research. This lack
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of direct impact does not necessarily mean that there is not any indirect , 
impact. /
Thirdly, the existence of “organizational learning systems” is crucial - ^ ^ 
for an organization to generate “organizational learning outcomes”, as its „ 
impact was significant. This emphasises the indirect nature of “the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics”, via “organizational learning 
systems” as an intermediate variable, on “organizational learning J  
outcomes”. A more detailed analysis of “organizational learning systems” 
revealed that, on average, “team improvements systems” generally had a 
more significant impact on “organizational learning outcomes” than 
“employee suggestion systems”, which had a weakly or non-significant 
impact. 2 '^
These relationships mentioned above aie shown in Figure 8.10 below.
Additionally, there was some insight gained about the speed of 
organizational learning, which was measured with the help of (c) “ratio of 
new products introduced compared to existing products” and (d) “new 
products introduced compared to competitors”. This could vary from a 
complete new development of a product to just an improved version of an 
existing product.
The characteristic “team work and team learning” (especially project 
teams with customers as well as suppliers, but also cross-departmental and 
hierarchical project teams) was the only one which had a significant impact 
on both variables, i.e. on “ratio of new products introduced compared to 
existing products” as well as “new products introduced compared to 
competitors”. Both of them might apply more to complete new product 
development with the help of development teams in reality.
“Organizational learning systems”, however, only had an impact on 
“the ratio of new products introduced” rather than on “new products 
introduced compared to com petitors” . Therefore, the existence of 
“organizational learning systems” is more likely to have an impact on the 
improvement of existing products. This distinction could not be measured 
here, however, it makes sense in reality that “team improvements systems” 
and “employee suggestion systems” are predominantly used for product 
improvements, which could be confirmed by the interviews. j
-  I
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Figure 8.10: Impact of the Learning Organization’s Characteristics on 
Organizational Learning Systems and Outcomes
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Team work and 
team  learning
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the  
w hole workforce
System ic thinking and 
mental m odels
Learning reward system  for 
em p loyees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy  
and em ployees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
Organizational 
Learning 
Systems
*** Team
Improvement
System
Em ployee
Suggestion
System
©
Organizational 
Learning 
Outcomes
**
Team  improve­
m ents implemented
Em ployee 
su ggestion s implemented
Ratio of new  vs. old 
products introduced
N ew  products introduced 
com pared to competitors
Improvement of Internal 
quality per units produced
Improvement of external 
quality per units produced
* = weakly significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0.05), and *** = strongly significant (p<0.01).
This section of Chapter 8 showed, by testing Hypothesis 1, that the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics, via organizational learning 
systems, have a positive indirect impact on organizational learning 
outcomes.
The next section looks at the question of where these Learning 
Organization’s characteristics originated.
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8.3. Analysis of the Second Hypothesis
IV.
The second hypothesis dealt with the sources of the characteristics of 
the Learning Organization. T h^ssurnpflonyvas made that Japanese car 
companies were these sources^^a£tor-cxailîpI^ Senge (1990), Adler & Cole 
(1993) and Garvin (1993) ^ in to i^ ,  there are some Japanese car producers / >
that can be classified as Learning Organizations. The higher the score of 
the ten characteristics the closer an organization comes to being an ideal ^  
Learning Organization. Additionally, the underlying reasons why some 
companies learnt to acquire the Learning Organization’s characteristics to a 
greater degree than others were explored. To offset the limitation of the 
cross-sectional nature of the questionnaire, a detailed analysis of the 
process of acquiring characteristics of the Learning Organization was^^%  ^
undertaken with the help of in-depth interviews, presented in the 
succeeding Chapter 9.
The basic assum pti^w as that for the acquisition of the characteristics 
of the Learning Organization a transfer of explicit and implicit knowledge 
was needed. Especially for the transfer of tacit knowledge personal contact 
within an official company relationship was required. This was measured 
through the existence and duration of different types of r e l a t i o n s h i p s ^ o z  
These could be, for example, with Japanese car manufacturers as customers 
and Japanese suppliers as owners or as c o - o p e r a t o r s .
The second hypothesis was developed to test the impact of relationships 
between Japanese car producers, or component suppliers, and car 
component suppliers in Britain on the successful implementation of the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics.
The Hypothesis 2, developed in Chapter 6, was as follows.
A more detailed analysis of the extent of the relationship by measuring the man days of personnel 
exchange was not feasible, as there were too many incomplete or missing answers to these questions.
Most companiesjjid not complete this detailed section in the questionnaire relating to Japanese ‘ 
suppliers as customers, as suppliers or as co-members of supplier associations (which can include 
competitors). Therefore, these kind of source measurements were dropped in the analysis of this data set. |
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Hypothesis 2: Those car component suppliers in Britain who have a 
relationship with Japanese companies have higher scores in the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization.
Hypothesis 2 tested whether the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization found at component suppliers was due to relationships with 
Japanese companies in the car industry (i.e. car producers and car 
component suppliers). It also assessed whether personal contact represented 
the important transmitter of tacit knowledge. The importance of personal 
contact in the form of “socialization” for transmitting tacit k n o w l e d g e  i s  
also mentioned by Nonaka (1994: 19) (see also Chapter 2.2.).
The sub-hypotheses of the second hypothesis were developed in the 
following order.
Hypothesis 2A: Those car component suppliers in Britain who have a 
relationship with Japanese car producers have higher scores in the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization.
Hypothesis 2B: Those car component suppliers in Britain who have 
a relationship with Japanese car component suppliers as owners have higher 
scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
Hypothesis 2C: Those car component suppliers in Britain who have a 
relationship with Japanese car component suppliers as co-operating 
p a r t n e r s  105 have higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization.
The research approach of Hypothesis 2 is depicted in Figure 8.11. The 
influence of Japanese car producers (independent variable) on 
characteristics of the Learning Organization (dependent variable) is 
indicated with an “A”. The impact of Japanese car component suppliers as -  ^
owners (independent variable) on characteristics of the Learning 
Organization (dependent variable) is marked with a “B”. Lastly, the 
influence of Japanese car component suppliers as co-operating partners
! L d ,
<.u^
h>
ÇâM
i f w
For Nonaka (1994: 33) tacit knowledge can be associated with organizational culture and procedures 
whereas explicit knowledge has the form of documents, filing systems, computerised databases, etc.
Co-operations could have the form of a joint-ventures, technical assistance/collaboration/agreements 
or design/technical co-operations to improve quality.
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(independent variable) on characteristics of the Learning Organization 
(dependent variable) is indicated with a “C”.
Figure 8.11: Assumed Impact of Japanese Companies on the Degree of 
Suppliers’ Characteristics of the Learning Organization
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
Jap an ese  car producers 
a s  custom ers
Jap an ese  component 
suppliers a s owners
Jap an ese  component 
suppliers a s co-operators
0
0
©
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
Team work and 
team learning
System ic thinking and 
mental models
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
whole workforce
Learning reward system  for 
em ployees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy 
and em ployees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
This second hypothesis was analysed with the help of different items, of 
which the dependent variable (characteristics the Learning Organization) 
have been explained at the beginning of Chapter 8. The independent 
variables will be explained in the following sub-section.
8.3.1. Additional Items for Analysis of the Second Hypothesis
The second hypothesis analyses whether the acquisition of the ten 
characteristics of the Learning Organization was due to a relationship with 
Japanese car producers and/or car component suppliers. These direct 
sources of characteristics were measured and tested for significance in 
correlation and regression analysis, which in turn was interpreted as 
causation due to the theoretical argument of this thesis.
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Additionally, information about the year of the establishment of the '  
relationship with the Japanese car producer and/or car component supplier 
was gathered. Moreover, the organizational resources devoted to change, as 
well as the receptivity of the company, were analysed with the help of the 
questionnaire data.
The questions relating to the Japanese car companies as customers 
(which were concluded from their name) looked as follows:
1. Car assemblers as your customers: What is their a) name, b) country of 
location, and c) in which year did the relationship begin?
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
a) name: 
a) name: 
a) name: 
a) name: 
a) name:
b) country:
b) country:
b) country:
b) country:
b) country:
c) year: 1 9_
c) year: 19_
c) year: 1 9_
c) year: 1 9_
c) vear: 19
The following questions were used for Japanese suppliers as owners 
(which were identified by their name and their country of origin):
8. Is your company partially or wholly owned by one or more companies?
0  No O Yes If yes, what is their a) name, b) country of origin, and c)
entry year?
1 ) a) name: b) countrv: c) vear: 19
2) a) name: b) countrv: c) vear: 19
3 ) a) name: h) country: c) year: 19
And these were the questions for the Japanese suppliers as co-operating 
partner companies. Co-operations were in the form of joint-ventures, 
technical assistance/collaboration agreements or design/technical co­
operations to improve quality.
- 2 8 4  -
8. DATA A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
1. Do you co-operate with Japanese supplier(s) producing similar products?
0  No O Yes If yes, what is a) their name, b) the form of co­
operation, and c) in which year did the co-operation start?
1 ) a) nam e:_______________  b) form :___________  c) year 1 9 __
2) a) nam e:_______________  b) form :___________  c) year 1 9__
3) a) name: _____________ b) form: ________  c) year 1 9__
The descriptive statistics for the variables, which measured the 
relationship with Japanese companies in the car industry as origins of the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics, are presented in Table 8.20 below.
Table 8.20: Descriptive Statistics for the Sources Variables
No Variable n
1 All Japanese Companies as Car Prod.
Mean: 0.58 St. Dev.: 0.49 Min.: 0.00
Customers
Max.: 1.00
31
2 Nissan
Mean: 0.35 St. Dev.: 0.48 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
19
3 H onda
Mean: 0.28 St. Dev.: 0.45 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
15
4 Toyota
Mean: 0.17 St. Dev.: 0.37 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
9
5 Japanese Suppliers as Owners
Mean: 0.10 St. Dev.: 0.30 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
5
6 Japanese Suppliers as Co-operators
Mean: 0.19 St. Dev.: 0.40 Min.: 0.00 Max.: 1.00
10
Note: Variable No 1 is composed from Variable No 2, 3 and 4, 
n = number of valid positive cases
The descriptive statistics consist of the mean, the median, the 
maximum, the minimum and the number of observations (n). The
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relationships were measured by whether they existed or not. The variable 
“all Japanese companies as car producing customers” was generated by 
whether there was a connection to at least one of the three companies 
Nissan, Honda or T o y o t a .
The correlation matrix, which shows the inter-correlation between 
Japanese companies in the car industry as origins of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics within the research sample, is shown in Table
8 .21 .
Table 8.21: Correlation Matrix of Japanese Companies as Sources of the 
Learning Organization’s Characteristics
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1.000
2 0.629 1.000
3 0.529 0.054 1.000
4 0.381 0.290 0.050 1.000
5 0.232 0.098 - .097 - .033 1.000
6 0.322 0.149 0.143 0.179 0.194 1.000
Note: For key of numbers (No) of the six variables see previous Table 8.20.
After introducing the new independent variables, the next section will 
look at the research approach of the hypothesis testing.
8.3.2. Research Approach for the Second Hypothesis
Null Hypothesis 2, which was derived from Hypothesis 2, looked as
follows.  ^ ~ ^
T, ^
The same variable, constructed by adding the number of Japanese car assemblers, e.g., supplying 
Nissan = 1, or Toyota and Honda = 2, showed similar results in the analysis, but was not used here.
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Null Hypothesis 2: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
have a relationship with Japanese companies do not have higher scores in 
the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
The 3 sub-null hypotheses of Null Hypothesis 2 were tested with the 
help of correlation and multiple regression analysis. The “scale of the ten 
characteristics of the Learning Organization” was used as the dependent 
variable. It was constructed out of all ten characteristics from the 
questionnaire and, therefore, labelled “ IOC”, as explained in the beginning 
of this chapter. The significant relationships were interpreted as having an 
impact, following the argument of this thesis that the Learning 
O rganization’s characteristics are transferred from Japanese car 
manufacturer or car suppliers to car component suppliers in Great Britain.
Hypothesis 2 was analysed empirically in detail, and the results of the 
analysis are presented below. The investigation starts with the examination 
of Hypothesis 2A.
8.3.3. Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis 2A
The analysis of Hypothesis 2A investigated the impact Japanese car j 
companies had on the degree to which suppliers in Great Britain exhibit j  
characteristics of the Learning Organization (see Figure 8.12). /  1
/
r u A - ^ - ,
/>
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Figure 8.12: Assumed Influence of Japanese Car Companies on
Suppliers’ Characteristics of the Learning Organization
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
Jap an ese  car producers 
as custom ers
Jap an ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s owners
Jap an ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s co-operators
©
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
Team work and 
team  learning
System ic thinking and 
mental models
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
whole workforce
Learning reward system  for 
em ployees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy 
and em p loyees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
Derived from Hypothesis 2A above, Null Hypothesis 2A was 
developed.
Null Hypothesis 2A: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
have a relationship with Japanese car producers do not have higher scores 
in the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
Correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis 2A showed that it could be 
rejected, because the relationship with Japanese car assembling customers 
had an impact on the degree to which car component suppliers in Great 
Britain showed the Learning Organization’s characteristics.
The correlation coefficient r = 0.578*** (p < 0.001, n = 48) between 
the Japanese car assembling customers and the scale of the ten 
characteristics of the Learning Organization showed a strong significance, 
which was interpreted as an impact of the former on the latter. This 
outcome was regarded as being satisfactory for the enipirical hypothesis 
testing, especially because of the strength of the significance level.
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Figure 8.13: Influence of Japanese Car Companies as Customers on the 
Suppliers’ Characteristics of the Learning Organization
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
J a p a n ese  car producers 
a s  custom ers
Ja p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  ow ners
J a p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  co-operators
r = 0.578*
n = 48
Team work and 
team  learning
System ic thinking and  
mental m odels
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of Information
Education and training of the 
w hole workforce
Learning reward system  for 
em p loyees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Leaming laboratories and 
constant experimentation
D ecentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy  
and em p loyees
Supportive corporate 
leam ing culture
= weakly significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0.05), and *** = strongly significant (p<0.01).
n = number of valid cases, r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level
Looking closer at each of the ten characteristics, there was an obvious 
positive correlation between the existence of one or more Japanese car 
producing customers with the majority of the ten Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics.
This showed the impact of Japanese car producers on the car 
com ponent suppliers’ different characteristics o f the Learning 
Organization. This impact was significant for all characteristics except 
“leaming reward system.” It was strongly significant for the characteristic 
“team work and team learning” (r = 0.458***, p < 0.001, n = 53), 
“continuous improvement of work” (r = 0.478***, p < 0.001, n = 53), 
“leaming laboratories and constant experimentation” (r = 0.478***, p < 
0.001, n = 52) and “flexibility of company strategy and employees” (r = 
0.341***, p= 0.007, n = 51).
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The impact of Japanese car assembling customers was significant on 
“systemic thinking and mental models” (r = 0.282**, p = 0.021, n = 52), 
on “education and training of the whole workforce” (r = 0.270**, p = 
0.026, n = 52), on “decentralized hierarchies and participative 
management” (r = 0.293**, p= 0.016, n = 53) and on “supportive 
corporate leaming culture” (r = 0.319**, p= 0.011, n = 51), but only 
weakly significant on “free vertical and horizontal flow of information” (r 
= 0.207*, p = 0.068, n = 53).
There was no impact on “leaming reward system for employees” (r = 
0.071, p = 0.306, n = 53), which might have been caused by the fact that 
the Japanese approach to leaming reward systems was adapted to a more 
westem style. These also included considerable amounts of direct monetary 
rewards (at least this was the case in some of the supplier companies 
interviewed), which is less common in Japan.
A summary of the correlation analysis results is compiled in Table
8.22 .
- 2 9 0 -
8. DATA A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
Table 8.22: Impact of Relationship with Japanese Car Manufacturers 
Derived from Correlation Analysis
LOCs Variable r n
10C Scale of the ten Learning Organization’s charact. 0.413*** 48
(1) Team work and team learning 0.458*** 53
(2) Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 0.207* 53
(3) Education and training of the whole workforce 0.270** 52
(4) Systemic thinking and mental models 0.282** 52
(5) Learning reward system for employees 0.071 53
(6) Continuous improvement of work 0.478*** 53
(7) Learning laboratories and constant experimentation 0.326*** 52
(8) Decentralized hierarchies and particip. management 0.293** 53
(9) Flexibility of company strategy and employees 0.344*** 51
(10) Supportive corporate learning culture 0.319** 51
* = weakly significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0,05) and *** = strongly significant (p<0.01).
LOCs = Leaming Organization's characteristics, r = regression coefficient, 
n = number of valid cases
Besides the testing of Hypothesis 2A, there was no direct significant 
impact of Japanese car producers as customers on the combined variable 
''o rgan izational learn ing  system ” (r = 0.121, p= 0.194, n = 53)io7.
However, when looking at the constituent factors, it showed that there 
was a significant impact on the dependent variable "continuous 
improvement team system” alone (r = 0.278**, p= 0.022, n = 53)i08, 
whereas "employees suggestion system” (r = - 0.233**, p= 0.046, n = 
53)109 also showed significance, but in the negative direction. This could be
107 Split up, there was in fact a significant result for Nissan (r = 0,241**, p = 0,041, n = 53), but
neither for Honda (r = - 083, p = 0,275, n = 53) nor for Toyota (r = 0,146, p = 0,148, n = 53),
108 This time, Nissan (r = 0,360***, p = 0,004, n = 53) and Toyota (r = 0,218*, p = 0,058, n = 53)
were significant, but not Honda (r = - 0,018, p = 0,449, n = 53),
109 Here none of the three Japanese car companies showed any significance at all: Nissan (r = - 0,126, p 
= 0,183, n = 53), Honda (r = 0,017, p = 0,451, n = 53) and Toyota (r = - 0,007, p = 0,478, n = 53),
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interpreted that Japanese car assembling customers had a positive impact on 
“team improvement systems”, but a negative impact on “employee 
improvement systems”.
The interviews showed that this was due to those component suppliers 
who had relationships with Japanese manufacturers normally abandoned 
their insufficiently working employee suggestion systems, when they 
installed a team improvement systems. The latter was the favoured system 
of Japanese car companies. However, there was an indication that these 
suppliers intended to re-introduce the employee suggestion system at a later 
stage.
Lastly, an overview is given on the positioning of the different car 
component suppliers with respect to their score on the scale of the ten 
Learning Organization’s characteristics. Also, their supply relationship 
with Japanese car assemblers is taken into account (see Figure 8.14).
The mean established on the scale of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics is 33. There is a clear indication that the majority of the 
suppliers without a relationship with Japanese car producing customers are 
below the mean, whereas the majority of the component suppliers with a 
relationship with Japanese car producing customers are above the mean.
Figure 8.14: Car Component Suppliers’ Position According to Degree of 
LOCs and Relationship with Japanese Car Assemblers
J a p a n e s e  car producing  
c u s to m e r s  ind icated  m ea n
Y g g  T --------------------■ --------------------- ■ ------------ ■ — ■ -----   I B --------------- B I B B —B
N o  H I B  B  B B B ----------------------------- 1-------------------------------------------------- 1
2 5  3 0  3 5  4 0  4 5
D e g r e e  of L O C s
LOCs = the Leaming Organization’s characteristics
In order to obtain a deeper insight into the data set, the independent 
variables were split up into the three different Japanese car 
assemblers situated in Britain, which were Nissan, Honda and Toyota.
- 2 9 2  -
8. D a t a  A n a l y s is  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
The data showed the significant difference in the influence exerted by the 
various Japanese car assemblers on the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics of car component suppliers in Britain (see Table 8.23).
Null Hypothesis 2A (Nissan): Those car component suppliers in 
Britain who have a relationship with Nissan do not have higher scores in 
the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
This Null Hypothesis 2A (Nissan) could be rejected, as there was a 
strongly significant impact on the “scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics” (r = 0.470***, p < 0.001, n = 48). In detail, Nissan had a 
varying significant impact on six of the suppliers’ characteristics.
Null Hypothesis 2A (Honda): Those car component suppliers in 
Britain who have a relationship with Honda do not have higher scores in 
the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
This Null Hypothesis 2A (Honda) could not be rejected, because the 
correlation coefficient with the “scale of ten characteristics” (r = 0.029, p = 
0.421, n = 48) was not significant. None of the characteristics of the 
companies supplying Honda showed any positive significant impact from 
Honda.
Null Hypothesis 2A (Toyota): Those car component suppliers in 
Britain who have a relationship with Toyota do not have higher scores in 
the characteristics of the Leaming Organization.
This Null Hypothesis 2A (Toyota) could be rejected as there was a 
highly significant correlation coefficient with the “scale of the ten Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics” of the car component suppliers (r = 
0.508***, p < 0.001, n = 48). Toyota had a varying significant impact on 
seven of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics.
I
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Table 8.23: Impact of Relationship with Japanese Car Manufacturers 
derived from Correlation Analysis in Detail
LOCs Nissan (r) Honda (r) To vota  (r) n
1 0 0 0.479*** 0.029 0.508*** 48
(1) 0.390*** 0.049 0.354*** 53
(2) 0.000 - .064 0.162 53
(3) 0.144 - .034 0.153 52
(4) 0.098 -.056 0.253** 52
(5) 0.259** -.106 0.329*** 53
(6) 0.298** 0.014 0.434*** 53
(7) 0.333*** 0.013 0.332*** 52
(8) 0.141 0.019 0.377*** 53
(9) 0.212* 0.172 0.189* 51
(10) 0.274** 0.096 0.237** 51
* = weakly significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0.05), and *** = strongly significant (p<0.01 ).
LOCs = the Leaming Organization’s characteristics, r = correlation coefficient 
For key of characteristics of the Leaming Organization see Table 8.22 above
When combining all three Japanese car companies in a multiple 
regression analysis, Null Hypothesis 2A could be rejected, as the regression 
coefficient was highly significant (adj R2 = 0.323***, n = 48). This implied 
that about 32% of the observed variability in “the Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics” could be explained by the relationship of the component 
suppliers to Japanese car companies. Nissan (be = 0.345***) and Toyota 
(be = 0.400***) showed a strong significance, whereas this was not the case 
for Honda (be = - 0.011).
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Table 8.24: Multiple Regression Analysis of Null Hypothesis 2A
Variable
Standard
Error
Beta
Coeff.
S ign ificance
Level
Nissan 1.099 0.345*** 0.009
Honda 1.126 - .011 0.926
Toyota 1.349 0.400*** 0.002
Constant 0.695 0.000
adj R2 = 0.323, n = 48
There were various possible explanations for why Honda had no 
significant impact on the degree of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics of its suppliers. Some of the insight resulted from the in- 
depth interviews that were conducted after the data analysis. Possible^ 
interpretations were as follows. ■ ' /
Firstly, the data set may not have been rep ré sen ta is . The data set 
could not be tested for its customers as there was no information publicly 
available about the population of customers of direct suppliers in Britain.
A second possible explanation could be that Honda only recently started 
its own customer relationships in Great Britain, because it used to co­
operate with Rover in the past, before the split in 1994. However, the 
interviews conducted gave no indication of this explanation, and it rather 
was the case that Rover relied on help from Honda to nurture its suppliers.
Thirdly, Honda apparently adopted a policy which did not put too much 
pressure on their supplier to change. In the in-depth interviews one 
supplier admitted that Honda wanted them to change, but did not push too 
hard, because the company was reluctant to do so, as it felt it did not have 
sufficient resources for implementing the change at that point of time.
Fourthly, some suppliers could have been producing goods of an 
insignificant value for Honda. As a consequence, it did not make economic 
sense in terms of pay back for Honda to invest in training in order to teach 
these suppliers the characteristics of the Learning Organization. In fact.
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this was the case with one of the suppliers, who was visited for in-depth 
interviews.
Last, but not least, it might be that Honda was not entirely the kind of 
Leaming Organization the literature claims it was. Honda might possess the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics, but did not have the ability to 
teach its suppliers how to become a Leaming Organization in their own 
right. This is no contradiction of the fact that Honda sends “improvement 
employees” to fix suppliers’ problems.
Analysis of the literature and history of the three Japanese car 
producers (Honda, Nissan and Toyota) supports this last explanation. The 
latter two were founded in the 1930s and started an intensive relationship 
with suppliers in Japan from the beginning with the target of developing 
them to an appropriate quality standard (which included supplier 
associations, called “kyoryokukai”, according to Sako (1995 and 1996)). ^ ^ t ( }  
Honda, however, started with car production as late as the mid 1960s and ^  
could build on a lot of suppliers to Toyota and Nissan. According to Sako 
(1995: 10), “Honda could buy in parts from suppliers nurtured by other \ ,
assemblers”. Therefore, historically, Honda did not have to develop and 
improve a majority of its suppliers when it started, and Honda still does not 
have its own supplier association in Japan today (cf. Sako 1995: 1). In ^  y
other words, Honda never had to leam to teach the characteristics of the  ^
Learning Organization to its suppliers in Japan. This difference in 
experience in Japan explains some of the difference in significance of 
impact between Toyota, Nissan and Honda in developing their supplier base 
in the UK.
The interviews suggested that Honda in Britain employed a strategy to 
teach its suppliers by initiating co-operation between them and Honda’s 
suppliers in Japan. MacDuffie & Helper (1996: 6) make a similar 
observation for Honda in the US. This indicates that Honda’s supplier 
relation strategy outside Japan is different from the one within Japan. This 
does not deny the fact that Honda sent employees to its suppliers to improve 
their performance. For example, Mair (1994: 141) observes the following 
difference in North America: “Whereas in the conventional Western 
industrial model, assemblers and parts makers treat each other’s factories 
as private, at Honda, related firms leam as much as they can about relevant 
parts of operations at their partners. Parts-maker engineers and production
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workers alike visit Honda to learn about the downstream processes in 
which ‘their part’ is used. More importantly, Honda and its transplant parts 
makers directly intervene in the ‘internal’ activities of their upstream parts 
makers.” And MacDuffie & Helper (1996: 51) also suggest that Honda was 
more involved in fixing problems at the supplier sites than in teaching. 
Palmeri (1992: 52f) observes a similar picture, still he also reports on 
some training which Honda provides to employees of an American 
component supplier. Although there might be variances in the behaviour of 
Honda US and Honda UK, the overall experience from the US underlines 
the explanation of the data pattern in the UK. ^ ^
Other non-Japanese car producers such as, for example. Rover (n 
= 41) showed no significant correlation at all (r = 0.072, p = 0.311, n =
48). Rover’s pattern was similar to that of Honda, which is an indication of 
the long, close relationship both companies have had in the UK. Due to  ^^  
commonly-developed models, they also shared component suppliers in  ^
Britain (Honda started to produce its own cars in Great Britain in 1989).
A relationship with Ford (n = 27) or Jaguar (n = 12) neither showed 
any significant correlation with, i.e. impact on, the variable of the ten 
Learning Organization’s characteristics. The analysis resulted in an r of 
0.101 (p = 0.247, n = 48) and an r of 0.046 (p = 0.377, n = 48), 
respectively.
Only VW/Audi (n = 7) had some significance with a positive impact (r 
= 0.216*, p = 0.070, n = 48) as a non-Japanese firm. This might come 
from a purchasing style, which had some Japanese elements (e.g., training 
of suppliers by purchasing teams).
General Motors (n = 17, including Vauxhall and Opel) had a negative 
significant impact on the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics with 
an r of - 0.239* (p = 0.051, n = 48), which was similar to Mercedes Benz 
(r = - 0.220*, p = 0.066, n = 48), which was, however, not strongly 
represented with only three valid cases.
The lack of valid cases was also true for the rest of the major car 
manufacturers, which did not show any significance. For instance, 
following other relationships were indicated: three with BMW (r = 0.028, 
p = 0.424, n = 48), three with Renault (r = 0.024, p = 0.434, n = 48), three
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with Peugeot (r = - 0.026, p = 0.430, n = 48), four with Volvo (r = 0.132, 
p = 0.185, n = 48) and two with Fiat (r = 0.172, p = 0.121, n = 48).
All in all, except for VW/Audi, the major non-Japanese car producing 
customers showed no significant positive correlation coefficients compared 
to their Japanese counterparts.
This background makes the outcome of correlation analysis of 
Hypothesis 2A, that Japanese companies have an impact on the Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics of their suppliers in Great Britain, even 
more convincing.
A caveat here might be the method of data analysis, i.e. the correlation 
analysis relied on the theoretical impact models. The limitation of the size 
of the questionnaire did not allow more questions for firmer data analysis, 
which might have been able to test the causation in more depth. But this 
problem was partially offset by the exploratory and in-depth interviews, 
which backed the results established in the correlation analysis.
The research of Hypothesis 2A was extended, by also looking at the 
d u ra tio n  of the relationship , and whether this had any effect on the 
transfer of the Leaming Organization’s characteristics from Japanese car 
companies to component suppliers in Britain.
The sub-null hypothesis would, therefore, state that the length of the 
relationship between component suppliers and Japanese car manufacturers 
had no effect on the scoring in the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization.
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Table 8.25: Descriptive Statistics for the Duration of the Relationships
No Variable n
1 All Japanese Companies as Car Prod. Customers 23
Mean: 8.08 St. Dev.: 12.71 Min.: 1 Max.: 10
2 N issan 15
Mean: 6.86 St. Dev.: 2.69 Min.: 1 Max.: 10
3 H onda 11
Mean: 2.81 St. Dev.: 1.40 Min.: 1 Max.: 5
4 Toyota 7
Mean: 3.14 St. Dev.: 0.69 Min.: 2 Max.: 4
Note: Variable No 1 is composed from Variable No 2 ,3  and 4,
Duration = 1995 - starting year of relationship, n = number of valid cases
Correlation analysis revealed that the sub-null hypothesis could be 
rejected with strong significance (r = 0.522***, p = 0.009, n = 20). This 
means, the longer the relationship lasted, the higher the scoring was 
Leaming Organization’s characteristics.
Taking a closer look at the three different Japanese manufacturers, 
N issan’s correlation coefficient showed a positive significance (r = 
0.489**, p = 0.045, n = 13). However, neither Honda’s (r = - 0.461, p = 
0.106, n = 9) nor Toyota’s (r = - 0.343, p = 0.226, n = 7) showed a 
significant positive correlation.iio
The reason for no significant correlation in Toyota’s case could have 
been, besides the low number of valid cases, the fact that N issan’s 
relationships started earlier (1985-94) and lasted over a longer period (up 
to 10 years). In comparison, Toyota’s relationships started later (1991-93) 
and were also of a much shorter duration, with a maximum period of only 
4 years (Honda (1990-94) had a maximum of 5 years).
A multiple regression analysis with the duration o f the relationship to the three Japanese car 
assemblers, or in combination with the existence of the relationship as a controlling variable, could not be 
processed by the statistical computer program SPSS.
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Table 8.26: Impact of Duration of Relationships on the Degree of 
Suppliers’ Characteristics of the Learning Organization
Company r P n years
All Japanese Car Companies 0.522*** 0.009 20 1985-94
Nissan 0.489** 0.045 13 1985-94
Honda - .461 0.106 9 1990-94
Toyota - .343 0.226 7 1991-93
r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level, n = number of valid cases
In summary, correlation analysis rejected Null Hypothesis 2A, that 
there was no impact of Japanese car assemblers on the degree to which the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization could be found with 
component suppliers in Great Britain. This strongly significant rejection (r 
= 0.578***, n = 48) was underlined by the fact that no significant positive 
correlation coefficient could be shown for the major non-Japanese car 
producers.
An additional finding after more detailed analysis revealed that, 
although Null Hypothesis 2A could be rejected for Nissan and Toyota 
(although Toyota only started in 1991 compared to Nissan’s start in 1985), 
this was not the case for Honda. Besides various other factors, this could be 
best explained by its late entry into the automotive industry in Japan in the 
1960s, when Honda could rely on suppliers for Nissan and Toyota, which 
had been nurtured and taught then since the 1930s. Therefore, Honda did 
not need to teach the characteristics of the Learning Organization to its 
suppliers in Japan, and Honda even nowadays is the only Japanese car 
manufacturer with no supplier association in Japan.
However, this does not mean that Honda does not support its suppliers 
in Britain by sending employees when there are severe problems. The 
interviews suggested that, in Britain, Honda employed a strategy to teach its 
suppliers by initiating co-operations between them and Honda’s suppliers in 
Japan.
The analysis of the relationship’s length also confirms the general 
picture: the longer the duration of the relationship with Japanese car
- 3 0 0  -
8. DATA A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
producers, the more the Learning Organization’s characteristics could be 
found at component suppliers in Britain.
8.3.4. Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis 2B
The statistical analysis of Hypothesis 2B investigates the impact of 
Japanese component suppliers as owners on the degree to which the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization can bp^fond ah component 
suppliers in Great Britain (see Figure 8.15). The Nufl-Hypothesis 2B went 
as follows.
Null Hypothesis 2B: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
have a relationship with Japanese car component suppliers as owners do not 
have higher scores in the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
Figure 8.15: Assumed Impact of Japanese Suppliers as Owners on the 
Suppliers’ Characteristics of the Learning Organization
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
J a p a n ese  car producers 
a s  custom ers
J a p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  ow ners
J a p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  co-operators
(D
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
Team work and 
team  learning
System ic thinking and  
mental m odels
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
w hole workforce
Learning reward system  for 
________ em p loyees________
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and  
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy  
and em p loyees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
Correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis 2B revealed that it could be 
rejected. The correlation coefficient was weakly significant for the "scale
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of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics” (r = 0.215*, p = 0.073, 
n = 48). Therefore, component suppliers in Britain which had a 
relationship with Japanese car component suppliers as owners (n = 5) 
tended to have more distinct characteristics of the Learning Organization 
than those who did not have such a relationship. However, this impact was 
much weaker than Japanese car producers as customers.
The only Learning Organization’s characteristic which had a strongly 
significant correlation coefficient was “free vertical and horizontal flow of 
information”, which was an r of 0.419*** (p = 0.001, n = 49).
The other two characteristics, which showed that Japanese suppliers as 
owners had a weakly significant impact on car component suppliers, were 
“systemic thinking and mental models” (r = 0.230*, p = 0.055, n = 49) and 
“continuous improvement of work” (r = 0.199*, p = 0.085, n = 49).
The rest of the characteristics did not show any significant correlation 
coefficients.
Additional findings, which emphasised that Null Hypothesis 2B could 
be rejected, showed that there were neither any positive significant 
correlations coefficients with parent companies from other nationalities.
British parent companies (n = 29) had no significant impact on the scale j
of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics (r = - 0.056, p = 0.354, n y  .
= 47). As a consequence, UK parent companies could not generally be 
regarded as a source of the characteristics of the Learning Organization.
This lack of significant impact also applied to parent companies from 
other nationalities. American parent companies (n = 10) also had no 
positive significant impact (r = 0.147, p = 0.161, n = 47), neither did 
German parent companies (n = 5) of suppliers in Britain (r = - 0.140, p =
0.173, n = 47). With the remaining companies, the number of companies 
from one country was too low to produced reliable results. These were 
parent companies with the following origins: one from Switzerland (r = - 
0.104, p = 0.242, n = 47), two from France (r = - 0.106, p = 0.237, n =
47), one from Canada (r = - 0.300**, p = 0.020, n = 47) and one from 
Italy (r = 0.228*, p = 0.061, n = 47).
The picture was similar to Hypothesis 2A above: ownership by non- 
Japanese companies had no significant positive impact on the characteristics
-  3 0 2  -
8. D a t a  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
of component suppliers in Britain. This again makes the impact of Japanese 
owners look even more relevant.
Figure 8.16: Impact of Japanese Suppliers as Owners on the Suppliers’ 
Characteristics of the Learning Organization
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
J a p a n ese  car producers 
a s  custom ers
J a p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  ow ners
J a p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  co-operators
r = 0.215*
n = 47
Team work and 
team  learning
System ic thinking and  
mental m odels
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
w hole workforce
Leaming reward system  for 
em p loyees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Leaming laboratories and  
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and  
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy  
and em p loyees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
= weakly significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0.05), and *** = strongly significant (p<0,01).
n = number of valid cases, r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level
In summary, correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis 2B demonstrated 
that it could be rejected, though not with the same vigour as Null 
Hypothesis 2A. This was because correlation was only weakly significant 
between the independent variable “Japanese suppliers as owners” and the 
dependent variable “scale of the ten Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics” of component suppliers in Britain. This weakly significant 
correlation was interpreted as a weakly positive impact of the former on 
the latter. The research result was emphasised by the fact that there were 
no positive significant correlations with parent companies from other 
nationalities.
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Three possible explanations for the only weakly significant results have 
been identified. Firstly, it might be that this knowledge, especially in a tacit 
form, is harder to transfer via a supplier as an owner, as this does not 
necessarily imply regular meetings and exchange of personnel on different 
hierarchical levels. Secondly, there might have been greater reluctance in a 
take-over to exert power, as the risk of failure tends to be very high with 
take-overs. Lastly, the transfer of the Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics from a Japanese supplier is only an indirect transfer of 
knowledge, originating from Japanese car producers.
The next sub-section deals with the analysis of Hypothesis 2C, which 
investigated the impact of Japanese component suppliers as co-operators.
8.3.5. Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis 2C
Analysis of Hypothesis 2C, as the third and last part of Hypothesis 2, 
studied the impact of Japanese car suppliers as co-operators on the 
suppliers’ characteristics of the Leaming Organization in Great Britain (see 
Figure 8.17). The corresponding Null Hypothesis 2C was as follows.
Null Hypothesis 2C: Those car component suppliers in Britain who 
have a relationship with Japanese car component suppliers as co-operating 
partners do not have higher scores in the characteristics of the Leaming 
Organization.
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Figure 8.17: Assumed Influence of Japanese Co-operators on the
Suppliers’ Characteristics of the Leaming Organization
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
J a p a n ese  car producers 
a s  custom ers
Ja p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  ow ners
Ja p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  co-operators
©
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
Team work and 
team  leam ing
System ic thinking and  
mental m odels
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the  
w hole workforce
Learning reward system  for 
em p loyees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and  
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy  
and em p loyees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
Null H ypothesis 2C could also be rejected, because there was a 
strongly significant correlation coefficient, interpreted as impact of 
“Japanese car component suppliers as co-operating partners” on the degree 
of the “characteristics of the Learning Organization” shown by car 
component suppliers in Britain (r = 0.345***, p = 0.009, n = 46).
Those characteristics of the Leaming Organization that had significant 
positive correlation coefficients on their own were “team work and team 
leaming” (r = 0.386***, p = 0.003, n = 58), “leaming laboratories and 
constant experimentation” (r = 0.299**, p = 0.017, n = 50) and “flexibility 
of company strategy and employees” (r = 0.202*, p = 0.082, n = 49).
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Figure 8.18: Influence of Japanese Suppliers as Co-operators on the 
Suppliers’ Characteristics of the Leaming Organization
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
J a p a n ese  car producers 
a s  custom ers
J a p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  ow ners
J a p a n ese  com ponent 
suppliers a s  co-operators
r = 0.345*
n = 46
Team work and 
team  learning
System ic thinking and  
mental m odels
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
whole workforce
Learning reward system  for 
em p loyees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and  
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy  
and em p loyees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
* = weakly significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0.05), and *** = strongly significant (p<0.01).
n = number of valid cases, r = correlation coefficient, p = significance level
In summary, correlation analysis of Null Hypothesis 2C showed that it 
could be rejected with a strongly significant correlation coefficient. The 
interpretation was that the relationship with Japanese car component 
suppliers as co-operators tended to have a strongly significant positive 
impact on the degree to which the suppliers showed characteristics of the 
Leaming Organization in Britain. This impact was slightly less strong as 
the impact created by Japanese customers, but much stronger than that 
created by Japanese parent companies.
After having tested the three sub-hypotheses of Hypothesis 2 on their 
own, the next section tests them in a multiple regression analysis.
8.3.6. Combined Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 2A&B&C
As a last step of the regression analysis of Hypothesis 2, a combined 
multiple regression analysis of the Null Hypothesis 2A, 2B and 2C was
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performed. This included the three different Japanese company sources in 
one investigation, which cannot be done with correlation analysis.
Null H ypothesis 2A&B& C: Those car com ponent suppliers in 
Britain who have a relationship with Japanese car producers and/or to 
Japanese car component suppliers as owners and/or to Japanese car 
component suppliers as co-operating partners do not have higher scores in 
the characteristics of the Leaming Organization.
Multiple regression analysis of Null Hypothesis 2A&B&C, including 
the variable for all three Japanese car producers (i.e. Nissan, Toyota and 
Honda) revealed that there was a strongly significant regression of the 
three different Japanese types of sources on “the Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics” (adj = 0.465, n = 31). It can be interpreted that nearly 
47% of the observed variability in the “Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics” could be explained by the relationship of car component 
suppliers in Britain with Japanese companies in the car industry, i.e. 
Japanese car producers and car components suppliers (see Table 8.27).
Table 8.27: Multiple Regression Analysis of Null Hypothesis 2A&B&C 
(Including Japanese Car Producers)
Variable
S tandard
Error
B eta
Coeff.
S ign ificance
Level
Japanese car producers 1.433 0.638*** 0.001
Japanese co-operators 1.367 0.233 0.102
Japanese owners 1.857 - .019 0.886
Constant 1.194 0.000
adj R2 = 0.465, n = 31
A highly significant regression coefficient was shown by the “Japanese 
car producers” (be = 0.638***, p = 0.001). The “co-operating Japanese 
suppliers” were the next closest to a weak significance, but actually showed 
no significance (be = 0.233, p = 0.102). “Japanese component suppliers as 
owners” showed no significant regression coefficient (be = - 0.019, p=
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0.886) and were far from being significant. This outcome is in line with 
the argument of this thesis that the original source of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics were Japanese car companies, whereas 
Japanese suppliers were only an indirect source.
A further multiple regression analysis of Null Hypothesis 2A&B&C, 
this time including the variables for Nissan, Honda and Toyota each, and 
not in a combined form as Japanese car customers, increased the 46.5% of 
the observed variability in “Learning Organization’s characteristics” 
slightly to 48% which could be explained by the relationship of car 
component suppliers in Britain with Japanese companies in the car industry 
(adj R2 = 0.480, n = 31) (see Table 8.28).
This time there were significant regression coefficients for Toyota (be 
= 0.485***) and Nissan (be = 0.363**). The co-operating Japanese 
suppliers registered a weak significance (be = 0.260*). These results could 
confirm the picture gained by the correlation analysis before.
Table 8.28: Multiple Regression Analysis of Null Hypothesis 2A&B&C 
(Including Nissan, Honda and Toyota)
Variable
S tan dard
Error
B eta
Coeff.
S ign ificance
Level
Nissan 1.206 0.363** 0.011
Honda 1.312 - .026 0.845
Toyota 1.381 0.485*** 0.001
Japanese owners 1.797 0.118 0.385
Japanese co-operators 1.342 0.260* 0.065
Constant 1.017 0.000
adj R2 = 0.480, n = 31
Finally, the positions of the different car component suppliers are 
presented, according to their degree of the scale of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics and whether they have a relationship with 
(A) Japanese car assemblers, (B) Japanese suppliers as owners and/or (C) 
Japanese suppliers as co-operators (see Figure 8.19).
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The mean, i.e. average, of the “scale of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics” is nearly 33. The majority of the suppliers without a 
relationship with Japanese companies in the car industry are below the 
mean. The second line from the bottom in Figure 8.19 are the suppliers 
with relationships with Japanese suppliers as co-operators only. There are 
no companies that had relationships with Japanese suppliers as owners 
alone, or together with Japanese suppliers as co-operators. The majority of 
the component suppliers with a relationship with Japanese car producing 
customers are well above the mean.
Figure 8.19: Car Component Suppliers’ Position According to Degree of 
LOCs and Relationship with Japanese Companies
m ean
Y es Y es  Y e s
Y es Y es No
Y es N o Y es
Y es N o No
No Y es  Y es
No Y es  No
No No Y es
No N o No
20
D e g r e e  of LO C s
LOCs = the Leaming Organization’s characteristics; A = Japanese car producing 
customers, B = Japanese suppliers as owners or C = Japanese suppliers as co­
operating partners indicated
In summary, the multiple regression analysis of Hypothesis 2A&B&C 
shows a highly significant impact of “Japanese car companies” on “the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics” found at component suppliers (be 
= 0.638***, n = 31). It showed that 46.5% (or even 48%) of the observed 
variability in “the Learning O rganization’s characteristics” of the
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component suppliers in Britain could be explained by their relationship 
with Japanese companies.
It again demonstrated the dominance of Japanese car assemblers as the j 
important source of the Leaming Organization’s characteristics. This was . ^
especially the case if compared to Japanese suppliers as parent companies, ' c,
which did not show any significant impact, but also as a co-operating -
company, which showed a weak significance at best.
The succeeding sub-section analyses some internal elements of the 
suppliers that might be conducive or impeding for the acquisition of the 
characteristics of the Leaming Organization.
8.3.7. Analysis of Resources and Receptivity
The conducive and impeding factors for double-loop learning, i.e. 
resources for implementing change and receptivity to change, were also 
investigated. This was done in addition to evaluating Japanese companies in 
the car industry as sources for the Leaming Organization’s characteristics.
The statements in the questionnaire, to capture the six items measuring 
“resources” and “receptivity”, were as follows.
XI.3. Do these statements describe your company’s resources available for 
change? Choice: 1 (not at all) - 2 - 3  (partially) - 4 - 5  (very much)
- “Change programmes are not restricted by our resources.”
- “We have employees who implement change programmes.”
- “We employ consultants to facilitate change programmes.”
- “We are receptive to new developments at the
a) top management level.”
b) middle management level.’ 
______________________________________ c) employee level.”_________
Descriptive statistics for resources for implementing change as well as 
receptivity for change are shown in Table 8.29. These are the mean (i.e. 
the average), the standard deviation, the maximum, the minimum and the 
number of observations (n). /
\ -
r
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Table 8.29: Descriptive Statistics for the Selected Variables of Resources 
for Change and Receptivity to Change
No Variable n
1 No change restrictions by resources 70
Mean: 3.10 St. Dev.: 1.10 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 5.00
2 Empioyees as change facilitators 70
Mean: 3.38 St. Dev.: 1.04 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 5.00
3 Consultants as change facilitators 70
Mean: 2.28 St. Dev.: 1.14 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 5.00
4 Receptivity to new developments of top management 70
Mean: 4.20 St. Dev.: 0.92 Min.: 1.00 Max.: 5.00
5 Receptivity to new deveiopm. of middle management 70
Mean: 3.90 St. Dev.: 0.95 Min.: 2.00 Max.: 5.00
6 Receptivity to new developments of empioyees 70
Mean: 3.62 St. Dev.: 0.95 Min.: 2.00 Max.: 5.00
n = number of valid cases
The inter-correlations between the six items measuring resources of 
change and receptivity to change are shown as a correlation matrix in 
Table 8.30.
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Table 8.30: Correlation Matrix of Resources and Receptivity
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1.000
2 0 .180 1.000
3 - .179 - .094 1.000
4 - .019 0.219 0 .109 1.000
5 0 .092 0.318 - .053 0 .813 1.000
6 0 .160 0 .249 - .234 0 .398 0 .584 1.000
Note: For key of numbers (No) of variables see previous table.
R esources fo r im plem enting  change were measured by three 
items in the questionnaire.
The first item  “Change programmes are not restricted by our 
resources.” showed a correlation coefficient which was not significant for 
the “scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics” (r = 0.090, p 
= 0.239, n = 64).
The second item “We have employees who implement change 
programs.” showed a strongly significant correlation coefficient for the 
“scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics” (r = 0.359***, p 
= 0.002, , n = 64). This indicated that there was an impact on the degree of 
the Learning Organization’s characteristics of component suppliers in 
Britain.
The third item “We employ consultants to facilitate change 
programmes.” correlated negatively with the “scale of the ten Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics” (r = - 0.105, p = 0.204, n = 64). Thus, it 
could not be shown that consultants have a positive impact on the degree of 
the Leaming Organization’s characteristics.
In summary, only one of the three items measuring resources for 
implementing change had a significant impact. This was intemal employees 
involved in change programmes which, as a sort of essential catalyst for 
change, helped the supplier companies acquire the characteristics of the 
Leaming Organization.
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Receptivity of management and employees to change was also 
measured by three items.
The first item “We are receptive to new developments at the top 
management level.” had a correlation coefficients which was highly 
significant on the “scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics”
(r = 0.537***, p < 0.000, n = 64). This indicated that the top management 
of the suppliers had a significant impact on the existence of the Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics in their companies.
The second item “We are receptive to new developments at the middle 
management level.” showed a strongly significant correlation with the 
“scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics” (r = 0.517***, p 
< 0.000, n = 64). This indicated that there was an impact on the middle 
management’s receptivity on the degree of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics with component suppliers in Britain.
The third item “We are receptive to new developments at the employee 
level.” again correlated strongly with the “scale of the ten Learning 
Organization’s characteristics” (r = 0.425***, p < 0.000, n = 64). The 
value of the correlation coefficients of employee’s receptivity, however, 
was lower than top and middle management’s, respectively.
In summary, there were some strongly significant correlations between 
the three items measuring receptivity of management and employees and 
the scale of the ten characteristics of the Learning Organization, 
interpreted as impact of the former on the latter. This could be evidence i-o !>  
that those^comparues with a higher receptivity at top and middle 
management level, as well as on employee level, had higher values in the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics. This would confirm the view in 
the majority of the literature on organizational learning and Learning 
Organizations, which stresses the importance of the receptivity of all 
members within the Leaming Organization. Still, the key role of the top 
management is clearly shown in the multiple regression analysis next.
A multiple regression analysis of the six items of resources for and 
receptivity to change with the “scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics” indicated a significant beta coefficient (be) in two cases. Of
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the two significant items, “We are receptive to new developments at top 
management level.” had a significant be of 0.404**, which showed the 
importance of top management, and “We have employees who implement 
change programs.” had a weakly significant be of 0.204*. The adjusted R 
squared was 0.32% with 64 valid cases (adj R2 = 0.319, n = 64).
Table 8.31: Multiple Regression Analysis of Resources for Change and 
Receptivity to Change on the Characteristics
Variable
S tan dard
Error
Beta
Coeff.
S ign ificance
Level
No resource restrictions 0.448 0.014 0.893
Internal facilitator 0.516 0.204* 0.070
External facilitator 0.442 -.072 0.510
Receptivity of top mm 0.922 0.404** 0.026
Receptivity of middle mm 1.015 0.003 0.986
Receptivity of employees 0.645 0.194 0.149
Constant 3.211 0.000
adj R2 = 0.319, n = 64
mm = management
Lastly, a multiple regression analysis of “Japanese companies” as 
sources, combined with “resources of and receptivity to change” with the 
“scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics” was conducted 
(see Table 8.32.). It indicated the importance of two variables, however, 
with a clear lead of the Japanese car companies, indicated by a strongly 
significant beta coefficient for “Japanese car companies” as a source (be = 
0.585***, p = 0.002), compared to a weakly significant “top management’s 
receptivity” (be = 0.519*) with a p of 0.052.
An adjusted R squared of 0.519 (n = 31) indicated that 52% of the 
variation of the “scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics” 
could be explained by the combination of Japanese car companies and 
suppliers as well as the resources and receptivity of car component 
suppliers.
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Table 8.32: Multiple Regression Analysis of Japanese Companies, 
Resources and Receptivity on the Characteristics
Variable
S tan dard
Error
Beta
Coeff.
S ign ificance
Level
Japanese car company 1.665 0.585*** 0.002
Japanese owner 1.886 -.027 0.846
Japanese co-operator 1.373 0.183 0.200
Restricted resources 0.588 -.107 0.427
Internal facilitator 0.678 - .068 0.647
External facilitator 0.619 - .183 0.200
Receptivity of top mm 1.324 0.519* 0.052
Receptivity of middle mm 1.268 -.246 0.319
Receptivity of employees 1.057 -.003 0.986
Constant 4.648 0.000
adj R2 = 0.519, n = 31
mm = management
The next and last sub-section of this chapter will give an overview of 
the results of the different forms of analysis of the second hypothesis.
8.3.8. Results of the Analysis of the Second Hypothesis
The third section of Chapter 8 analysed the second hypothesis, which is 
whether there is an influence of “Japanese car assembling or component 
supplying companies” on “the Leaming Organization’s characteristics” of 
car component suppliers in Britain.
The theory-led data analysis, as summarized in Table 8.33 below, 
suggested that there was a strongly significant impact of “Japanese car 
companies as customers” on “the Leaming Organization’s characteristics” 
of car component suppliers (Hypothesis 2A) and of “Japanese car 
component suppliers as co-operators” (Hypothesis 2C).
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Table 8.33: Summary of the Statistical Analysis of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis: 2A 2 8 2 0 2A&B&C
Impact on LOCs by
Japanese Car Producers 
as Customers
* * * * * *
Japanese Suppliers as 
Owners
* -
Japanese Suppliers as 
Co-operators
* * * -
LOCs = the Leaming Organization’s characteristics, - = no significance,
* = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 1%
The impact of “Japanese car component suppliers as owners” was only 
weakly significant in the correlation analysis (Hypothesis 2B). But it was 
not significant in the multiple regression analysis (Hypothesis 2A&B&C). 
One of the reasons for this difference was the fact that only the correlation 
analysis could be done one-tailed, i.e. analysing relationships more 
sensitively, which was not possible with regression analysis. The multiple 
regression analysis also means that the effect of “Japanese car companies as 
custom ers” on “the Learning Organization’s characteristics” of car 
component suppliers was the strongest by far.
Correlation analysis rejected Null Hypothesis 2A (r = 0.578***, n =
48), which assumed that there was no impact of “Japanese car assemblers” 
on the degree to which the “characteristics of the Leaming Organization” 
existed at component suppliers in Great Britain. This strongly significant 
impact of “Japanese car producers” was emphasised by the fact that almost 
no positive significant correlation could be found for non-Japanese car 
producers.
An additional finding after more detailed analysis revealed that, 
although Null Hypothesis 2A could be rejected for Nissan and Toyota, this 
was not the case for Honda. This could best be explained Honda’s history, 
which, due to a late entry into the automotive industry in Japan in the mid 
1960s, could rely on suppliers already trained by Toyota and Nissan.
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Therefore, Honda apparently never had to learn to teach any characteristics 
of the Learning Organization to its suppliers in Japan in the way Toyota 
and Nissan had to do it. The case looked slightly different in Britain: Honda 
helped out suppliers by sending occasionally experts to their plants to fix 
production problems. But, Honda also employed a strategy to teach its 
suppliers in Britain by initiating co-operation between them and Honda’s 
suppliers from Japan. This could be concluded from the interviews.
Correlation analysis of Hypothesis 2B revealed that Null Hypothesis 2B 
could be rejected, as the correlation coefficient between “Japanese suppliers 
as ow ners” and the “scale of the ten Learning Organization’s 
characteristics” of component suppliers in Britain was weakly significant (r 
= 0.215*, p = 0.073, n = 47). This suggested that the relationship with 
Japanese car component suppliers as owners had a weak positive impact on 
the suppliers’ characteristics of the Learning Organization. This 
interpretation was underlined by the fact that there were virtually no 
positive significant correlations with parent companies from other 
nationalities.
There were some explanations for the findings of Null Hypothesis 2B. 
Firstly, there might be a higher reluctance in a take-over to exert power, as 
the risk of failure is very high. Secondly, it might be that the explicit and 
especially tacit knowledge about Leaming Organizations might be harder 
to transfer via a supplier as an owner. Lastly, the transfer of the Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics from a Japanese supplier was only an indirect 
transfer of knowledge, originating from Japanese car producers.
Correlation analysis of Hypothesis 2C showed that the corresponding 
Null Hypothesis 2C could be rejected (r = 0.345***, p = 0.009, n = 46) as 
the correlation coefficient was strongly significant. This was interpreted as 
that the relationship with “Japanese car component suppliers as co- 
operators” had a positive impact on the degree to which the “characteristics 
of the Leaming Organization” could be found at suppliers in Britain.
The multiple regression analysis of Hypothesis 2A&B&C showed a 
highly significant impact of Japanese car companies on the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics of component suppliers (be = 0.638***, n = 
31). And 47% of the observed variability in the Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics of the component suppliers in Britain could be explained by 
their relationship with Japanese companies.
- 3 1 7  -
8. DATA A n a l y s is  o f  t h e  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
This multiple regression analysis demonstrated the dominance of 
Japanese car assemblers as the important source of the Learning 
O rganization’s characteristics of supplier in Britain. This was 
compared to Japanese suppliers as not significant sources, in form of either 
a parent company (be = - 0.019) or a co-operating company (be = 0.233), 
although the latter came close to be weakly significant.
A multiple regression analysis of the impact of Japanese companies as 
sources, combined with resources for change and receptivity to change, on 
the scale of the ten Learning Organization’s characteristics indicated two 
significant beta coefficients. This was all “Japanese car companies” as a 
source (be = 0.585***), but also “top management’s receptivity” as a 
nearly significant facilitator (be = 0.519*). This time even 52% of the 
variation of the “scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s characteristics” 
could be explained by the existence of links to “Japanese car companies”, 
together with the “resources for and the receptivity to change” of the 
suppliers.
In summary, the empirical testing of Hypothesis 2 via sub-hypotheses 
produced significant evidence that Japanese companies in the car industry 
were a knowledge source for the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics for car component suppliers in Britain. The 
correlation coefficients were strongly significant for Japanese car 
producing customers or co-operators of car component suppliers in Britain 
(the latter could also include Japanese competitors), but only w e a k l y ' 
significant for Japanese suppliers as owners.
The outcome of the multiple regression analysis matches the assumption 
developed in Chapter 6, which suggested that Japanese car producers were 
the major sources of the Learning Organization’s characteristics in the car 
industry. This knowledge was passed on to their own suppliers in Japan in 
the first instance, in order to improve their competitiveness, and, thereby, 
the competitiveness of the car manufacturers themselves. These Japanese 
suppliers then were the indirect source of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics, which had a weaker impact on car component suppliers in 
Britain compared to the Japanese car assemblers themselves.
Due to insufficiency of data, the sources of Japanese suppliers as 
customers, suppliers or co-members of supplier associations (including
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competitors) could not be investigated in this empirical research approach. 
However, the theoretical argument as well as the exploratory and the in- 
depth interviews suggested that they all play a role in the process of 
acquisition of the Learning Organization’s characteristics.
The results of Null Hypotheses 2 testing by correlation analysis are 
combined into one illustration, as depicted in Figure 8.20.
Figure 8.20: Influence of Japanese Companies on the Degree of the 
Learning Organization’s Characteristics of Suppliers
Sources of the 
Learning 
Organization's 
Characteristics
Jap an ese  car producers 
a s custom ers
Jap an ese  component 
suppliers a s owners
Jap an ese  component 
suppliers a s  co-operators
I * * *
© * * *
Characteristics of the 
Learning Organization
Team work and 
team learning
System ic thinking and 
mental models
Free vertical and horizontal 
flow of information
Education and training of the 
w hole workforce
Learning reward system  for 
em ployees
Continuous improvement 
of work
Learning laboratories and 
constant experimentation
Decentralized hierarchies and 
participative m anagem ent
Flexibility of com pany strategy 
and em ployees
Supportive corporate 
learning culture
= weakly significant (p<0.1), ** = significant (p<0.05) and *** = strongly significant (p<0.01).
Because of the limitation of the cross-sectional nature of the 
questionnaire, detailed analysis of the process of acquiring the 
characteristics of the Leaming Organization was carried out with the help 
of in-depth interviews. This is presented in the next chapter.
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9. In-Depth Interviews with Four Selected Suppliers ^  V
-
After the exploratory interviews in Chapter 7 and the questionnaire 
analysis in Chapter 8, Chapter 9 presents the in-depth interviews (for a 
guideline see Part 3 of the Appendix).
These in-depth interviews focus on the relationship between the sources 
(i.e. Japanese companies) and the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization (Hypothesis 2) as well as between the latter and organizational 
leaming systems^^^ and organizational leaming outcomes (Hypothesis 1).
The reverse order of the hypotheses has been chosen as the data 
analysis of the questionnaire data in the previous chapter suggested some 
significant impact in this sequence.
The aim of this chapter is, on the one hand, to corroborate the major 
quantitative findings from the questionnaire analysis in a qualitative way 
and, on the other hand, to obtain a clearer picture of change over time of 
the companies involved- Latter includes the investigation of causal links 
more deeply than,6jwas possible with correlation or regression analysis.
For the in-depth interviewing four car component suppliers^i^ out of 
the 70 who completed the questionnaire were selected. Two people at each 
of the four companies were interviewed separately: they were normally a 
representative of the management and a representative of the shop floor 
workforce. ^
These four component suppliers were then divided into two groups.
 ^  ^  ^ The existence of an organizational learning system meant in this context that there had to be at least 
a team improvement system, which could include an employee suggestion system. The pure existence of a 
employee suggestion system alone was not seen to be sufficient, because it did not necessarily need any 
Leaming Organization’s characteristics to be implemented, as it was demonstrated in Chapter 8.2.
A pledge of confidentiality was given to all companies and all people interviewed. Therefore, tÉ ie^îx^  
companies are labelled with Roman numbers “Company I’’ to “Company IV ” and their representatives^ 
“Management Representative I” to “Management Representative V” (as there were two at Company IV) as 
well as “Shop Floor Representative I” to “Shop Floor Representative IV”. For the same reason of 
confidentiality the women interviewed are referred to in the male form.
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The first group of two companies interviewed consisted of tjjosêtwo 
companies which had a high score in the Learning O rg ^ iza tio n ’s 
characteristics. They were examined because they were seen to be 
exemplary companies, and research interest focused on the description of 
the process by which they became Leaming Organizations, i.e. successfully 
acquired the characteristics of the Leaming Organization.
The other group identified were those two car component suppliers that 
had low scores in the Leaming Organization’s characteristics and indicated 
no relationships with Japanese companies in the form of customers, owners 
or co-operators. Here the interest was why these companies had that low 
scores and what prevented them acquiring the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics.
As explained in Chapter 8, the scores on the scale of the ten Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics were obtained by summing the single scores 
of each of the ten characteristics. These scores were derived from the y  ' 
questionnaires. The first group of two suppliers selected for in-depth 
interviews had a value on the scale of the ten Leaming Organization’s 
characteristics of 40.0 (Company 1) and 39.9 (Company II). This was at the 
top end of the company sample, as Figure 9.1 shows. The second group, 
with 22.8 (Company III) and 26.4 (Company IV) was at the bottom end. 
Furthermore, every value of the ten characteristics is presented in an 
overview for each of the four companies. However, it would have been 
beyond the limits of this thesis to show and discuss the score of every single 
answer.
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Figure 9.1: Distribution of the Leaming Organization’s Characteristics
Companies 
7
mean
c \ j c o ' ^ i o c D r ^ o o o ) O t - c \ j c o ' « ^ L n c o i ^ o o o 5 0 ' i - c \ j c O ' ^ i o
C \ J C \ J C \ J C M C \ J C \ J C \ J C \ J C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O C O ' ^ ' ^ ' ^ ' t ' ^ ' ^
Scale of the ten Learning Organization's characterisitcs
number o f valid cases = 64
Most of the interviews, which lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, were 
combined with factory tours, which provided a better overall picture for 
the research and enabled an in-depth understanding of the organizational 
learning processes. Photos^nd^'charts in the factories as well as 
rearrangements of machinery, which were all explained during the tours, 
demonstrated the learning processes the suppliers with high scores of the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics had undergone. This was especially 
the case for Company I, which will be introduced as the first of the two 
exemplary companies selected for in-depth interviewing.
9.1. Investigation of Company I
Company I had a high degree of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics (40.0). The interviews with Company I were conducted with 
the Personnel Manager (Management Representative I) and a young shop 
floor worker (Shop Floor Representative I), who had just been promoted 
to be responsible for the continuous improvement process. The factory 
visit revealed the teaching methods and techniques, which especially Toyota 
used, being a customer.
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Table 9.1: Descriptive Statistics from Company I’s Questionnaire
No Value Variable Averaae
(1) 5.0 Team work and team learning 3.0
(2) 4.0 Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 3.8
(3) 4.0 Education and training of the whole workforce 3.2
(4) 3.4 Systemic thinking and mental models 3.4
(5) 3.2 Learning reward system for employees 2.7
(6) 4.1 Continuous improvement of work 3.4
(7) 3.7 Learning laboratories & constant experimentation 2.9
(8) 4.4 Decentralized hierarchies & participative management 3.8
(9) 4.4 Flexibility of company strategy and employees 3.3
(10) 4.0 Supportive corporate learning culture 3.2
40.0 Scale of the 10 characteristics of the Learning Organization 33.0
9.1.1. Sources of Organizational Leaming at Company I
According to Management Representative I, the continuous team 
improvement system was imported by the management of Company I from 
Toyota, and also Nissan, in Japan:
“They went over there. They went to see their systems in 
operation. So, yes, most of the Directors went over there and 
then it cascaded down.”
This was seen more as a process of gaining business with Toyota rather 
than as a learning process. It started, according to Shop Floor 
Representative I, with resentment on Toyota’s side:
“He [Company I^TManaging'Director] went over to Toyota [in 
Japan] about, four and a half, five years ago. And he went and 
knocked on their door and he actually said: ‘We want to do work 
for Toyota.’ They turned round and they said: ‘You can’t just do 
it like that, you’ve got to get into the system.’ They tried to put
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him off a bit. But he was having what he wanted. They came 
over and they’ve been working with us ever since.”
This shows that the persistence of the Managing Director of Company I 
played a major role in the process of gaining Toyota in the UK as a 
customer and teacher.
Shop Floor Representative I gave an outline of how Toyota UK taught 
the tacit knowledge of the Toyota Production System on the site of 
Company I. This was very much by socialising and not a very formal 
process:
"It was more of them coming in and showing us and telling us, 
working with us. They believed us, as I said, they were in a dark 
tunnel half way, they’d let go off our hands, return, and then 
we’d have to go the other half ourselves. But that’s the way to 
learn.
Shop Floor Representative I illustrated this teaching process by Toyota 
with the example of introducing of just-in-time delivery:
"Well, basically, they came on the first time, they turned round  ^
and said what they wanted: ‘Two collections a day.’ That’s the 
collections from off the deck, into the machine shop and back / _ 
onto the deck. We did this. Three months later they came back, 
they said: ‘We want to make it every two hours.’ Reluctantly our 
Director turned round and said: ‘Okay, we’ll do it, see how it 
goes and see what the advantage is.’ Various other points [besides 
saving space] were beneficial to us. Three months elapsed [and 
Toyota said:] ‘We want it every hour.’ Our Director turned 
round and said: ‘We can’t do that.’ But we did, and now they see 
the benefits of it. There were no worse problems, that’s all there 
is. Production space in the shop floors is a premium, we’ve got 
that many benefits from it. So they led us down the path and then 
let our hands go, and we had to go the whole way.”
This careful approach, by teaching with the extensive use of supporting 
personnel from Toyota and a careful step-by-step method, has been the key 
to this successful method. Both elements are important for teaching tacit 
knowledge.
-  3 2 4  -
9. In -D e p t h  In t e r v ie w s  w it h  F o u r  S e l e c t e d  S u p p l ie r s
The personnel from Toyota knew what they were talking about, as they 
had experience with kanban and just-in-time production, and they were 
actually introducing it in Company I with a hands-on approach.
The step-by-step method ensured that a new pattern of behaviour was 
carefully inculcated and was first successful on a low level (double-loop 
learning, as it changed the framework of action), and then this new 
approach was steadily improved to the desired level (single-loop learning, 
as the improvements were taking place within the new framework).
These three conditions, i.e. a teacher, a step-by-step method and time, 
were absent 20 years before, when Company I wanted to introduce kanban 
with top performance in one go and fell ‘flat on its face’, according to Shop 
Floor Representative I.
Another interesting finding was the way Toyota introduced Total j 
Productive Maintenance (TPM, for more detail see Senju 1992) for new I ^  
machines in the Toyota production cell. The training of the employees of ,
Company I as done with the help of a production cell solely producing for > 
Land Rover, before the new Toyota production cell was introduced. This 
made the introduction of TPM easier in the Toyota cell, but it also helped 
to increase the efficiency of Company I on a whole, which indicates that 
Toyota concluded from systemic thinking that the overall prosperity of 
Company I was in Toyota’s long-term interest.
Another way of teaching used by Toyota was the promotion of 
continuous improvement. This was done by bringing suppliers together in a 
sort of supplier association, consisting of direct suppliers, which included 
Company I. Toyota UK selected one company, which chose a major 
problem to be solved. Representatives of the involved component suppliers 
then tried to solve this problem in a team. The process was described by 
Shop Floor Representative I as follows:
“I can give you one example. I went to a place called Brozer, and 3 ^ ^  
it’s a purpose-built supplier for Toyota. And what they’d done, is ^  ^
they’ve got a kaizen activity up there called ‘jishuken’. And ^  
basically it’s a changeover kaizen, it’s anything to do with 
changeover method. And they’ve introduced six companies 
separated round the country; they come together, they give them 
a project, and all six companies haven’t met before. [We] got in 
the room, had a problem, they worked it out together. And the
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advantage of teamwork in that was displayed over a three-month 
period - it was unbelievable. And they actually achieved what 
they set out to do. And, Nakamura-san, who is a top bloke from 
Toyota in Japan, he came over for the presentation. It was 
extremely interesting. It showed the power of people joining to 
achieve things rather than as individuals. Toyota was 
demonstrating what teamwork can do, in the way, we as suppliers 
for Toyota can join up and use our experience in different fields 
to achieve what we want.”
The last part of the statement again shows the belief in team work and ) ^
team learning as a superior method of solving complex problems compared 
to individuals working alone.
These common improvement exercises were also extended by Company 
I to those customers, who were also direct suppliers like themselves. This 
means Company I started to teach problem-solving to other companies for 
mutual benefit.
The statements above showed the importance of Japanese car 
assemblers, mainly Toyota, in the development process of improved 
organizational learning within Company I. "
The input of Nissan UK, as another Japanese car assembler, was 
described as different from Toyota’s efforts. Nissan was seen as being in * \
favour of the organizational learning of Company I, but this did not 
involve active teaching. Management Representative I even went so far as 
to claim that Nissan did not want to share knowledge:
“Nissan, not too keen on it [teaching]. Well, they don’t like giving 
anything away. Or that’s the impression I’ve had.”
Although Nissan UK did not teach and train directly, he admitted that 
they cared about improvements, and even helped to improve the training 
courses of Company I:
“Yes, well, they [Nissan] come in to see you improve. And they 
visit us quite often. If we want to move a machine, let’s say we 
just want to turn it round, they have to say yes. We can’t even 
move it without their clearance. And they drive us towards better 
and better [standards]; they insist on the training programmes
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that we write are written in their style. They’ve improved our 
training programme.”
Company I also adopted the “5 Cs” from Nissan Japan (comparable to 
Toyota’s “5 Ss”, see also Osada 1991 for more detail), but Shop Floor 
Representative I could not remember all the words the “5 Cs” stood for:
“It’s clear, configure, conformity, and there’s another two, I 
can’t quite remember.”
However, that method of learning was an adaptation from different 
sources. According to Shop Floor Representative I the process went as 
follows:
“[The Logistics Manager] chose an American video and they call 
it the 5 Ss. Nissan called it the 5 Cs. W e’ve amalgamated it and 
w e’ve created our own: the good points from each. Because 
they’ve both got their good points.”
Nissan UK’s role, which was more of a pushing rather than a teaching 
nature, was described by Shop Floor Representative I to have been like 
this:
“They [Nissan] were pleased we’re doing it [training], they were 
delighted we’re doing it. It was one of the things they suggested 
we do.”
The question regarding a system of spreading the knowledge generated 
had different responses. Whereas Management Representative I claimed 
that it was just recently under discussion. Shop Floor Representative I said 
it was already installed:
“What we do then is we meet on a weekly basis, or a monthly 
basis, and w e’ll actually action certain people out, who are 
showing promise within an area, to go out and do a kaizen on 
another area. For instance, one person at the moment is the team 
leader. He’s been showing good skills with this kaizen. So what 
we’ve turned round and decided is, he can go into the foundry 
and do a kaizen activity on [a different] site. And his information 
is brought back in weekly reports, presented at a monthly 
meeting, and it goes to all the relevant areas.”
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This means that there are weekly and monthly reports about successful 
continuous improvement projects, although it was not obvious to everyone 
that they serve the purpose of spreading newly-acquired knowledge.
9.1.2. Change in the Characteristics of Company I
Management Representative I admitted that, despite the trend towards 
team work, some of the employees would not change to team work, 
however, this did not mean that they would be made redundant:
“So there’re other areas still to improve, still to go into teams. 
There are certain people still working here that will never make 
team workers. So, we will have those until they retire. We won’t 
sack them, we won’t get rid of them. It’s, they’ve worked with us 
for so long. If they don’t make a team member, then we have to 
find them a job where we don’t need a team member.”
The beginning of this statement also implies that despite the big changes 
Company I has gone through there are still a lot of changes to be made. 
Although Management Representative I admitted that the change process 
had been more or less initiated by top management and customers, he saw 
this change as being bottom up, despite the obvious help:
“The company itself develops, and I doubt whether senior 
management would agree with me, but develops bottom up, not 
top down. It’s driven from the bottom. It means that the worker 
tells somebody what he wants. You’ve got the target up for their 
training and development. And the worker will say T want that 
filled in’. And the manager then is driven towards filling it in. In 
other words, giving him the training.”
There was a trend in improving training of employees in recent years, 
according to Shop Floor Representative I:
“The main thing for me within the last. I ’d say, 18 months to two 
years, is the development of the people who are working in the 
training side of it. I feel it’s improved. It’s improved definitely 
for myself. And other people feel it’s improved. Like five years 
ago we’d never have had anybody going into the meeting room 
and having a day’s course on training, that was just not heard of.
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So our company is changing. We can’t afford not to train. So 
that’s my biggest single point, it’s training.”
There was also a more informal way of exchanging implicit knowledge 
between different areas of Company I, which was made possible by 
rotating people, which themselves had to become more flexible:
“All the people on the cells are encouraged to work in other 
areas [of the site], they’re trained. So they’ll be working one 
week in one area, two weeks later they could be in another area.
So they’ll take their ideas and that way it gets around as well.” o
Due to the influence of the relationship with Japanese car assembling 
customers, a new training programme was introduced in Company I, which 
dealt with methods of enhancing problem-solving, such as communication, / 
kaizen (continuous improvement), kanban system, pareto charts, parts per j  
million (PPM) return analysis, etc. The training programme was initially y  
started at the top of the company and now was available on the shop floor 
as well. Communication depicted an integral part of the new training 
programme:
“It’s a day course, [it] lasts ten hours. So they train in 
communication. Also, now we have weekly meetings, monthly 
meetings and management and the directors come to the meetings 
as well. So there is communication now established at all levels.”
According to Management Representative I, this course, which was 
described as “another Japanese idea” , considerably improved 
communication in Company I. This knowledge is even shared with the local 
business school in the area, as part of Company I’s philosophy to give back ..
its share to society, which is an indicator of systemic thinking.
Shop Floor Representative I commented on the improvement of 
communication in his company as follows:
“It [communication] is improving. As I say, like on the VW cell 
[i.e. production area for VW products only] they never had daily 
team briefs. They never had a night shift liaison book. And all 
that’s been introduced.”
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An example of spreading the knowledge of a team improvement is 
given by Management Representative I, but he also indicated some lack of 
structure in this process to get knowledge from one area to another:
“Well, I ’ll give you an example about this: we had a snap 
coupling. All of our dies, they’re high-pressure dies, and they 
carry either water or oil under pressure through the die to cool 
or in some cases to heat it. And they used to take a long, long 
time to get on and off. And one of the teams had purchased a 
snap coupling, so they could just snap them on and off. So they 
won’t be screwing, just pulled it, shut off and the die came out. 
That’s been used more and more across the plant.”
A system that spreads information about newly acquired knowledge 
was under consideration at the time of the interview and was planned to be 
introduced in the near future. Management Representative saw scope for 
better official communication, as there was no inform ation about 
continuous improvement team activities published. However, he was aware 
of possible problems in sharing knowledge:
“It seems stupid to me, for one team to reinvent the wheel, when 
another one’s already done it. And yet some of these teams take 
pride in what they’ve done, and they don’t want others to use it.”
9.1.3. Learning Systems and Outcomes at Company I
Company I introduced its continuous improvement system in 1990. 
This outcome showed a continuous growth of im plem ented team 
improvements, from 6 in 1990, over 18 in 1992, to 40 in 1994 (0.012, 
0.035 and 0.078 team improvements per employee, respectively). 
Management Representative I described the reason for the introduction of 
the continuous improvement system as being customer driven:
“I think we were driven by the customer to be quite honest. If 
you’d have taken us in, say 1985, if the customer said to us we’ve 
got 4% scrap, he’d say, well that’s great, that’s good. The 
customer doesn’t say that anymore. He wants it in parts per 
million, he wants zero reject. And the only way you’re going to 
do it is continually improve the process, kaizen, you’ve got to
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every time improve the process. I ’ll give you an example. A die 
change, before we operated on it, would take five to eight hours.
Now we can do it in 45 minutes. So it’s continuous improvement.
And we say it should be done in 20 minutes, so we’ve still a long 
way to go.”
The continuous team improvement system started by having a team 
leader elected by the team or selected by management. The latter proved to 
be superior for Company 1:
“W e’ve found that every team leader that has been elected by 
management has worked, most of those elected by the team have 
not, because it’s normally the one that shouts the loudest.”
It looked different with the employee suggestion system, which was 
overhauled in 1987. Despite this improvement. Management Representative 
1 was not convinced that it worked properly:
“Before ‘87 it [the employee suggestion system] really didn’t 
exist. It was there, you could put suggestions forward. 
Management didn’t read it very often, in my opinion, that’s just a 
personal opinion. Now, they run, and suggestions, a lot of 
suggestions, do go in and are responded. But I still think it’s the 
wrong system. What I’m saying is, I think if you talked to some 
managers, they say, yes it works well. 1 don’t see it. I mean when 
it first started you’d see some names go up on the board, so-and- 
so was awarded so-and-so. You don’t see it anymore. When you 
talk to the workers, now I do that a lot obviously for training, if 
they talk about it, they rubbish it, they say it’s no good. And I 
think unless it’s accepted as a good idea by the workers, nothing’s 
going to move it. And I would say it will die.”
He further complained that the responsible people did not regard 
suggestions for small improvements as real suggestions, which caused a 
reluctance within the company to propose small improvements.
In 1994, only 15% of employee suggestions were implemented and 
Management Representative I explained:
“I think the take-up is low because limited people are putting 
[ideas] into the suggestion scheme, and they’re putting it in
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without much forethought, in my opinion. And I’ve seen a lot of 
ideas away from their own area, not properly thought out.”
In addition to the lack of employee suggestions, which were useful for 
general employee issues, the lack of attention to small problems was also 
criticised by Management Representative I. He saw the attention to small 
improvements as the advantage of the Japanese way of working:
“But the new way of working is basically the Japanese way of 
working. The Japanese way of working is that everything you 
change is a suggestion - not just the big things.”
Shop Floor Representative I showed some adm iration for the 
suggestion system of Land Rover, because it was very popular with the 
Rover shop floor workers, with whom he had contact. The workers at 
Rover told stories about the huge sums of money they had gained from 
their improvements. However, Shop Floor Representative I also saw that 
there was the danger of looking only at the big improvements at Rover. He 
admitted that he was not participating in the actual employee suggestion 
system of Company I (not to be confused with the team improvement 
system).
Describing the continuous team improvement process at Company I, 
Shop Floor Representative I explained the method of indirect monetary 
rewards within the company:
“They [the operators] want to improve their area. And by doing 
that it creates cell ownership. So eventually they’ll improve their 
work output, which will increase their bonuses, so they will get 
more money.”
This did not apply to all cells. This picture was different to the view of 
Management Representative I, who claimed that there were no monetary 
rewards at all:
“And we’re surprised, we expected to have problems where we 
didn’t pay them. But there isn’t a problem.”
It became clear, however, that Company I did not give any direct 
incentives for the continuous team improvements implemented.
For Shop Floor Representative I, continuous team improvements 
(kaizen) have more important benefits to offer than money:
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“The biggest point about kaizen: it creates a team atmosphere.
They go in together, they brainstorm together, the ideas are put 
together and they carry them out together. So the main thing is 
[that] cell ownership is created, team spirit is created. Money is 
an added bonus.”
It was also interesting to see that Management Representative I 
highlighted the benefits of continuous team improvements (kaizen) in the 
working conditions of team members and that these were not only the 
company’s goals of increased effectiveness and efficiency. This suggests a 
more systemic type of thinking similar to Toyota, which is not only 
focused on direct benefits to the company:
“The kaizen [continuous team improvement] activity is to make 
your job easier, to be better. Because we’re now very much 
structured into teams, team orientation is improving your team 
pride in a team. And that’s why they come up with the ideas, 
there’s no money in it at all. There is in the suggestion scheme, 
or there are prizes in the suggestion scheme. But kaizen is to 
improve your system and make it a better working place.”
According to him, other motivators to join continuous improvement 
team activities were recognition, which he saw as being the best reward 
available, and competition between teams:
“But they’re taking pride in it, where they can improve it. Each 
team wants to be the best and a kaizen activity will make them 
better.”
And although there was no official “no-lay-off’ policy for rationalized 
jobs, there was an implicit understanding that these redundant people were 
going to be employed somewhere else in the company. This is again an 
indicator for systemic thinking about negative sides-effects.
In summary. Company I confirms most of the findings of hypotheses 
testing of Chapter 8 and also illustrates these in more detail.
Induced by the persistence of the Managing Director of Company I to 
gain business with Toyota, it played an important role for teaching the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization to Company I. This teaching ; )
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* It seems that Nissan has recognised this inferiority of teaching compared to Toyota, as they have 
started a programme of supplier improvement since the beginning of 1996 (FT 13-12-1995).
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was done with the help of close personal co-operation to ensure the transfer 
of tacit knowledge,
Nissan, however, played a more passive role in the teaching process, 
and preferred to stay on the explicit side of teaching. This is a good 
explanation for why Toyota has at least the same impact as Nissan on the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization of car component suppliers^ 4'  ^
although Nissan has been in Britain much longer than Toyota^i^, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 8.
This teaching of Toyota helped Company I to acquire the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization. The step-by-step method 
ensured that the a new pattern of behaviour was carefully trained and was 
first successful at a low level (double-loop, learning as it changed the 
framework of action). Then this new approach was steadily improved to 
the desired level (single-loop learning, as the improvements were taking 
place in the new framework).
The changes in characteristics happened especially through a complete 
change in corporate culture that put the management into the position of 
being facilitator for the work force. This also included the improvement of 
communication and the introduction of extensive training.
The preferred improvement system was the continuous team 
improvement system (kaizen), as the employee suggestion system did not 
show the desired results. Whereas the former system did not include any 
direct monetary incentives, the latter did. This shows again that money is 
not a guarantee for a successful improvement system. Other important 
factors are team work and competition as well as job security, when 
efficiency improvements make positions in one area redundant. These 
insights are in line with the findings of Chapters 7 and 8.
The next company presented had also high scores in the characteristics 
of the Learning Organization as well as organizational learning systems.
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9.2. Investigation of Company II
Company II had, like Company I, a high degree of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics (39.9) and received no teaching from Nissan, 
but from  Toyota. The in-depth interviews with Company II were 
conducted with the “Total Quality Facilitating Manager” (Management 
Representative II) and a shop floor worker (Shop Floor Representative II).
Table 9.2: Descriptive Statistics from Company II’s Questionnaire
No Value Variable Averaae
(1) 4.0 Team work and team learning 3.0
(2) 4.3 Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 3.8
(3) 4.5 Education and training of the whole workforce 3.2
(4) 4.4 Systemic thinking and mental models 3.4
(5) 3.2 Learning reward system for employees 2.7
(6) 3.9 Continuous improvement of work 3.4
(7) 2.9 Learning laboratories & constant experimentation 2.9
(8) 4.5 Decentralized hierarchies & participative management 3.8
(9) 4.4 Flexibility of company strategy and employees 3.3
(10) 3.9 Supportive corporate learning culture 3.2
39.9 Scale of the 10 characteristics of the Learning Organization 33.0
9.2.1. Sources of Organizational Learning at Company II
Shop Floor Representative II reported no direct training from Nissan, 
as its orders do not appear to have been of sufficient size to warrant 
training Company II’s employees for Nissan. But besides sending people 
for fixing specific problems, Nissan chose to undertake an indirect way of 
teaching and training via their suppliers:
“Nissan doesn’t train, they will come and give advice. A 
‘thousand’ people will come in and jump on the organization, 
they will come and explain things they would do that perhaps we
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have done wrong. Because we are quite forward looking, they 
will look at our systems and agree or disagree with them. Nissan 
tends to send some of their suppliers.”
There was no learning going on as yet with the new Japanese member 
in Company IPs group of companies. However, Company II benchmarked 
itself in some areas with data available from other Japanese companies.
Management Representative II stated that he was getting training from 
the parent company in the United States, provided by some external 
American consultants. The rest was self-study:
“It was very much self-study, going to college and doing night 
classes on quality, and running the little part of the department 
that I had in a total quality fashion and being able to relate what I ^
did there.” ^  ^I
After looking into the sources of organizational learning, the nexth^ 
section deals with the change in the organizational characteristics. 1
9.2.2. Change in the Characteristics of Company II
With the arrival of the new Managing Director in 1992, the change 
Company II started in the view of Management Representative II:
“Some of the things he [the new Managing Director] came up Ç^'jr  
with when he came and gave his first address to people, he said ’
people will change or they will be changed. He put over the ^
message very clearly we need to be a team to develop the  ^ pU.
organization, or we will not survive.” ,
Management Representative II describes the structure of Company II as:_ r i  f  
now being very team centred: ^
“The steering committee [the top of the organization] is broken ^ -
up into: general manager, UK manager, operational excellence 
champion, manufacturing champion, logistics champion or 
inventory champion, quality champion. And to the side of that we 
are introducing technical excellence and customer excellence, 
they are two things that are going to be slotted on the side, 
although it sounds stupid that we haven’t got that. So I generally 
manage a meeting on a fortnightly basis where each of these
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parties come together and report on the things we have done 
against target. They have a number of teams, so if you think of 
an organization instead of it being mixed into different 
departments, its mixed into different processes.”
Management Representative II described communication as initiated 
from the top, but with growing room for feedback from the bottom:
“It [communication] starts from the brief that is originally 
written by the senior management group on the Monday 
morning. It gets added to, and it is anything from visitors to 
business processes. It is very much hierarchical floor down and 
the manager gives it to the supervisors, and then the supervisors 
will stop the business on a W ednesday for 15 minutes. 
Supervisors read this out or go into conference rooms, which 
now happens, and talk to the people in-depth and get feedback 
questions from them.”
Being aware that some of the communication problems in the past were 
mainly related to growth. Management Representative II now sees some 
change happening. This is mainly directed towards formalization of 
communication (e.g., notice boards):
“The business has grown quite quickly. It has been growing for 
quite a lot of years and then you have big jumps. We were 
getting to a stage where employees didn’t know one another. I 
find it difficult now, because I don’t know who they are. So we 
have to let them know systematically more information about the 
business. It has progressed through that and we are ready for the 
next stage of employee involvement, it is something called ‘the 
line for success’. That is looking at the real measures of the 
organization, put notices up on boards, based on our objectives 
and saying: ‘OK, this is how we meet those objectives.’ If we can 
reduce down time, then we can increase productivity.”
Communication was described by Shop Floor Representative II as being 
good vertically, but with still some scope for improvement horizontally, 
describing the annual speech of Company IPs Managing Director:
“If it is about work on your line then communication is really 
good. He [the managing director] was telling us what we are
-  3 3 7  -
9. In -D e p t h  In t e r v ie w s  w it h  F o u r  Se l e c t e d  S u p p l ie r s
going to be doing. He was just telling us what he wants us to do.
He asked everybody if they had questions. We were just there to 
listen and not ask any questions.”
Shop Floor Representative II was trained as a facilitator for continuous 
team improvement activities in one week. He is now able to train other co­
workers:
“I went on a training course, do presentations, one to one * 
training, teaching people the knowledge we know.”
After describing changes of some characteristics of Company II, the 
next issue are the organizational learning systems.
9.2.3. Learning Systems and Outcomes at Company II
Shop Floor Representative II described the continuous team 
improvement system as follows:
“For people to learn by their mistakes, you could pass on 
continuous improvement, quality and communicate with 
everybody. So if they had a problem you could solve it. Just to 
make things better.”
In Company II, like in Company I previously, new jobs were given to 
those employees whose positions were made redundant by improvement 
suggestions that had been implemented. However, this policy was only 
limited to the shop floor and has not been applied to office workers so far.
According to Shop Floor Representative II, the procedure for the 
implementing improvement suggestions depended on the size of the 
problem. Smaller ones were solved directly with the help of the supervisor, 
larger ones involved the business centre manager and was facilitated by 
regular (weekly) team meetings.
Management Representative II outlined the learning that took place in 
the process of implementing the continuous team improvement systems. It 
initially was focused only on big projects, which were harder to find the 
more were implemented successfully:
“We have quality circles, and like a lot of companies who have 
quality circles [we are] looking for people all over the
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organization, looking for a project that they wanted to work on.
Now, big projects don’t happen all the time. It is great for people 
to say there is always continuous improvement and there is, but 
there are no big projects for the ordinary person to work on.
What we said is, let’s train everybody in continuous improvement 
tools and train everyone, so we did. I spent three days with 
everyone in the organization, groups of 20, teaching them: tools, 
total quality, what the vision is, where we would like to be, what 
is their role in the new business, new organization, etc. So we set 
up the teams and what did we do? We did the same thing. Pick a 
project that you want to work on. And we saved £100,000 on 
these projects, but we spent a lot on training.”
Company II introduced new methods which helped them to become 
aware of not only big but also small new problems and solve them in a 
semi-structured way. This included tree diagrams. Motorola’s six sigma 
quality level, 5 Ss^i^ and re-engineering. Using all these methods, which 
might appear somehow fragmented, is an indicator of a self taught learning 
process of explicit knowledge, without a guiding company which transfers 
tacit knowledge through personal interaction. 1 j - u
The employee suggestion system was overhauled in 1994, and, 
according to Shop Floor Representative II, it worked as follows:
“If you had a suggestion on how to save money and make the job 
better, we would work out how much it would cost to improve it, 
how much the job was. And then you would get a share of the 
money.”
Management Representative II, however, admitted that the overhauled 
employee suggestion system was not successful at all, because it was flawed 
from the beginning and had to be replaced only one year later (in 1994 
implemented employee suggestions, with 0.011, were nearly ten times 
lower than implemented team improvements per employee, with 0.094):
The Management Representative explained: “58 is a process of looking at your own area, the S is 
you sort through and sort out your area, you set limits and locations, you shine things clean, you share the 
information and then you stick to the rules.” (For more information about 5Ss see Osada 1991.)
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“We were told by corporate [head quarters] we had to have an 
employee suggestion scheme because it is a TQ thing to do. So we 
benchmarked a few companies and we copied Rovers. It was the ^
worst thing we could ever do. It was based on 20% of the savings Y'
that you could make. Managers said it was their job, the people c
said it wasn’t. Some people got figures from here and some ^
people got figures from there, no one got paid out and there 
were no savings made.”
The new replacement for the suggestion system was seen to be 5 Ss.
The training was not done by Nissan, but by a European consultancy. 
Despite the high level of responses within this programme there was the 
impression that it had a one-off effect, though a significant one. Questions 
relating to mechanisms on how to keep the process going did not receive 
convincing answers. This feeling was confirmed during the factory visit 
where charts showed a plateauing of the improvement process of this 5 Ss 
employee suggestion system.
According to Shop Floor Representative II, there was no system 
installed to spread the newly-gained knowledge within Company II, 
although there were occasional meetings between people of different areas 
and hierarchies. Although Management Representative II claimed the same, 
the interview with him revealed that there actually were bi-weekly 
meetings of the people who were responsible for a certain area of the 
business (i.e., manufacturing, logistics, quality, etc.). This ensured not only 
the transfer of knowledge in one area of Company II’s value chain to 
others but also between different areas. There were also annual knowledge 
share fairs to meet and exchange ideas regarding improvements of the 
whole group of companies to which Company II belonged.
In summary. Company II did not have the opportunity to acquire tacit
knowledge about the Learning Organization’s characteristics directly from 
a Japanese car assembler. This could be a major reason for the fact that 
improvement initiatives had to be generated alone in a sometimes painful 
trial-and-error process. ;
Both, Company I and II had problems running their current employee 
suggestion systems, but they were considerably successful with their team 
improvement system. These were backed by a high degree of the
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characteristics of the Learning Organization, such as Chapter 8 has 
suggested.
The following group of the last two companies to be looked at had a 
low score in the Learning Organization’s characteristics.
9.3. Investigation of Company III
Company III had a very low score in the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics, with a value of only 22.8. The interviews were conducted 
with a Personnel Manager (Management Representative III), who also 
completed the questionnaire, and a shop floor worker (Shop Floor 
Representative III). The factory visit in this case was very helpful, because 
from the production batches and cell sizes it was easy to conclude the 
number of car component customers as possible sources for the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics.
r 7
Table 9.3: Descriptive Statistics from Company I ll’s Questionnaire
No Value Variable A veraae
(1) 1.0 Team work and team learning 3.0
(2) 3.9 Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 3.8
(3) 1.8 Education and training of the whole workforce 3.2
(4) 2.8 Systemic thinking and mental models 3.4
(5) 2.2 Learning reward system for employees 2.7
(6) 3.3 Continuous improvement of work 3.4
(7) 2.0 Learning laboratories & constant experimentation 2.9
(8) 1.7 Decentralized hierarchies & participative management 3.8
(9) 1.4 Flexibility of company strategy and employees 3.3
(10) 2.9 Supportive corporate learnino culture 3.2
22.8 Scale of the 10 characteristics of the Learning Organization 33.0
- 3 4 1  -
9. In -D e p t h  In t e r v ie w s  w it h  F o u r  S e l e c t e d  S u p p l ie r s
9.3.1. Sources of Organizational Learning at Company III
Although Honda UK was a client of Company III, it became obvious 
during the factory visit that the products ordered were only in comparably
r t J .
small volumes and only little value was added to these car components by 
Company III. Thus, and because of the finding in Chapter 8 that Honda 
generally did not train. Company III neither received any help nor any ; 
training from Honda, also not indirectly via its Japanese suppliers. This 
again suggested that the economics of training, i.e. the pay-off, play an 
important role in the decision-making process of Japanese car assemblers to 
teach suppliers the characteristics of the Learning Organization, or to help 
with the introduction of continuous improvement systems.
According to Management Representative III, although Ford demanded 
the introduction of a continuous team improvement system, they did not 
actively help in establishing one. Instead, Ford prompted the organization 
to establish a workshop with a European consultancy for one week, in 
1994. This training was only for a team of ten people from Company III, 
and Management Representative III was the only one of that team, who 
actively tried to spread this newly gained knowledge. His impression was 
that the implicit knowledge gained from this training was not sufficient to 
establish a continuous improvement system in Company III:
“So we tried to continue with kaizen, but I didn’t feel I had 
enough knowledge. I felt very inexperienced, and it kind of 
stopped. Then we had an external consultant, who used to work 
for Ford, [he] would come in to the company fairly often. And I 
got talking to him and said that I wanted to continue with kaizen, 
but I didn’t feel that I had the experience. So he organized 
another workshop.”
This additional week of training in 1995 still comprised only about 15 
people from Company III and it did not include training these people in a 
multiplier effect like in Company II. This time the drive neither came from 
Ford nor the top management, but from the shop floor. Top management 
gave no backing and was more interested in the high quantity rather than 
the high quality of the products:
“Then we continued with kaizen, but the interest came from us 
rather than the management. And most people felt that they
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couldn’t leave their work, they felt pressurised to work rather 
than get involved with kaizen.”
Shop Roor Representative III noted that the process of continuous team 
improvement systems “fizzled out” after its introduction. Management 
Representative III saw one of the major reasons for the failure of the 
introduction of the continuous team improvement system (kaizen) in the 
lack of backing from top management to change the corporate culture 
towards a supportive environment, i.e. nurturing the characteristics of the 
Learning Organization:
“There isn’t a common goal. If the goal was ‘we need quantity 
and quality, and to get this we need to improve the processes to 
work together as a team,’ and if the board of directors were to 
publicly state this, so that everybody could perhaps relax and say: 
‘right, okay, I can become involved in kaizen, I can do this.’ If it 
was accepted and everybody knew what this goal was. I think that 
is the culture that is missing. At the moment people don’t 
understand what they can do, or what they should do. We do 
need to change the culture, change attitudes.”
As a supportive organizational culture is one important part of the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization, this leads directly to the next 
issue, which is the change in the organizational characteristics of Company 
III.
9.3.2. Change in the Characteristics of Company III
Communication was described by Management Representative III to 
have been changed, away from an informal approach:
“The changes that have occurred have been that it was very much 
a family-type business, where everybody knew everybody. And a 
lot of people were related and communication was a lot easier, 
because there were fewer people. And it would be in the canteen, 
everybody could hear if something had happened.”
This change, from a family business to being part of a group of 
companies, was followed by a transition period of strong growth:
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“Now, well, we went through a period of perhaps two or three 
years, where it was total chaos. There was too much work, not 
enough people, even though there were more people, there still 
weren’t enough people. A lot of overtime, a lot of pressure, no 
thanks, no recognition, no communication, you just did your job 
- very, very hard.”
Communication took place bottom-up, informally and normally only 
when employees’ complaints were expressed:
“Management got to know about the shop floor through some 
people, only some, approaching them and complaining. Well, it’s 
very, very informal. Sometimes the cell leaders will have a 
meeting and complain. It’s usually complaints to the supervisor, 
who then will pass it on to management. Sometimes a manager 
will be present in the cell leaders meeting and they will hear that 
way. Sometimes a manager will come down on the shop floor 
and just walk around.”
The top-down information flow looked more formal at Company III:
“And the other way round, the management informing the shop 
floor, they’ve got [it] better, they’re putting more notices up on 
notice boards, like visitors. Just recently the Managing Director 
has put a notice up to say that he wants a newsletter issued three 
or four, or two or three, times a year. But that is formal 
information. Information from management tends to go down 
through supervisors to the cells.”
Com pared to M anagem ent R epresentative I l l ’s view about 
communication between different levels o f hierarchy, Shop Floor 
Representative III saw communication within the shop floor level as good:
“Yes, there is a good communication, actually in fabrication on 
the shop floor. Not anywhere else as much, but definitely on the 
shop floor there is good communication.”
However, top-down communication was judged as being poor:
“There is not a good communication from the management to the 
shop floor, the communication is terrible, really bad. The thing 
is, right, the manager will probably have a meeting and they
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decide various things and it’s probably going to be a memo or it 
will be orally. If it’s a memo, it will go down to the supervisors, 
then to the cell leaders, which should be pinned up on a notice 
board. And sometimes, when the cell leaders forget to tell you 
that there is a memo from the works meeting, you don’t see it. So 
it is not as if it comes straight down it passes along. And if it’s 
orally it goes from boss to supervisor to charge hand to cell 
manager, and within this time it can either be changed or 
forgotten. It’s not direct. But we do get memos, but the managers 
should come down and make sure that everybody is aware of it.”
Despite the existence of bottom-up communication, for example the 
Managing Director comes to the shop floor every two weeks for a chat. 
Shop Floor Representative III did not think this has any real influence on 
management:
“For decisions management sometimes ask the workforce for 
their opinion, but they don’t take any notice although they do ask.
They do it their way anyway, they probably will ask.”
Thus, from Shop Floor Representative I l l ’s point of view the 
characteristic “free vertical and horizontal flow of information” had scope 
for improvement. This was especially on the content side, which was not 
measured in the construct presented here, and showed a value (3.9) slightly 
above average (3.8). The observation reflects the findings of Chapter 8.2, 
which showed that “free vertical and horizontal flow of information” 
(constructed by forms of communication) was the only characteristic that 
had no significant impact on organizational learning systems.
Management Representative III experienced some changes in the 
training of Company 111. There had been no training in the company since 
the beginning of the 1990s and compared to the other companies, it, 
therefore, had values well below average:
“And we had no training, whatsoever. As we got bigger, very 
quickly got bigger, they, the Board of Directors decided that they 
needed someone to train, someone to do introduction, to do 
training on the shop floor.”
But, besides there being only one course on offer for statistical process 
control (SPC), there was also the openness to admit that getting the training
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going had many obstacles. This lack of training also contributed to the 
third failure in implementing a continuous team improvement (kaizen) 
system in Company 111. Another reason was the fact that there was no time 
for the employees provided by top management to implement the system 
properly:
“Trying to get kaizen off the ground, continuous improvement 
philosophy, we did use a form of training charts called ILU^i^.
[We were] trying to get that going, but not succeeding. The ILU 
charts haven’t been successful, because we needed to start again, 
from the very beginning and try and identify what the operations 
are. The cell leaders, who are the most important people within 
the group, are the best people to identify what these areas are.
But unfortunately they’ve just got so much work to do. To try 
and take them away from the shop floor is very difficult, it’s 
virtually impossible.”
This impression of very little training at Company III was also given 
by Shop Floor Representative III, describing the training received:
“And we did last year watch a kaizen video, which I think was 
from Japan. We not really had any training. I ’ve been here for 
three years and there has been no training. I came on the shop 
floor and we had charge hands. And they stuck you in and they 
didn’t really tell or show you how to do it properly. I embedded 
myself in a way. 1 watched the people, and they told me what 1 
was doing wrong.”
9.3.3. Learning Systems and Outcomes at Company III
Company III showed interesting results concerning organizational 
learning outcome in the form of quality: whereas the internal quality was 
low, with 10% of the part containing failures, the external quality was 
considerable high, with a failure rate of only 0.05%. This was possible
ILU is a Japanese training system, which is also used in the automotive industry. Every line stands 
for an advanced training level, the order is I, L, U, O. An O with a line in the middle indicates the ability to 
train others (for the ILU matrix with more detailed information see Part 4 of the Appendix),
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because of heavy rework included in the production process. It shows how 
little interest in organizational learning exists. Root cause analysis to solve 
quality problems was not conducted. The organizational learning systems 
did not work and as such interrupted the organizational learning cycles.
As explained in the two sections above, the introduction of a continuous 
team improvement system was attempted three times at Company III, but 
failed to work. This was caused by the low values in the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics, mainly because of the absence of backing 
from  top management. Also, using a European consultancy which 
apparently had little tacit knowledge about team improvement systems as 
facilitator did not help. And although rejects were “a quite high problem in 
this company”. Shop Floor Representative III openly admitted he had not 
been included in continuous improvement activities (kaizen):
“I have really nothing to do with kaizen. But I should imagine it 
is for continuous improvement, and plus things to make it a little 
bit easier, like if you could find a way of doing it easier or 
quicker. And everybody can give suggestions, like somebody can 
walk to some of the management and say: ‘Look I find it easier to 
do it that way.’.”
According to Management Representative III, the only reason for the 
work force to join continuous improvement activities at the moment was to 
“make their lives easier”. Asked why the employees did generally not 
participate, the answer was:
“Because they know they wouldn’t get thanked. They know they 
wouldn’t get recognised. They know they wouldn’t be rewarded.
So the only reason to do it would be to make their life easier.”
Shop Floor Representative III could remember two rare examples 
relating to improvements. The first one, however, showed that it did not 
tackle the real underlying problem of rejects, as the root causes were not 
fixed, only the outcome of the problem:
“I think somebody said something in our cell actually: ‘See, what 
happens: if we make some rejects, they get reworked.’ So they 
get sent out and get reworked. So one of the girls said: ‘Oh, if we 
could maybe rework them by ourselves.’ Like the end of the
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shift, you finish an hour before you go home, and then rework 
them yourself, so they are ready for the next morning.”
The second example of an improvement was as follows:
"Another thing was tooling. To make some parts you have to 
change your tooling four or five times, because there are 
different sizes of nylon, different end fittings. And what one 
suggested was, if we got a tooling that we haven’t got to change, 
that was versatile, so that we could do the whole thing without 
changing the tooling. A bigger thing and maybe move it around.
And that happened with one of [them], we have got something 
new now, which has actually helped us a lot to save time.”
And although the second example can be seen as a real improvement, it 
took about a year to implement. This extremely slow feedback might be 
another reason for the repeated failure in implementing the team 
improvement system. Employees are unlikely to be motivated for another 
improvement, before they see their first improvement successfully 
implemented, not to speak about the rewards.
The opinion of Shop Floor Representative III about the continuous 
improvement process was that there was no knowledge about it available in 
Company III to implement it properly. However, he also had thoughts 
about how to improve it, still only addressing explicit knowledge:
“I think it [the team improvement system] is a very good way 
actually, but I don’t think that they have enough knowledge of
how the kaizen works [sic!]. I mean we’ve seen a video and had a
little discussion and talk about it. But, and then people forget, 
don’t they? I mean, I think we would need a fortnightly 
newsletter, or something like this, going around.”
There was no systematic approach of spreading newly-gained 
knowledge from continuous improvement activities within Company III. 
The transfer of an idea from one part of the company to another seemed to 
depend on pure chance. Management Representative III complained:
“That’s what I think makes it so difficult, because there is no 
system [to spread new knowledge].”
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Shop Floor Representative III gave an example of how an improvement 
of another manufacturing cell got picked up just by chance. But the reason 
for the lack of knowledge flow was seen to be the work overload rather 
than missing systematic processes:
“I t’s quite ironic really, because we do have a good 
communication actually in fabrication, but sometimes it does 
lapse. Like if you are doing something and then I come over to 
the cell and say: ‘Oh, that’s a good idea who told you that?’ They 
said: ‘Oh, we thought about it last week.’ I said: ‘Oh, we could 
have been doing that.’ On the whole, we have got a good 
communication in fabrication, but sometimes it does lapse. It’s 
just we are so busy at the moment, we have no time to do 
anything, really.”
In summary, the case of Company III shows four major problem areas 
which contributed to the failure of the introduction of continuous team 
improvement systems.
Firstly, there was no backing from top management for the 
introduction of a continuous team improvement (kaizen) system, neither in 
the provision of time nor adequate and sufficient training. This again led to 
a low scoring in the Learning Organization’s characteristics, which were 
hardly conducive to the running of a continuous team improvement system.
Secondly, a European consultancy, not very familiar with the tacit) 
knowledge needed for the introduction of kaizen, trained the employees, \ '3  
which was not very fruitful. fc
Thirdly, there was only a relatively low number of employees in 
Company III, who were intensively trained for continuous improvement, ' 
and the training for the rest appeared to be very short and shallow.
Finally, the time needed for implementing one proper example of an 
improvement took about one year, which is much too long to keep 
employees motivated and, therefore, to keep the system going, i.e. the 
organizational learning cycles.
The continuous team improvement system was relaunched for the third 
time, when the questionnaire was completed. Half a year later, at the time 
of the in-depth interview, this third initiative had obviously failed once
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more, due to a lack of supporting characteristics o f the Learning 
Organization. This was in line with the model developed, as it showed a 
highly significant impact of Organizational Learning characteristics on 
organizational team learning systems.
Despite the repeated failures of introducing organizational learning 
systems. Company III was acting in a sector of an industry which was 
growing, because the production of these kinds of products had been 
outsourced by car manufacturers to components suppliers. This implied 
high growth rates for Company III. In turn, this again made the pressure to 
change towards the model of the Learning Organization less urgent for top 
management, as they appeared to be successful with their current strategy. 
The case of Company III shows that an organization with considerable low 
values in characteristics of the Learning Organization can still be growing 
very successfully in a supportive environment, at least for a certain period.
The next and final supplier interviewed was in a more competitive 
environment than Company III, but was still very profitable and, therefore, 
also not very inclined to change.
9.4. Investigation of Company IV
Company IV had a low score in the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics with a value of 26.4. The interviews were conducted with 
two Personnel Managers (Management Representative IV and V), one of 
whom answered the questionnaire, and one shop floor worker (Shop Floor 
Representative IV). There was also a factory visit from which it was 
possible to conclude that some change had taken place.
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Table 9.4: Descriptive Statistics from Company IV’s Questionnaire
No Value Variable A veraae
(1) 2.0 Team work and team learning 3.0
(2) 2.7 Free vertical and horizontal flow of information 3.8
(3) 3.6 Education and training of the whole workforce 3.2
(4) 2.3 Systemic thinking and mental models 3.4
(5) 3.0 Learning reward system for employees 2.7
(6) 2.9 Continuous improvement of work 3.4
(7) 2.0 Learning laboratories & constant experimentation 2.9
(8) 3.1 Decentralized hierarchies & participative management 3.8
(9) 2.5 Flexibility of company strategy and employees 3.3
(10) 2.3 SuDDortive corporate learnino culture 3.2
26.4 Scale of the 10 characteristics of the Learning Organization 33.0
9.4.1. Sources of Organizational Learning at Company IV
Management Representative IV described the process of change of 
Company IV as being dramatic and rapid. But as Company IV did not have 
the advantage of a Japanese role model for teaching them the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics, all new knowledge about those and about 
organizational learning systems had to be gathered and adapted in a 
sometimes quite painful trial-and-error process:
“And really, it was a dramatic period within the company’s 
history of change - very rapid, very quick. We had a lot of 
management off-site meetings at that point in time. Off-site, 
where you couldn’t be attacked by the telephone. And we 
discussed a lot of the issues. So, if you like, the demands were put 
onto us. But a lot of what we’ve done from that point has been a 
result of our own interpretation of what the environment is doing 
and how we, if you like, bring it in with this culture of the 
company. I would say quite categorically, what we did initially 
was wrong. But I would honestly say that we leamt a lot from 
the experience, and in some circumstances put things right.”
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Although there was a Japanese affiliate in Company IV ’s group of 
companies, and another affiliated company in Britain which supplied 
Toyota, there was no inter-organizational learning going on between them. 
Management Representative V saw the reason for this in the internal 
competition:
“I feel we could live with each other. Unfortunately in some 
senses the political atmosphere in the group is competitive rather 
than co-operative - that’s the typical situation.”
According to Management Representative V, the support of a European 
consultancy was used for the introduction of a continuous team 
improvement system:
“Very simply, I mean, our approach at that time, not knowing 
much about continuous improvement, was to look around and see 
how we could approach it. And from our own perspective, a 
suggestion from me [was] that we could maybe use a consultancy 
to help guide us as it were.”
The use of a consultancy to leam was not suggested by customers, like 
in Company I ll’s case, but Company IV decided to go that way as there was 
no expertise in-house. Management Representative IV remembered. But 
using a consultancy with little tacit knowledge implied many problems for 
the introduction of a continuous team improvement system:
“In our particular case we decided to go for consultancy, 
basically because there wasn’t the expertise here. Having gone for 
the expertise, the main problem with it, although we wrapped it 
up in the plan of continuous improvement, was that it tended to 
be very prescriptive. You know, they [the consultants] came in, 
they said: ‘This is what you do, you do this, you do this, you do 
this.’ And it was a prescription towards change. In other words, 
they stood up and told people: ‘This is what’s going to happen.’
And it didn’t happen the way they said it was going to happen.
So, initially we started off on the wrong foot, because everybody 
had an impression of what improvement was about. And when 
things didn’t happen the way that they thought it was going to 
happen, quite honestly, disillusionment set in quite quickly 
afterwards.”
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Going into more detail, there were a couple of problems linked with 
the prescriptive consultant approach, some of which were directly brought 
forward by Management Representative IV.
Firstly, there was only one Japanese technique (fishbone or Ishikawa 
diagram) taught to solve all kinds of problems. This was perceived as being 
sometimes too rigid, and it was not always appropriately applied. It could 
also be the case that the training for the use of the Ishikawa application was 
insufficient and, therefore, the technique did not show the desired results.
Secondly, the management reaction to install a team when needed was 
much too slow, and, because of that, employees quickly lost interest in the 
problems.
Thirdly, the initial momentum faded after its introduction, apparently 
due to a lack of backing by the Learning Organization’s characteristics. 
Therefore, this approach was abandoned:
“Fishbone diagram, Ishikawa diagram - in some circumstances 
they may not have needed it. They might have used, for instance, 
process analysis, waste elimination, these sort of ideas. But 
because they were trained in a specific manner, everybody felt 
that they had to go this way, and it wasn’t necessarily the case.
And it fell into dispute, really from a number of points. First, the 
speed with which management could get round to assigning 
people to the problem. So, if someone came up and said, ‘here is 
a problem’, and if a period of time went passed before any action 
happened, then people just became disillusioned. So that was a 
particular problem. Keeping the momentum up, we found was 
very difficult - very, very difficult. Well, there was, as I say, this 
feeling that we were stagnating, I suppose, but the initial 
enthusiasm was waning a little, you know, moans and groans and 
complaints. And I think, you will always have a sector of people, 
who you have in the company, who aren’t interested in change.
And all that serves to fuel the inertia towards change. So, a lot of 
criticism  was levelled at the consultants. And really we 
abandoned this prescriptive approach.”
Fourthly, the outside consultants provided relatively poor training, 
which seemed to have been off-the-shelf and initially designed for a 
management audience only:
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“For instance, the training that I saw that was happening, the 
quality of it was not very clever. It was targeted at the wrong 
audience, we were talking to people on the shop floor, and they 
[the consultants] were rude to you, talking as if they were 
delivering it to management.”
Fifthly, the volunteering of facilitators for the continuous improvement 
processes led to the selection of employees, some of whom were not even 
capable of reading or writing:
Again this [election of facilitators] is part of the problem. 
Initially they were volunteers. Now, don’t get me wrong, I think 
volunteers, you know, is a good idea. But, for instance, one of 
the volunteers couldn’t read or write. To try and co-ordinate, to 
organize meetings or write memos to people - impossible, 
obviously impossible. No disrespect to the person, he’s a very 
enthused person, but you need obviously some base skills that the 
people need to do. And they’d [consultants] never even 
considered it.”
Management Representative V added a sixth reason for the failure of 
the introduction of the continuous team improvement system, which was 
that suggestions for improvements were often made for other areas than 
their own. On the one hand, this did not create ownership and the 
suggestions lacked insight, on the other hand, the employees affected saw it 
as an interference in their area:
“The other thing we did really very badly, was we tended to 
accept any idea, instead of saying we want ideas relevant to the 
individual workplace, where they’re the experts and ideas which 
they ultimately will be responsible for implementing. So that’s 
the point of one of the fundamental mistakes we made. Again, 
this stemmed from the consultants. And what w e’re finding is 
that by restricting it to the individual’s working environment, 
you’ve got, first of all, more enthusiasm.”
This eventually led to the removal of the consultancy, and Company IV 
decided to approach continuous team improvement systems on its own. 
Sources then were visits to other companies, which ran these systems and 
also literature. Both forms, especially the latter, are vehicles for explicit
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but not for tacit knowledge. This lack of implicit knowledge was the major 
reason for why the degree of the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization was still very low in Company IV, although a continuous 
team improvement system was installed. This was, however, more due to 
the team in the personnel department as a spear head of change.
This does not mean that there was no change in the organizational 
characteristics, as the following section will show.
9.4.2. Change in the Characteristics of Company IV
Management Representative IV was convinced that Company IV was 
still in an organizational learning process, though more by evolution rather 
than planning:
“But a lot of what we were doing here sort of evolved, should I 
say, within the company. We wouldn’t specifically say that you’re 
going to do this, you can do this, you’re going to end up with 
that. We started to do it, and as the process of going in and 
getting involved with it, other issues started to emerge. For 
instance, we had a vague idea that what we wanted to do was to 
measure people’s abilities at the end.”
But there was another problem in the change and organizational 
learning process, which was caused by the fact that Company IV was rather 
successful in terms of profitability and, therefore, many people in the 
management did not see a real need for change.
The state and change of communication in Company IV was seen by 
Management Representative IV as not being without problems, but some 
training (which had a value above average) had been implemented now to 
improve parts of it:
“Well, we have a number of communication vehicles. We have 
employee consultation and council meetings, which involve 
representatives of the company a lot, who have been elected. But 
it’s a non-union situation. And then that involves operations 
director, myself and others. That are issues of general interest, if 
you like, developments in the company, new business, threats, 
opportunities in the organization. Team briefings we have, again
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we have had difficulties with team briefings, because of the 
industrial society model of cascading team briefings. Very much 
as Nissan found, we found that it started off very well, but after a 
year or so the supervisors and managers didn’t have enough to 
say. More to the point, they were I think not trained very well, 
and we’ve now developed a training course for them.”
Com munication was also seen as problem atic by Shop Floor 
Representative IV and with much potential for improvement:
“And I think they’re trying to do something about it, but there is 
still a problem with communication. Management, I suppose, 
don’t tell you everything, perhaps they shouldn’t tell you 
everything. But then you’ve got to have some involvement, 
there’s got to be a two-way corridor, between the shop floor and 
management. So perhaps they’re working on it, perhaps not hard 
enough, but it’s not easy. We are still having to ask what’s going 
on, w e’re not being told. They w on’t voluntarily offer the 
information until it comes upon us, or we sort of drag it out of 
them in a sense. So, as I say, they are trying to improve the lines 
of communication, but, as of yet, I haven’t seen a lot of 
improvement.”
Management Representative IV reported that the change in the 
information policy towards more content was received differently by 
different employees in Company IV:
“We have people who, if you like, are against change and pro 
inertia, and they see it as a threat. And other people are quite 
open to it and, you know, were very grateful for the information 
that came out.”
Despite a general lack in the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization, organizational learning systems were in operation in 
Company IV. However, both were not in good shape and as a consequence 
the results of organizational learning were low.
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9.4.3. Learning Systems and Outcomes at Company IV
According to Management Representative IV the introduction of 
continuous improvement systems was due to market pressure: ^  ^
“Basically to try and attain a competitive advantage, I would say. ^
The reason for that is that there is a lot of pressure from the 
external market place in which [Company IV] competes. And a 
lot of our customers, people in the form of Vauxhall and so on, 
are striving towards competition with the likes of Toyota. And as 
a result, since we are in their supplier chain, it’s impact on us 
was marked. And we either had the opportunity to, if you like, 
move towards continuous improvement or virtually kiss good­
bye to Ford’s and Vauxhall’s business over a period of time. I 
mean. I’m not saying it would happen there and then, but over a 
period of time it would happen. So it was a case of making sure 
that we had a competitive advantage.”
That the old employee suggestion system was currently not working 
properly was without doubt for Shop Floor Representative IV:
“It was a long time ago, when anything was happening with that 
when I first started here. A few ideas came off the shop floor, 
but I don’t think it worked very well, to be honest.”
Also Management Representative IV described the old employee 
suggestion system as not working properly. But, additionally he saw it as 
being inconsistent with the continuous team improvement system in 
Company IV, because it focused only on the cost side and the big problems:
“In fact many years ago we had a suggestion scheme, which was 
typical of many western organizations, which said the company 
would make a payment equivalent to 5% of the annual savings in 
the event of the suggestion resulting in cost savings of over £250 
per year. We abandoned that a few years ago, because it was 
blatantly inconsistent with continuous improvement. The message 
it was giving was that only cost improvements were important, 
and only large-scale ideas were important.”
Additionally, the bureaucracy of the employee suggestion system 
limited its success. The new system, introduced later, was called the
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proposal scheme, in order to avoid any connotation of the old unsuccessful 
scheme, but its success still had to be proven.
The approach had been changed, and Management Representative V 
saw the new aim of the scheme to increase incentives for participation and 
not the outcome (which explains why “learning reward system for 
employees” was slightly above average):
“So what we’re trying to reinforce was the mechanism, the 
involvement in continuous improvement, rather than the 
outcome.”
Shop Floor Representative IV had a good opinion of the continuous 
improvement system in Company IV, although he was not participating:
“Continuous improvement? Well that seems to work pretty well.
I wouldn’t have said it’s affected our department a lot, we haven’t 
had a lot to do with it.”
The fact that his department was not participating showed that the 
continuous improvement system was not working everywhere. This was 
despite the fact that these employees recognised the potential for 
improvements within their department:
“We work as a separate unit to the company. People approach us 
and we try and do what we can to help that. But the continuous 
improvement, what I’ve seen of it, tends to deal with the 
production line work, to speed up and to make it more efficient. 
Obviously we probably could improve things but it is running 
pretty well.”
In summary, the case of Company IV shows how problematic the 
introduction of a continuous team improvement system with the help of an 
external European consultancy can be, which has no tacit knowledge to 
teach the implementation and running of organizational learning systems, 
not to speak about acquiring the Learning Organization’s characteristics.
The presentation of six major problems, mentioned in the in-depth 
interview by the management side as barriers against the introduction of a 
continuous improvement system, showed how difficult this process of self 
development by trial-and-error towards the ideal of the Learning
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Organization can be. But it also shows that it can be done, however, more 
slowly and painfully, and with more limited results, as shown in the 
previous cases.
The comments of Shop Floor Representative IV revealed that the 
continuous team improvement system still was not very firmly established.
The reason could be found in the low degree to which the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics could be found at Company IV. It was not an 
ideal environment for embedding this kind of organizational learning 
system, as the help of Japanese companies with their tacit knowledge was 
missing. But also, the good financial situation made many employees of 
Company IV less prone to change.
Company IV’s continuous improvement system was launched by a small 
subculture group in Company IV and did not apply to all areas. This group 
might have had a higher degree of characteristics of the Learning 
Organization than the rest of the organization, which was indicated in the 
questionnaire. However, the successful performance in terms of profit of 
Company IV made it problematic to transfer the subculture onto the whole 
organization, as no urgent pressure for change was perceived by the rest.
9.5. Summary and Conclusion of the In-depth Interviews
All in all, these in-depth interviews showed various interesting points, 
which are summarized in the following paragraphs. The overall picture 
suggests that the outcomes of the hypothesis testing in Chapter 8 could be 
corroborated by the image gained from the companies interviewed. -
Firstly, the first two car component suppliers, i.e. Company I and II, 
revealed various insights into the structure of companies which have a high 
degree of the Learning Organization’s characteristics and successfully 
employ organizational team learning systems. The preferred organizational 
learning system was the continuous team improvement system, as the 
employee suggestion system did not show the results desired.
The best explanation for this is the fact that there was no role model JA  ^ 
available from Japanese companies for employee suggestion schemes, 
compared to kaizen as a role model for continuous teari^ improvement 
systems. As it turned out, tacit knowledge when teaching fe^izen and the  ^ •
existence of the Learning Organization’s characteristics su ^o rted  this /
9 . In -D e p t h  In t e r v ie w s  w it h  F o u r  S e l e c t e d  S u p p l ie r s
process. Other important factors for the successful implementation of the 
team improvement systems were team competition and a certain job 
security when efficiency improvements made positions in one area 
redundant, which goes in line with the findings of Chapters 7 and 8. 
Furthermore, the long-standing bad experience with employee suggestion 
systems in the past did not make the revival of this option very attractive.
Secondly, the two suppliers of the second group in this chapter. 
Company 111 and IV, which indicated very low scores in the characteristics 
of the Learning Organization, received little backing from their top 
management to acquire these characteristics. It was useful to hear about the 
supplier companies from two points of view, i.e. not only from the 
Management Representatives’ but also from a Shop Floor Representative, 
in order to obtain a more balanced view and better understanding of these 
companies.
Company I l l ’s low value on the scale o f the ten Learning 
Organization’s characteristics was responsible for the fact that the 
continuous team improvement system was about to fail for the third time 
when the questionnaire was being completed. Half a year later, at the time 
of the in-depth interview, this initiative had obviously failed again, because 
of a lack of sufficient backing through the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics. These again were neither backed by top management nor a 
Japanese car assembling customer. Honda’s refraining from teaching was 
apparently caused by the fact that the amount of business was too low and 
with little value added, so as to make it attractive for Honda as a customer 
to invest into teaching of its supplier. Furthermore, Honda had little 
experience in teaching its suppliers anyway, as Chapter 8.3 showed.
Company IV’s low degree of its Learning Organization’s characteristics 
did not support its continuous improvement system sufficiently on an 
organization-wide basis. In addition, it was launched by a comparably small 
subculture group of middle managers. This group was very enthusiastic 
about its work but it lacked a strong backing from top management as well 
as help from Japanese companies in the car industry. Therefore, the 
continuous team improvement system was not spread to all departments 
within the company.
In comparison, the first group of suppliers with a high degree of 
characteristics of the Learning Organization had, for example, in 1994 an
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average of 0.086 (= (0.078 + 0.094) / 2) implemented team improvements 
per employee, which was 64% higher than the value of 0.052 (= (0.050 +
0.055) / 2) from the second group with a low degree. This also shows that 
an organizational learning system performs much better with the help of a 
high degree of characteristics of the Learning Organization. Without this, J  Q 
an organizational learning system, especially a team learning system, i s j ^ ^  
doomed to under-perform, or even fail.
Thirdly, it is helpful to compare the second group of companies with 
low scores in the Learning Organization's characteristics with the model of 
an incomplete comprehensive organizational learning cycle (see Figure ''--AWO 
9.1), developed in Chapter 2. In reality, these incomplete comprehensive 
organizational learning cycles mainly had their breaks either between ( l ) ^ ^ f ^  
individual learning and codification or between (2) codification and team T  
learning and/or organizational learning.
The breaks between (1) individual learning and codification were 
suggested to be caused by the fact that an individual is not capable, forgets 
or has no incentives to codify newly-acquired knowledge. In reality, the 
incapability was mainly caused either by a top management which was not 
inclined to change or by a lack of education and training or wrong training 
content, such as in Companies III and IV. And the breaks between (2) 
codification and team learning and/or organizational learning particularly 
applied to Company III, due to missing incentives for team learning in 
conjunction with high work pressure.
Interruptions between (3) team learning and generalization happened in 
Company III and especially Company IV (but also occasionally Company I) 
when the teams did not make their knowledge accessible to the whole 
organization. This learning block was caused by a lack of skills and 
training, no incentives for generalization or team competition. The breaks 
between (4) generalization and organizational learning because the 
organization was not willing to take up the generalization of team learning 
due to conflict with the dominating organizational culture, were the case 
for Companies III and IV.
As regards to severed links between (5) organizational learning and 
institutionalization. Companies III and IV showed that generalized 
knowledge could hardly be stored, as a large part of the organization was 
convinced that this newly acquired knowledge was not relevant for the
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organization as a whole. This opposition originated mainly from Company 
I ll’s growth, and the financial success of Company IV neither created 
obvious need for change learning, i.e. double-loop learning. And finally, 
regular interruptions between (6) institutionalization and individual 
learning applied to both suppliers, i.e. Companies III and IV, due to a lack 
of formal procedures to make institutionalized knowledge easily accessible 
to everyone.
Figure 9.2: The Incomplete Comprehensive Organizational Learning 
Cycle
Individual
Learning
C odifica­
tion
Institutionali­
zation
Organizational
Knowledge
Team
Learning
Organizational
V^earning^
G enerali­
zation
The in-depth interviews showed that, although actual breaks in the 
comprehensive organizational learning cycle are sometimes more blurred 
than the six theoretical cuts, this plain model helps to understand reality by 
reducing the complexity through simplification. Additionally, in the case of 
Companies III and IV, no organizational learning cycle was started by the 
top management in the first instance, as they did not appear to leam 
individually, which leads to the next point.
Fourthly, the commitment of top management plays a major role for 
the success or failure of the implementation of organizational learning 
systems as well as for the acquisition of the Learning Organization’s
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characteristics. Their existence plays an important backing role in the 
implementation and running of organizational learning systems. In the first 
group of companies, both times the change was initiated by the Managing 
Director. However, whereas in Company I ’s case the organizational 
learning cycle was facilitated by approaching Japanese car customers 
pitching for new business, in Company IPs case the organizational learning 
cycle had to be developed with less Japanese guidance, which was not 
always a very smooth process. And in Companies III and IV’s case the 
organizational learning cycle was not really started at all by the top 
management.
Fifthly, the in-depth interviews confirmed the impression that the 
contact with Japanese companies iiT'the car industry (i.e. car producers 
and/or component suppliers) is the key for a fast and secure way of - 
acquiring the Learning Organization’s characteristics and properly 
working organizational team learning systems for car component suppliers 
in Britain. However, the amount of business with suppliers also plays a 
major role in the decision of Japanese car companies whether or not to 
invest into teaching of its suppliers. Additionally, the last two suppliers, i.e. 
Companies III and IV, showed that organizational learning systems tend to 
be not successful and fade quickly without a sufficient degree of the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics as a backing. In addition, neither of 
them had received training from a Japanese company in the car industry.
Sixthly, the two car component suppliers with low values in the 
characteristics of the Learning Organization had no system installed yet to 
spread newly developed knowledge around the whole organization. 
However, the two suppliers with a high degree of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics had already developed essential parts of a 
system.
Last but not least, although a company can have a high degree of 
characteristics of the Learning Organization and an organizational learning 
system (Company II), it can lose business orders in a highly competitive 
subsegment of the component industry. Whereas, on the other hand, an 
organization, which has a low level in the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics and no properly operating organizational learning systems 
(Company III), can grow and prosper in a favourable subsegment of the 
industry with little competition.
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The implication is that it is not advisable for future empirical research 
to link organizational learning capabilities to corporate success, like growth 
and/or profits, unless the extent of competition in the industrial subsegment ^  
or strategic group is also measured (although this still might need the 
inclusion of various other factors that contribute to corporate success). 
Analysing only one industry without more in-depth detail would be not 
precise enough and indeed blur the research efforts.
This chapter dealt with the in-depth interviews and their findings, 
which was the third and final step of the empirical research approach. 
Qualitative and quantitative research was conducted in order to analyse 
organizational learning and the Learning Organization in reality.
The next and final chapter concludes this thesis.
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10. Conclusion ^
This last chapter draws the conclusion of this thesis, derived from the
. { (1theoretical discussion and the empirical analysis of car component suppliers ^  
in llntmn. ^  ^
In particular, this research focused on the refining of the understanding ^  
of organizational learning and the Learning Organization. Organizational  ^ ^
learning was discussed and defined, and its process was demonstrated with '  *  ^
the model of the comprehensive organizational learning cycle, which 
included organizational knowledge. The Learning Organization was 
researched by defining and analysing its characteristics, learning system s/ 
outcomes and sources, all four of which were operationalized for empirical 
^ research in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. This last chapter puts the main findings ‘ 
into perspective.
The chapter starts with its contribution to the currently available body 
)of literature on the Learning Organization and organizational learning, 
continues with a recapitulation of the approach taken in this thesis. Then, it 
• outlines the limitations of the empirical and theoretical work and, finally, 
concludes what implications the research results have for management.
10.1. Contributions of this Thesis to Existing Literature
The contributions of this thesis to the existing body of literature on 
organizational learning and the Learning Organizations lie in the synthesis 
of, and several new insights about, the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics, their outcomes and origins, as well as an improved 
definition of organizational learning and a new model of a complete 
organizational learning cycle. u ju J  "
Additionally, compared to the paradigm of lean production, the 
discussion at the end of Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 showed that the theory 
of organizational learning and the Learning Organization, besides similar 
explanatory power, also offers an underlying coherent theoretical 
framework with its focus on learning. It can even explain recent 
developments in the Japanese car industry, which lean production cannot do 
anymore, due to the conceptual limitations of its paradigm. /
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10.1.1. Contributions Derived from Hypothesis Testing
Firstly, a coherent model of the Learning Organization with its 
characteristics could be synthesised from the piecemeal models of the 
existing literature. It was demonstrated that this coherent framework of the 
ten Learning Organization’s characteristics was useful for empirical 
analysis, in order to understand the role they play in enhancing 
organizational learning of the Learning Organization.
Secondly, in accordance with the theory developed, by rejecting the 
first null hypothesis it could be shown that there is a significant impact of 
the Learning Organization’s characteristics on organizational learning j ^  
outcomes, which has never been researched in this depth before. One 
important finding was that this impact of the Learning Organization’s ^  
characteristics on organizational learning outcomes occurs mainly in an  ^
indirect way via organizational learning systems as an intermediate 
variable, and not in a direct way.
The questionnaire analysis suggested that a successful introduction of 
continuous improvement team systems was strongly dependent on the 
degree to which the characteristics of the Learning Organization existed.
The in-depth interviews helped to interpret the result of the questionnaire 
analysis that car component suppliers with a high degree of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics had introduced continuous improvement 
team systems and abolished employee suggestion systems, due to the success 
of the former compared to the failure of the latter.
The implications of this thesis are that individual learning alone can 
lead to organizational learning, but that team learning plays a pivotal role 
as a transfer mechanism from individual learning to organizational 
learning, especially in the case of complex knowledge. Furthermore, 
organizational learning systems, in the form of employee suggestion 
systems and especially team improvement systems, play a crucial role in the 
organizational learning process. Organizational learning systems were 
neglected in the literature about organizational learning to date, i
Thirdly, by rejecting the second null hypothesis it /could be 
demonstrated that relationships of car component suppliers in Britain with 
Japanese companies in the car industry are important for these suppliers in 
order to acquire the characteristics of the Learning Organization. The
'
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impact of was highly significant for relationships with Japanese car 
manufacturers (which were (fegardeSp as the source for the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics) as-Well as Japanese car suppliers as co- 
operators. The impact was only weakly significant for relationships with 
Japanese car component suppliers as owners. Thus, the research suggested 
that for the teaching of the Learning Organization’s characteristics, the 
transfer of implicit, i. e. tacit, knowledge plays a major role. This can only 
be done properly through regular personal contact in a conducive 
relationship, i.e. “socializing”, e.g., in form of regular engineers visits to 
provide training or secondment of employees for a longer period.
A summary of the major results of the hypotheses testing with 
questionnaire data from seventy car component suppliers in Britain is 
depicted in Figure 10.1 below.
Figure 10.1: Summary of the Major Results of Hypotheses Testing
Sources of the 
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Ja p an e se  car 
producers 
a s  custom ers
Japanese  
component 
suppliers as 
owners
Japanese  
component 
suppliers as 
co-operators
Characteristics 
of the Learning 
Organization
Team  work and 
team  learning 
Free vertical and 
tiorizontal flow of 
information 
Education and training of 
ttie wtiole workforce 
Systemic thinking and 
mental models 
Learning reward system  
for employees 
Continuous improve­
ment of work 
Leaming latwratories and 
constant experimentation 
Decentralized hierarchies 
and participative 
management 
Flexibility of company 
strategy and employees 
Supportive corporate 
leaming culture
Organizational
Learning
Systems
Team
Improvement
System
Employee
Suggestion
System
' = weakly significant (p < 0 .1), ** = significant (p < 0 .05), and *** = strongly significant (p < 0 .01 )
Organizational
Learning
Outcomes
Team
improvements
irnplemented
Employee
suggestions
implemented
Ratio of new vs. 
old products 
introduced
New products Intro­
duced compared to 
competitors
Improvement of 
intemal quality per 
units produced
Improvement of 
external quality per 
units produced
10.1.2. Further Contributions to Existing Literature
Firstly, the working definition of organizational leaming (the first two 
sentences of the definition below), elaborated in Chapter 2, could be
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confirmed by the empirical findings of this thesis. In addition, as a further 
contribution, it was concluded from the empirical research in Chapter 8 
and 9 that the intentional use of especially formalized team learning, to 
solve organizational tasks and improve organizational performance, leads 
to better results from organizational action. This insight is added to the 
definition in order to clarify the interactions of the different elements:
Organizational learning is a process of knowledge acquisition or 
knowledge generation of an organization, performed through 
individuals, which can be accomplished by teams. It is based on 
organizational memory that is expanded, which can improve 
organizational actions. The intentional use of organizational 
leaming systems, especially team leaming systems, in order to 
solve organizational tasks and improve performance, has a 
positive impact on organizational actions and their outcomes.
Secondly, the model of the comprehensive organizational learning 
cycle, elaborated in Chapter 2, could be corroborated by the impressions 
gained from the empirical work. The questionnaire analysis in Chapter 8, 
but also the empirical research of the in-depth interviews in Chapter 9, 
suggest a dual-phased comprehensive organizational leaming cycle, which 
is structured as follows.
(1) In the primary comprehensive organizational leaming cycle, started 
by the Managing Director (individual leaming) and/or top management 
(team learning) normally on a double-loop level, the organization is 
focused and structured to accomplish certain goals in a secondary leaming 
c y c l e . 116 The results of the in-depth interviews suggest that the Managing 
Director option is more prevalent in starting an organizational cycle by 
setting a specific goal for the next organizational leaming cycle (see the 
line drawn between “Codification” and “Organizational Learning” at 
Figure 10.2 below, which is thick now).
____________________________
116 However, should this primary organizational learning cycle be ill reflectédr^e. lack systemic 
thinking, and not be focused on enabling and fostering organizational leamîîigrth© secondary organizational
learning cycles are doomed to fail. This occurs normally when the attempt is made to copy a concept 
without understanding the underling tacit knowledge, which indicates again the importance of socialization.
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(2) In the secondary comprehensive organizational learning cycle, 
which tends to be repetitive, the rest of the organization can strive for these 
set goals: either predominantly single-loop leaming in the case of product 
or process improvements or predominantly double-loop learning in the 
case of product or process developments. In both cases, team leaming is 
superior in solving complex problems which involve implicit knowledge 
from different areas, but also because of the fact that team leaming systems 
work more effectively and efficiently in practice than individual leaming 
systems. This means as well that the need for including team leaming into 
an organizational leaming cycle depends on the complexity of the problem. 
For simple problems, individual learning can be enough on its own and, 
therefore, more appropriate (a differentiation, which was not really
considered in the existing literature to date).
Figure 10.2: The Comprehensive Organizational Leaming Cycle
Individual
Learning
C odifica­
tion
Institutionali­
zation
Organizational
Knowledge
Team
Learning
Organizational 
V  Learning
G en erali­
zation
The implication of these findings about the nature of the dual-phased 
comprehensive organizational leaming cycle is that statements such as that 
from Senge (1990a: 7) that the “old days when a Henry Ford, Alfred Sloan, 
or Tom Watson learned fo r the organization are gone”, on the contrary, 
still hold true today. However, it showed that the primary comprehensive
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organizational learning cycles of top management are most effective when 
they aim to facilitate organizational leaming of the rest of the organization 
in secondary comprehensive organizational leaming cycles.
Furthermore, as opposed to their model, presented in Chapter 2, 
Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) describe in their case studies a process of the 
developm ent of a new p r o d u c t ^ which is also a dual-phased 
comprehensive organizational leaming cycle. The case studies normally 
start with the action of top manager or top management, which perform 
the primary organizational learning cycle for the organization, as they 
perceive the need for the development of a new product and restmcture the 
organization accordingly. Then, a secondary organizational leaming cycle 
is performed, mostly with many leaming loops on the individual and team 
level, when the individuals of a project development team achieve the 
development of the new product with the help of their team. This also 
means that these organizational learning cycles for new product 
development are more a top-team-down approach, than a middle-up-down 
approach, like that suggested by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), implying that j 
the organizational leaming cycle is started from middle management. This 
can be said as well in a light of the in-depth interviews in Chapter 9, w h ic h ^  ^  
showed that starting the primary comprehensive organizational leaming 
cycle from middle management does not work properly in reality.
Incomplete organizational learning cycles within the comprehensive 
model emerged mainly in the primary cycle. This was because none of the 
top management had started a comprehensive organizational leaming cycle 
by individual learning. Consequently, the person or relevant group in 
middle management failed in secondary organizational learning cycle, 
either around “codification” or around “generalization” (for example, this 
was the case with the two companies with a low prevalence of the Leaming 
Organization’s characteristics in Chapter 9). However, it is not always clear 
in reality where exactly the break in the organizational leaming circle may 
be, as the comprehensive model might suggest.
* New product development normally requires double-loop learning, in order to change the frame of 
actions, compared with the improvement of existing products, which normally needs only single-loop rV A* 
learning. The latter is not included in the model portrayed by Nonaka & Takeuchi, although it appears to be 
more typical to Japanese companies than the development of complete new products.
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If one applies the model of the comprehensive organizational leaming 
cycle to plants or small companies, this thesis shows that a small 
organization is often part of at least one larger organization, which again 
can belong to an even larger organization. How does this fit in with the 
comprehensive model? The answer is suggested to be that in all cases there 
are individuals involved as the basic leaming unit. However, individual 
learning, team learning and organizational learning can be found on 
different levels and in different forms in a large organization. This 
learning process, which includes the efficient transfer of tacit knowledge 
(socialization), can have at least six different forms in practice: (1) 
team/employee suggestion systems, (2) product development teams within 
the particular division/unit, (3) product development teams with 
suppliers/customers/partners, (4) meetings of different teams of one 
corporate division/unit, (5) contact fairs of the different divisions/units of 
the company or (6) task force teams which visit the different divisions/units 
of the company. Although the comprehensive organizational leaming cycle 
will look the same, the level of the organization will obviously differ. Also, 
sharing of knowledge with other organizations constitutes a new 
comprehensive organizational learning cycle in itself, which normally 
starts with individual leaming of one or more individuals. ,
K
10.2. Assessment of the Approach of this Thesis
This thesis has endeavoured to make a contribution to the theory of 
organizational learning and the Learning Organization by establishing a 
new framework for the Learning Organization, as an ideal model of an 
organization which excels in organizational learning. The research 
approach is explained in more detail below.
After the introduction and discussion of existing theories of 
organizational leaming and the Leaming Organization, a synthesised model 
of the Learning Organization was developed. Furthermore, this thesis 
identified a current lack of empirical research available in this area. In 
addition, many weaknesses were found in the few investigations done to 
date, including a lack of theoretical underpinning, as discussed at the end of 
Chapter 6. As a consequence, the theoretical framework developed (based 
on the Learning Organization’s characteristics) was operationalized in 
order to undertake in-depth empirical research in practice. Three areas
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were focused on: firstly, the characteristics of the Leaming Organization, 
secondly, the outcomes of organizational leaming and, thirdly, the sources 
of the Learning Organization’s characteristics. j
%10.2.1. The Ten Characteristics of the Leaming Organization^
This thesis’ contribution is that the ten characteristics o f the Learning 
Organization have not been refined, structured and synthesised to date 
such a comprehensive way. Also, to date nobody has shown how conducive 
these characteristics are for organizational leaming.
The ten characteristics of the Leaming Organization are displayed in 
Table 10.1. The shading in which the items appear in the table indicates a 
ranking. This was not yet the case when the characteristics first were 
introduced in the middle of Chapter 3. The characteristic “systemic 
thinking and mental models” is ranked as the most important feature, 
indicated by a dark shading. The theoretical discussion at the end of 
Chapter 3 explained the importance of this characteristic as well as the ^  
regression analysis in Chapter 8, which established its key importance for , 
an organization to become a Leaming Organization. bU p
The characteristic “continuous improvement of work” is re g a rd e d ^  ‘ 
the second most important characteristic, also being necessary and-^^J^ 
sufficient, due to its pivotal role to continuously challenge and improve the 
status quo in an organization, as has been elaborated in Chapter 3. 
However, it did not show a significant difference in importance in the 
empirical analysis compared to the other eight characteristics of the 
Learning Organization in Chapter 8. As a consequence, “continuous 
improvement of work” is only shown in a light shading in Table 10.1.
It is hardly possible to rank the succeeding eight characteristics in 
importance, all of which have been suggested to be necessary but not 
s u f f i c i e n t !  18 in Chapter 3. But, the “supportive organizational learning 
culture” stands out for two reasons. Firstly, it is constmcted from a group 
of six elements itself and, secondly, it has an all embracing and nurturing 
role. This is why this characteristic has been given a light shading.
118 This means that these characteristics alone are not enough to create a Learning Organization.
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The characteristics “free vertical and horizontal flow of information” is 
also worth mentioning, as Chapters 8 and 9 showed that content of 
information plays a much more important role than the form in which this 
information is distributed. However, there was no indication that it was 
more important than the other six remaining characteristics of the 
Leaming Organization. This is why all seven remaining characteristics are 
classified as being necessary but not sufficient and, therefore, have not been 
shaded at all in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1: The Ten Characteristics of the Leaming Organization
• Systemic thinking and mental models
• Continuous improvement of work
• Supportive corporate learning culture*
• Team work and team learning
• Free vertical and horizontal flow of information
• Education and training of the whole workforce
• Learning reward systems for employees
• Flexibility of company strategy and employees
• Decentralized hierarchies and participative management
• Learning laboratories and constant experimentation
includes; d ia lo g u e , sh a red  interpretation of reality, sh a red  v ision  of th e  future, 
o p e n n e s s  & trust, com m itm en t & to lera n ce  an d  risk taking & responsib ility
Note: The darker the shading the higher the ranking of the characteristic.
The more prevalent these ten characteristics of the Learning 
Organization were in a company’s questionnaire, the closer it reflected the 
ideal of the Leaming Organization. It was hypothesised that this would lead 
to better organizational leaming outcomes, which are dealt with next.
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10.2.2. The Six Measures for Organizational Leaming Outcomes
This thesis developed six measures of organizational leaming outcomes, 
in order to gauge the extent of organizational learning outcomes of an 
organization empirically. The existing literature could not provide any 
useful operationalized measures for this research.
The six measures of organizational learning outcomes were divided 
into the following three different groups with two scales each.
The first group, which gauged the amount of individual leaming which 
had turned into organizational learning, consisted of the (a) number of 
implemented team improvements and the (b) number of implemented 
suggestions per employee.
The second group, which assessed the speed of organizational 
learning 119^  included the (c) ratio of new products introduced compared to 
existing ones and the (d) self-assessment of new products introduced 
compared to competitors.
The third group, which measured the extent of improvements in 
quality, comprised (e) improvement of intemal quality per units produced 
and (f) improvement of external quality per units produced. The latter 
refers to the improvement of rejects or recalls of products by customers.
Besides these organizational leaming outcomes, there was also a focus 
on the sources of the characteristics of the Leaming Organization.
10.2.3. The Sources of the Learning Organization’s Characteristics
The argument advanced in this thesis that the theory of the Learning 
Organization is a coherent theoretical model was based on the concept of 
organizational leaming. It proved to be a useful tool to help explain the// 
global market success of Japanese companies.
As, since the early 1990’s, direct car component suppliers in Great ^ 
Britain have been and are strongly exposed to the impact of Japanese 
companies in the car industry, these suppliers were selected as the subject
 ^ 9^ This could range from product development of completely new products to product improvement^, 
whereas the rest of the groups of outcomes only measured product or process improvements.
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of research. The sourcejs of the characteristics of the Learning 
Organization w e^  Hyjpot^sjsed to be mainly Japanese car producers as 
Learning Organizations in their own right. Therefore, the diffusion of 
characteristics of the Learning Organization to car component suppliers in 
Great Britain was explored.
10.2.4. The Two Main Hypotheses and the Research Methods
The overall research focused on two main hypotheses, which findings 
were recaptured at the beginning of this chapter. The first hypothesis put 
forward a positive impact of the Learning Organization’s characteristics on 
organizational learning outcomes (intra-organizational learning). The 
second hypothesis proposed that these Learning O rganization’s 
characteristics were predominantly due to some form of relationship with 
Japanese car producing or Japanese component supplying companies (inter- 
organizational learning).
Hypothesis 1 tested whether car component suppliers in Britain which 
showed a higher score in the characteristics of the Learning Organization 
tend to perform better in organizational learning outcomes.
Hypothesis 2 analysed the source of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics and tested whether component suppliers in Britain which 
had more contact with Japanese companies in the car industry tend to have 
more characteristics distinctive of the Learning Organization.
The empirical part of this thesis used a combination of three different 
research methods.
Firstly, exploratory interviews were conducted with six car component 
suppliers in Britain to test the general approach of this thesis and refine the 
hypotheses. Secondly, completed questionnaires from seventy suppliers 
were examined to test the hypotheses empirically. And, thirdly, in-depth 
interviews with four selected companies were conducted at the end in order 
to support the findings and to confirm the interpretations from the 
questionnaire survey, as well as to investigate the process of organizational 
learning over time.
As previously argued in Chapter 6, in case of contradictory results 
between the different research methods employed, this thesis rather 
followed the phenomenological approach (i.e. focusing on meanings) than
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the positivist approach (i.e. focusing on facts). This is because the world is 
not seen as being external and objective, but rather as being socially 
constructed and subjective. _  i
10.3. Limitations of the Contributions of this Thesis
The limitations of the research pursued in this thesis, some of which 
can also be areas for future research, are as set out below.
Firstly, the sample size of the seventy questionnaires, in combination 
with certain unanswered questions by some recipients, led to a low number 
of valid cases with respect to a few items in this research. However, one 
could nevertheless argue that a clear picture still emerges in the analysis 
carried out by this thesis, due to the research combination of a 
questionnaire survey and the conducting of interviews.
Secondly, most car component suppliers did not complete the sections 
in the questionnaire relating to Japanese suppliers as customers, as suppliers 
or as co-members of supplier associations (which can include competitors). 
Therefore, the analysis of these sources was dropped when the 
questionnaire data was evaluated. However, the theoretical argument as 
well as the interviews suggested that they can all play a role in the process 
of acquiring the Learning Organization’s characteristics.
Thirdly, the questionnaire with its cross-sectional nature had some 
disadvantages compared to a longitudinal study, especially when looking at 
the empirical causal relationships. For the research of this thesis, as 
explained in Chapter 6, a cross-sectional study approach was chosen. Some 
of its deficiencies were offset with the help of exploratory and in-depth 
interviews, both confirming the; assumed causal relationships. Still, a 
longitudinal study could be an m t^csting field for future research, for 
example, about the learning process between direct car component 
suppliers and their suppliers, or perhaps set in a different industry context.
Fourthly, the questionnaire sample can be seen as being representative 
for the population of car component producers in Britain that directly 
supply car manufacturers with respect to turnover and employees. Testing 
of further values for representativeness (like e.g., type of component) was 
not possible due to a lack of data available. However, the actual population
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was not of major concern for the purpose of this research, which was more 
aimed at the empirical testing of a newly-designed theoretical model.
Last, but not least, there are also some implications of this research for 
senior management.
10.4. Implications of this Thesis for Senior Management
The key question for senior management certainly is: what is the 
advantage of being a Learning Organization? Generally speaking, it enables 
the organization to stay competitive by steadily improving its performance 
and solving problems quickly. The structure of a Learning Organization 
also helps to anticipate, and, therefore, avoid crises. This is enabled 
through the ability to acquire or generate explicit and especially tacit 
knowledge at a high pace and turn it quickly into tangible outcomes. The 
main reason for this is, on the one hand, the close team-based contact 
between the employees, who leam for their organization as they see that 
their contribution counts and is rewarded. On the other hand, there is also 
the close-team-based contact with clients, which keeps the company in 
touch with customer needs, which can sometimes change quickly.
The following recommendations for senior management can be 
concluded from this thesis as regards car components suppliers in Britain, 
who want to increase the competitiveness of their companies. This can be 
achieved by striving towards the ideal model of the Learning Organization 
in order to achieve a high performance in organizational learning 
outcomes. Whereas top management have the advantage to act as they wish, 
middle management has the more difficult task of convincing top 
management to act so.
The research presented in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 s^ w e d  that the best 
way, because it is the most direct one, to acquire the characteristics of the ^
Learning Organization is to gain or to have Japanese customers. The^^— 
questionnaire analysis suggests a strong preference for Toyota or Nissan 
compared to Honda. As explained in Chapter 8, Honda, as a late-comer to 
the automotive industry in Japan, did not have to leam how to teach its 
suppliers, which were already trained by Toyota or Nissan. However, in 
order to offset this deficiency in Britain, Honda tends to facilitate co-
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operation with Japanese suppliers, a fact to be taken into consideration i
S ^  T'when doing business with Honda. In any case, the quantity of business ^
should be large enough to give these Japanese customers sufficient self- 
interest to train their supplier.
The second best alternative is to seek for Japanese suppliers as co- 
operators, in the form of joint-ventures, technical assistance/ collaboration 
agreements or design/technical co-operations to improve quality. The third 
best alternative is to have a Japanese company as an owner, but this has a 
much weaker impact than the first two options.
There is also the option of acquiring the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics by a trial and error process, without the help of socializing,
i.e. close personal contact, with the kind of Japanese companies mentioned 
above. However, this conversion process, which tries to convert explicit 
knowledge into implicit knowledge, is much more onerous and takes much 
longer. Additionally, the research showed that this “do-it-yourself’ 
approach can lead to organizational learning of the wrong explicit 
knowledge about the Learning Organization’s characteristics, which is 
neither conducive to improving organizational learning nor organizational 
learning outcomes of the organization.
Although the questionnaire-based research could not give any 
indication about learning from Japanese supplier companies as customers, 
suppliers or as co-members in supplier associations, the interviews 
suggested that this can be the case. Furthermore, there was little significant 
evidence to be found in this work which suggested that European or - - ^  
American companies, either as customers or owners, were a source for the 
Learning Organization’s characteristics for component suppliers in Britain.
In addition to the characteristics of the Learning Organization, an 
organizational learning system, preferably in the form of a team 
improvement system, with responsibility and power for its teams in 
combination with a co-ordinator, is the most important tool to transfer 
individual knowledge into organizational knowledge. This enables a 
company to become a high performer in organizational learning, and, 
therefore, outcomes, i.e. number of improvements implemented, speed of 
product developments and improvements in quality.
As regards the speed of product development (measured by the two 
variables (c) ratio of new products introduced compared to existing ones
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and (d) new products introduced compared to competitors), only the use of 
project teams (assessed by the characteristic “team work and team 
learning”) had a direct positive impact on both. This was especially the case 
for inter-organizational project teams with customers or suppliers, but also 
partially for combined intra-organizational cross-departm ental and 
hierarchical project teams.
The in-depth interviews highlighted the fact that an organization with a 
low score of the Learning Organization’s characteristics in a favourable 
subsegment of the industry with little competition, can nevertheless grow 
strongly or make good profits, and be successful. However, as previously 
mentioned in this thesis, there is a general trend of increasing competition 
for all car component suppliers, which has been fuelled especially by global 
sourcing and single sourcing (i.e. only one supplier for one part), as well 
as increased competition among car assemblers. This makes the option of 
striving for the ideal of the Learning Organization attractive for 
component suppliers, even if some few areas in the car component industry 
are currently still relatively safe from cut-throat competition.
The questionnaire analysis and the in-depth interviews highlighted the 
fact that the successful change towards the Learning Organization is very 
dependent on the backing of top management. If they did not perceive any 
need or pressure to change, then it was very difficult for the organization 
to change at all. The in-depth interviews in Chapter 9 also suggested that 
the role of top management, especially the Managing Director, play a 
significant role for the acquisition of the Learning Organization’s 
characteristics, like the multiple regression at the end of Chapter 8 
proposes. On the one hand, the regression analysis showed only a weakly 
significant impact of top management’s receptivity, on the other hand, this 
was the only other significant variable besides Japanese car companies, 
which showed a highly significant impact. In other words, the backing of 
top management can make or break the acquisition of the Learning 
Organization’s characteristics, which again are needed for the successful 
implementation and performance of organizational team learning systems.
In transforming an organization towards the ideal of the Learning 
Organization, the characteristic “systemic thinking and mental models” 
plays a major role, as confirmed by the logistic regression analysis. Also 
the interviews with those companies which had a high degree of
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characteristics of the Learning Organization showed that “systemic thinking 
and mental models”, especially of top management, plays a decisive role in 
this transformation process. The organization-wide implementation of the 
ideas gained from this characteristic is very important.
The question remains: is there a specific management style for 
directing an organization towards the Learning Organization? The 
conclusion of this work is that this management style is flexible and 
receptive in view of the characteristics of the Learning Organization, 
especially of “systemic thinking and mental models”, and it focuses on 
contributing to organizational learning outcomes. Doing so helps senior 
management to decide which areas are critical for the completion of 
comprehensive organizational learning cycles, in order to structure the 
organization accordingly and to make organizational learning happen on a 
continuous basis - not just by chance.
o
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A PP E N D IX :
1. Questionnaire for Suppliers
2. Questionnaire Guideline for Exploratory Interviews (General Example)
3. Questionnaire Guideline for In-depth Interviews (General Example)
4. Skill Levels for I, L, U Skill Matrix (Source: Company B)
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Please complete the questionnaire and return it to:
(the a d d r e s s  ca n  b e  u se d  for a  w indow  en v e lo p e )
Mr P h ilipp  Rosengarten 
London School o f Econom ics 
In d u s tr ia l R e la tions Departm ent 
H oughton  Street 
London WC2A 2AE
C on fiden tia lity : Your data will be used only for research at the LSE by Philipp Rosengarten. 
Company names will not be mentioned in any form in the analysis or presentation of the data. 
For any further questions, please call Philipp Rosengarten: 0171-955 7917 or 0171-834 0587
)|ease note: If your company involves more than one factory, please refer only to the 
_________ facto ry  at your s ite  when answering the questions._______________
. Team Work: (employees working together in a team/group)
. General questions about shopfloor teamwork used for production:
- Do you use a shopfloor team structure for production? O  No O  Yes, since 19 _
- How many people does a shopfloor team normally consist o f ?  people
- Do these teams form a larger group for information exchange?
O  No O  Yes If yes, how many teams form a larger group? teams
- Do shopfloor teams meet to discuss improvements?
O  No O  Yes, times a month fo r  minutes on average.
- Do shopfloor team members rotate between jobs regularly?
O  No O  Yes, every  hour(s) during their shift.
Z. In 1994, how many types o f mixed project teams existed in total consisting o f  
employees from d ifferent. . .  a) departments:  teams
b) levels o f hierarchy:  teams
c) departments and levels o f h.:  teams
5. In 1994, how many mixed project teams existed in total consisting o f your own 
employees and employees from y o u r . . .  a) customers:  teams
b) suppliers:  teams
c) partner com p an ies:____teams
1. In which year did you start to employ mixed project teams? In 1 9 __ ._________
I. Inform ation and Comm unication;
.. General questions about information and communication in your company:
- What kind of communication channels do you use in your company?
a) briefings O No O Yes,____times a month for____ minutes.
b) meetings with representatives of employees
O No O Yes, times a month for_____ minutes.
Are these representatives unions? O No O Yes
c) newsletters O No O Yes, every week(s).
d) others ___________________________________________
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- What kind of information do you disclose to all employees in your company?
a) Financial performance O No O Yes, since_19__.
b) Quality performance O No O Yes, since_19__.
c) Productivity performance O No O Yes, since_19__.
d) Production plans O No O Yes, since_19__.
e) Investment plans O No O Yes, since_19__.
Z.Do the following statements describe the role of information within your company?
- 'Information exchange occurs across and between. . . not at all partially very much
a) different departments.' ©  — (!) — d )  — @  — (D
b) different levels of hierarchy.' ®  (D (3) @  (§)
- 'Information concerning work is shared by ail employees.' ®  ® ®  @  ®
- 'All employees communicate with each other informally.' ®  ® ® @  ®
- 'Face-to-face communication is the most usual way.' ®  @  ® @  ®
- 'Communication flows from .. . a) top to bottom' ®  ® @  @  ®
b) bottom to top.' ®  — @  — @  — @  — ®
II. Education and Training:
1. General questions about education and training:
- What percentage o f sales was spent on education and training in 1994?__ %
- The latest major restructuring o f the education & training programme was in 19 _
- How many different courses do you offer shopfloor workers?___
- Do you design these courses in-house to suit your needs? O  No O  Yes
- Do you use T.W.I. (Training Within Industries) as a design platform  
for your in-house training courses? O  No O  Yes O  Don't know
Z. Do these statements describe education and training provided in your company?
not at all partially very much
- 'Education and training is carried out systematically.' ®  ®  @  ®  ®
- 'Education and training is done . . .  a) at all levels.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
b) in all functions.' ® ~ @  —@  —@  —®
- 'Education and training is provided on the shopfloor for . . .
a) workers i n . . .  aa) statistical techniques.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
ab) graphical techniques.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
ac) creativity techniques.' ®  ®  ®  ®  ®
ad) communication skills.' ®  ®  @  ®  ®
ae) presentation skills.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
b) team leaders in . .. ba) statistical techniques.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
bb) graphical techniques.' ®  ®  ®  @  ®
be) creativity techniques.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
bd) communication skills.' ®  @  ®  @  ®
be) presentation skills.' ®  ®  ®  ®  ®
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V. Problem Solving and Opinions
. Do the following sta tem ents describe how your em ployees solve problems?
'In taking problem solving actions employees consider. . . not at all partially very much
a) likely reactions to their actions.' (D ®  ®  @  ®
b) delay of reactions to their actions.' (D ®  ®  @  ®
'Problems are traced back to their root causes.' (D ®  ®  @  ®
- 'Emphasis is placed on the context of problems.' ®  ®  ®  @  ®
- 'Short-term solutions are normally avoided.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
- 'Personal opinions are expressed to . . . a) colleagues.' ®  ®  ®  @  ®
b) superiors.' ® ~ @  — —®
- 'Different opinions are accommodated by consensus.' ®  ®  ®  ®  ®
i. The last m ajor change in your com pany's problem  solving approach began in 1 9 __.
/. Rew ard System: (note: payment is considered only a part of the reward system)
.. Do these sta tem ents below describe the  rew ard system  w ithin y o u r com pany?
not at all partially very much
- 'Only non-financial rewards are given for acquired skills. ®  ®  ®  @  ®
- 'Our reward system for shopfloor workers is based o n . . .
non-monetary rewards.' ®  ®  @  @
- 'Punishment for failures is generally avoided.' ®  ®  @  ®
- 'Our reward system for employees is long-term oriented.' ®  ®  ®  @
- 'Our reward system values the . . .
a) outcome of learning activities' ®  ®  ®  @
b) outcome of experimentation.' ®  ®  ®  @
I. Please give examples o f non-m onetary  rewards your com pany u ses:_______
p. The last major restructuring o f your reward system for employees began in 1 9 __ .
[/I. C ontinuous Im provem ent:
. General questions about continuous improvement projects performed by project 
teams (or groups) o f employees in your company: Go to part 2.)
Do you employ continuous improvement project teams? O  No O  Yes, since 1 9 __ .
How many continuous improvement team projects did you implement?
in 1990:  in 1992:  in 1 9 94 :_____  O  Not counted.
How much were the estimated savings by these continuous improvement projects?
in 1990:_____ £ in 1992:_____ £ in 1 9 9 4 :______£ O  Not counted.
Is there a co-ordinator o f these continuous improvement project teams?
Q  No Q  Yes, he/she does it Q  a) full-time or Q  b) in addition to h is/her job._____
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. General questions about continuous im provem ent by em ployee suggestion system:
Has you r com pany installed  an  em ployee suggestion system?
O  No {m- Go to part 3.) O  Yes, the latest version was in troduced  in 1 9 __
How m any em ployee suggestions for continuous im provem ent w ere generated?
in 1990:____  in 1992:_____ in 1994:   O  Not counted.
W hat percen tage o f all these suggestions was im plem ented?
in 1990:_____ % in 1992:____ % in 1994 :_____% O  Not counted.
How m any days on  average d id  the im plem entation o f a  suggestion take?
in 1990:____  in 1992:_____ in 1 9 9 4 :_____  O  Not counted.
How m uch m oney was saved p e r  suggestion on average?
in 1990:______ £ in 1992:_____£ in 1 9 9 4 :___ _ £ O  Not counted.
5. Do these sta tem ents describe continuous im provem ent w ithin your company?
- ’Continuous improvement occurs for . . .  not at all partially very much
a) work flow.’
b) products.’ ®  — @  — @  — (D
c) services.’ ® ~ @  —@  —@  —(D
d) security.’ ®  —d ) —®  —@  —©
- ’Continuous improvement is performed using . . .
a) statistical techniques.’ ®  ®  ®  @  ©
b) graphical techniques.’ ®  ®  ©  @  ©
c) creativity techniques.’ ®  ®  ©  ®  ©
d) communication methods.’ ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
e) presentation methods.' ®  ®  ©  @  ©
- ’Continuous improvement is based on accurate analysis.’ ®  ®  ©  ®  ©
- ’Everyone is involved in continuous improvement.’ ®  ®  ©  @  ©
- ’Procedures for improvements are detailed & standardised.’ ®  ®  ©  ®  ©
/II. Experim enting: (experiment = test or trial carried out carefully in order to study the
results, gain new knowledge and insights, and create something new) 
L. Do the  following statem ents describe experim enting w ithin your company?
not at all partially very much
- ’Employees experiment. . .  a) using computer simulations.’ ®  ©  ©  @  ©
b) using exercises in teams.’ ®  ©  ©  @  ©
c) in small independent units.’ ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
- ’Employees experiment by systematically . . .
a) searching for new knowledge.’ ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
b) testing of new knowledge.’ ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
- ’Experimenting is not only the task of the R & D people.' ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
- ’When we introduce new machines we test one first.’ ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
- ’Mistakes due to experimenting cannot be avoided.’ ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
- ’We use product development teams with employees
from different departments and levels of hierarchy.’ ®  ©  ©  ®  ©
I. Your last m ajor change relating to  experim entation in your com pany was in 1 9 __ .
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/III. H ierarchies and M anagem ent:
Do these statements describe management within your company?
The company's long-term decisions are not at all partially very much
discussed among. . .  a) top management.' ®  (D (D @  ®
b) middle management.' ®  ® ®  @ ®
c) other employees.' ®  ® ® @  ®
'Decisions are made with the involvement of the
employees affected by them.' ®  ® ®  ®  ®
'Decisions are delegated to the people who take action.' ®  ® ®  @  ®
'All sections of the company are guided by . . .
a) shared visions.' ® “ @  — ® ~ @  — ®
b) shared values.' ®  ® ®  ®  ®
'The company's top management is responsible for . .  .
a) understanding the organisation as a system.' ®  ® ®  ®  ®
b) the structuring of learning processes.' ®  @  @  ®  ®
c) creating the company's shared vision.' ®  ® ®  ®  ®
d) anticipating long-term issues.' ®  ® ® ®  ®
Z. The last major change o f your company's employment hierarchy began in 1 9 __
[X. FlexibiïïtvT
I. Do these statements describe attitudes within your company?
- 'Top management plans company strategies not at all partially very much
taking into consideration different scenarios.' ®  ® ®  ®  ®
- 'Top management tries to anticipate all future
developments which might concern the company.' ®  ® @  ®  ®
- 'Top management's strategic planning
reflects continuously changes in reality.' ®  ® ® ®  ®
- 'White-collar workers are rotated . . .
a) within the same department.' ®  ® ®  ®  ®
b) between different departments.' ®  ® @  ®  ®
c) between different sections.' ®  @  ®  ®  ®
- 'Shopfloor workers, who have been with your company for at least two years, . . .
a) have been trained in all jobs of their production team.' ®  ®  ® ®  ®
b) can perform all jobs of their production team.' ®  ®  ®  ®  ®
Z- The last major change programme related to company flexibility started in 1 9  .
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L Corporate Culture:
.. Do these statements below describe the corporate culture within your company?
- 'We use communication techniques that help employees . . not at all partially veryjnuch
a) recognise their differences in opinion.’ (D (D (D
b) put aside their differences in opinion.' (D @  @  '
- 'Important discussions are guided by facilitators.' (D ®  ®  @  '
- 'Employees discuss their personal understanding of the
company's reality with other employees.' (D ®  ®  @
- 'Personal understandings are harmonised by consensus.' (D ®  ®  @
- 'Employees discuss their personal vision about
the company's future with other employees.’ (D ®  @  @
- 'Personal visions are harmonised by consensus.' ®  ®  (D @
- 'Employees express opinions openly. .  a) to peers.' ®  ®  @  @
b) to superiors.' ®  ®  ®  @
- 'Employees have confidence in their . . a) peers.' ®  ®  ®  @
b) superiors.' ®  — ®  — ®  — ®  —
- 'Employees are highly committed to the company.' ®  ®  @  ®
- 'Employees have a high tolerance of other's opinions .' ®  ®  ®
- 'Everyone in the company takes risks sometimes.' ®  ®  ®  @
- 'Everyone is responsible for the outcomes of his actions.' ®  @  ®  @
2. The last major change programme for your company's culture began in 1 9 __
Kl.  O rganisational Change:
1. Have major change programmes taken place in your company since 1980?
(e.g. Total Quality Initiative, Continuous Improvement Programme, etc.)
O  No O  Yes 1st change 1 9  2nd change 1 9  3rd change 1 9 __
(w- Go to part 3.)
2. What were the reasons* for and objectives o f  these change programmes?
(*e.g. change in ownership, top management, market conditions, competitors, customers, etc.)
- 1st change:___________________________________________________________________
-2nd change:___________________________________________________________________
- 3rd change___________________________________________________________________
3. Do these statements describe your company's resources available for change?
not at all partially very much
- 'Change programmes are not restricted by our resources.' ®  ®  (D ®  ®
- 'We have employees who implement change programmes.' ®  ®  @
- 'We employ consultants to facilitate change programmes.' ®  ®  @  @  '
- 'We are receptive to new developments at the . . .
a) top management level.' ®  ®  @  '
b) middle management level.' ®  ®  @  ®
c) employee level.' ®  ®  @  @  ®
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[II. Company Data:
. Name of company:______________________________________ founded in 1 9  
. Your name & title:______________________________________^  :______________
u Number o f employees:
in 1990:_________ in 1992:  in 1994:_________
k Sales turnover (in million pounds):
in 1990:_________£ in 1992: £ in 1994:_________ £
). What percentage was the share o f car components in terms of sales in 1994?___%
). How many different sites are owned by your company? site(s)
Ï. You supply O  car assemblers direct and/or O  component suppliers that do so.
k Is your company partially or wholly owned by one or more companies?
0  No O  Yes If yes, what is their a) name, b) country of origin, and c) entry year?
1 ) a) name:_____________________________  b) country:  c) year. 1 9 __
2 ) a) name:_____________________________  b) country:_____________  c) year 1 9 __
3 ) a) name:_____________________________  b) country:_____________  c) year 1 9 __
. Since the acquisition, how many o f the m anagem ent/em ployees d) o f  the owners
worked at your company on a long-term basis or for projects and e) o f your 
com pany worked at the owners' company or were trained by the owners?
. 1) d) long-term:__ / _ or projects:___ / __  e) worked:__/ __  or trained:__ / __
.2 )  d) long-term:__ / _ or projects:___ / __  e) worked:__/ __  or trained:_/ _
.3 )  d) long-term:__ / _ or projects:___ / _e) worked:__ / __  or trained:___ / _
(III. Products:
L. Your best selling product in terms o f sales turnover . . .
a) represented what percentage o f  your sales turnover in 1 9 9 4 ?  %.
b) consists o f how many parts? parts. very low medium very high
c) has a complexity you would rank as ®  — d) — d) — @  — (D
2. What percentage o f your products in the market are newer than . . . 
a) one year? %. b) two years?__ %. c) four years? %.
3. At what stage does your com pany introduce new products compared to
direct competitors? a bit same a bit
later later time earlier earlier
®  — (5) — (^  — (^  — (|)
How was your overall product quality in terms o f . . .
(note; - a 'unit’ can be a part, a square metre, etc.; example: _4_ u.p. 1.000 (u.p. = units per)
- if you do not measure your quality, please indicate with 'N/M' (= not measured))
a) first-pass yield (= number o f units (specify:________ ) which did not pass through
the production process without being scrapped or reworked)
in 1990:___ u.p.___  in 1992:________ u.p.  in 1994:__ u.p_________
b) units shipped to customers which were rejected or recalled 
in 1990: u.p. in 1992: u.p. _ in 1994: u.p. __
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. How many units did your company produce?
in 1990; units in 1992: units in 1994:___________units
. Have major machinery investments begun operating since 1990?
O  No O  Yes If yes, how high was the share in terms o f sales turnover?
in 1990:__________ £ in 1992:__________ £ in 1994:_________ £
. How high was your value-added (= sales turnover - cost of goods bought)?
in 1990:__________ £ in 1992:__________ £ in 1994:_________ £
How high was your capacity utilisation (in percentage)?
in 1990:___ % in 1992:___ % in 1994:___ %
How high was your overtime o f the workforce (in percentage)?
in 1990:___ % in 1992:___ % in 1994:___ %
(IV. Custom ers:
. Car assemblers as your customers: What is their a) name, b) country of location, and
c) in which year did the relationship begin?
1 ) a) name:  b) country:___________  c) year: 19__
2 ) a) name:________________________ b) country:___________  c) yean 19__
3 ) a) name:________________________ b) country:___________  c) year. 19__
4 ) a) name:________________________ b) country.___________  c) year 19__
5 ) a) name:________________________ b) country___________  c) year 19__
. Since that year, your company d) had how many visits of their improvement
teams/specialists and how many of their employees worked at your company,
e) had how many of your employees worked at their company and how many of 
your managers/employees were trained by them?
_  and trained:__/ __
and trained:__/ __
_  and trained:__/ __
. 1) d) visits: _ and their empl.: - e) your empl.:
.2 ) d) visits:. _ and their empl.: _ e) your empl.:
.3 ) d) visits: _ and their empl.: - e) your empl.:
.4 ) d) visits:, _ and their empl.: - e) your empl.:
.5 ) d) visits:. _ and their empl.: _ e) your empl.: and trained:__/_
I. Car com ponents and  m aterials suppliers as your customers: W hat is the ir a) nam e,
b) coun try  of location, and  c) in which year d id  the relationship begin?
1 ) a) nam e:_____________________________ b) country:_________ c) yean 1 9 __
2 ) a) nam e:_____________________________ b) c o u n try _________ c) yean 1 9 __
3 ) a) nam e:_____________________________ b) c o u n try _________ c) yean 1 9 __
4 ) a) nam e:_____________________________ b) country._________ c) yean 1 9 __
. Since th a t year, y o u r com pany d) had  how m any visits o f th e ir im provem ent 
team s/sp ec ia lis ts  an d  how m any o f th e ir  em ployees w orked a t yo u r com pany,
e) had  how m any o f your em ployees w orked a t the ir com pany and  how m any of 
y o u r m a n a g e rs /e m p lo y e e s  w ere tra in ed  by them ?
.1 )  d) v isits:__ / __and  their em pl.:______e) your e m p l:___  and tra in ed :__/ __
.2 )  d) v isits:__ / __ and  their em pl.:_____ e) your em pl.:_____  and  tra in ed : _/ __
.3 )  d) v isits:__ / __and their em pl.:____  e) your em pl.:_____  and tra in ed : _/ __
. 4) d )  visits:__ / __and  their em pl.:______e) your em pl.:___ and tra in e d :___ / __
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:v. Other Sources o f  Knowledge:
. Do you co-operate w ith Japanese supplier(s) producing sim ilar products?
0  No O  Yes If yes, w hat is a) the ir nam e, b) the form  o f co-operation, and
c) in which year d id  the  co-operation start?
1 ) a) nam e:_______________________  b) form :__________________ c) year 1 9 __
2 ) a) nam e:_______________________  b) form :__________________ c) year 1 9 __
3 ) a) nam e:_______________________  b) form :__________________ c) year 1 9 __
. Since estab lishm ent how m any o f the  m anagem en t/em ployees d) o f  the  p a rtn e r
w orked at your com pany on a long-term  basis or for projects and  e) o f your 
com pany w orked a t the  p a rtn e r 's  com pany o r were trained by the  partner?
. 1 ) d) long-term :___ / _ o r projects:__ / ___ e) w orked:__/ __ o r tra in ed :_/ ___
. 2 ) d) long-term :___ / _or pro jects:__ / _e) w orked:____ / __ or tra in ed :__/ __
. 3 ) d) long-term :__ / _or pro jects:__ / _e) w orked:____ / __ or tra in ed :__/ __
I. Is yo u r com pany supplied by Japanese suppliers?
O  No O  Yes If yes, a) w hat is th e ir  nam e, b) in w hat year d id  the  relationship  
begin, and  c) is there  intensive personal contact? not at aii partially very much
1) a) nam e:  b) yean 1 9   c) © —@  — @  — @ —(1)
2 ) a) name:      b) yean 1 9 ___ c) ®  —d ) —d)  — (D
3 ) a) nam e:  b) yean 1 9 ___ c) ® —d ) —d ) — (D
k Is y o u r com pany a  m em ber o f  a supplier association/club? (e.g. sm m t , etc.)
0  No O  Yes If yes, w hat is a) th e ir  nam e and  b) which was you r en try  year?
1 ) a) nam e:__________________________________  b) year 1 9 __
2 ) a) nam e:__________________________________  b) year 1 9 __
3 ) a) nam e:__________________________________  b) year 1 9 __
. W hat is the  c) the organiser's nam e an d  d) do you have Japanese members?
.1 )  c) nam e:____________________________ g) O  No O  Yes If yes, how m an y ?_
.2 )  d) nam e:___________________________  g) O  No O  Yes If yes, how m an y ?_
.3 )  d) nam e:___________________________  g) O  No O  Yes If yes, how m an y ?_
. Does your com pany have its own supplier association? O  No O  Yes
. Does you r com pany have its own supplier im provem ent employees? O  No O  Yes
. Does your com pany em ploy consultants for training and education?
not at all partially very much
O  No O  Yes If yes, is it on a  regular basis? ® “ d ) ~ d ) ~ @ “ ®
?. W hat o th er m eans of education and  training does your com pany use?
(e.g.: seminars, conferences, literature, videos, interactive laser discs, etc.)
'hank you very much for your time spent. You will receive your customised analysis in due course.
-  9  -
EXPLORATORY INTERVIEW GUIDELINE (GENERAL EXAMPLE) 
[Name of company] ([telephone number])
T reated  confidentially! - Tape record? - How m uch time?
Short introduction!
• Could you tell m e som ething abou t your daiiy work?
• W hen was you r com pany founded?
• W hat is the  s tru c tu re  of y o u r com pany? And w hat abou t the ow nership?
• W hat is you r task in this com pany?
• Did m ajor changes happen  since 1980? W hat where the  initiating factors?
• W hat and  how d id  your com pany learn f ro m . . .
a) custom ers/suppliers in G reat Britain (nationality)?
b) custom ers/supp iiers in America (nationality)?
c) custom ers/suppiiers in Japan  (nationaiity)?
• Which custom er played an  im portan t roie in your com pany's ieam ing?
• W hat o th e r sources w here there  for your com pany to learn  from  Japan?
• Awards? How?
• Is you r com pany in a supplier association? Have you you r own one?
• W hat kind of train ing does you r com pany provide for
a) own m anagem ent (form al/inform ai learning)?
b) own shopfloor w orkers (form al/inform al learning)?
c) suppliers (form al/inform al learning)?
d) whom  eise?
• Have you got a  com pany suggestion scheme? Suggestions p e r employee?
• Does you r com pany rew ard learning of employees?
• Do you use team /groups as a  w ork structure? W hat is a  team  for you?
• W hat roie does standard ization  play in your company?
• Does yo u r com pany experim ent a lot?
• W hat role does com m unication play in your company?
• Com pany new spaper o r letter? Copy?
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDELINE (GENERAL EXAMPLE)
[Name of company] ([telephone number])
[information about Continuous Team Improvement System and/or Employee 
Suggestion System, the score of the Learning Organization's Characteristics]
Interview will be treated confidentially! - Tape record? - Short introduction.
Could you tell me something about your daily work?
# You have (have not) in troduced an  a) Continuous Team Im provem ent System 
a n d /o r  b) Employee Suggestion System in 19XX. Why?
- If yes for a), why do  you have a fu ll-tim e/part tim e co-ordinator 
for the  Continuous Team Im provem ent System?
- If yes for b), w hy only X% of the suggestions im plem ented in 
Employee Suggestion System in 19XX?
• W hat is y o u r experiences w ith the
a) Employee Suggestion System?
b) Continuous Team Im provem ent System?
• W hat is your opinion about
a) Employee Suggestion Systems?
b) Continuous Team Im provem ent Systems?
• How do you spread newly gained knowledge and  insights through
a) the departm ents?
b) units o f your company?
c) affiliated com panies?
• W hat is you r experiences w ith and  your opinion about
- m ixed project teams? Since when? Why?
- inform ation and  com m unication? Way versus content?
- corporate  culture?
• Do you know w hy you won a  [name of car com pany]'s supplier award?
• W hat w ere the activities o f you r custom er's im provem ent people?
- Any training?
- Any system s installed?
• Reasons for change in 19XX were indicated with
- W hat kind o f change was it?
• Do you have Japanese affiliated com panies in your group?
- Do you benchm ark  your com pany with them?
- Do you have regular contact w ith them?
• If tim e available: questions abou t m arked characteristics in questionnaire.
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